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Abstract
In 1953 Aarne Koskinen’s book, The Missionary Influence as a Political Factor in
the Pacific Islands, appeared on the shelves of the academic world, adding further fuel to
the longstanding debate in anthropological and historical studies regarding the role and
effects of missionary activity in colonial settings. Koskinen’s finding supported the
general view amongst anthropologists and historians that missionary activity had a
negative impact on non-Western populations, wiping away their cultural templates and
disrupting their socio-economic and political systems. This attitude towards mission
activity assumes that the contemporary non-Western world is the product of the ‘West’,
and that what the ‘Rest’ believes and how it lives, its social, economic and political
systems, as well as its values and beliefs, have derived from or have been implanted by
the ‘West’. This postulate has led to the denial of the agency of non-Western or colonial
people, deeming them as ‘history-less’ and ‘nation-less’: as an entity devoid of identity.
But is this postulate true? Have the non-Western populations really been passive
recipients of Western commodities, ideas and values?
This dissertation examines the role that Christianity, the ideology of the West, the
religion whose values underlies the semantics and structures of modernisation, has played
in the genesis and rise of West Papuan nationalism.
The modernist and primordialist approaches to the study of the relation between
nationalism and religion assume either structural-functionalist or intellectualist
definitions of religion. This thesis rejects that view in postulating that religion plays a
foundational role in the rise of both historical consciousness and nationalism.

Positioning itself in antithesis to traditional primitivist approaches to the study of
West Papua, which have tended to study the Papuan people as a set of distinct tribes, each
endowed with particular identity dynamics, this thesis attempts to provide a
comprehensive study of West Papuan nationalism as a single ethnic and geographical
entity. Breaking away from modular forms of nationalism, which consider such a
phenomenon as a res ‘capable of being transplanted’, it attempts to recover the ‘eventful
reconfigurations’ which have allowed for the rise of West Papuan national consciousness
and identity. Sahlins’ structure of the conjuncture will be used as the basis for the
articulation of a methodology to enable the recovery of the lost history of pre-literate
peoples and the discarding of the interrelated myths of ‘history-less-ness’ and ‘nationless-ness’.
This thesis argues that West Papua was a distinct ethnic identity long before the
Europeans entered the region. This identity was shaped and defined by processes of
adaptation to a particular ecosystem and by the longstanding relations that the Papuans
had engaged in with the neighbouring Malay populations in, what can be regarded as, the
‘Maluku-Papuan-Ceramese’ zone. Consequently Papuan pre-colonial ethnic identity,
authenticated by a series of myths and stories, acted as the prime mover in determining
the relational dynamics and dialectics with the Europeans and Christianity.
It will be shown that Christianity did not create the Papuan nation and West Papuan
nationalism, although, once Christianity was ‘inculturated’ into the Papuan culturalreligious template, Christian institutions acted as the structure and semantics by which the
Papuans were able to communicate and articulate communal sentiments of belonging,
coalescing into a unified entity. Papuan hermeneutics, known as cargoism, played an

important role in mediating and systemising Christian beliefs and values into Papuan
cultural-religious templates, so that the locus of Papuan national identity came to reside
in the intersection of Papuan stories and myths with Christian narratives.
In the aftermath of World War II, the Dutch nation-building program inculcated
into the emerging Papuan intelligentsia an idea of nation and nationalism, which could
serve their neo-colonial interests and resist Indonesian incorporation of the territory. This
program came to clash with the autochthonous Papuan nationalism, which had
manifested itself in the great Koreri movement of 1938-1942.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………p. v
Introduction………………………………………………………………………...p.1

Chapter I – Nationalism: Exploring the Enigma of the Amoebic……………...p. 12
Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Overview………………………....p. 15
Idealist-Historical and Ethno-National Theories……………………….p. 18
Modernisation Theories…………………………………………………p. 24
Religion, Nationalism and Historical Consciousness……………………p. 37
The Dialectics Between the ‘National’ and the ‘International’………….p. 47
Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics………………………………...p. 52
Conclusions………………………………………………………………p. 65

Chapter II – The Architecture and Archaeology of Memory and Oblivion
Or the Conundrums of Methodology and Hermeneutics…………..p. 67
The Western Archives of West Papua…………………………………p. 74
The Vexata Quaestio of Hermeneutics…………………………………p. 81
Papuan Time- Reckoning Systems……………………………………..p. 95
Identifying an Indigenous Apocalyptic Eschatology…………………...p.108

i

Chapter III –Parsing the Papuan in Southeast Asia Before Dutch
Colonisation…………………………………………………………..p.114
The Papuans in South-East Asia……………………………………… p. 121
The Arrival of the Europeans…………………………………………..p. 138
Regional Perceptions of Papuan Identity………………………………p.152
Christianity and Colonialism: Exporting the West,
Importing the Rest……………………………………………………..p.161
The Maluku Mission and the Papuans………………………………...p.171
Promoting Christianity in the Maluku-Papuan Region………………...p.182
Conclusions…………………………………………………………….p.192

Chapter IV – In Search of the Papuan Clio……………………………………….p.195
Trekking the Papuan Archives…………………………………………..p.196
Gurabesi and Nuku: Prolegomena to a Papuan History…………………p.204
The Story of Gurabesi…………………………………………………...p.206
Nuku and the Maluku- Papuan Connection……………………………..p.215
Conclusions……………………………………………………………...p.229

Chapter V – Colonisation, Conversion and the Construction of Ethnic
Identity………………………………………………………………...p.231
The World System and the Dutch Discovery of West Papua………….p.234
The Dilemma of Colonising West Papua……………………………...p.240

ii

Mission and State: The Dialectics of a Connubium in Colonial
Settings…………………………………………………………………p.242
Christianity and Missiological Heterogeneity in the Papuan Mission
Field……………………………………………………………………p.249
From Merkus-Oord to Mansinam: Christianity lands in Papua………..p.256
Conversion, Convergence, Sub-Mission……………………………….p.262
The Politics of Space……………………………………………………p.270
Cargoism: The Political Space of the Papuans………………………….p.273
Cargoes and Missionaries……………………………………………….p.277
Conclusions……………………………………………………………...p.287
Chapter VI – The Tension between the Ethnic and the National in West Papuan
Nation-Building……………………………………………………….p.288
From Koreri to Second Coming……………………………………….p.292
Winds of Change………………………………………………………p.295
The Politicisation of Koreri and the Birth of Papuan Nationalist
Ideology………………………………………………………………..p.301
Dazzling Images of Freedom and Equality…………………………….p.309
The Return of the Missionaries………………………………………...p.314
Maju against Reconstructie: Conflicting Goals in Post-Colonial West
Papua…………………………………………………………………..p.322
Papuan Response to Dutch Neo-Colonialism………………………….p.333
Persisting Trends and the Eternal Return………………………………p.343

Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………..p.352
iii

Appendix……………………………………………………………………………..p.357
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………....p.363
Maps…………………………………………………………………………………p.403

iv

Acknowledgements
Writing a PhD thesis may seem a lonely task but at the end, when you turn back to
look at the years spent reading, researching and discussing, you realise that many people
were present and contributed, either directly or indirectly, to its accomplishment.
In these four years, among the many people whose names because of space limits I
cannot list but with whom I will always have an enormous debt of gratitude, there are a
few whose help and support have played an outstanding role in the realisation of this
work. Words are insufficient to express the magnitude of my everlasting gratitude.
I thank my supervisors. Firstly, Associate Professor Adrian Vickers whose
extensive and deep knowledge of South-east Asian history, culture and society has
provided me with that guidance and support necessary and whose interest, enthusiasm,
constant presence and moral support have represented a spur to overcome the obstacles
and moments of impasse which inevitably accompany PhD research. Secondly, but not
for importance, Professor Peter King of the University of Sydney who first talked me into
undertaking PhD studies and whose confidence of my ability and support have constantly
encouraged me to continue. The constant and continuous dialogue with both my
supervisors has played a key role in channelling and structuring my research.
I would like to thank some of my informants, Dr. Evelien van den Broek of the
Foundation Study & Information Papua Peoples in Utrecht, Fr. Theo van den Broek of
the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura, Mr. Rudy de Iongh and the friends of the West Papuan
Association in Sydney for sharing with me their experiences and knowledge of Papuan
affairs. For their technical support I would also like to thank Dr. Chris de Jong of the
Church Archives in Utrecht, the Franciscan order in Napoli (Italy) whose members, for
v

their vow of humility, do not want to be individually singled out, and my friend and
colleague Jasmin Sydee for the long hours spent proof-reading the final draft of this
dissertation.
I thank the University of Wollongong for granting me an Australian Postgraduate
Award (APA) in March 2000 which has allowed me to undertake PhD studies on a full
time basis as well as the following research institutes of the University of Wollongong for
providing me with the financial support for my archival research in Europe: the Centre
for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies (CAPSTRANS) and the Institute of Social
Change and Critical Inquiry (ISCCI). I thank also the academics of the School of History
& Politics of the University of Wollongong, Associate Professor Gregory Melleuish and
Dr. Stephen Brown for the interest shown in my research and for providing me, along
with my supervisor Adrian Vickers, with some teaching and research assistance during
these years.
Special thanks to Dr. Benny Giay whose enthusiasm for my research and findings
has provided meaning and scope to the time and effort of the last four years, and to
Professor Marcello Del Verme of the University of Napoli (Italy) for what he taught me
during my studies at the University of Napoli, and for his ongoing interest and moral
support.
For their constant support many thanks to my family, particularly my parents,
Ettore and Norma Rizzo, and to my sister, Antonietta, who has contributed in the retrieval
of sources in Europe for my research.

vi

Finally I thank all those scholars, past and present, whose work and studies have
represented an important foundation and benchmark for this thesis and without whom this
task would have proven impossible. To all of them my deepest and sincere gratitude.

vii

Introduction
Hai Tanahku Papua

This dissertation examines the extent to which Christianity has contributed to the
emergence and development of West Papuan national consciousness and identity. I will
undertake a long-term inquiry into the pre-colonial history of the Papuan people in order
to identify the roots of their ethnic identity, which was defined and shaped by their
interactions with the neighbouring Malay populations and which acted both as a filter and
catalyst of their colonial experience and as the foundation of their ‘modern’ national
consciousness.
The idea for this thesis was born out of the consideration that nationalism has been,
and still is, envisaged in modern and post-modern literature as an ‘ideology’ of the
Christian West exported to the ‘Rest’ or the ‘Other’ during the colonial era. This ‘vision’
or ‘belief’, based on the implicit negation of both the historicity and identity of colonial
and non-Western peoples, continued to foster both the (indirect) subjection of colonial
peoples, and a World System in which the right of self-determination and independence
is constantly held hostage or hijacked by the interests of a capitalist and Christian West. It
also follows that the recognition of nationhood, which is the condicio sine qua non for
self-rule, is determined more on the basis of political convenience or opportunism than on
historical truth and ‘factuality’.
While Chinese and Indian civilisations partially escaped the obliterating and
nullifying force embedded in such act of negation,1 people lacking historical records or
‘archives’, that is ‘documents’ or the ‘fetishes of the written word’, became the victims of
1

In this regard see: Adas M., Machines as the Measure of Men. Science, Technology and Ideologies of
Western Dominance, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989, pp. 69-127.
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the ineluctable colonial nihilism of the West. The myth of the ‘people without history’ or
‘history-less people’, underlying the policies of dominance and acculturation of postEnlightenment and Positivist XIX century colonialism, stood as the political and cultural
paradigm of modernity. The omnipotence and superiority of the ‘West’ over the ‘Rest’
represented the undertow of social and cultural relations in colonial settings. If literate
societies, such as the Indian and Chinese, came to be clustered into the ‘sensuous’
discourses and representations of Orientalism, pre-literate societies were hemmed in or
harnessed by the ‘fossilising’ concept of Primitivism. The colonial enterprise thus found
its ‘justification’ in its ‘just action’ against wretched barbarity and blasphemous
heathenism.
Post-modern or post-colonial stances have done little to change such an approach.
Heralding the deconstructionist manifesto, they stress the importance of the archive and
the document or text in historical research. Deconstructionism and discourse formation
and practices are the Trojan Horses post-modernists use to penetrate the stronghold or
powerhouse of the archive. The prominence attributed to the written text tends inevitably
to foster a latent regime of tautological dependencies by which colonial structures,
discourses and representations are perpetuated since the colonised, lacking archival
ownership, has to ‘necessarily’ rely on the ‘fetishes’ and ‘hermeneutics’ of the coloniser
to reconstruct and structure its own history.
The recent trend in the field of humanities and social sciences of attempting to
recover the ‘epistemologies of the other’, or to ‘decolonise methodologies and history’,2
continues to return, unabatedly and tautologically, to their ‘colonial premises’ because of
2

Young R., White Mythologies. Writing History and the West, Routledge, London, 1990. Cfr. Tuhiwai
Smith L., Decolonising Methodologies. Research and Indigenous People, University of Otago Press,
Dunedin, 2002.
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their tendency to identify epistemology with hermeneutics. This confusion consequently
results in the articulation of non-Western epistemologies and narratives according to
Western categories.
The literature on West Papua has not escaped the post-colonial approach that has
interpreted the reactions of the Papuans to Dutch and Indonesian development policies
and rules and to missionary activity, as the product of primitivism and backwardness.
Ethnographers and anthropologists, who have turned to the study of West Papuan culture
and society, have contributed to prompting and perpetuating the primitivist approach and
the ‘tribalisation’ of the West Papuans, fragmenting their identity and reality in a myriad
of clan or tribal entities and identities, considered as ‘bounded realities’. It follows that
the ‘study of the tribes’ perpetuates the notion of primitivism associated with the image
and representation of the ‘Papuan’. Titles as An Hour to Stone Age,3 Cannibal Valley,4 or
Gardens of War: Life and Death in the New Guinea Stone Age,5 which appeared on the
bookshelves in the 1960s and 1970s, or documentaries such as Dead Birds about the Dani
of the highlands,6 presenting (and representing) the Papuans as primitive cannibals and
head-hunters living still at the dawn of civilisation, are evidence of the Primitivist
approach and perception of the Papuan. This tendency still echoes in the titles and
language of more recent writings such as Modern Risks to Ancient Shangri-La,7 Playing

3

Horne S., An Hour to Stone Age, Moody Press, Chicago, 1973.
Hitt R., Cannibal Valley, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1962.
5
Gardner R. & Heider K.G., Gardens of War: Life and Death in the New Guinea Stone Age, Deutsch,
London, 1969.
6
The documentary Dead Birds was filmed by Robert Gardner and released by Contemporary Films and
Mutual Distributors in 1963.
7
Thoenes S., ‘Modern Risks to Ancient Shangri-La: It’s still there but it’s getting smaller all time’,
Financial Times (London), May 22, 1999.
4
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up the Primitive8 or Lost Mountain: Plunged into the 20th century, Tribes struggle to
cope.9 Furthermore post-war literature on the nationalist movement of West Papua has
spread the idea that Papuan history is of recent vintage and began only in 1945, 1962 or
1969.10 It ignores or denies the existence of a previous pre-colonial and post-colonial
‘ethno-national’ history and presents Papuan nationalism as a product of the Dutch
nation-building program enacted between 1945 and 1962. The process of ‘rectification of
Papuan history’, currently in progress, is paradigmatic in this regard and well illustrates
the persistence of latent primitivist approaches.
This thesis is an attempt to break away from both colonial and post-colonial
historiographical traditions, which have served and still serve colonial and neo-colonial
ambitions, to unveil the parallel and neglected historiography and history of the colonised
Papuans, that history and historiography which shaped the trajectory and configuration of
Papuan ethnic and national identity. This perspective will lead to an exploration of how
alien ideas and ideologies, such as nation and Christianity, were interpreted and
systemised in the Papuan worldview. I attempt to examine the outcomes of such an
hermeneutical-structuring process and systemisation. I will argue that Christianity did
not ‘create’ West Papuan nationalism, although it contributed to institutionalise latent
feelings of ‘nation-ness’ and nationhood, thus informing the quest for statehood with a
clear purpose in a World System ‘regulated’ by the interests of the Christian West.

8

Kirksey E., ‘Playing up the Primitive, New Internationalist, April 2002.
McBeth J., ‘Lost Mountain: Plunged into the 20th Century, Tribes Struggle to Cope’, Far Eastern
Economic Review, 157, 1994, pp. 31.
10
See for instance Bonay E. J., Sejarah Kebangkitan Nationalisme Papua, PhD Thesis, University of
Leiden, 1984. Cfr. Webster D., ‘ “Already Sovereign as a People”: A Foundational Moment in West
Papuan Nationalism’, Pacific Affairs, 74, 2002, pp. 507-528.
9
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This dissertation consequently comes to challenge previous theories, approaches
and myths, which have characterised the study of pre-literate societies, and of West
Papua in particular. First it refuses the ‘tribalisation’ of the Papuan socio-cultural world
and, more recently, of Papuan nationalism, produced by anthropological studies, to adopt
a comprehensive approach to the study of West Papuan nationalism in which ‘West
Papua’ is assumed or postulated as an entity in and for itself in the geographical area of
what is today Eastern Indonesia. Secondly it confutes and rejects the myth of ‘historyless-ness’ associated with pre-literate peoples arguing that the West Papuans had an
historical consciousness, visible in the religious domain, already evident in pre-colonial
times, onto which Christianity came to be grafted. It is for this reason that this thesis will
undertake a long-term historical inquiry into the pre-colonial history of West Papua and
will not be a political analysis of West Papuan nationalism, which was structured and
defined by colonial policies only in the aftermath of World War II. I believe, in fact, that
the latter cannot be analysed and understood without a full understanding of West Papuan
pre-colonial and colonial history and the modes by which the Papuans articulated their
historical experience.

Only the final section of the thesis will briefly integrate the

historical analysis with contemporary events and processes of West Papuan nationalism.
Studies of nationalism unanimously appear to agree that historical consciousness
and/or history (it would be more appropriate to say historiography) are related either
‘functionally’ or ‘structurally’ to the formation of nationalism and ethnic or national
identity. Instead, I postulate that historical and religious consciousness plays a
‘foundational’ role in the rise of ethnic and national consciousness and identity. I argue
that it is because of the existence of an historical-religious consciousness, expressed in an

5

autochthonous protology, that in pre-colonial times the Papuans had already developed a
clear perception of their identity, defined in ethnic terms. This identity derived from their
longstanding relations with and within the neighbouring Malay world of Maluku and
Ceram. The Papuans of the coast spread this self-identity to the Papuans of the interior
with whom they had particular ceremonial or commercial relations.
Existing Papuan narratives testify to the existence of some sort of autochthonous
pre-colonial history. The stories reveal the existence of a particular narrative mode and of
a hermeneutics, commonly referred to as cargoism or cargo cultism. This term was
coined by the Europeans to designate or indicate a phenomenon they observed in
Melanesian settings. Missionary accounts often report episodes of cargo cultism they
witnessed, but considered them only as the mere product of an ‘erring acculturation’, a
misunderstanding by the ‘natives’ of Western values, customs and beliefs.
Dutch Christian missionaries were the first Europeans to establish permanent posts
in West Papua where they landed in 1854. The Christian mission became, since its first
appearance, the symbol and embodiment of the West for the Papuans and the Christian
and ‘white’ amberi or Pandita (foreigners or missionaries) came to be envisaged as the
agents of Western civilisation. The terms of the relationship between the mission and the
Papuans will be explored to determine how and to what extent Christian beliefs and
values became part of Papuan identity. The ‘discovery’ of Papuan hermeneutics will
show that more than being ‘acculturated’ by the Christian missionaries, the Papuans
‘inculturated’ Christian beliefs and values, that is re-interpreted and systemised the
contents of Christianity into their historical-religious worldview and ethnic identity. This
stance tends to present the Papuans as dynamic, active masters of their destiny, breaking
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away from the colonial approach of the ‘lazy’ or ‘passive’ native. The cargo movements,
recorded and narrated by European missionaries and administrators over more than a
century, provide chronicles, ‘episodes’, devoid of the spatio-temporal ‘coordination’ and
semantics typical of narratives. In my view, however, a Papuan history as well as
historiography is possible. Consequently I believe that cargo hermeneutics, underlying
Papuan epistemology, contains the traces of Papuan historicism.
On the basis of these premises this dissertation argues that Papuan national
consciousness can be located in the intersection of pre-colonial Papuan narratives (myths)
with colonial and Christian institutions. The mission, consequently, comes to play an
important role in the ‘politics of space’, first with the Papuans and then between the
Papuans and the Dutch government, which characterised colonial settings and became a
common feature of the landscape.
In the six chapters of this thesis I will trace the itinerary of the idea and perception
of Papuan ethnic identity from the protological myth of the Paradise Lost of Koreri to the
eschatological narrative of the Promised Land of Merdeka.
In the first chapter I will discuss the theories of nationalism and their relevance to
the study of West Papuan nationalism. It will be argued that since there is no universally
accepted definition of nationalism, each study needs to be approached in a particularist
perspective and must be examined in the wider context or configuration of the
international system of the time. I will show how existing theories of nationalism have
neglected the foundational role of religion in prompting perceptions of identity as well as
processes of identification, because of their ‘compartmentalized’ approach to the study of
religion, culture and society. A perusal of nationalist movements and ideologies reveals

7

that religious beliefs, values and norms, ‘ritualised’ in narratives, symbols and
ceremonies, represent the semantic and structural basis for the feelings of ethnic and
national identity.
In the second chapter I will set out the methodological approach with which I will
study the development of West Papuan nationalism. Since methodology is intrinsically
determined by the nature of the sources used and evidences available, I will briefly
present the material examined. Furthermore, since anthropological studies on West
Papua, as previously argued, have focused on the examination of single tribes in the
synchronic perspective typical of the social sciences, I will attempt to overcome the
notions of primitivism and evolutionism embedded in this type of approach – which
generates the notion of ‘history-less-ness’ – as well as the post-colonial interpretations
and epistemologies that inherently contribute to perpetuate the colonial. The logic and
ontology of tenses, the crux and obsession of historians of all times, will be briefly
addressed in order to identify a perspective or approach able to overcome the existing
hermeneutical dire straits. Sahlins’ structure of the conjuncture, coupled with Anthony
Smith’s perspective of ethno-nationalism, will be used to identify and interpret the
developments of West Papuan history showing how a particular ethnic identity came to
be both connected to particular spatio-temporal experiences and to inform the structuring
of particular relations.
Since history can be regarded as the ‘narrative of time’, special attention will be
devoted to the analysis of the concept of time among pre-literate populations. I do this in
order to clear the ground of inveterate prejudices, which assume that pre-literate societies
have a cyclical concept of time and that forms of linear time reckoning are alien to their
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worldview. It will be shown that the apocalyptic-eschatological-messianic dimension
informing Papuan cargo cults stems from Papuan autochthonous cultural processes and
their patterning of ecological adaptation and societal integration. This has produced a
linear dynamics in which the Eschaton coincided with an apocalyptic palingenesis.
Therefore it can be argued that cyclical time does not exclude or preclude the existence of
linear time.
In the third chapter I will challenge the view of Papuan ‘history-less-ness’
demonstrating the colonial fallaciousness of such an assumption. A perusal of published
and archival documents will reveal how the West Papuans were an integral part of Southeast Asia and were endowed with a particular ethnic and geographic identity. The arrival,
first of Islam, and then of Christianity in the Papuan neighbourhood during the XV
century finds the Papuans as active participants in the existing inter-island trade network,
the epicentre of which was represented by the mythical four quarters of Giailolo
(Halmahera), Bacan, Tidore and Ternate. The connection with Maluku, as will emerge
from this thesis, will represent a recurring feature of Papuan history. In the course of this
chapter it will also be shown, by referring to documentary evidence and the presence of
common myths and ideas, that the Papuans inhabiting the interior were an integral part of
this world of relations long before Archbold’s Catalina landed in the Baliem Valley in
1936.
In chapter IV I will examine the narratives by which the Papuans accounted for
their role and function in the inter-island system of relations of the Maluku-CeramPapuan region. These narratives, coalescing around the XV century figure of the Papuan
hero Gurabesi, reveal their Papuan origin because of the peculiar hermeneutics and
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structural patterning also found in other previous myths onto which they came to be
grafted. The same hermeneutics informed the dynamics and dialectics of a later episode,
that of the revolt led by the Maluku prince Nuku, in the XVIII century, which saw the
participation of the Papuans inhabiting littoral and insular areas of West Papua.
Following the end of the XVIII century revolts led by Nuku, the archives become
silent regarding the Papuans. The reason for the sudden eclipse is difficult to explore
because of the lack of Papuan evidences. West Papua appears again in the records in the
1820s in conjunction with the colonial enterprises of the time. In 1854 Christianity finally
lands on West Papuan shores. In chapter V I will present the phases of the penetration of
Christianity in the territory between 1854 and 1938. It will be shown that during this time
Christianity, following its inculturation through the native cargo hermeneutics, became an
important feature of an emerging ‘collective’ ethnic identity of the Papuans, the
formation of which was fostered by the mission network.
The effects of the mission network appeared in the great cargo movement of
Angganita in which Christianity enriched Papuan modes of representation sanctioning the
transition from an exclusive tribal to an inclusive collective and ethno-national mode of
identification. It will be shown that during World War II the christianisation of Papuan
identity and the policies of Islamisation implemented by the Japanese during their
occupation acted as the critical locus or structure of the conjuncture that brought about
the politicisation of feelings of national identity and unity among the West Papuans.
The natural development of West Papuan nationalism, which gained momentum
during the war period, was forestalled and went underground once the program of nation
building implemented by the Dutch between 1945 and 1962 intensified. In chapter VI the
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tension between Papuan nationalitarianism,11 rooted in the pre-war Koreri experience,
and the Dutch program of nation-building, between an autochthonous form of nationalist
sentiment and an intrusive nationalism, will be presented as the constant Leitmotiv of
those years. The Dutch inculcated an idea of nation that suited their own neo-colonial
interests, at the time, by presenting them as Papuan ideals, and unintentionally
contributed to facilitate the Indonesian Anschluss.

11

The term has been coined by Fanon F. The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968, p.
176. Anouar Abdel-Malek provides the following definition of nationalitarianism: “[The] nationalitarian
phenomenon…has its object, beyond the clearing of the national territory, the independence and
sovereignty of the national state, uprooting in depth the positions of the ex-colonial power – the reconquest
of the power of decision in all domains of national life…Historically, fundamentally, the struggle is for
national liberation, the instrument of that reconquest of identity which…lies at the centre of everything”.
Abdel Malek A., Nation and Revolution, McMillan, London, 1981, p. 13. Cfr. Snyder L.L., Global MiniNationalisms: Autonomy or Independence, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1982, p. 1.
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Chapter I
Nationalism: Exploring the Enigma of the Amoebic.
Dulce et decus est pro patria mori
Horace, Odes, III, 2:13

Qu’est ce-qu’une nation? Renan’s question still echoes after more than a
century. It is significant that the question began to be posed as an historical and social
problem in the year 1882, at the height of capitalist colonial expansion, a phenomenon
that found its ideological justification in the doctrines of positivist intellectuals. One
would have expected such a question to rise at the beginning of the XX century when
nationalism played an important role in shaping power relations.1 The chronology of
the study of nationalism suggests that the problematic character of the concept of
‘nation’ and its derivative ‘nationalism’ was identified only at the height of colonial
expansionism when the increasing and systematic dilation of colonial boundaries to
encompass alien peripheries, endowed with peculiar cultural traits, served to
strengthen the boundaries of a core-identity, which felt itself threatened by the
subjected colonial entity. It follows that the forging of the coloniser’s identity entailed
the weakening of that of the colonised. Both colonisers and colonised engaged in
preserving and protecting their identities, which paradoxically were both threatened
and shaped by a persistent ‘alter-ity’ in colonial contexts. The French scholar Renan,
whose enigmatic question still resonates in the current era of what could be defined as
continuous neo-colonial de-colonisation in which boundaries are still being re-shaped
and re-drawn, argued that
a nation is a great solidarity, created by the sentiment of the sacrifices which
have been made and of those which one is disposed to make in the future. It
supposes a past, it renews itself in the present by a tangible deed: the approval,
the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life. The existence of a
1

Chabod F., L’Idea di Nazione, Laterza, Roma, 1979, pp. 17-19.
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nation (pardon this metaphor!) is an everyday plebiscite; it is, like the very
existence of the individual, a perpetual affirmation of life.2
Renan clearly indicates that a nation is a community that shares the consciousness of a
common past, a past that comes to be articulated and transmitted in a set of myths and
narratives which a people believe and partake in and with which they tend to
individually and collectively identify. The constant and continuous reiteration of these
myths and narratives tend both to generate and to perpetuate the nation. Consequently
it appears that the rise of national identity and nationalist claims is intrinsically tied to
the emergence, constitution and solidifying of historical consciousness.
Every community appears to be endowed with a memory of past vicissitudes
and experiences, but before these can coalesce into a selectively meaningful narrative
underlying sentiments of and claims to nationhood, the intervention of a particular
factor capable of prompting the rationalisation and conventionalisation of perceived
common traits and experiences is necessary. States of oppression and cultural
alienation, where the free expression of deeply rooted values and beliefs is
suppressed, commonly represent the ideal milieu in which nationalist ideas and
processes emerge and come to be articulated into movements and ideologies.
In recent decades, in the historical milieu referred to as the post-colonial era, a
conspicuous amount of interest and attention has been devoted to the study of
nationalism. Scholars of various disciplines have attempted to provide an explanation
for its rise, meaning and development in human history and societies. The
phenomenon of the constitution of nations and national identities, the emergence of
national sentiments, the construction of nationhood and nationalist ideologies appear
to be all interrelated constituents of a single phenomenon. While scholars of the time
2
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in which Renan was writing were articulating the question of nationalism to support
colonial expansion, the interest of current scholarship derives from the attempt to
explain either the failure of many de-colonised nation states and their political
instability or the post-war nationalist breakthrough in the Third World and the
subsequent one in the post-Soviet world. The weakness of some decolonised states
induces us to question the universality of the concept of nation and speculate whether
the concept is, as it has often been argued, a western res translated to and into colonial
settings. Is the cause of the current post-colonial instability to be traced in the
programs of nation-building and state-crafting enacted by the colonial powers during
the phase of decolonisation? Being Western, such programs tended to foster the
formation of dependent peripheries merely serving the neo-colonial interests of their
former masters. These questions will constantly appear in the course of this thesis
which explores the genesis of the West Papuan nation and how and to what extent the
colonial experience has influenced such a genesis. It will also examine whether there
was a pre-colonial historical-consciousness and identity born out of the longstanding
relations the Papuan peoples had with the neighbouring Malay populations.
This chapter examines the theoretical bases necessary for a consideration of
West Papuan nationalism. By reviewing critically the existing theories of nationalism
I will demonstrate that current debates neglect pre-colonial experiences especially
those of pre-literate and tribal populations. These theories have also failed to consider,
the role of religion in the phenomenon of nationalism and how religion is intrinsically
tied to the existence of historical consciousness embedded in origin myths, in stories
and in ritual performances. They do so because they are entrenched in a functionalist
treatment of cultural variables.

University Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 17.
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Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Overview
The difficulty of examining the complex and peculiar reality of nationalism is
determined by the fragmentation of knowledge into a plethora of independent and
often antithetical disciplines. Different approaches, departing from different
theoretical assumptions, have failed to attain an acceptable and compendious
explanation. This failure is mainly ascribable to the anisotropic and amoebic nature of
nationalism, which eludes any mono-systemic analysis. By privileging one factor or
dimension over others, mono-systemic analyses tend to yield a theory that is
inherently a mere synecdoche of the ultimate solution. An eclectic approach should
prove to be more effective since nationalism is a multifarious, heterogeneous, mutant
reality, a continuous “moving target”3 that cannot be understood from a single point
of observation.
In the light of these considerations the controversy between the schools which have
been labelled modernists, who maintain that nationalism is tied to the development
and spread of capitalism, and primordialists-perennialists, who argue that nationalism
is the product of a natural human propensity to gregariousness, appears to be
inconclusive and academically dysfunctional resting on partial and contradictory
assumptions as I will show in this chapter.
Modernists, such as Gellner4, Anderson5, Nairn6 and Hobsbawm7, assume that
the origin of nations and nationalism lies in the structural changes that affected
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economic and social systems during the industrial revolution at the end of the XVIII
century, implicitly denying the importance of cultural factors.
In the opinion of the modernists, the introduction of new means of production
and the division of labour caused a restructuring of social relations and the
polarisation of class interests. Nationalism emerged as a means to promote and direct
change through the creation of an organic solidarity as well as a means to protect and
promote class interests. The prevalence of one intention or aim over another brings
about the constitution of different political organisations depending on the nature of
the political system ranging from totalitarianism to socialism and democracy. Thus
nationalism is identified by the modernists with the process of nation-building, a
nation being a mere artificial construction fuelled by particularist class interests.
This notion of nationalism contrasts with that proposed by the primordialists.
Scholars such as Smith8, Reynolds9 and Hastings10 believe that nations are “natural”
givens. Consequently it is possible to find traces of nationalism and nationhood in
ancient times. The feeling of belonging, the acknowledgment among a group of
people of sharing common cultural, racial, linguistic traits, a common ancestry,
history or religion is a documented fact in history. Groups did coalesce around or
were bound together by these focal points or ties. This tendency or proclivity brought
about the rise of politically and socially organised nations claiming sovereignty over a
territory.
The epistemological cleavage in the study of nationalism represented by the
primordialists and modernists arises because of diverging foundational assumptions
8
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regarding the original spatial and temporal collocation of the rise of nationalism and
the selection of constants and variables that have contributed to the emergence and
development of the phenomenon. Furthermore both theoretical approaches seem to
implicitly agree that nationalism is a product of western civilisation and that the
emergence of nationalism in colonial settings was fuelled by the introduction of either
western gnoseology or western socio-economic and political systems.
Because of the large number of theories included in the two mainstream
epistemological approaches, it is convenient to divide the existing analyses into six
epistemic approaches defined by a particular set of assumptions regarding the forces
that shape social, economic and political relations as follows: idealist-historical
theories, ethno-national theories, modernisation theories, class-centred theories, statist
theories and uneven development theories of Marxist derivation.11
The modernisation, class-centred, statist and unequal development theories
clearly belong to those theories of the Marxist matrix that privilege economic and
social factors and processes to explain the emergence of nationalism. Ethno-national
and idealist-historical theories, by contrast, stem from the primordialist approach,
stressing the importance of cultural factors in the rise and development of nationalism.
Beside the two existing mainstreams it is necessary to consider a third one, that
of the postmodernists. Scholars such as Bhabha12, Chatterjee13, Yuval-Davis,14
Enloe15 and Schlesinger16, to only cite a few, concentrate on exploring the
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fragmentation of contemporary national identities in the current order of global
politics and culture.
Since postmodernism focuses in particular on analysing the dynamics of
identity in pluralist societies, at a synchronic and local level, they prove to be
inappropriate in the study I am undertaking which aims at exploring the genesis of the
idea of a ‘Papuan Nation’ beyond tribal pluralism and the role played by westerncolonial institutions and ideas. Postmodernist approaches, dealing mainly with postcolonial configurations, tend to reverse the modes of or ‘deconstruct’ national
formations that took place in colonial settings, treating these as quasi-static ‘bounded
entities’ or ‘texts’ in which, inherently, the dynamics are those of the observer and not
of the observed. The studies of Patricia Spyer17 on the Aru islanders, of Janet
Hoskins18 on the Sumbanese and of Danilyn Rutherford19 on the Biakkers of West
Papua, are exemplary in this regard and show how local cultures influence the vertical
dynamics of interaction with colonial powers and modern nation-states, but are
implicitly unable to explain the horizontal dynamics prompting discourses of
nationalism capable of overcoming historically rooted and/or ethnic divisions.

Idealist-Historical and Ethno-National Theories
Historical theories have their origin in the idealist speculation and the
spirituality and aesthetical sensibility of XIX century Romanticism. In 1872 Mill,
discussing the positiveness of representative systems, argued that it was “a necessary
16
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condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the
main with those of nationality”, emphasising that “where the sentiment of nationality
exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the
nationality under the same government”.20 Mill’s positive understanding was echoed
some year later by Ernest Renan in his famous Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? referred to
at the beginning of this chapter.
Both Mill and Renan maintained that a nation was determined by the will and a
people’s genius, the daily plebiscite of every single individual of a community. As
Kedourie points out, this favourable tradition derives from Locke’s apologia for
freedom and the criterion of political representativeness.21Consequently nationalism,
in the sense of self-determination, comes to be identified with the determination of the
will. Fichte, in his Reden an die Deutsch Nation, wrote that “it is neither the strong
right arm nor the efficient weapon that wins victories, but only the power of the
soul”.22
By contrast, the conservative faction of XIX century academia and politics was
keener in identifying and pointing out the inherent dangers to consolidated institutions
and established order in the spread of nationalist ideologies. Lord Acton, the
inaugurator of this tendency, prophetically proclaimed that nationalism did not aim at
achieving liberty and prosperity but at “making the nation the mould and measure of
the state”, a process that would lead to sacrifice of moral values and material stability
in order to establish its new ‘invention’.23
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As Kedourie points out, echoing Lord Acton’s belief, until the French
Revolution, conflicts were caused by territorial claims or dynastic succession,
conflicts of interests that were resolvable through negotiation and compromise.
Nationalism by contrast “represented politics as a fight for principles, not the endless
composition of claims in conflict” and “since principles do not abolish interests a
pernicious confusion resulted”.24 Interests and claims are negotiable but they become
unnegotiable items when they are transmogrified into or intertwined with principles
that by virtue of their essential nature are unnegotiable.
Kedourie’s negative evaluation of nationalism stems also from the nationalist
claim that political boundaries must be determined on the basis of linguistic
considerations. This critique is directed against Fichte who maintained that “those
who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible
bonds by nature itself, long before any human art begins”. In Kedourie’s opinion the
‘politicisation’ of language introduces a dangerous element of arbitrariness and
ambiguity. As evidence of the unreliability of nationalist claims based exclusively on
linguistic grounds is the difficulty to establish a clear-cut distinction between
language and dialect, and cases of diglossia in some countries.25 Linguistic factors
may fuel irredentism in territorially contiguous countries, although this is not a
necessary corollary as the West Papuan case confirms,26 as it may also prompt, in
some cases, the formulation of ideologies of racial exclusiveness. Such a possibility
was noted by Fichte who argued that a nation “if it wishes to absorb and mingle with
itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do so without itself
becoming confused and violent by disturbing the uneven process of its culture”.
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The historical theories of nationalism are fundamentally diffusionist, holding
that nationalism spread from the western core to colonial peripheries. According to
historical idealists, the origins of nationalism, considered as a structured ideology, are
to be traced to the historical context of medieval Europe27 where the term nationes
was first applied in the organisational structure of the universities.28 The nation,
emerged in its larval state in this milieu and is considered by the idealists as the
outcome of an ‘act of will’. Human beings, because of a natural, innate propensity,
tend by living together to constitute kinship sodalities or communities in which the
functions and roles of the members are structurally determined and regulated and
resources are distributed on the basis of privilege and rank.
From the idealists’ assumptions it can be inferred that they consider nationalism
the bearer of quasi-religious concepts and not the outcome of a psychological attitude
and necessity, as theorised by Hertz29 and more recently Greenfeld30, although
admitting that nationalism entails a feeling or sentiment of belonging.
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The idealist analysis, by implicitly emphasising the priority of thought over
action, tends to disregard the dynamics of socio-economic and cultural change,
relegating socio-economic factors to the subsidiary role of contributory or intervening
variables. In fact, although the breakdown of traditional and stable communities, the
resentment of an intelligentsia excluded from participation in political affairs and the
development of a Kantian philosophical dualism are adduced by idealists as causes of
the rise of nationalist claims and unrest, they argue that these are the consequential
result of the penetration of secular thought into traditional thinking which inevitably
acts as a solvent of traditional institutions.31 They fail to explain how and when
kinship groups or tribes become nations, to state it in sociological terms the transition
from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.
More recent historical-idealist analyses of nationalism, known as ethno-national
theories, maintain that communal ties of ethnic identity determine the development of
nationalism. Consequently nationalism comes to be identified with national sentiment,
a subjective and affective force that binds people together. For the ethnicists,
nationalism is an ideological movement that aims at “attaining and maintaining
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its
members to constitute an actual or potential nation”.32 The revival of the ‘ethnic
dimension’ of community constitutes the essence of nationalism and the key to
political legitimacy.
The prominent theorist of ethno-nationalism, Anthony Smith, identifies the
essence of ethnicity in individual experiences, that is the complex of “myths,
memories, values and symbols (…) the characteristic forms, or styles and genres of
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certain historical configurations”.33 Nationalist mobilisation, therefore, in this context
appears to be brought about by the dichotomy between an objective socio-political
change establishing horizontal social categories and subjective affiliation to vertically
ethno-national communities. In response to the cultural disruption produced by this
dualism a disaffected intelligentsia arises which attempts to reformulate in ethnic
terms the original modes and templates of relation.34 According to Smith it is the
intelligentsia that rediscovers an ethnic past and defines vernacular communal
nationalism in antithesis to the state-sponsored Weltanschauung.35
The ethno-national approach proves to be effective in explaining the modes of
internal integration, but it needs to be coupled with a consideration of the influence of
exogenous factors. Ethno-national theories clearly reject the role played by the global
communication and transnational structures and agencies in both prompting and
shaping nationalism. The theoretical propositions of ethno-nationalism appear to be
affected by a sort of creeping psychologism, ethnicity being envisaged as an entity
independent of both class interests and the international system.36
It appears evident that the functionalism of ethno-nationalist and the historicism
of historical-idealist theories tend to be inherently abstract since they analyse
nationalism in se et per se, disregarding its structural dialectics within the wider
international system that inherently determines its rise and shapes its ideological
content. Idealist and ethno-nationalist theories are effective, however, in explaining
how the contents of nationalist ideologies are construed, although they are unable to
account for the social processes that bring about the rise of nationalist movements.
33
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They provide the false impression that the phenomenon of nationalism is the outcome
of some sort of static parthenogenesis and a merely cultural phenomenon.

Modernisation Theories
Many scholars acknowledge the unifying force of culture and the fact that
cultural or ethnic nationalism contributes positively to the processes of nation
building. Others, such as Kohn, argue that cultural nationalism is functional only in
the formation of nations in backward cultures and cannot lead them to socio-political
and economic modernisation.37

On the basis of this premise, it appears that

modernisation theories tend to relegate cultural factors to an ancillary role in the
emergence of nationalism, considering the latter as a dynamic process in which social,
economic, political and cultural factors interact on both a synchronic and diachronic
level.
Modernisation theories are sociological in character. Most of them consider
nationalism as a ‘subspecies’ of ideologies originating from a radical and structural
transformation of the social system; others tend to merely equate it with the processes
of nation building.38 The sociological and Marxist foundation of modernisation
theories determines the limits of this epistemological approach since it is unable to
account for the existing differences in space and time of the phenomenon of
nationalism.
There are two main sociological models proposed by modernisation theories: an
‘integration’ model which addresses the problem of the persistence of social forces
36

Smith clearly states this independence. See: Smith A., ‘The Supersession of Nationalism?,
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 31, 1990, pp.1-32.
37
Kohn H., The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background, Macmillan, New York,
1946, pp.3-4.

24

and relationships, and the ‘conflict’ model that focuses on processes of change and
mutation of social norms and structures.39 The former maintains that nationalism is a
product generated by the breakdown of traditional communities under the influence of
modernisation: the introduction of innovative technology and change in traditional
modes of production cause a radical change in the original templates of social
relationships. Vertical kinship relations are replaced by horizontal class ones, bringing
about a polarisation of political and economic interests.
Eisenstadt maintains that the disintegration of traditional communities is caused
by structural differentiation prompting a dislocation and relocation of structural
elements. This process inevitably produces social tensions of which nationalist
movements and ideologies are expression.40 Nationalism intervenes to systemise the
newly introduced elements, re-engineering social, economic and political relations in
order to adapt the community of individuals to the changed environment. Smelser
believes that “nationalism is a sine qua non of industrialisation because it provides
people with an overriding, easily acquired, secular motivation for making painful
changes”.41 It is a phenomenon which reveals the characteristics of what Smelser
refers to as a ‘value-oriented movement’,42 since it appears to be prompted by the
necessity to renovate and modernise values and beliefs of a traditional community
transformed by the introduction of a new division of labour, into a stratified society.
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The integrationists substantially maintain that the persistence and connivance of
atavistic forms, such as language, customs, cultural symbols with modern goals and
values can be explained in terms of the overlapping of Gesellschaft innovations with
Gemeinschaft residues. Implicitly they suggest that nationalism can cement disparate
elements and forge a new social identity by differentiating and reintegrating the
individual components of a community. Since the processes of differentiation and
reintegration exert extreme pressure on the structures of traditional societies,
nationalist ideologies come to function as means of social adjustment. This approach
finds its theoretical archetype in Durkheim’s definition of anomie, caused by the
transition from a mechanical to an organic type of solidarity, one prompted by the
introduction of new modes of production and division of labour. In order to overcome
this state of structural entropy it is necessary to identify a cohesive force able to
reconstruct group solidarity.
The weakness of integrationist theories is to be found in the synchronic
perspective they adopt, which is typical of sociological analyses. The teleological
explanation and the reification of ideal types, proposed by the integrationist approach,
use tradition and modernity as heuristic devices. It follows that their analyses appear
to be affected by a sort of mechanical determinism grounded in the predictable
mechanics of human needs and strain effects.
The lack of pragmatism in the, inherently functionalist, integrationist approach
is visible also in the tautological treatment of ideology. Integrationists consider
ideology as a response to psychological strain, social penury and structural entropy
caused by rapidly induced change, failing to consider the causal relationship between
the situation of strain and its simultaneous production of or connection with symbols
and belief systems. In other words they do not explain the processes by which
26

individual discontent assumes a collective form manifested in the tacit
acknowledgment and acceptance of a specific and common social symbolism.
Another question that the integrationists fail to address concerns the ideological
responses to both external influences and autochthonous internal pressures affecting
transitional communities. The fundamental ‘sociologism’ characterising the
methodology of the functionalist-integrationist approach, along with its ontology of
the hic et nunc, disregarding diachronic developments, prevents it from providing
adequate and comprehensive answers to the causes of nationalism. The priority that
functionalist analysis ascribes to structural elements over ideological ones, considered
as either mere effects or accidents, impedes a deep understanding of the phenomenon
of nationalism and its relation to cultural and socio-economic change.
The overestimation of the effects that situational strain exerts on the social
structure introduces an element of predictability and determinism in the development
of social trends. It is undeniable that physical deprivation and psychological
frustration, or religious and political persecution, can give rise to value-oriented
movements. Relative deprivation does tend to generate expectations at a
psychological level that often can be socially projected. These however are not a
prerogative of backward or traditional societies, as Kohn assumes.43
Nationalism according to the integrationist theorists aims at integrating
individual components, whose system of structural relations has been disrupted by
processes of modernisation, into a new functional organic solidarity, a modern
society. Nationalism is the product of a class or elite engineering and restructuring
power relations to serve peculiar interests.
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In contrast with this conclusion, Breully’s state-centred theory argues that
nationalist ideology is not the expression of a particular social class or segment but a
solution to overcome the antithesis between the state and society.44 As Akzin points
out “not always meet as harmonising and complementary forces; quite often they
constitute competing forces”.45 Nationalism in this case performs a mobilising and
coordinating function in inter- and intra-state relations. Nationalist ideology
legitimates the role of the state by transforming it into the institutional expression of
national interests and establishing a structural link between the political sovereignty of
the state and the national citizenry so that nation, society and state come to constitute
an indissoluble identity. The coordinating and mobilising functions of nationalism
coincide however with the growing secularisation brought about by socio-economic
and political modernisation and the consequent constitution of a ‘public domain’
represented by the coalescence of societal interests.
The systemic limitations characteristic of state-centred theories are represented
by the axiomatic assumption that processes of modernisation will bring about the
secularisation of traditional societies, an assumption that tends to foster abstract
generalisations disregarding historical and cultural peculiarities. The only
generalisation that structuralism could offer was the identification of the locus in
which processes of innovation and change take place.

Communication theories

identify the stage of ‘transition’ from a traditional community to an industrial society
as the causa causans or locus originis of nationalism.
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Both Deutsch46 and Gellner47 maintain that it is in the limbo between tradition
and modernity that nationalism has its origins, at the stage that Lerner calls the ‘point
of engagement’, the painful threshold where the intimate psychological restlessness of
the ‘transitional man’ and the past and present historical events are on the point of
being linked.48 It is at this stage that traditional symbolism, obsolete and meaningless
in the new socio-economic environment, comes to be replaced by a significant new
set of symbolic representations. The diaphanous channel of communication
introduced by technological development and institutionalised education, becomes the
locus in which new identities are brewed and beliefs and institutions are selected,
adopted and imposed.
According to this epistemological approach, education, spreading a common
means of communication and semiotics, fosters the rise of cultural homogeneity and
becomes the driving force of change by replacing birth as the criterion for authority. It
introduces abstract concepts that oust customary loyalties and obligations, as
Wertheim argues in his study of the modernisation of Indonesian society.49 Vertical
processes of enculturation are substituted by horizontal processes of socialisation.50
The processes of change, triggered by the spread of literacy and education, however,
involve only a limited number of individuals, those politically, socially and
economically aligned and endowed with complementary communication habits and
46
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social and economic preferences, for, as Deutsch argues, “within any geographical
setting and any population, economic, social and technological developments mobilise
individuals for relatively more intensive communication”.51
According to Gellner a unified system of education, spreading a common
language and symbols, prompts the awareness of cultural affinity and generates the
necessity of affective belonging by delimiting and defining the concept of
nationality.52 It follows that the nation-state assumes the configuration of a ‘mass cocultural society’,53 that is linguistically and culturally homogeneous.54
Modernisation does not consist only in the introduction of new technologies and
in the improvement and widening of communication strategies but also in the rise of
new cultural forms.55 Cultural symbols and language became crucial in the processes
of forging and fostering a new system of structural relationships suitable to the new
industrial-urban environment. The unequal distribution of wealth, privileges and
resources in urban contexts tends to prompt the rise of a fierce urban class
competition in which the privileged classes, in order to increase their benefits and
protect their interests against immigrants or new arrivals, erect an impenetrable
cultural barrier against them under the banner of nationalism.56
Gellner’s theory displays the advantages provided by an eclectic approach
allowing for an analysis of the phenomenon of nationalism, which takes into account
disparate interacting factors. The vulnerability of his approach lies however in the
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prominence he ascribes to language, which tends to reduce nationalism to a linguistic
movement, turning his analysis into a macro-socio-linguistic one.57
Notwithstanding the excessive importance conferred on linguistic factors in
some analyses, communication theories do identify a series of important cultural and
socio-economic factors and processes that arise in the transition from a traditional to a
modern society. Their epistemological limits lie in the fact that they consider the
nation as a constructed, artificial reality and nationalism the ideological means by
which heterogeneous groups are gathered to form a single body, that of the nation.
The importance of communication is also stressed by Benedict Anderson who
ties the origins of nationalism to the spread of, what he calls “print-as-commodity”.
According to Anderson, a nation is nothing but ‘an imagined community’ the
existence of which is founded on and living in the imagination of its members who
perceive themselves as part of a distinctive community.58 This imagined community is
obtained by a “systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology
through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations”.59 For
this reason he connects the rise of nationalism with the spread of ‘printing press
capitalism’ that, by adopting vernacular and indigenous languages, replaced the
written script monopolised until then by a narrow oligarchy. The destruction of this
monopoly paved the way to mass communication and to the rise of linguistically
defined communities. The spread of literacy and education brought about a new idea
of history that had been in the traditional gnoseological system identified with
cosmogonic myths. The rupture of this identity introduced a new anthropocentric
57
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worldview and the constitution of new power relations. The link between the three
new categories of fraternity, power and time was represented by the construction of
the new rational imagined community.60
Modernisation theories tend to link the emergence of nationalism to the system
of international relations and the processes of capitalism. It is from this very
connection with the external political and economic processes that derives the
ambiguous nature of nationalism: while, in fact, capitalist processes force nations to
look forward to the attainment of national goals, they invite them also to look
backwards in search of historical attachments and memories able to foster a sense of
common identity.61
Anderson, focusing on the wider international and trans-national setting, argues
that the uneven development of global culture represents the seedbed of nationalism.
The discontinuities in territorial development produce a series of social and political
antinomies expressed in nationalist struggles. According to Nairn the origins of
nationalism are “located not in the folk, not in the individual’s repressed passion for
some sort of wholeness or identity, but in the machinery of world political
economy”.62 Global economy inevitably leads to domination and exploitation. In this
context nationalism becomes for the oppressed a liberating force able to achieve
autonomy within the global system.63
The theories of uneven development proposed by both Anderson and Nairn can
be related to Worsley’s theory of capitalist imperialism,64 and are useful to explain the
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rise of nationalist movements and the processes of nation building in colonial settings
although they are unable to overcome the Marxist dialectics of periphery and core that
casts uneven development analyses in a diffusionist mould. The merit of uneven
development theories, however, stems from their internationalist perspective, avoiding
the Parmenidean abstraction of historical and ethno-national theories. By contrast, the
limit of their analyses lies in the fact that they focus mainly on structural relations
within the socio-economic system, failing to consider the role played by political
agencies within the system of socio-economic relations in forging nationalist
discourses. Anderson does stress the importance of the spread of literacy, the
emergence of vernacular literatures and the rise of a new intelligentsia, but these seem
to be subordinated to the major role played by capitalism.
The failure to consider the role of agency in the emergence of nationalism is
repeated in Kautsky’s interest theory65 and class-centred theories as a whole.
Kautsky’s theoretical approach stresses the importance of capitalist industrialism in
the emergence of nationalist movements and ideologies. Nationalism is considered the
expression of a particular social class and consequently its origins are to be traced in
the exploitative logic of industrial capitalism. In this case, it may act either as the
ideological tool of the ruling classes in order to foster consensus and abate dissent,66
or as the expression of exploited colonial people demanding the right and power to
shape their destinies.67 It is, however, the product of a specific social class and is
constructed to satisfy class interests and needs acting either as a cohesive force
emanating from the authority of a state elite or as a divisive one driven by the
grievances of marginalised or exploited segments of a society.
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State-driven nationalism usually yields authoritarianism or totalitarianism.
Social classes during this process become masses and social movements become
totalitarian movements, “mass organisations of atomised, isolated individuals”68
inspired by a belief in their collective superiority and of being invested with a
messianic mission. Kornhauser maintains that mass movements, which he identifies
tout court with nationalist movements, consist of those individuals who have broken
with traditional groups and social functions and therefore are prone to join movements
invoking the nihilistic destruction of the traditional system in order to restore a lost
sense of belonging.69
Hobsbawm agrees with other theorists that it is in times of systemic changes,
characterised by uncertainty and cultural disorientation, that nationalism emerges to
restore a sense of permanence and stability, becoming the expression of what
Kornhauser calls an ‘organised insecurity’.

Modernisation and globalisation are

induced and governed by capitalism acting as a unifying, centripetal force at a global
level and a divisive, centrifugal force at the local level, prompting the emergence of
nationalist claims.70
Class-centred and uneven development theories tend to envisage nationalism as
arising from a situation of social conflict caused by the polarisation of class interests.
These disregard the role played by cultural factors such as religion, language and
customs in the rise of nationalism, focusing instead on the effects of urbanisation and
industrialisation on traditional social structures. Such analysis stresses the economic
and social aspects involved in the rise of nationalism, arguing that cultural elements
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play a functional role in the construction of nationalist propaganda by transmogrifying
class interests into collective ideals.
Both primordialist and modernist theories are inclined to focus either on the
analysis of one particular nationalism, generalising from it for their conclusions, or
they select a particular factor and analyse several nationalisms exclusively in the light
of its function in the social, political, economic and cultural processes taking place.
Both inductive and deductive methodologies yield results characterised by a high
degree of particularism since nationalism in se et per se is a sui generis or particularist
phenomenon, a symbiont destitute of specific contents. As Andrew Vincent has
recently pointed out:
The most tried and tested manner of discussing nationalism (…) has been
through sovereignty and state language. The discourse of both the latter
concepts predates nationalism by centuries. Both concepts also embody
implicitly the logic of particularity (…)71
It can be argued that nationalism tends to plagiarise existing discourses about
sovereignty and legitimacy tied to particular historical-geographical realities.
The theories analysed, although diverging on their fundamental assumptions,
implicitly tend to agree that nationalism is a European creation or invention
transferred to colonial contexts through colonial practices and decolonising programs.
From Europe nationalism, envisaged as a sort of new universal and natural religion,
spread to other parts of the world through the processes of acculturation enacted by
colonisation. Consequently the nationalisms that emerged in colonial settings are a
product of mere mimesis or methexis, imitation or participation. Alien slogans, ideas,
effigies and symbols have been borrowed or adopted by groups who have often
misunderstood, misapplied or distorted the meanings and functions of a particular
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nationalism born out of distinctive historical and ecological experiences so that “the
political thinking of the indigenous intelligentsia is purely derivative, and on the
whole out of place in the local setting” since “theories are mistaken for political
slogans and hypotheses are treated as strait-jacketing doctrines”.72
The impression of ‘derivative nationalism’ stems from the fact that both
primordialist and modernist theories neglect the existence of a pre-colonial history
and historical consciousness in which dynamics of ethnic identity may have already
taken place. It is this very neglect that has generated the misconception or colonial
myth of ‘history-less-ness’, which has been extremely useful to ethically and
politically justify colonial oppression first and neo-colonial nation-building practices
later.
My reluctance to adopt postmodernist theories or approaches stems from the
fact that these do nothing but “perpetuate the colonial” since by deconstructing postcolonial entities they support and favour the implementation of neo-colonial practices.
Postmodernism can be tout court envisaged as the ‘discourse of neo-colonialism’. The
deconstruction of national entities to recover local narrative-discourses undermines
‘national histories’ reaffirming the myth of ‘history-less-ness’.
Furthermore, all theories examined tend to neglect the important role of both
religious and historical consciousness in the emergence of nationalism considering
them as mere means to construct ideologies and mobilise people and failing to
acknowledge that the intimate connection between religious and historical
consciousness may prompt the rise of an autochthonous ethno-nationalism prior to
any attempt of post-colonial nation-building.
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Religion, Nationalism and Historical Consciousness
According to the theories analysed, the emergence of discourses of nation and
nationhood in colonial settings appear to be connected to the spread of western
civilisation. The diffusionist perspective of modernisation theories seems to
acknowledge this as an undeniable and unquestionable fact. By contrast, primordialist
approaches, maintaining that nationalism is the product of a natural human proclivity
to gregariousness, which causes the sharing of common cultural elements, tends to
equate nationalism to tribalism.73
Notwithstanding the antithetical premises on which primordialists and
modernists found their analyses, both epistemologies seem to acknowledge that
nationalism binds individuals into homogeneous groups, mobilising them for the
attainment of a common goal. Socio-economic and political interests spur this
necessity to coalesce, and in order to homogenise the maze of interests of a group, it is
necessary to condense them under the shield of some sort of common ideal that may
be rooted in religion, language or history.
Nationalism appears to be strongly connected to history, that is to the
‘particular’ vicissitudes or events experienced by people in a ‘particular’ place that
come to represent the principium individuationis of their very ethnic genesis and
existence. As the previous perusal of theories of nationalism has shown, history
appears to be a common feature of all existing nationalisms. As Anthony Smith
73
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argues, “the myth of a common and unique origin in time and in place (…) is
essential for the sense of ethnic community, since it marks the foundation point of a
group’s history, and hence to its individuality”.74
Myths of origin appear to be rooted in the sphere of religious experience and
thus the historical consciousness of a people is tied to its religious experience
expressed through a peculiar language and semiotics embedded in temporal
narratives. Religion appears to have been the seedbed of ethnic or cultural identities
since it inherently represents the expression of an inner feeling, of a peculiar way of
perceiving and interpreting reality and history, a mode of connecting and conceiving
the dimensions of space and time. For its very nature it consequently becomes a
formidable conservative force and, acting on both an individual and collective
psychological level, is able to coagulate and synthesise disparate and conflicting
elements and ideas.
The phenomenon of religion has been considered either as a psycho-intellectual
creation75 or as a symbolic fact76 and both approaches to the study of religion seem to
recognise the morally compelling and socially cohesive force of religious sentiments
and systems. Under the influence of such force often nationalism has either allied
itself with a traditional religion or has presented itself in effect as a religion. Bruce
Kapferer has shown in his study of Australian and Sri-Lankan nationalism how
nationalism in the former assumed the role of a religion articulating discourses and
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structures of national identity, while in the latter it merged with institutional
Buddhism.77
Studies regarding the genesis and function of religion have constantly swayed
between the two hermeneutical approaches referred to above, disregarding the
important ‘cultural’ foundation of religion. The resistance of religious systems to
change has been imputed either to its function of instrumentally generating and
maintaining structural power relations or its psychological effects. In reality religions
do change under the influence of transformations affecting the external environment,
incorporating and reinterpreting intrusive or new elements, even though the original
deep structure remains unaltered. Max Weber observes:
However incisive the social influences, economically and politically
determined, may have been upon a religious ethic in a particular case, it
receives its stamp primarily from religious sources, and, first of all, from the
content of its annunciation and promise. Frequently the very next generation
reinterprets these annunciations and promises in a fundamental fashion.
Such re-interpretations adjust revelations to the needs of the religious
community.78
An ‘ecological’ approach to the study of religion, one which considers religion
as a system of survival generated by processes of adaptation to a particular physical
environment, would be able to account for both its resistance to change and its own
necessary tendency to change. The ecological peculiarities of the environment prompt
the rise of unique forms of theophanic and hierophanic experiences. Taboos and legal
codes informing the socio-economic and political conduct of the individual and the
community protect the latter from the dangers of the physical environment.79 The
transposing and the ritualising of life to the domain of the public provide norms of
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adaptation and foster internal integration, through the conceptualisation of the
perceptions of time and space, the elaboration of a common language and semiotics
and the creation of myths and stories. Being a system of survival, religion
consequently tends to prompt the formation of particular social political and economic
systems managing and allocating scarce and vital resources as well as protecting the
community’s interests from external threats.80
Consequently religion as a primordial contour of national identity deserves to
occupy a more central place in the study or hermeneutics of nationalism. As George
Mavrogordatos has recently pointed out in his study of Christian Orthodoxy and
nationalism in Greece, “despite the prolific literature on nationalism and the growing
literature on religion, currently there is no systematic framework focusing specifically
on the linkage between the two”.81
A growing number of theorists are beginning to reconsider the relationship
between nationalism and religion. Recently Anthony Marx, in his Faith in Nation:
Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism,82 argues that the birth of nationalism dates to a
time when religious intolerance ravaged Europe. This statement reiterates the
argument, already elaborated a few years earlier by Linda Colley, suggesting that
religion has always been central to nationalism since the latter begins with an act of
demonising a ‘religious other’, fostering the coalescence of a community.83 Kedourie
had already pointed out that religion through the ‘transvaluation’ of its original values
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is able to seduce and mobilise the masses through millennial promises communicated
in the language and rituals of their religious traditions.84 In line with this approach is
Jurgensmeyer who has identified the important alliance between religion and
nationalism in decolonised states and how this alliance has been constructed to oppose
what he refers to as the secular version of nationalism imported by the former colonial
powers.85
Marx, Colley, Jurgensmeyer and Kedourie still place the analysis of the role of
religion in the mould of modernist functionalism, in which ‘transvaluation’ implicitly
stands for ‘secularisation’ and religion is identified with tradition in antithesis to
modernity.

In the approach to the study of the relation between religion and

nationalism, the real question, as Mavrogordatos points out, is not about ‘affinity’ or
‘covariance’ as Smith argues86, but about ‘filiation’ since religion provides “a
primordial line of demarcation easy to identify exclusive and more impermeable than
language or any other cultural trait being, by definition, value-laden and inherently
breeding a sense of superiority”.87 The role of religion in the context of nationalism is
more than instrumental. Religion represents the moment and locus (the spatiotemporal configuration) in which a community becomes aware of its existence and
meaning as a ‘historical community’. It appears that it is in the domain of religion that
historical consciousness emerges.
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According to a tradition that has its fons et origo in Hume’s philosophical
speculation,88 historical consciousness stems from the existence of social
consciousness, namely when a community comes to share a series of beliefs and
values. Consciousness of the past thus is envisaged as a social construction. I believe
however that the Humean assumption reiterated by Hegelian-Marxist scholarship is
fundamentally erroneous since it appears to be based on the confusion of historical
consciousness with historical knowledge. Brown falls victim of this very confusion by
linking patterns of social stratification to patterns of historiography in order to account
for variation in the meaning and function of historical writing.89 He fails to explain
what produces a correlation between the mode of social stratification and the quality
of historiography since he disregards the foundational role played by religion.
Religion, in fact, acts as the epistemological locus in which structural components are
linked through the underlying assumptions of space, time and language shaping the
overall cultural configuration. This appears to undermine Dumont’s axiom regarding
the a-historicity of the Indian caste system,90 deeply rooted in Hindu practices.91
Myth and history, in my opinion, are not antinomic domains but binomials of a
single domain. The structuralist per antonomasia, Levi-Strauss, had to acknowledge
that the distinction between the two is not as clear-cut as some scholars suggest.92
Both represent, in fact, to use Huizinga’s words, “an intellectual form in which a
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civilisation renders account to itself of its past”.93 As Pompa argues, facts of history
cannot be distinguished from mere fantasy “other than by an appreciation of the way
in which we have come to acquire belief in them and of the constitutive places they
occupy in our thinking about the past”.94 Stories and mythical accounts in preliterate
tribal societies disguise historical facts hence revealing the existence of an historical
consciousness. The process that brings about the actualisation of such consciousness
is prompted by the religious experience itself, in what Martin Buber refers to as the ‘IThou’, the relational experience in which
the ‘I’ emerges as a single element out of the primal experiences, out of the
vital primal words I –affecting –Thou and Thou – affecting - I , only after
they have been split asunder and the participle has been given eminence as
an object.95
It is in this relation that consciousness of the Self comes about, informing
temporal and spatial experiences with a peculiar meaning. The contact with the world
that falls outside that particular relation with the ‘Other’ determines its objectification:
the memory of past vicissitudes, rooted in that very hierophanic or theophanic
experience becomes essential to establishing tangible and unique criteria of identity
demarcation. The intimate connection of the religious experience with a specific place
and time explains why it inevitably comes to be connected with discourses of
ethnicity, fostering the rise of what Anthony Smith refers to as ‘demotic ethnie’.96 It
follows that preliterate people possessed temporal narratives, a history, prior to
colonisation, stating the origins and meaning of their existence, demarcating the
boundaries of their original identities
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Since nationalism is rooted in the domain of religion it is clear why it tends to
propose a vision of the future in-the-image-of-the-past in such a way that protology
and eschatology come to coincide. It is in this past-future vision or continuum that
both history and nationalism reveal their religious foundations. Nationalism, through
religion, comes to be connected both to the past, that is history, and to the future,
generating messianic-soteriological expectations. Nationalist ideologies incorporate
and rhyme archaeological relicts with a teleological-eschatological tension, turning
the myth of a ‘paradise lost’ into a vision of a ‘promised land’.
In the idea of nationalism as a ‘religion of history’,97 the theoretical chasm
between primordialist and modernist theories gradually blurs. Modernisation
processes do not completely wipe away tradition rooted in religious beliefs and
expressed in myths and rituals, but simply erode its surface structure so that persisting
underlying structures of meaning, embedded in the deep structure, act as the ordering
basis of the ideological system of latent anti-colonial nationalism. This system will
generate movements of messianic and soteriological character when the state of
anomie and relative deprivation triggered by cultural and social change reaches
unbearable proportions, when the divide between the interests of the colonised masses
and the ideal trajectories proposed by the elites, or colonial government, widens. In
this milieu, nationalist ideologies become a sort of ‘political religion’ that, as
Durkheim argued, is able to coalesce and mobilise the resentment of the culturally and
socially dispossessed.
Religion and historical consciousness are the seedbed of nationalism, and in the
contention for social recognition and justice they become the driving forces of social
and political action. In an era when the centrifugal forces of globalisation threaten
97
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national identities, religion, by fostering the consciousness of a specific ‘ethnic past’,
becomes the centripetal force of the nation. As Benedict Anderson argues, echoing
Lord Acton’s aphorism that “exile is the nursery of nationality”,98 a new phenomenon,
that of ‘long distance nationalism’, represents “a probably menacing portent for the
future. First of all it is the product of capitalism’s remorseless accelerating
transformation of all human societies. Second it creates a serious politics that is at the
same time radically unaccountable”.99 Religion fosters the rise of a communal sense
of belonging and demarcates the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in discourses
of identity and participation in ‘national rituals’.
The belief that nationalism is a secular ideology is, in my opinion, obsolete.
Religion is still a strong factor intervening in civil politics and social life. The division
between the spheres of the secular and the religious, between the sacred and profane,
is in se et per se dubious, the limen between the two blurred and hard to define.100
Secular states and ideologies appear all to stem from an original religious source. The
preambles of the constitutions of many states echo fundamental values and beliefs that
derive from an original religious substratum.101 Secularisation is a myth, although a
controversial one.102 Religious beliefs and values as well as religious institutions and
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leaders have played an important, integral role in shaping nationalist movements and
ideologies in different spatio-temporal contexts.103
As argued at the beginning of this section, religion is inherently a system of
survival generated by processes of adaptation to the physical environment which
influenced the dynamics and structure of group integration. Theophanic and
hierophanic experiences have been influenced by the peculiarity of ecological
adaptation. It follows that the hermeneutics underlying particular epistemologies are
influenced by these very processes, expressed in religious beliefs, rituals and values.
Religion and culture may be regarded as an indissoluble monad articulating particular
social, political and economic patterns.
This assumption may explain why the introduction of western social, economic
and political systems into decolonising settings failed to achieve the desired results,
notwithstanding, in some cases, these were introduced along with what is still
regarded in some quarters as the ideology of the West, namely Christianity. Those,
however, who believed that christianisation would have brought about the acceptance
of western forms of socio-political and economic organization failed to consider the
important fact that Christianity in colonial settings underwent a process of
vernacularisation, a process involving the re-interpretation of Christian values, beliefs
and norms by the hermeneutical categories of the colonised. The culmination of this
process is marked by the transformation of the mission, a foreign import, into a native
Church. Churches in colonial settings display those indicators of social control
identified by Migdal, compliance, participation and legitimation.104 These factors
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account for their prominent role in provoking or assisting nationalist struggles and the
role of religion in the formulation of nationalist ideologies.

The Dialectics between the ‘National’ and the ‘International’
The hypothesis of the religious foundation of nationalism is able to account for
the international dimension that nationalist struggles come to assume. Besides being
generated by the relations developed with similar national entities that have gained the
right to statehood by mutual de jure and de facto recognition, the international system
comes to play an important role in shaping and conferring legitimacy on nationalist
claims. The domains of the national and the international appear to share ontologically
porous boundaries. Both appear to have originated from the fragmentation of
universal Christendom in Europe in the early modern era when the translation of the
Bible from Latin into vernacular languages, along with the spread of printing or what
Anderson calls ‘print-capitalism’, destroyed the monopoly of doctrine, of knowledge
and, above all, of hermeneutics held by the clergy, opening up new avenues and
modes of communication.
The translation of the Bible, in some cases, brought about its reinterpretation in
the light of non-canonical exegeses rooted in peculiar cultural-ecological experiences.
Hermeneutics and language prompted the rise of ‘national churches’ especially in
socially and economically advanced areas such as England and The Netherlands. The
marked degree of hermeneutical-linguistic differentiation, which came to be tied to or
reflect specific socio-economic and political interests, within the borders of
Christendom, resulted in the inevitable outbreak of conflicts.

The international

system, which emerged from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, can be regarded as the
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corollary of years of religious wars. The ‘secular arm’,105 which appears to have
emerged victorious, relied heavily on the Westphalian principle cuius regio eius
religio to promote a new system of ‘inter-sovereign’ relations, the fundamental
structural unit of which came to be represented by the nation-state.
It follows that the presumed secular system,106 or institutions of the state, came
to be rooted and found their legitimation in the religious substratum of the nation.
The transition from the medieval to the modern system of ‘inter-sovereign’ relations
is founded on an inherent ontological tautology. It appears that nationalism, while
generating the ‘inter-national’ system, derives its raison d’être from its very existence
by contributing to define the jurisdictional boundaries of political, social and
economic action and the sovereign rights and legitimacy of the single nation-states.
The decolonisation program, which in the aftermath of World War II
transformed the former colonial territories into independent nation-states, is
paradigmatic in indicating the role of the international system in promoting and
generating claims to nation-statehood. The principle of uti possidetis, applied by the
international agency to determine the right to independence and statehood, served the
neo-colonial interests of the former colonial powers which either directly or indirectly
continued to interfere with the political, economic and social life of the new states.
The irrationality of the equation colony = nation-state helped to nurture the original
inter-dependency. The cultural heterogeneity, which characterised the societies of
former colonial possessions, compressed within the narrow boundaries of the nationstate system, brought about the rise of ethnic conflicts, which still persist today.
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The configurational dynamics of the ‘post-colonial’ international system
constantly fosters the rise of new nationalisms. The capitalist system prompts the
coalescence of group interests, either superseding or in alliance with ‘national
interests’, which find their ‘justi-fication’, in the sense of facere iustum (to make just),
in the hermeneutical particularism derived from the fragmentation of Christendom:
the Cold War was generated by opposing ideologies affirming or denying the validity
of the religious component; the post-Cold War is articulated along religious lines
where the Christian, capitalist and nationalist West is set against a Pan-Islamic
sodality or the Dar-al-Islam. But the epoch is far from being either a ‘Clash of
Civilisations’107 or an ‘End of History’108 heralded by some illustrious scholars in the
early nineties: here we are assisting in the re-structuring of a World System based on
the nation-state, the meaning and functioning of which depends on the existence of a
configurational-structural dialectics.
Since the international system determines and is determined by the existence of
the nation formalised in the state entity, any nationalist claim that threatens directly or
indirectly the system of relations becomes ipso facto an international issue. An
example of the international dimension of nationalist struggle, in which religion plays
an important role in determining support for the parties involved, is provided by the
Arab-Israeli conflict.109 As Premdas points out:
The pervasive incidence of cultural pluralism and multi-ethnicity found
among the world’s 160 states provides potentially inflammable raw
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materials for conflict; the permeable borders facilitate widening
involvement with dire and destructive consequences.110
It follows that the survival and perpetuation of the international system, being
an interconnected whole, depends on its economic and political stability. The carving
up of member states into smaller national units or the polarisation of state entities into
opposing blocs supporting one of the parties involved in a civil strife, on the basis of
either religious or ethnic affinities, may endanger the internal dialectics and dynamics
of the system of relations and alliances. The omnipresent and latent trend by interest
groups to ‘translate’ the international system into a global one in which the nationstate may be replaced by Multinational (MNC) and Trans-national (TNC) Companies
and Non-Governmental Agencies (NGO) and other similar ‘matrix’ agencies reveals
how destabilising nationalist struggles are perceived to be by these groups and really
are to the World System. But the ‘hermeneutics’ that tends to ‘sublimate’ the nationalinternational dialectics into a homogenising global entity conceals the risk of more
devastating effects. It engenders a variety of essentialist and fundamentalist reactions
produced by different combinations of global and local phenomena. The resurgence of
religious fundamentalism, an obvious return to the origins of the nation, is the natural
outcome, an explicit “return to the local” as a “response to globalisation”.111
In a homogenising system, which is characterised by the existence of a socioeconomic inequality enabling its functioning and encompassed in the formula ‘NorthSouth’ which cuts across religious and ethnic allegiances, religion returns to fulfil its
original function of guaranteeing survival becoming the source of security for a
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threatened identity. Lapidus shows for instance how Islamic movements involve a
combination of the universalistic notion of the Umma with more local particularistic
identities.112 The trend is visible also in those nation-states such as Iran and
Afghanistan where a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam has supported political
regimes and national identities.113 Religious fundamentalism may be viewed tout
court as the expression of the local or the national against the homogenising forces of
global capitalism. It re-essentialises, re-historicises and re-totalises those communities
resisting the ‘global assault’ either by defining, re-formulating and strengthening their
original identities or by bringing about the formation of new forms of identification.
The wars in Kosovo,114 Bosnia115 and Chechnya,116 stemming from the break up of
the federal states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are examples of modern
religious wars carving out nation-states in the name of the Westphalian principle cuius
regio eius religio.
The study of West Papuan nationalism, presented in the following chapters,
reveals how the international system or World Order has influenced its development
over time. The international forces of capitalism, colonialism and imperialism
prompted the ‘discovery’ of West Papua’s economic and strategic potential in the
XIX century, which brought about the drawing of local realities into the wider
network of capitalist relations while simultaneously demarcating their particular

Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991, p. 33. Also: Hall S., Held D. & McGrew T. (eds.), Modernity and Its
Futures, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992; Castells M., The Power of Identity, Blackwell, Oxford, 1997.
112
Lapidus I., ‘Between Universalism and Particularism: The Historical Basis of Muslim communal,
National and Global Identities’, Global Networks, 1, 1, 2001.
113
Faist T., ‘Transnational Social Spaces out of International Migration: Evolution, Significance and
Future Prospects, European Journal of Sociology, 39, 1998, pp. 213-247.
114
Mertus J.A., Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started a War, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1999. Mertus believes however that the Kosovo-Albanians did not define themselves in
religious terms that is as Muslims but in ethnic terms as Albanians failing to define the ‘Albanian’.
115
Burg S.L. & Shoup P.S., The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International
Intervention, New York, 1999.
116
Lieven A., Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999, pp.
355-368.
51

ethnic identities. In this process of integration Christianity acted as a means to
globalise and localise at the same time. As Bayly points out in his analysis of archaic
and modern globalisation in Eurasia and Africa between 1750 and 1850
the Asian and African people began to take up and adapt a concept of
religion and nation which was in some essential sense derivative of Western
discourses. In this sense, the nation-state and doctrinally differentiated
religions were globalised even though their tendency was to fragment and
enhance difference among societies. (…) modern nationalism and modern
religious beliefs did not erase (…) earlier formations. Instead ancient
religion and old patriotisms were subsumed into the new forms of
nationalist and religious ideology.117
The rise of Papuan nationalism developed in the context of a World System and,
as May’s article regarding the sources of external support for the West Papua
movement implicitly suggests,118 it appears to have been influenced by systemic
forces operating beyond the control of single agencies.
By different modes and means religious beliefs and institutions have contributed
to foster the genesis of discourses of identity and nationalist aspirations at the local
level prompting the creation of an ‘inter-national’ system of relations. It is in the
domain of religion that primordial sentiments of unity encompassed in the idea of
nation have been conjugated with the civil politics of the state.

Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics
Geertz argues that it is possible to identify a latent tension between those
primordial sentiments rooted in pre-modern differences of language, religion and
cultural heritage, which divided people in pre-colonial settings, often giving rise to
117
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nationalist movements, and civil sentiments inculcated into the citizenry by colonial
governments or the intelligentsia of the new independent states which promote an
‘engineered’ form of nationalism.119 Consequently the citizenry appears to be more
divided than united by culture in the colonial-drawn territories so that the new
independent post-colonial states are far from being an ‘appropriate’ realisation of
consciously rooted national aspirations.120
The aim of the present discussion is not to compare synoptically patterns of
conflicts and arrangements between primordial sentiments and civil politics but to
detect the cultural ‘webs of significance’ that the encounter or clash of these two sets
of distinct ideas and beliefs produce in the populace. These symbolic webs are
important since they inherently legitimate power structures and channel human
aspirations by providing the believers with an intimate sense of purpose and agency
within an ordered and meaningful world. Consequently the aim of the present
investigation is to detect and identify the mechanisms by which these two systems
coalesce to create new symbolic significances.
Social discontent and nationalist claims, as already pointed out, tend to
crystallise around specific foci, represented by Geertz’s primordial ties or assumed
natural givens. Primordial sentiments, in societies where the tradition of civil politics
is weak, tend to be assumed as bases for the demarcation of autonomous political
units. While, in fact, economic and social disaffection threatens revolution, the loss of
loyalty based on religious, linguistic, racial or cultural peculiarities threatens partition,
irredentism or merger, namely a re-definition of a community or state’s domain.
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Geertz, in this regard, identifies six foci around which discontent tends to aggregate,
that is kinship, race, language, region, religion and custom.121 The politicisation of
these primordial attachments is fuelled either by political oppression, as in the cases
of secessionism and colonialism, or by partition which brings about the rise of
irredentist or pan movements.
The transition from a colonial government to an independent state organisation
cannot be merely envisaged as a process of hand-over between two distinct power
agencies. It entails a process of constructing a political consciousness in an
unmodernised population hitherto excluded from political and administrative affairs.
Moreover political consciousness and collective interest in public affairs are not facts
achieved once and forever, but have to be continuously nurtured. As Geertz states:
(…) as a primordially based ‘corporate feeling of oneness’, remains for
many the fons et origo of legitimate authority (…) much of this interest
takes the form of an obsessive concern with the relation of one’s tribe,
region, sect, or whatever to a centre of power that, while growing rapidly
more active, is not easily either insulated from the web of primordial
attachments, as was the remote colonial regime, or assimilated to them as
are the workaday authority systems of the ‘little community’. Thus, it is the
very process of the formation of a sovereign civil state that, among other
things, stimulates sentiments of parochialism, communalism, racialism, and
so on, because it introduces into society a valuable new prize over which to
fight and a frightening new force to contend with.122
Numerous are the examples of how primordial sentiments have been used to
divide a state rather than fomenting unity in the post-colonial era. In Sri Lanka, for
instance, economic changes, induced by modernisation policies, aroused fears that the
position of the industrious and aggressive Tamils would be strengthened at the
expense of the less methodical Sinhalese. Governmental economic planning, risking
radical change in demographic distribution and the criteria of parliamentary
representation, fuelled discontent, which was automatically ‘psycho-somatised’ in the
121
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form of racism, positioning Dravidian and Hindu Tamils against Aryan and Buddhist
Sinhalese.123
Primordialism, as the Sri Lankan experience suggests, can be envisaged
therefore, not only as a legacy hindering development and modernisation but also as
an effect of change itself. This type of dialectics seems to be identifiable in almost all
new states emerging from the uti possidetis policy of the decolonisation process. In
the case of Indonesia, for instance, the antithesis primordiality-modernity assumes a
variety of forms in which regionalism, racism, religion and language are connected to
economic and political inequality.124
The use of primordial tendencies, stirred by centralised developmental policies,
implies the creation of a new ad hoc type of authority. Since the doctrine that
legitimates authority stems from the moral coerciveness that primordial-rooted
sentiments impose, recognition of authority comes to lie within the structural
boundaries of affinity, acknowledged as the sole ‘signifier’ of intelligible and
acceptable ‘signifieds’. This particular condition explains the strenuous violence
against and resistance to perceived alien and oppressive entities. Primordial ties, in
order to become active political forces, must be ignited by a perceived structural
inequality and inferiority of status translated into paradigmatic economic and social
realities. These perceived systemic inequalities are hence ‘ethnicised’.
Although race, kinship, language and custom can play a decisive role in the rise
of nationalism, nothing seems to be more powerful and effective than religion since it
tends to transcend reality and provide the individual with an intimate strength and
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consciousness of his place in the cosmos. The action of religion in shaping nationalist
claims, however is various because of its ‘ecological’ origins, as pointed out in an
earlier section.
In Africa, Asia and Oceania, religion has represented, and continues to
represent, an important distinctive feature in the realm of politics and to be
intrinsically connected to nationalism. Pakistan and Israel stand out as paradigms of
the osmosis existing between religion and nationalism. Pakistan, in particular,
represents an example of how a religious community can establish itself as a political
entity by overcoming the inhibiting dialectics between nationalism and Islam.125 In
other cases, especially in relatively homogeneous contexts, religion has been
employed as a welding and mobilising force in the processes of nation building. In
Japan, for instance, Shinto, rooted in the prehistoric mythical experience of the
Japanese people, moved to a conspicuous position as the great energiser in the
national effort to modernise, focusing on the Sacred Emperor as the living object of
the people’s loyalty.126

125

Islam and nationalism, in fact, have struggled to come to terms with each other since the former has
never operated the fundamental distinction between the ‘jurisdictions’ of Religion and State as
Christianity did. Islam remains inherently a way of life in which politics and the belief in Allah’s will
represent a monadic identity. See: Abbot F., ‘Pakistan and the Secular State’, in Smith D.E. (ed.), South
Asian Politics and Religion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, pp.352-370. It seems that
Sukarno, in the aftermath of Indonesia’s independence, was well aware of the particular character of
Islam. As a matter of fact, in order to bring together the multi-cultural and hetero-religious population
of the Indonesian islands, he instituted as the official religion of the state, a new form of national
religion, the Pancasila. See: Jones D.M., Political Development in Pacific Asia, Polity Press,
Cambridge, 1997, pp.31-32. For the genesis and development of the ideology of the Pancasila see:
Geertz C.,’ Ideology as a Cultural System’, in Apter D. (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, Free Press, New
York, 1976, pp.67-69.
126
The prehistoric formulation of Shinto was saisei itchi or the unity of rites and government, which
implied ipso facto that the government had always used religious rites in order to support political
issues. Before World War II Shinto, highly influenced by the religious Japanese tradition embodied in
the Zen, represented the basis of Japanese religious/spiritual state as Kokkateki Shinto (National
Shinto). Only after the war did the Japanese refer to a State Shinto (Kokka Shinto). See: Fridell W.M.,
‘Modern Japanese Nationalism: State Shinto, the religion that was ‘not a religion’’, in Merkl P.H. &
Smart N., (eds.), Religion and Politics in the Modern World, New York University Press, New York,
1983, pp.155-168.
56

As Hans Kohn has pointed out, the rise of nationalism is usually preceded by a
revival and reformulation of religious principles and attitudes.127 In India, for
instance, under the pressure of British reformism which impinged upon some of the
fundamental religious beliefs and values of the local populace, religious authorities
promoted a series of revivals and reforms of Hinduism.128 Buddhism, Judaism and
Islamism, also, in order to become bearers of nationalism, had at times to undergo
processes of either revival or reform. In the Islamic context Wahabbism is, for
instance, a clear example of Islamic revivalism, which at the beginning of the XIX
century resulted in the creation of a political realm, although delimited by hazy
boundaries, and still represents the core of Saudi Arabia’s nationalism.129 In Turkey,
often regarded as an example of ‘secularised’ Islamic state, in reality nationalism was
born out of the latent, structural tension or dialectics between the religious faction of
Islam and the secularist establishment engaged in an attempt to accommodate western
thought and technology with Islamic tradition.130 As Yavuz points out “because
secularism did not separate religion and politics but rather subordinated religion to the
political realm, it promoted the politicisation of Islam and of the struggle between
secularists and Muslims for the control of the state”.131 Analogously Judaism, in
which the common origins of religious and historical consciousness are evident,
experienced a series of reforms and internal tensions at the turn of the XX century
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which brought about the emergence of Zionism, an ideology which, centred on the
historical and religious meaning of Zion, aimed at restoring Erez Israel (the Land of
Israel) to the Jewish people.132 The debate prompted by Zionism on whether Israel
was to be a ‘Jewish State’ or a ‘State of Jews’ still continues.133 Furthermore,
Hinduism134 and Theravada Buddhism,135 due to their particular legalistic,
philosophical and presumed a-historical nature, in order to become driving forces in
nationalist movements underwent reforms which either ‘historicised’ or ‘pragmatised’
their contents which often led them, as in the Sri-Lankan case, to link with the
exclusive and restrictive notion of race.136
Further evidence of the intimate connection between religion and nationalism is
the appearance of religious sects and politico-religious movements in contexts where
political activity is forbidden by the colonial authorities or where the development of
132
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a widespread national consciousness is still embryonic. The Maji-Maji uprising of
1905-1907 in German East Africa (modern Tanzania)137 and the Mau-Mau rebellion
in British Kenya are typical examples of this kind of phenomenon. In these politicoreligious movements, often of an eschatological, messianic and apocalyptic nature, a
new prophetic leadership emerges against both the colonial and traditional power
structure, since the former aims at introducing reforms and policies subverting the
native socio-economic system founded on traditional religious beliefs, and the latter
appears unable to oppose or protect against foreign intrusions. The Mau-Mau and the
Maji-Maji rebellions as well as the Melanesian cargo cults are expression of this type
nationalism, erroneously considered immature or larval, in which the desire for
independence and nationhood still float in an indistinct aura of mystic religiousness
because of the lack of ‘systemic institutions’ through which to ‘structure’ their claims.
In studying the intricate relation between religion and nationalism in the new
states, one must distinguish at the outset the two complementary levels on which
religion manifests itself: the institutional and the emotional, that is the public and the
private. The former refers to the institutionalisation and ritualising of religious beliefs
and organisations as a systemic adjustment to the material world; the latter to the
original relationship between the individual and the divine enucleated in religious
ideology which influences both the ethical and psychological dimensions of a human
being. From an epistemological point of view it is necessary to distinguish between
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the effects that religion, as a corpus of moral doctrines, has on the development of
nationalist ideologies and the pragmatic activity of religious institutions such as the
Church, the Mosque and the Synagogue.
The dichotomy between the private and the public dimension of religion can be
exemplified by the Filipino struggle for independence. Here in the religious rite of the
Pasyon, the theological significance of the image of the ‘suffering servant’ combined
with the activity of the lower indigenous clergy influenced the modes of action and
thought of the peasant nationalist movements. As Ileto has pointed out, the
dramatisation of the story of Jesus Christ and the rituals of the Holy Week had two
different functions in Filipino society. Apart from being employed by the Spanish
colonisers, through the activity of the missionaries, to instil respect and loyalty both to
the Spanish Crown and to the Church, these stories introduced moral and
eschatological preoccupations into a peasant and illiterate population. It was this
function, over which the missionaries and colonial power lost control that provided
the Philippine society “with a language for articulating its own values, ideals and even
hopes of liberation”.138
The contribution of religion in the creation of nationalist ideologies and
movements can be explained by considering the essence and character of religious
beliefs. Religion appears, in fact, to be always associated with soteriological needs
and expectations and a theodicy that can provide the quester with a suitable and
pacifying response to the world in the guise of a set of behaviours, norms and values.
Consequently the transposition of this function from the private sphere to the realm of
public affairs flows naturally since religion informs the moral codes of conduct of
individuals and communities. In the locus where this transition occurs lies the origin
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of the phenomenon of nationalism that bridges moral norms with the political
institutions of the state.
The role the Church played in the struggle for independence in East Timor is
paradigmatic in illustrating the function of religion and religious institutions in
shaping nationalist ideologies and struggles. The Catholic Church became the
institution that catalysed and structured nationalist claims and resistance of the East
Timorese against colonial rule.139 Similarly in Greece the Orthodox Church became,
under Ottoman domination, the repository of the Byzantine tradition to which the
nationalists turned for inspiration.140 In Russia it acted as a unifying and driving force
and “alone realised the identity of liberty and unity”.141 In Poland142 and in Ireland143
Roman Catholicism played an important role in preserving both the Polish and Irish
nation, preventing their assimilation into their neighbouring invaders.
The ecclesiastical involvement in nationalist struggles, however, does not ipso
facto or syllogistically imply that the Church and its theology are the initiators of
independence claims, or the demiurge of nationalist sentiments, but that these simply
act as stable gravitational points in moments of collective and individual uncertainty
and distress. In Southern and Central Africa, for instance, the independent churches,
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that traced their origins to schismatic church movements (Ethiopian and Zionist) in
neighbouring South Africa and Rhodesia, became the systemic centres to which the
oppressed workers and peasants turned to in their quest for self-rule and racial and
cultural dignity. Although, in some cases, as in the Ethiopian Church, they became
effective nationalist institutions with a budget, a constitution, a flag and a paramilitary
force, the churches never initiated nationalist movements but simply gathered and
rationally condensed the feelings of resentment and the aspirations to social and
economic equality of their followers.144
In colonial settings a factor that may have caused religion to become often the
focus or seedbed of nationalist movements and ideologies is the work carried out by
the missionaries whose activity greatly encroached upon the indigenous systems of
belief. Their presence introduced, in non-western colonial contexts, notions of
strangeness, diversity and pluralism, disrupting existing categories and worldviews.
The emergence of messianic movements stemmed from the ‘transitional religious
milieu’, often assuming nationalist accents and connotations. The mixture of Christian
and indigenous religious elements in the ideologies of these movements indicates how
deeply rooted religion is in the collective unconsciousness.
Christianity also introduced a new way of organising a community’s life by
establishing new institutions such as schools, hospitals and churches, which replaced
traditional kinship structures, and new technologies, which altered traditional labour
patterns. New categories of thought and cognitive systems associated with western
socio-economic systems eroded traditional organisations.
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Hastings argues that the nation as a cultural construction and category is of
Christian origin and where it has appeared it has done so “within a process of
Westernisation or imitation of the Christian world, even if it was imitated as Western
rather than as Christian”.145 Christianity, in fact, appears to stimulate the rise of
nationalism because of a combination of, sometimes unique, elements. These are the
tendency to sanctify and canonise the origins of a particular community by rooting it
in particular historical occurrences or events that come to be mythologised or
commemorated, especially when celebrated as threats to national identity. Thus
Christianity’s providential perspective represents the locus in which nationalism and
history are ‘visibly’ conjugated. Furthermore the social and structural role played by
the clergy, the production of vernacular literatures, the provision of a biblical model
of the nation, the existence of an autonomous national church and the discovery of a
unique national destiny may have also acted as structural and doctrinal factors in the
formulation of the idea of nation, nationhood and nationalism within the Christian
religious milieu.146
Ecclesiastical hierarchy and congregational organization, the existence of
canonical Scriptures and of institutional ritualism, supported by an apodeictic legalism
and a proselytic missionary activity, are some of the elements that have favoured the
involvement of Christianity in political and nationalist struggles. Important and
determinant was also its ideology based on the ideals of freedom and equality and a
promise of palingenetic renewal and soteriological achievement. Christianity, having
already undergone a transformation disengaging it from a peculiar homeland and
ecosystem in the first centuries of the Christian era, assumed an ecumenical and
universal character in a way that its ‘sublimated’ contents and forms became
145
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transferable to and translatable into any cultural context: the odyssey of the ‘People of
Israel’ became the symbol and paradigm of all human nations.
The diffusion of the Christian message and of biblical ‘theolegomena’147 and
images has been possible through the appropriation of the language of the people
addressed. The first translations of the Scriptures into indigenous idioms began to
circulate in colonial settings along with the spread and multiplication of missionary
posts during the XIX century. Against the colonisation of language by political and
administrative authorities, the missionaries opposed the ‘translation’. This became a
metonym of a process of conversion, which brought about the transformation of
differences into similarities and western logical categories into indigenous ones.148
Although it has been used in nationalist movements to emphasise distinctiveness and
individuality, language has never been the fons et origo or causa prima of nationalist
movements.149
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Religion itself can be envisaged as a language of symbolic significances, a
means of semiotic communication intelligible only to the members of the
congregation, a means that fosters a system of relationships by constructing
diaphanous webs of structural correspondences. For foundational character religion is
able to create homogeneous communities from heterogeneous groups.

Conclusions
In the discussion above, I have tried to provide a critical and comprehensive
overview of theories of nationalism in order to identify an appropriate approach to the
study of West Papuan nationalism. It has emerged that each theory considered,
deriving from the analysis of a single nationalism, remains tied to a specific spatiotemporal context and is not transferable and applicable to another. The ‘particularity’
and ‘particularism’ that characterises the phenomenon of nationalism, consequently,
accounts for its ontic elusiveness.
My critical overview of theories has also revealed that religion has constantly
played an important role in almost all the nationalisms studied inducing one to
conclude that an appropriate approach to the study of nationalism is likely to involve
the domain of the religious experiences that inform the culture and historical
consciousness of both the individual and the community. Religion, as a system of
psychological and social adaptation to physical contingencies and occurrences as well
as a system of meaning embodied in intelligible symbols and ritual performances,
generates specific underlying and communally shared assumptions about time, space
and language that foster intra- and inter-group communication inherently tending to
define and demarcate boundaries within which discourses about identity, nationhood
and ethnicity are able to develop.
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This type of approach reveals that communities, irrespective of their socioeconomic and political organization, have a peculiar historicity. The denial by both
modernist and primordialist theories of a pre-colonial history to pre-literate and/or
non-western populations appears to be without empirical foundation since it has been
constructed on the assumption that nationalism is exclusively a European category or
invention transferred to colonial settings. It is possible to argue that what is eminently
European is the form of state system imposed in decolonising settings that called forth
the construction of an ad hoc nation to ‘match’ and eventually overcome those
structures.
The foundational (not functional) role of religion in eliciting historical and
ethnic consciousness will represent the theoretical underpinning of the study of West
Papuan nationalism. The surviving mythical accounts, recorded over a long period of
time by missionaries, casual explorers, anthropologists and colonial administrators,
reveal the existence of an historical consciousness rooted in the particular
religiousness of the Papuan people which acted as the mould of their ethnic identity in
pre-colonial and colonial times. Although these accounts have been muddled up by
the recorders, creating what Levi-Strauss calls, “a hodge-podge made up of tradition
and beliefs belonging to great many different social groups”,150 it is nevertheless
possible to identify functional categories of Papuan hermeneutics by which to
organise and interpret systematically autochthonous perceptions of experiential data
provided by identifiable Papuan chronicles.
The lack of native written documents and the ‘forced’ reliance on ‘observers’
accounts’ call for the identification of a methodology able to overcome the risk of
ethnocentrism on the part of the observer. This will be dealt with in the next chapter.
150

Levi-Strauss C., op.cit., p. 35.
66

Chapter II
The Architecture and Archaeology of Memory and Oblivion
Or the Conundrums of Methodology and Hermeneutics

L’oubli, et je dirai même l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la
création d’une nation, et c’est ainsi que le progrès des études historiques est
souvent pour la nationalité un danger.1

Ernest Renan’s statement regarding the meaning of the idea of nation once again
alludes to the amoebic, elusive and ambiguous ontology of the concept. The French
scholar argues that the nation is the product of a collective amnesia implying that the
origin of the idea resides in the demiurgic power of a volitional act. Consequently,
since the nation appears to be an artificial product of the will, which manipulates and
interpolates the past to sustain its creation, historical inquiry may also represent a
threat because of its potential to awake or actualise the quiescent reminiscent faculty
of an ‘amnesic nation’.
Because of the central role historical consciousness plays in the problematic
identified in chapter I, I wish to show that this appears to be rooted in the religious
domain of a people. It has emerged from the previous discussion that religious
consciousness and historical consciousness appear to constitute a monad, an
indissoluble identity encompassing the fundamental notions of time and space.
The veridicality of such a postulate or axiom can be proven by observing the
different modes and means by which people account for the occurrence of events and
represent the world they live in. If, as Heraclitus once stated, “war is the father of

1

Renan E., ‘Qu’est-ce qu’ une nation?’, in Oeuvres Complètes de Ernest Renan, Tome I, Édition
définitive établie par Henriette Psichari, Calmann-Lévy Éditeurs, Paris, p. 891. Translation:
“Forgetfulness, and I would also add historical error, are an essential factor for the creation of a nation,
and that the development of historical studies is often a danger for nationality”.
67

all”,2 ‘meaning’ can be considered as the discriminating factor of all. Consequently
interpretation or hermeneutics become an important factor in drawing peculiar
epistemologies and historical narratives. The recovery of such an hermeneutics and its
modes of structuring are essential to the understanding of the creation or emergence of
nationalist discourses, ideologies and narratives.
Eugene Weber, in tune with Renan’s statement, argues, in his Peasants into
Frenchmen, that the notion of oblivion is a necessary prerequisite to the construction
of a nation.3 The process of forgetting the past paves, in fact, the way to forget and
overcome the idiosyncrasies of an inherent tribalism. Remembrance cannot be
assumed as the effective basis on which to found a national history able to coalesce
the disparate temporal and geographic experiences of individual ‘demotic clusters’
into a comprehensive ethnic group. Oblivion, by contrast, constitutes the basis to
create and imagine a past of shared experiences. This explains why more than being
founded on concrete historical mémoires, nationalism appears to be rooted in a
particular historiography, in a sort of abstract réverie d’un temps perdu.
Analogously the emergence of West Papuan nationalism appears to be the
outcome of a collective reminiscence of mythical unity and amnesia of historical
idiosyncrasies embedded in their distinctive tribal cultures. This is embodied in the
Papuan myths referring to an ancestral Golden Age, variously known as the Koreri
among the inhabitants of the Biak-Numfor area, Hai or Nabelan-Kapelan among the
Dani people of the interior. These myths stemmed from the common belief of an
original a-temporal spatial and ontological reality of unity and harmony, a ‘Paradise’
lost because of a man’s act of foolishness. The loss, that inaugurated time, entropy,
multiplicity and death, was however compensated by the hope or promise of the
2
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return, the νοστος, of the original, primeval unity, a promise that accounts for the
presence of eschatological and messianic expectations, of ‘nost-algia’ (Lat. ‘longing
to return’), in Papuan religiousness. Even among the Marind-anim of the south coast,
where no analogue of the ‘Golden Age’ has been found, the theme of the return is
present in particular in the Sosom cult as will be shown later in this chapter.4 Here,
because of the precariousness and insalubrity of the environment, a complex religious
system of ritual performances covering all aspects of human life during the
astronomical year, appears to have replaced or compensated the evolution of such a
belief.
As will emerge from the discussion in the following chapters, this expectation
represents a recurrent feature in the religious systems of many Papuan tribes and that
manifested itself in times of crisis and change. When Christianity landed on Papuan
shores, it found this fertile spiritual humus on which to implant the Christian
soteriological message of moral redemption and social palingenesis. Christianity,
following its inculturation into the indigenous templates, appears to have harnessed
and synthesised the apparent heterogeneity of expressions of Papuan religiousness and
provided a common unifying language and symbolism in which to articulate Papuan
aspirations.
In my opinion, the rise of Papuan nationalism can be explained only with
reference to its pre-colonial religious worldview, condensed in a series of traditional
narratives, and its intersection with colonial and Christian institutions. As will be
argued in chapter III, a variety of external factors and contingencies triggered the rise
of internal perceptions of identity and diversity that came to be rationally elaborated
3
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and expressed in the political discourses of nationalism and independence. Since the
locus of Papuan identity seems to reside in the unfolding of and participation to
historical processes and events, the exploration of past developments and the
experiences of the Papuan people come to represent the empirical field of inquiry. In
the Papuan case, this empirical basis presents itself as a minefield beset with problems
not only of methodology, regarding the use and historicity of the existing sources of
information, but also, and above all, of hermeneutics.
The processes involved in the emergence and construction of West Papuan
nationhood and nationalist discourses have never constituted an object of systematic
analysis. West Papua has been considered, since its ‘discovery’ by the Western world,
a field of anthropological and ethnographic inquiry. Scholars have limited their
research to the mapping of socio-economic and political structures and cultural
templates of a myriad of tribal communities believed to be still living at the dawn of
civilisation. Consequently the evolutionist or diffusionist approaches, based on the
synchronic empiricism typical of social sciences, have implicitly denied historicity to
Papuan societies, freezing them in the remoteness of a static primitivism. By
fragmenting Papuan society in a number of individual tribal units, anthropologists and
ethnographers have concentrated their attention on the study of one Papuan people or
tribe at a time. The category of ‘tribe’,5 a product of occidental logic, by denying
implicitly the notion of civitas or civilisation, has contributed to enhance the
perception of the ‘nationlessness’ of the Papuan people.
The anthropological and ethnographical approach to the study of West Papuan
societies and worldview explains why West Papuan historiography is of relatively
recent vintage or still in its embryonic phase. Its official beginnings date to the
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aftermath of World War II during the intensive scheme of nation building developed
and undertaken by the Dutch colonial administration.
The type of historiography developed during this period lacks distinctive
authenticity and appears to be enmeshed with Dutch propaganda aiming at forestalling
Indonesia’s request for incorporation of the territory. The historical reconstruction,
commissioned in the middle of the XIX century by the Dutch colonial government
and carried out by Haga, is an attempt to prove the ethnic distinctiveness of the
Papuans vis-à-vis their Indo-Malay neighbours and their territorial independence.6
Although there is no institutional link between the two projects being currently
undertaken, analogous bias appears to affect the project regarding the ‘Rectification of
Papuan History’ announced in the year 2000 by the Presidium Dewan Papua7 in
conjunction with the study, currently under way at the Institute for Dutch History in
the Netherlands and financed by the Dutch government, regarding the developments
surrounding the 1969 Act of Free Choice.8 While colonial interests prompted Haga’s
research, the more recent project appears to be in line with the persisting neo-colonial
interests and ambitions of the Dutch government that reluctantly was forced to
surrender West Papua to Indonesia in 1962.
The revision of the developments and events leading to the 1969 Act of Free
Choice appears to be based on the implicit assumption that West Papuan history
began with Dutch colonial rule that reached its apex in the years between 1945 and
1962. As stated in the previous chapter, this stance appears to be clearly supported by
6
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post-colonial (postmodern) historiography that, while providing romantic and
attractive analyses of the aims and processes of colonial representations and
discourses, inherently and simultaneously provides the grounds, means and modes for
neo-colonial constructions, policies and justifications so that the category of the
‘colonial’ is constantly being reiterated and articulated in new representations. This is
done by resorting to the denial of colonial notions of primitivism in the name of what
can be regarded as neo-colonial representations or categories of ‘ethnic identity’ and
‘ethnicity’. The category of the ‘colonial’ continues to survive in the current research
of anthropologists who, as already pointed out, tend to approach the study of Papuan
society on a ‘tribal basis’ just as their eminent predecessors of colonial times did.
This thesis represents an attempt to break away from this type of scholarship
and produce an integrative study of West Papuan nationalism by overcoming the
apparent cultural differences of Papuan society generated by anthropological studies
and step beyond the recent developments and processes of induced nationalism and
nation-building. Consequently the study calls for the identification of a methodology
capable of overcoming the limitations of the sources available.
In the present chapter I will try to identify the epistemological bases for
understanding the notion of ‘Papua’, that is the categories that define and differentiate
the concept in relation to the West by examining the nature of the sources available in
a diachronic and a synchronic perspective. This will bring the discussion to question
whether it is possible to write a history of Papua that reflects the Papuan cognition of
events and processes as expression of a Papuan identity.
Since it has been impossible to carry out field work in West Papua because of
the existing political tensions in the territory, which have intensified following the
September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the killing in November of the same year of
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one of the nationalist leaders, Theys Eluay,9 episodes which have contributed to create
unsafe conditions for foreign travellers and in particular researchers, I had to rely on
archival resources outside West Papua.10 This unfavourable circumstance has
represented a partial set back for my research. Firstly, I have missed out on the
possibility of experiencing Papuan landscapes and the records that they incorporate
since I agree with Barbara Bender’s assumption that “there is an historicity and
spatiality to people’s engagement with the world around them” recorded in the
landscape created by that very engagement.11 Secondly, I had to face the problems
entailed with the use of archives stemming from the criteria adopted in selecting and
preserving documents and how these can be identified and retrieved, each archive
being inherently a political construction of memory generating discourses to protect
the interests of hegemonic groups. An analysis of the archives of Papuan history will
be provided in this chapter and this discussion will lead to consider the important issue
regarding the historicity of the Papuan people and the possibility of writing a Papuan
history, issues implicitly bound to the problem of Papuan nationhood and nationalism.
Since the writing of history is tied to the conception that a society has of time,
the temporal categories of pre-literate societies will be considered so to identify an ad
hoc hermeneutics to understand Papuan conception of history and related
gnoseological templates and to clear the grounds of the colonial categories of
primitivism and history-less people.
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The Western Archives of West Papua
At the outset of a study that aims at reconstructing the historical developments
involved in the emergence of processes and discourses of ethnic and national identity
in a preliterate context, a brief critical evaluation of the sources available and the
hermeneutical problems entailed with their use, represents a methodological
imperative.
There is an extensive anthropological and sociological literature regarding the
analysis of what has been termed by some distinguished academics as ‘primitive
societies’. Although acknowledging the inestimable value of such literature both for its
ethnographic accuracy and ethnological analysis, one cannot fail to notice that its
approach to the study of non-Western societies appears to be biased or affected either
by a intrinsic diachronic evolutionism or synchronic diffusionism. Both approaches
tend to consider societies, not invested by the processes of modernisation, as
‘primitive’, ‘primordial’ or ‘savage’.
Primitivism, stemming from the philosophical speculations of XVIII century
Enlightenment and idealised by XIX century Romanticism in the myth of the Bon
Sauvage, was first devised as a ‘scientific’ category by the antiquarian and
intellectualist stream of anthropological studies, inaugurated by Edward Burnet Tylor
and Sir James Frazer during the second half of the XIX century. For the
intellectualists, contemporary primitive societies represented the initial stage of human
social and cultural development. The Marxist tradition, notwithstanding its attempt to
break away from the abstraction of the intellectualist approach, also fell victim of the
same ethnocentric debacle by considering the non-western societies as either the
antithesis or a derivative of the Occident. Both the intellectualist and the Marxist
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speculations postulate the static nature of pre-literate societies,12 hermeneutical stances
that served the political and economic interests of the colonial powers and justified the
policies of acculturation, assimilation and development implemented in the colonised
territories.
The scientific literature regarding West Papua appears to be influenced by these
ethnocentric/Eurocentric attitudes. The information is consequently biased and
deformed to suit the systemic postulates of the examiner and, in some cases, the
political interests of the commissioning agency. However, the ‘before’ can only be
reconstructed by the ‘after’, that is by means of an historical investigation based on
documenta that impart a particular, distorted interpretation as the etymology of the
word ‘document’ implies.
The literary sources contained in Portuguese and Dutch colonial archives appear
also to be politicised since they inherently attempt to justify the colonial enterprise.
Before the year 1855, when the first missionaries landed on Papuan shores, archival
references to West Papua are random or exceptional. Only when the race for colonies
and resources gained momentum among the European countries did West Papua gain
attention and consideration. In other words, in our reconstruction of Papuan historical
narratives we must rely on documents and evidences compiled and handed down by
European missionaries, traders, explorers and colonial administrators with all the
hermeneutical and epistemological problems connected to the use of such sources. The
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subjective perceptions, interests and aims of the reporter-observer inevitably distort or
bias the objectivity of the facts reported.
The XVI century Portuguese and Spanish sources that I have been able to gain
access to in the Vatican Archives and Library contain a few random references to the
Papuans. These references are at times anecdotal in character and appear to be in tune
with the spirit of the time and that travelogue literature more interested in the
recording of curiosities and mirabilia than in the gaining of some sort of scientific
knowledge.
The nature of this exotic and picturesque literature contributed to support the
colonial enterprise by implicitly pointing out the diversity and backwardness of distant
peoples and places, the ‘antipodal inversion’ characterising their world,13 and the
superiority of the Western Christian world endowed with the duty to provide for the
development of these peoples. In chapter III I will refer to this literature in order to
identify the nature of South-east Asian Christianity and its relation with the Papuans.
The archives and the literature reveal that the Papuans appear to be in the XVI
century a particular group, suddenly disappearing a century later from the records. No
reference is made to the Papuans in the XVII century. This silence of the archives may
be explained by the unrest characterising the region at that time caused by the
confrontations and battles between the Dutch, the Portuguese and the British over the
control of the lucrative spice trade.14 The role that the Papuans played in these
struggles, and whether they did participate, is difficult to determine although it is
possible to speculate that, because of their ties with the Sultanate of Tidore and the
relations with the Papuan settlements in north Halmahera (Jailolo), the Papuans
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somehow either participated in or were affected by the struggles as will be shown in
chapter III.
The Papuans reappear again in the XVIII and XIX century Dutch sources in
relation to disturbances and troubles they were causing to mercantile navigation in the
Maluku-Ceram area as will be discussed in chapter III. It is possible to argue that these
disturbances may have been a direct consequence or the continuation of Papuan
activity during the XVII century struggles and supports my previous hypothesis
regarding their possible direct involvement. In contrast with the anecdotical nature of
the Iberian sources, the Dutch records appear to be more precise and attentive in
reporting the Papuans. These sources, in fact, contain important ethnographic
information of the Papuan people and their territory. Anthropology, at the time, was
considered by the Dutch government as a discipline with the purpose of providing
practical and useful knowledge of Indonesian peoples to prospective colonial
administrators. It was therefore a discipline subordinated to politics and political
economy, without theoretical autonomy. The pragmatic rather than scholarly approach
was emphasised by the institutional link between ethnology and geography in
academic studies.15 For this reason most of the research in and on West Papua was
conducted by administrative and missionary institutions that, although sharing the
same general aims of pacification and acculturation, developed differing cognitive
dispositions influenced by their respective preoccupations.16
The administrators, concerned with the maintenance of law and order and the
planning of a viable political and economic development in the colonial territory,
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tended to channel the ethnological and anthropological research in order to meet these
goals. Acculturation and pacification, by contrast, acquired a different meaning for the
missionaries who aimed at creating the conditions for evangelisation and conversion.17
The action of the latter proved to be more incisive and penetrating than that of the
colonial administrators, with education and literacy becoming the means to ‘intrude’
into and change the native cognitive and belief systems. Furthermore, at times, the
accounts of the missionaries, in particular those prior to World War II, were written
for either edifying or proselytic purposes and directed to a Christian audience and
consequently can be regarded as the product of a particular discourse stemming from
and supporting the ecclesiastical establishment and power structure.
The diversity of intents produced a collection of ethnographic works that
differed considerably as to content and perspective. Other contrasting approaches
emerge when comparing more recent anthropological material collected by mainly
Dutch professional anthropologists. Although some of this research was commissioned
by the colonial government,18 it has a more autonomous stance in the processes of data
collection and analysis. However even the scientific ethnographies of professional
anthropologists are rather heterogeneous in their interpretation and understanding of
West Papuan culture. Each anthropologist, in fact, embraced a peculiar approach
reflecting the different anthropological schools of thought of the time.19 Hermeneutics
appear to have been ‘politicised’ by the academic competition.
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Wolf & Jaarsma, ibid., p.111.
J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong held the Chair of General Anthropology at Leiden University between
1922 and 1956. During this period he was able to overcome the pragmatic use of anthropology
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op.cit., pp.113-115.
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The ethnographies by Frederick Christian Kamma, who worked as a missionary
in West Papua during the 1930s in the Biak-Numfor area, are paradigmatic in this
regard. In fact, while attempting to explain Papuan reactions to European penetration
and presence with reference to Papuan beliefs and values, Kamma’s analysis
inevitably comes to be influenced and channelled by the tenets and modes of structural
anthropology in vogue at the time. Written in a period of intensive Dutch rule in West
Papua during the early 1950s, it aims at serving Dutch neo-colonial ambitions.
However the detailed collection of myths, events and rituals is invaluable for any
researcher that approaches the study of pre-war West Papua. Kamma’s findings and
assessments have provided a departure point for this thesis, which, however, moves
away from both the spatio-temporal limits characterising his work, in order to provide
a comprehensive study of West Papuan nationalism, as well as his methodology.
The only means available to overcome the epistemological impasse presented by
the West Papuan anthropological and ethnographical literature is to collate similar
pieces of information derived from contemporary sources, as a devised criterion of
plausibility, and then proceed to inductively infer veridical facts contrasting them,
when possible, with the evidence contained in native mythological accounts.
On a first reading of the available primary and secondary sources examined in
the course of my research, it emerges that Dutch propagandist historiography created
‘the Papuan nation’ inducing the people to forget their original tribal divisions and
come together under a single, common banner. If this was the case, it might be
suggested that the cultural templates of the Papuan tribes presented common traits that
could function as catalysts prompting the rise of feelings of commonness. On the basis
of this assumption any analysis exploring the genesis of nationalism needs to
determine to which extent an ‘original’ Papuan history has been preserved in the
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colonial-induced nationalist historiography and/or how Papuan historical/mythical
narratives have been used to create it. Departing from the existing archival records and
the existing anthropological and historical literature, I will follow a journey à rebours
in time in order to identify the locus or substratum of Papuan identity on which it was
possible to found a common nationalist discourse.
In my opinion such a locus can be identified only by recovering original Papuan
hermeneutics, visible in Papuan narratives, that is the structural-semantic relations
underlying Papuan modes of narration and representation. As I argue in chapter I, in
regard to the nexus of religion-culture, these structural semantic relations appear to
have been determined and defined by processes of adjustment to a particular
ecosystem prompting simultaneous processes of internal integration among the
members of the group sharing common ecological boundaries. Consequently notions
of time and space appear to be the product of these very processes and function as the
basic organising principles of religious and cultural templates. The intrinsic semantics
and functional modes of these notions need to be defined and explored in order to
identify Papuan historical consciousness as well as historicism.
Historical documents contained in European archives, dating back to the period
between the XIV and XIX centuries, contain references to the existence of ‘a’ Papuan
people and their activity in the South-east Asian region. While many Asian and
South-east Asian kingdoms had a long tradition of historical recording, the Papuans
were still relying on mnemonic devices and ritual repetitiveness to transmit historical
events.
The arrival of the missionaries in the territory, followed some years later by that
of the Dutch colonial administrators, represented a turning point in Papuan history as
well as historiography. Historical events, witnessed by the Europeans inhabiting the
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territory, began to be recorded in letters, reports and official documents. The archive
of Papuan events that was thus being slowly constructed consisted, however, of a
fragmentary record of events similar to the Roman annalistic tradition, but from which
I believe it is possible to elicit ‘chronicles’, destitute of momentousness, of Papuan
history. What characterises this type of historical archive regarding Papuan nationalist
and historical discourses is the emerging latent antithesis between the assumed or
presumed Western creationism, manifesting itself in processes of acculturation and
assimilation, and a non-Western parthenogenesis embedded in the phenomenon, often
referred to as revivalism or nativism and expressed in the so-called cargo cults.

The ‘Vexata Quaestio’ of Hermeneutics
“In the beginning there was the West.
And the West was with God.
And the West was God”.
My parody of the first lines of John’s Gospel aims at stressing the nature of
colonial, historical and anthropological epistemologies. The Christian West has
constantly acted as the frame of reference against which non-Western societies have
been analysed and ‘judged’. The deriving prejudices, in fact, are nothing but the
outcome of this despicable act of misjudgment. The West has for centuries embodied
the evangelical Logos, the absolute hypostasis of God’s order, perfection, truth and
intelligence. The ‘Rest’, in this biased perspective, came to be envisaged as the result
of an ‘act of creation’ of Western wisdom.
The notion of primitivism associated with pre-literate societies, has caused the
rise of prejudices and preconceptions that have conditioned the study of cultural
systems. It has been argued in Marxist circles that processes of modernisationWesternisation would have inevitably prompted processes of secularisation of
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indigenous systems of socio-political and economic organization. The argument
postulated that the worldview of pre-literate societies was inherently religious, magic
and mythical lacking of any notion based on scientific empiricism or rationalism.
Modernisation would have transformed the homo religious into a homo theoreticus. A
sort of Copernican revolution would have taken place in which anthropocentrism
would have replaced the original theocentrism and western rationalism would have
swept away the assumed irrationalism of native epistemology and hermeneutics. The
emergence of nationalist ideologies and movements in non-western societies, while on
one hand seemingly to be the outcome of either adjustment or resistance to processes
of induced modernisation and acculturation, is also characterised by the revival of
autochthonous cultural beliefs, values and expressions. This leads one to hypothesise
that, more than being acculturated, non-western societies tended to translate the
intrusive structures and ideas through their own epistemological categories before
systemising them into their autochthonous gnoseology and cultural templates. In the
following chapters this tendency will clearly emerge.
Current hermeneutics, notwithstanding the attempt made by some authors to
break away from the tenets tenaciously sustained and divulged by a traditional and
sclerotic academia, have continued to maintain and foster the ethnocentrism of the
beginnings. On the other hand, independent non-western epistemologies have failed to
be developed by that same intelligentsia that fought against colonial rule and its
attempt to destroy non-western identities in the name of a ‘constructed’ ethnic and
cultural distinctiveness. Thus epistemological colonialism has replaced territorial
colonialism. The ‘Asian values’ debate can be regarded as a clear attempt to move
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away from Western imposed notions and views of the world and of history towards
the recovery of autochthonous, pre-colonial hermeneutics and epistemologies.20
The existence of the phenomenon of revivalism, which casts a shadow of doubt
over the validity of the tenets of Marxist and intellectualist epistemologies, induces to
critically question some of the inveterate notions and concepts of the primitivistevolutionist approach and acknowledge the inherent originality and rationality of preliterate cultural systems. Fabian, in his Time and the Other, has pointed out that the
misconception and misrepresentation of non-western societies has been generated by
the methodology of anthropological studies which were, at times, serving colonial
interests, and which translated spatial and cultural differences into temporal
distances.21
The challenge is at this stage and under these circumstances to identify a new
mode of analysis and interpretation capable of reinstating cultural entities in their
autochthonous and ‘original’ perspective, although I acknowledge that “the origin is
possible and conceivable only in disguise”.22 Consequently the silence of the archives,
the ‘momentary’ disappearance of the Papuans from the records, becomes a
‘momentous’ and significant fact, although it is merely a ‘disguise’. The problem with
archival material is that, as Derrida points out,

“the technical structure of the

archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its
very coming into existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization
produces as much as it records the event”.23 In other words, ‘factuality’ is the condicio
20

Khoo Boo Teik, ‘The Values of a Miracle: Malaysian and Singaporean Elite Constructions of Asia’,
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Fabian J., Time and the Other. How Anthropology Makes its Object, Columbia University Press,
New York, 1983, pp. 17-18.
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Derrida J., ‘Force and Signification’, in Derrida J., Writing and Difference, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
London, 1978, p. 8.
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Derrida J., Archive Fever. A Freudian Impression, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995,
p. 17.
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sine qua non of ‘historicity’. The ‘decision’ to include the document or record the
event in the “sequential and iussive” archive determines its historicity and therefore
the possibility of history.24
It appears evident that any attempt to reconstruct and chronicle the historical
developments of cultural realities that lack written documents proves to be a sort of
Sisyphus fatigue. In fact the historian, struggling to attain a tantalising scientific
objectivity, tends inevitably to adopt epistemological and hermeneutical parameters
and criteria derived from his personal cultural perceptions and experiences and to
apply them to the analysis of events and activities of a perceived ‘unknown and
foreign world’. The antithesis between the emic and the etic, the crux of
anthropological analyses, besides appearing in all its crude reality, stands here as an
insurmountable hurdle. The cause for the existence of such a hermeneutical chasm is
to be imputed to an epistemology, that acknowledges a large number of followers in
modern historiography, claiming that only the histoire événementielle, namely
occurred and documented facts, can constitute the object of historical analyses.
Consequently what falls outside the ‘realm of factuality’ is mere subjective
speculation.25
‘Factual history’, fundamentally concerned with reconstructing occurrences in
chronological and causational succession, betrays its bias by extracting and isolating
events from a supposed and fictitiously constructed historical ‘progression’ and
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Foucault argues that “The necessity of Madness, throughout the history of the West, is linked to the
deciding gesture which detaches from the background noise, and from its continuous monotony, a
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of history”. Quoted from Derrida J., Writing and Difference…cit., p. 42. Cfr. Foucault M., Madness
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historical methodology can be found in the preface to his The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, first published in 1843 (republished: AMS Press, New York,
1975, pp. 1-4) in which he stated the importance of archival documents for historical reconstruction.
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charging them with pretentious universal significations.26 This type of methodology
consequently hinders the understanding of the motivations of historical agencies,
yielding to artificiality, misconception and void rhetoric. It derives that an historical
analysis that aims at reconstructing a history wie es eigentlich gewesen (as it
happened)27 must consider other underlying factors in the genesis of events and
phenomena.
The necessity to consider and examine psychological factors, individual and
collective, involved in the genesis and spatio-temporal occurrence of historical events
emerges a fortiori when confronted with the unreliability of historicist assumptions
and patterns which tend to indulge in universalistic generalisations.28 This appears
evident in the new historicist trend, inaugurated in the 1980s, and known as New
Historicism,29 which postulates the shaping intentions in literary and political
behaviour and their linkage with cultural phenomena, the Foucaultian relation
between power and discourse, the historicity of the text and the textuality of history.30
New Historicism seems to have abandoned its universalising philosophical and
teleological habitus to embrace a methodological approach, influenced by a positive
evaluation of the so-called micro-history,31 and what Ricoeur refers to as a
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“hermeneutics of suspicion”.32 In this new epistemological milieu historicism is
conceived as the spatio-temporal ‘contextualisation’ of events, a process which entails
a “formal comparative placing of an event, form of behaviour, or concept in a series
of others which are similar though they may be separated in time and in space”.33 If
this new historicist approach has the merit to bring about a deeper and less prejudiced
and stereotypical understanding of historical processes, it fails in the long run to solve
the vexata quaestio regarding the definition of ‘historical fact’. This limit may be
overcome by coupling the theoretical parameters and tenets of historical
‘contextualisation’ with Sahlins’ theory of the ‘structure of the conjuncture’ and
‘structuration’.
Sahlins argues that the ‘structure of the conjuncture’ is “the way cultural
categories are actualised in a specific context through the interested action of the
historical agents and the pragmatics of interaction”.34 Historical events, or more
precisely, the events of historical significance, are produced by the structuretransforming process that Sahlins calls ‘structuration’, that is the structural change
that action triggers through its own products.35 The event or fact, consequently, comes
32

For the discussion of this peculiar hermeneutics see: Ricoeur P., ‘Hermeneutics and the Critique of
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33
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Toward a Historical Anthropology, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, 1991, pp.80-81.
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to be envisaged as the empirical form of the system, an immediate effect of the
process of ‘structuration’36: the structural discontinuities present in this dialectic
process concur to produce the event, otherwise it would be simply the manifested
unfolding of the cultural order.37 In other words the event is what alters the existing
relations within the system.
Sahlins’ hermeneutical approach is therefore particularly effective in the
analysis of pre-literate societies as the West Papuan. The task of reconstructing an
objective account of historical development in cultures that have no written records
requires an holistic approach that considers cultural and psycho-sociological factors in
complementary association with ethnographical-ethnological and archaeological
evidence. In the context of ‘pre-literate history’,38 in fact, the historian has to ‘read’
history not in the objectivity of the written document but in that of the material culture
and beliefs of a human group. Besides creating a conceptual template that takes into
account differences in language, cognitive systems and symbols and the meaning of
time and space, the historian has to become the active observer of a new challenging
reality.39 It emerges that history has to be intended as not only a ‘narrative’, but also
as a ‘structuring’ process.
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In the light of this new perspective cultures, believed to be a shared web of
symbolic meanings or significations,40 are treated as readable and/or decipherable
texts. The intelligibility of the text is obtained by engaging in cross-cultural
communication, juxtaposition becoming an important component of interpretative
anthropology.41 This juxtaposition, envisaged as the metaphor of an inter-cultural
dialogue, is based on a paratactic relation between the examiner and the examined,
each maintaining unaltered their constitutive and connotative characteristics, and
never develops into syntax. It is evident that this approach tends inherently to break
away from and overcome the limitations of both the Parsonian interpretative tradition,
that assumes dealing with each society in its own terms, and the structuralism of LeviStrauss that, by constructing taxonomies, strove to identify a universal syntax for all
existing cultural systems.42 As Marcus and Fischer point out
The authority of grand theory styles seems suspended for the moment in
favour of a close consideration of issues as contextuality, the meaning of
social life to those who enact it, and the explanations of exceptions and
indeterminants rather than the regularities in phenomena observed – all
issues that make problematic what were taken for granted as facts or
certainties on which the validity of paradigms had rested.43
Consequently in this new epistemological atmosphere relativism, until now
regarded as the doctrine inclining towards an apathetic or hyper-critical scepticism,
comes to be re-evaluated as a hermeneutical methodology, a medium of

economists, psychologists and sociologists”. See: Robinson J.H., The New History, n.p., New York,
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interpretation44 in which scientific objectivity is guaranteed by the ‘ironic’ treatment
of selected symbols and images of a given culture.45
The structure of the conjuncture approach combined with that of interpretative
anthropology provide the appropriate lens through which to read Western narratives
of pre-literate societies and identify ‘chronicles’, in the sense of Derridean ‘traces’.46
Such ‘traces’ could constitute the basis of possible Papuan historiographies as well as
the re-writing of both mnemonic experiences and textual legacies.
Furthermore, the ‘microscopic-telescopic’ or structural-narrative approach of
interpretative anthropology, apparently bridging the gap between teleological
historicism, concerned with meaning, and historiography, concerned with chronology
and factuality, seems to bring about a re-evaluation of those ‘fluid’ traditions not fixed
in the written text and in which historical processes and developments have been
‘stratigraphically’ re-arranged and condensed.47 Although I have not directly accessed
oral accounts of Papuan history but only some of the written texts of the oral tradition,
I believe that the latter represents a valuable source of information since it reflects
Papuan constructions and interpretations of spatio-temporal events. The fact that oral
history is more about meaning than about facts48 explains why, in the reconstruction
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of the history of pre-literate societies, it becomes important as evidence and a source
of information.
Mythological accounts collected by anthropologists, missionaries and colonial
administrators are able to provide the historian with the hermeneutical and
epistemological context in which to systemise Papuan chronicles. As Levi-Strauss has
argued, myths are communications transmitted in a language unknown to the
‘outsider’ or the ‘other’, but susceptible to being deciphered.49 Kamma states that
What is curious about myths is not that they have been composed but that
they are believed. Belief though depends on the existence of a specific
tradition. Every myth must contain a point of contact for identification.
Not everything is believed or suitable for being handed over to later
generations. A mythology without a system would be chaotic, it would not
provide a susceptible basis for society.50
It follows that mythology cannot be based on an unconscious structure as the
primitivist tradition argues51. Myths are not the product of what has being labelled
‘pre-logical thinking’.52
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An attentive analysis of myths contradicts primitivist assumptions, both of the
evolutionist and diffusionist schools, revealing that there is a conscious participation
in mythopoeic activities. Culture can be considered, in fact, as the inherent and
autonomous capacity of the individual to use symbols to structure and elaborate in
intelligible terms both his world-view and his way of life. If it is true that symbolic
structures ‘make’ man, at the same time man creates ex nihilo or ex novo symbolic
structures. Being contemporaneously the agens and patiens of symbolic systems, the
individual can change structures by operating on the symbols and their semantic
value.
It appears evident that there is no need to suppose a hermeneutical or logic
asymmetry in order to explain cultural differences. Radical pan-relativistic views
appear to be unable to understand the underlying external and internal factors that
shape cultural beliefs and values. By different means and methods, rationality, with its
inherent tendency toward the search for universal truths and rational references,
reaches the same failing conclusions.53 This becomes obvious when considering the
relativist basis of rationalism.54
Confronted with the particular reality of oral societies, a current of modern
studies has deemed it necessary to develop a new epistemological approach, known as
‘perspectivism’. Perspectivism is believed to be the appropriate hermeneutical domain
for providing proper moral and political judgements, concerning the nature of the
summum bonum, and the teleology and methodology of political and social actions of
53
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a group.55 The basic assumption of this new trend of studies is that there may exist
‘different worlds’, shaped by different external factors and internal processes.
The assumption that myths are the product of a conscious epistemological
activity finds support in Kamma’s analysis of West Papuan mythology. Kamma
argues that, since the meaning of the symbolic representations is hidden or
unintelligible to the non-initiated, and that one must be initiated or educated to their
understanding, mythopoeic processes must entail a conscious participation.56 The role
of consciousness in the creation of myths also accounts for the oral nature of native
religious texts and represents the reason why these have never been fixed in canonical
and definite texts. If, in fact, unconsciousness was the source of symbolic meanings,
these could have changed little over time. Kamma, once again, effectively illustrates
the point stating that oral traditions that are shaped into myths are always on the move
along with the culture of a group in a given time and place.
Sahlins identified the same process in his analysis of the ‘structure’ of Hawaiian
myths. The peculiar structure of the myth allows for the explanation of the
consonances and dissonances created by historical changes.57 Induced changes do not
affect the mythical structure that continues to operate: the Hawaiians, according to
Sahlins, continued to treat Cook as their God Lono in an expectable structural way
notwithstanding the disruptive elements introduced by the British that affected
sensitive areas of Hawaiian society:
The irruption of Captain Cook from beyond the horizon was truly an
unprecedented event, never seen before. But by thus encompassing the
come to be two aspects of the same ‘process of identification’. The locus of identity, in fact, lies in the
very process of abstraction.
55
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existentially unique in the conceptually familiar, the people embed their
present in the past.58
As to the stratigraphical structure of mythological systems Levi-Strauss,
although reluctantly, since it tended to implicitly contradict his belief that the
unconscious played a major role in mythopoeia, had to acknowledge that myths often
exhibited a ‘slated structure’ which
comes to the surface through a process of repetition. However the slates are
not identical. And since the purpose of myth is to provide a logical model
capable of overcoming a contradiction (an impossible achievement if, as it
happens, the contradiction is real), a theoretically infinite number of states
will be generated, each one slightly different from the others. Thus, myth
grows spiral-wise until the intellectual impulse which has produced it is
exhausted.59
Levi-Strauss’s reflection appears to undermine the assumption of the
homeostatic nature of myth and oral traditions as well as that of their metaphysical or
imaginative origin. Changes within the mythological system are not exclusively
produced by external influences or contingencies but also by an internal,
autochthonous development. As Goody has pointed out, in the oral tradition of
mythological accounts innovations are accepted as if they are believed to be sensible
and useful and reflect the needs of the community, a process however that he believes
does not foster reflexive thought.60 An attentive analysis of the process of mythopoeia
reveals the inappositeness of Goody’s conclusions.
The reiterative aspect of myth in ritual, its objectification into standard practices
testifies to the existence of reflexive thought among pre-literate people. Consequently
the fixation of a mythical account into a written text, subtracting it from the flux and
influence of daily contingencies depriving it of its functional vitality, decrees its death.
It is not rationalisation but the authoritative standardisation by the act of writing that is
58
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the tombstone of myth. Thus the inconsistencies that come to be identified in the
written text are not derived from the incapacity of the natives to perceive rational
relations but from the limits of an inappropriate medium. The inconsistencies
crystallised in the written text belong to different temporal strata and can be used to
reconstruct

diachronic

developments

revealing

exogenous

and

endogenous

innovations, foreign influences and autochthonous developments. While on the other
hand, their synchronic reading supports the notion of primitivism and timelessness.
Christianity may be assumed as the common ground in which Western
rationalism and non-Western revivalism confronted each other on their own terms.
The presence of Western Christianity in the Papuan world introduced new
gnoseological and hermeneutical categories. In order to assess the extent and depth of
Christian influence, that is to determine the epistemological boundaries of Christian
influence in the Papuan worldview, it is necessary to examine the original,
autochthonous conceptions of time and space of the Papuans.
Space and time are, in fact, the organising principles of human cognition. The
representation and meaning of reality rests on and is shaped by these two categories.
By establishing the socio-cultural meaning and function of these categories, it will be
possible to determine the meaning of history of the Papuan people as well as to
identify the ontological locus of identity and ethnicity.
The new understanding of oral history, until now relegated to the status of a
mere document for the synchronic analyses of anthropologists, brings the so-called
‘history-less’ peoples into the spatio-temporal boundaries of history. It is through the
re-evaluation of oral traditions and their relation with the existing historical narratives
that, as Eric Wolf argued, “both the people who claim history as their own and the
60
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people to whom history has been denied emerge as the participants in the same
historical trajectory”.61

Papuan Time-Reckoning Systems.
In the collective imaginary of modern societies history has unconsciously
assumed the meaning of ‘time’. Originally the former was believed to be the autoptic
account of events and vicissitudes of peoples along a continuous diachronic line.
Temporality was simply the background on which those events were classified and
interpreted according to the rationale of the law of causality.62 In the course of the
centuries, history has assumed a different meaning, gradually identifying itself with
the notion of time so that historical narratives come to be envisaged as “narratives of
time”.
Because

of

the

cumulative

effect

of

temporality and

the

inherent

authoritativeness that derives from perceptions and conditions of priority and
eldership, history has become the foundation of legitimacy of power agencies and
structures when elaborated in the light of a peculiar and ad hoc historiography.
Historiography is, consequently, nothing but a politicised version of history.
The process of the ‘politicisation’ of time63 explains why many nations are
regarded by XIX and XX century historians as ‘history-less’ or ‘nations without
history’. The concept of Marxist derivation, based on Durkheim’s assumption that
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time is fundamentally a ‘social given’64, maintains that those national groups who had
not developed viable state systems in the past would have been unable to create future
national independent states.65 The concept of ‘history-less societies’ consequently
comes to be coupled with that of ‘state-less societies’ who appear to live within the
apparently static and narrow limits of the tribe destitute of any sort of historical
development.
Such a conflation of ‘stateless’ and ‘history-less’ categories lies in an incapacity
to understand the spatial and temporal perceptions and dimensions of these peoples.
While the relationship of history-time in Western societies has undergone a process of
identification, in those who live beyond the boundaries of European political, social
and economic development, time and history have continued to constitute two separate
categories.
Janet Hoskins, in her analysis of the meaning and function of time and time
reckoning in Sumba, notes that pre-literate societies are not destitute of temporal
memory but that this is conceived and perceived differently. Hoskins defines such
temporal memory as ‘heritage’ in which “the past is still alive and used day after day
to provide moral examples, to interpret the future, and to invest both the individual
human life and the nation with a sense of destiny”.66 By contrast, in ‘history’ the past
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is dead, it has lost its original meaning and vitality becoming ideology “with a
purpose, designed to control individuals or motivate societies, or inspire classes”.67
The distinction between heritage, as memory of the past typical of pre-literate
societies, and history of modern or modernised societies is able to give reason for the
apparently different function and meaning of time between pre-literate and modern
societies. As Hoskins points out, ‘Western history’ presents itself as “an ideology of
cumulative, irreversible change” in which the past is envisaged as being part of a
linear time line, marked by distinct, non-repeating events in which individuals emerge
as actors and their deeds as unique occurrences. Thus the past refers to a definite series
of actions discontinuous with the present.68 On the other hand, if the past is conceived
as heritage it is susceptible to being repeated, although transformed, since it does not
refer to specific events but to potentialities. As Hoskins effectively specifies in this
regard:
Instead of a line of unique occurrences, the past is an array of established
sequences, like the stages of a ritual which can be instantiated in various
forms. Thus a headhunting raid may be carried out by many different actors,
but they must follow the proper procedures. Its characteristic ritual forms
(songs, dances, offerings) can even be adapted to other contexts without a
total loss of meaning. The ‘heritage’ of the past allows for a more flexible
synthesis of new senses that are attached to a shared sequence.69
The conceptualisation of the past in terms of heritage explains why processes of
assimilation, acculturation and adaptation, at the time of the contact era, became
possible: new concepts came to be systemised and contextualised within the existing
traditional cultural frameworks. Only when heritage was transmogrified into history,
creating an ontological discontinuity between the past and the present, did conflicts
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arise between the colonised and coloniser.70 On the basis of these considerations one
may understand why the category and notion of time in pre-literate societies appears to
be cyclic or repetitive. This perception of repetitive time stems from an ‘optical’
distortion produced by the application of Western categories.
An attentive examination, in fact, reveals that a cyclic concept of time reckoning
is not antithetical to linear temporality, instead both represent an integrated
complementary system. Cyclical flow merges into a linear temporal continuum so that
synchrony, the intelligible structure that survives all changes, merges with diachrony,
the processes which submit organisms to irreversible change.71 Gell, in his study
regarding the ida initiation ritual celebrated by the Umeda of West Papua, argues that
the idea of cyclic or repetitive time that characterises life cycle and fertility rites, is not
a drama religiosum designed to make the prospect of death less terrifying. Instead it is
an attempt to resolve the ambiguity of time that is both an Heraclitean continuous
process, in which nothing remains the same, and a synchronic, Parmenidean
opposition between young and old. In his opinion the solution to the antithesis is
attained
by mutual accommodation between the two: diachrony submits to
synchrony by becoming an oscillation which never departs too far from the
axis of the synchronous ‘now’: synchrony submits to diachrony in admitting
the regular induction of fresh cohorts into the categories it provides;
inductions which are generally marked by rites de passage.72
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The structural compatibility between linear and cyclic time and the qualitative
heterogeneity of time among some societies has also been pointed out by Clifford
Geertz in his essay ‘Person, Time and Conduct in Bali’.73 Geertz asserts that in Bali
permutational and Gregorian calendars coexist and are not incommensurable or
conflicting since permutational calendars express qualitative time measurements,
while the Gregorian calendar expresses quantitative measurements. Thus the former
tends to ‘de-temporalise’ the notion of time itself so that Balinese time comes to be
perceived as a “motionless present, a vector-less now” in which all conceivable
people are present simultaneously.74 At the same time this process has the effect of
depersonalising the individual that is not seen as living a historically unique life in a
non-repeating durational time, but to be a repetitive token fossilised in a timeless
space.75 Under these circumstances the recording of events appears to be of secondary
importance since it is the synchronic dimension that prevails over any diachronic
development. Permutational calendars are not organic systems of time measurement
but a component of a system of action aiming at guaranteeing the ‘synchronic
perpetuation’ of Balinese society.
Geertz’s theory has been criticised by Maurice Bloch who argues that Geertz has
interpreted ritual messages, aiming at legitimising authority, as the Balinese cognitive
mode of time reckoning. Consequently Geertz’s speculation is inherently flawed since
it confuses ideology with cognition. While the latter is a human universal, a mode by
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which humans structure experiences and relations, ideologies, on the other hand, are
‘functional’ ideas aiming at legitimising authority in ritual contexts.76
According to Bloch, the Balinese temporal system does not exclude change: a
universal linear time exists in Bali and it is adopted for practical purposes.77 This
however means simply juxtaposing a dual system of time reckoning that does not
consider the semantics of different temporal systems. Meaning is always inherently
associated with a specific function that is culturally or socially determined.
Gell shows that among the Umeda, time is modalised rather than metricised so
that a temporal field is represented as a spread of equi-probable contingencies not
calculated by any regularised schedule. Since the Umeda lack an external public
schedule, they need to make ‘situationally’ specific judgements regarding their
location in relation to their temporal neighbourhood.78 It appears that the situational
reference tends to ‘spatialise’ time. An analogous process has been identified in Bali
by Howe, who asserts that the temporal flow is not perceived and conceived in terms
of ‘duration’ but as a process involving the creation of intervals, transitional points or
“nodes” of time. It is in these points of caesura where change occurs.79
Although space and time are fundamentally different, as Hobart states,80 I
believe that the categories of time and space are interdependent and constitute the
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abstract forms by which humans perceive the world and construct, order and store the
knowledge of their perceptions and reasoning. An analysis of the modes and processes
by which Balinese construct ‘historical’ texts may cast a light on the relationship
between spatial and temporal patterns of time reckoning.
Vickers, in his article ‘Balinese Text and Historiography’, points out that the
Balinese perceive time in qualitative terms, as a series “of past events patterning
present events, meaning that something which happened in the past is not over
forever and never recoverable”.81 Events tend to ‘coincide’, in the language of the
Balinese sedeng luunga, a “process of being made good”.82 Vickers’ philological
analysis of Balinese texts provides insight into the modes of Balinese temporal
cognition. It clearly appears that time, and consequently history (knowledge of the
past) has to be understood not in terms of the relation cause-effect, but in terms of
effect-meaning. It follows that time is a qualitative res, not a quantitative one. The
process of ‘qualitative coincidence’, identified by Vickers, does not seem to exclude
a spatial dimension. A confirmation of this hypothesis can be traced in Papuan
mythology.
In Papuan myths temporal discourses appear to be connected to spatial ones.
Among the Marind-anim on the south coast, as among the Biak people in the north for
instance, time and space are not separated entities. The Dema Sosom of the Marindanim tribes travels from the east every year at the time when the east monsoon has
caused the swamps to dry up. He travels westwards from the village of Kondo to that
of Anasi on the coast and then from there turning inland to visit the villages of Saror
and Kuprik. It takes almost six months to visit all the villages from east to west, the
Subject: Balinese Time and the Elimination of History’, Review of the Indonesian and Malaysian
Affairs, 31, 1997, pp. 123-172.
81
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duration of the dry season when the gardens produce yams and taro in abundance. The
dry season is therefore the ‘time’ in which the ‘sacred space’ of the Sosom-mirav, or
Sosom-place, is built by the men of each village and in which initiation rites take
place. The progression of the Sosom cult from east to west is translated into a temporal
cluster, the ritual lasting for the period of the dry season, contrasted to the wet season
associated with the west.83 Furthermore the Mayo cult, also part of the religious system
of the Marind-anim, reveals a process of temporal clustering.84 As Molenaar argues:
a category with a temporal implication such as life/death, can function with
a spatial reference to the place of the living and the space of the dead. And
thanks to the non-chronological, non-geometric nature of space and time,
they can present shifting boundaries in the present. Past and future are not
necessarily divorced from the present.85
During both ritual occurrences initiation rites are celebrated synchronising and
coordinating the social system, structured by age groups, with the spatial-temporal
flow. Gell, in his analysis of the Ida ritual among the Umeda of West Papua, shows
that these rituals seek to create order and pattern in Umeda society in coordination
with the natural cyclical flow. At the same time, however, it functions as a means to
pre-empt nature by cultural means: the cassowaries, that play an important role in the
ritual, are considered by the natives
the Lords of Misrule, representing man in ‘natural’ guise, fertile but
disorderly, free but anti-social. The scenario of the ritual is the subjugation
of this natural spontaneity, which alone can ensure the perpetuation of
Umeda society but which at the same time threatens its very essence.86
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When the Umeda grow old they come to resemble cassowaries, living an
independent and autonomous life with their wives and children in the bush. The ritual
acts as a stratagem to counteract this tendency for Umeda society to dissolve into its
constituent parts since it is only by asserting its cultural and social hegemony over
the wilderness and nature that it will be able to perpetuate itself.87 Time appears,
during the ritual, to be reversed in order to forestall the tendency to dissolve. The
senior takes precedence over the junior, so that the representation of lifecycle phases
occurs in a reversed, symbolic time. This however is only apparent, and stems from
the existence of the synchronic, immutable temporal oppositions between senior and
junior members of society. These are temporal statuses that do not change although
the individual who occupies them does.88
Barnes, in his study of the collective thought in Kedang, further corroborates the
theory regarding the need in pre-literate societies to overcome the dichotomy between
linear and cyclic time by pointing out that, although in Kedang telling time is based on
the eternally recurrent, time is conceived as oriented, irreversible although repetitive.
Time reversal, in fact, is believed to bring disaster, a return to primeval chaos or
entropy:
When the souls of the ancestors are called back, it is in controlled
ceremonies and at special portals or points of origin, which allow their
orderly and temporary presence. All of these ideas have in common the
conviction that the orderly way to return to the starting point is by
proceeding through a sequence to its completion without ever reversing the
direction.89
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The fact that the pre-literate populations of West Papua were able to coordinate
ritual celebrations over a relatively long span of time indicates that they had the means
to record the intervals between the beginning and the end of the celebrations. This
consisted not only in the qualitative recording of temporal intervals but in referring
also to the spatial interval between the village that hosted the first celebration and the
one that hosted the last. Space, consequently, is not thought of as a geometric entity, as
time is not believed to be an abstract quantitative sequence. Space becomes temporal
and time spatial thus constituting an indissoluble correlation. As space, time is also
tridimensional, with successiveness, irreversibility and transitivity constituting its
dimensions.90 The progression of the ritual is in fact determined by this tridimensional
pattern.
The same temporal-spatial template is present in Biak mythology in which westeast journeys have a temporal connotation, being associated with the beginning of the
new era of Koreri.91 Analogously spatio-temporal correlations are found among the
Muyuw of Woodlark Island. According to Damon, among the Muyuw, the New Year
ceremonies are not tied to specific phases of the moon but reflect a spatial progression
from east to west in which different regions differentiate themselves in respect to the
equinoxes and an intervening solstice events. Damon asserts that “the system’s rigor
concerns space (and kinds of time), not the amount or sequence of time”.92
The existence of a spatio-temporal correlation in time computation induces us to
consider a fundamental question: that regarding why, of all possible representations of
90
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time does a society tend to adopt a particular system of time reckoning. In other words,
in order to understand the functional role of time reckoning in a society it is necessary
to investigate why different societies adopt different systems of time computation and
whether the creation and adoption of a dual system of time reckoning is simultaneous.
A close analysis of the relations between time structures and religious rituals in
pre-literate societies reveals that historical contingencies and external influences have
introduced new elements into existing cultural systems. Time, in pre-literate societies,
appears to be determined by a continuous dialogue between culture and nature. This is
exemplified in the association of solar time, determined by fertility rites, with life
cycle ceremonies. Among the Marind-anim of West Papua, for instance, the Sosom
cult is both a fertility rite, in which Sosom represents the phallus, and a male initiation
rite.93
From the various accounts examined regarding West Papuan fertility and
initiation rites, it appears that the fertility rites, once incorporated into the initiation
ones, tend to be eclipsed by the latter and in areas open to external trade, fertility rites
tend gradually to disappear. The change in religious attitude is probably caused by the
change in economic patterns of survival and political allegiances. The fertility of the
tribe’s land does not represent any more the exclusive source of wealth and
subsistence. Goods and commodities can be provided from the extra-tribal world
through trade and/or ceremonial exchange or tribute. As Robin Horton pointed out in
his analysis of African tribal societies, in those societies moving away from
subsistence farming towards a broader intercommunicating zone, socio-economic
change affects the structure and meaning of traditional cultural and religious
templates.94
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The association of cyclic fertility rites and linear initiation rites, of ecological
cycle and structural-social time, is an extremely important factor since it signifies the
integration of the macro-cosmos (the world) with the micro-cosmos (the group or
tribe). Such a condition paves the way for the rise of the belief in a great cyclic period
(Universal Conflagration) from which a new and better world will emerge. This
correlation, however, does not exclude the conception of linear time. The apocalyptic
eschatology that emerges from such correlation has its main source in the temporal
linearity of life cycle ceremonies tied to a lunar calendar.95 The latter appear often to
be associated with the dead culture-heroes and/or ancestors, a fact that sanctions their
disengagement from both initiation and fertility rituals. Gradually they come to
constitute a ceremonial group of their own connected to the religious system of belief
in spirits and ghosts. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed and corroborated by
Held’s findings among the Waropen of Geelvink Bay. Held, in fact, observes that
there is a clear-cut distinction between saira or initiation rites and munaba rituals
connected to the cult of the dead, a distinction related to the universal opposition of
masculine and feminine.96 Held writes in this regard:
Among many peoples the idea of the ultimate unity of life and death is wellknown, although it may not be so strongly alive and although it may at least
not have been clearly elaborated in a cosmological system, but they are
nevertheless conscious of the mythical oppositional connection between the
two sexes and the labour of both. And in any case, the relation between the
sexes seen from the mythical point of view is not isolated from the
connection between life and death, nor it is detached in a general
cosmological sense from the connection between day and night (…).97
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From the quoted passage one can infer that Held, who carried out field work
among the Waropen during the late 1930s, perceived that the opposition between saira
and munaba rituals was implicitly a temporal antithesis generating a unity by
overcoming the incommensurability of linear and cyclic temporal processes.
Anthropological analyses have revealed that in oral societies time is not
represented as an abstract dimension of reality, a cognitive quid or a Kantian
aprioristic pure form, but as an element inseparable from the concrete events taking
place in a well defined space. To use Molenaar’s words:
The duration, synchronicity, succession and alternation of socio-cultural
phenomena are conceived and measured in terms of other phenomena which
form a frame of reference. This frame of reference makes the
synchronisation and coordination of different actions possible.98
In pre-literate societies time is conceived as a spatial and functional
representation. It is a qualitative entity, or to be more precise, a physical quantum, the
qualities of which remain unaltered by movement. Consequently the difference
between oral-traditional and literate-modern societies does not consist in a different
mode of perception and cognition of time but in the use and function of time
reckoning. As Fraser has pointed out “what is usually regarded as a uniform flow
which embraced equally all structures and processes is revealed as a nested hierarchy
of qualitatively different temporalities”.99 Fraser distinguishes three ‘nested levels’
each corresponding to a precise function in human life and activity: an eco-temporal
level related to the seasonal successions of the calendar; a bio-temporal level which is
related to the cumulative time of living bodies; and finally a noo-temporal level that
encompasses a teleological awareness and establishes the ontological locus of the past
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as an entity distinct from the present and the future.100 Nested levels of temporality
related to specific functions still persist in modern societies.101
The acknowledgment of the existence of a functionally multi-stranded
temporality in oral societies as well as in modern civilisations promotes a holistic and
rational understanding of the interactions among the representations, uses and
meanings of different notions of time. Meaning consequently represents the discrimen
between modern and traditional systems of time reckoning, deriving from the
particularity of their religious experiences, rooted in a peculiar ecosystem, as well as
from the social and political functions ascribed to the concept of time. Hence, in the
light of the semantics of the system, linear and circular temporality are complementary
categories each fulfilling a specific function. Linear temporality, that tends to generate
teleological ideas and eschatological conceptions, does appear to be present in oral or
preliterate societies. What must be investigated is its function and meaning.

Identifying an Indigenous Apocalyptic Eschatology.
The existence of an underlying notion of oriented and irreversible time in the
system of thought of pre-literate societies is extremely important and casts a new light
on the effects that Christian evangelisation had on animist populations.
Haddon, at the height of British imperialism wrote:
An awakening of religious activity is a frequent characteristic of periods of
social unrest. The weakening or disruption of the old social order may
stimulate new and often bizarre ideals, and these may give rise to religious
movements that strive to sanction social and political aspirations.
Communities that feel themselves oppressed anticipate the emergence of a
hero who will restore their prosperity and prestige. And when the people are
imbued with religious fervour the expected hero will be regarded as a
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Messiah. Phenomena of this kind are well known in history, and are not
unknown at the present day among peoples in all stages of civilisation.102
The idea that psychological unrest and social discontent generate eschatological
tensions and desires of palingenetic renewal appears to be espoused also by scholars
such as Lanternari103 and Cohn.104
It appears that the concept of linear time tending towards an Eschaton comes to
be emphasised when oppression and frustration force people to seek or dream of a
better world usually projected in a foreseeable future. Thus the past and the present
come to be connected with a new temporal dimension and to represent the structural
and dynamic stages of an interrupted linear continuum.
Apocalyptic eschatology is, however, an ontological hybrid since it can be
conceived as the outcome of a confluence of linear and cyclic time-reckonings.
Apocalypticism can be envisaged as a relic of cyclic time, of the idea of a universal
conflagration that many societies, in particular the agrarian cultures, believe will occur
at a certain point in time, inaugurating a new cycle. The Umeda of West Papua, for
instance, believe that a cataclysm will happen that will destroy the world:
The waters in the rivers will rise up and simultaneously the sky will fall,
crushing all living beings out of existence. Then the water will fall again,
and the sky resume its normal position, and the corpses of the Umeda will
lie rotting. When the corpses have rotted away altogether, and only the
fleshless bones are left, then the plants and animals and human beings will
revive, and the world will be created again from the beginning, only to go
through exactly the same process again.105
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By contrast eschatology, in which Messianic and prophetic figures usually play a
prominent role, is by antonomasia the quintessence of linear time. The belief in the
Eschaton, that is the coming of the end, has its origins in the seedbed of apocalyptic
traditions. The myth of a primeval deluge, present in the mythology of many spatially
and temporally distant societies, represent the nucleus of the set of ideas regarding the
end of the world. The deluge, in fact, represents the origin of a linear development and
evolution of a people.106 The progenitors of tribal groups, the mythical ancestors, are
those who survived the devastating event and sanctioned the beginning of the
‘historical’ time of a group. The phenomenon of progression and development can be
traced in the social systems of pre-literate tribes or societies, the structures and
relations of which reflect ideas, beliefs and values informing the code of behaviour
and culture of the group itself.
In support of this view Biersack, examining the social formations of the Paiela
people, inhabiting the valleys of the Enga province of Papua New Guinea, observes
that the formation of family units, stemming from an original ancestor, appears to be a
culturally defined process.107 This appears to be, in fact, governed not by a rule, as the
structuralists would suggest, but by the ‘father’s mana’. Consequently the generation
of socially exogamous units (yame) “over time produces a longitudinal trajectory in
which serial filiation is portrayed as serial transformation”.108 The ideology that
governs yame formation among the Paiela is that what is “unrelated must become
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related”.109 This process stretches both in space and in time. The continuous creation
of new units generates a millenarian motion that will come to an end when the time of
serial filiation qua serial transformation will end or, to use the expression of the Paiela
people, “when all men are brothers and we will marry our sisters”.110 In this context
the Big Man, chosen to lead the community for his charismatic qualities, becomes the
mediator that guarantees the stability necessary to the unfolding of the process of yame
formation and the realisation of the millennium.111 The millenarian processes involved
in the formation of Papuan social structures account for the presence of latent chiliastic
tendencies in the belief system that supports that very structure and that come to be
activated under certain structural conjunctures.
Apocalypticism and eschatology during the colonial era came to be fused into a
single concept or ideology and represented the supernaturalistic response to a state of
anxiety, alienation, helplessness and deprivation experienced in the political,
economic, social and religious spheres by oppressed communities. It is a revolutionary
response to oppression in view of its basic conviction that God would overthrow the
present order and set free the oppressed.112 For this reason only in the presence of an
alien oppressive entity can the idea of eschatology substantiate and take a precise
ideological formulation and pragmatic form. Linear time becomes the basis of this new
ideology. Soteriological aspirations to freedom and redress from the wrong suffered at
the hands of an alien nation are projected in a near future and announced by a Messiah.
The natural elements used to calculate the cyclic flow of time are functionally
maintained and systemised into the linear flow as means of “understanding the
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times”113 and thus determining the ultimate coincidence of protology and eschatology
to produce the primeval unity.
Gradually from the belief in God’s intervention emerges the contextual idea of
the ‘Chosen People’. The recording of events becomes crucial since past and present
events contain prefigurations of the future and legitimate a people’s aspiration to
identity and freedom. It is in this locus, the ‘structure’, as will be discussed in the last
two chapters, that the myth of the ‘stolen cargo’, ‘the biblical secret withheld by the
missionaries’, will emerge. This will occur when European presence and socioeconomic change, that is the contingent ‘conjuncture’, in West Papua intensified. The
past is envisaged as a ‘repository of meanings’ for understanding the present and
forecasting the future. The meaning of the past accounts for the effects of the present.
It is at this crucial stage that historiography comes into being since history, that is the
‘linear’ recording or memory of veridical facts, was already there as mythology.
An analogous process seems to have taken place among the Sumbanese. Janet
Hoskins argues that the history of the Sumbanese starts with the colonial encounter
although they do not deny earlier transformations of their society. However they do
assess the meaning of the latter differently as the author points out:
History in their usage is not ‘about’ the society it depicts; it is the process of
that society’s emergent self-consciousness. Before the resistance against the
Dutch, there were trade relations with European powers, local feuds and
headhunting raids, narratives and ancestors whose chronologies were
uncertain. History began when regional autonomy was challenged and the
Kodinese became part of a larger world of interacting forces. It was not the
presence of written documents that made these events historical but their
consequences – the awareness of cultural identity through loss of
autonomy.114
Eschatological time, in nuce in the apocalyptic tradition of many societies,
emerges and takes a conscious form, disengaged from visions of cyclic destruction and
113
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palingenesis, in the context of colonial oppression and/or in situations of relative
deprivation when an ‘Other’ challenges their existence and identity. Historiography is
its ‘political’ form by which a people engage in a dialogue with the outside world.
On the basis of these considerations it is possible to argue that in pre-literate or
oral societies the category or concept of eschatological time existed long before
christianisation took place. The identification of such a peculiar notion of time in preliterate mythology and its autochthonous meaning casts the entire phenomenon of
christianisation as well as modernisation in a different perspective.
As stated at the beginning of this section the Papuan people have been presented
as a ‘history-less’ people, a concept that implicitly denies their existence in world
history. But this is a ‘Eurocentric’ view or perception. The historical written and
material documents available on the Papuan people, in fact, have been ‘read’ by
combining interpretations of evidence into a narrative consistent with the European
perception of the past. The notion of revivalism, used to explain non-Western cultural
or socio-political phenomena, consequently, is nothing but a product of Western
rationalism.
For centuries most of the Papuan tribes inhabiting the territory and islands of
West New Guinea lived unknown to the European world. This however does not mean
that they lived, as it has often been erroneously stated, in total isolation from the
outside world. The Papuans were part of a regional world of relations in the form of
ceremonial exchanges, trade and politico-economic allegiances. They were part of the
Indo-Malay world and region and it was in this relational context that Papuan
perceptions of ethnic identity first emerged.
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Chapter III
Parsing the Papuan in South-east Asia before Dutch Colonisation

The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides
to which facts to give the floor and in what order or context (…) It is the
historian who has decided for his own reasons that Caesar’s crossing of the
petty stream, the Rubicon, is a fact of history, whereas the crossings of the
Rubicon by millions of other people before or since interests nobody at all.1
In this chapter I will explore or try to determine whether an ethnic ‘Papuan
identity’ existed as a ‘historical reality’ or ‘entity’ in South-east Asia before 1945, by
examining the available information and references contained not only in Portuguese
and Dutch colonial sources, but also in Indo-Malaysian and Chinese documents. The
aim of such an examination is that of reconstructing Papuan historical identity as well
as ‘historical trajectories’ prior to the establishment of official colonial rule and the
beginning of christianisation. The word ‘development’ will be avoided for the
evolutionism implied in the term. As a matter of fact I do not believe in a history
conceived as a ‘vertical progress’ but in a history as an iter, an ‘horizontal itinerary’
through time, shaped and regulated by people’s needs, wants, aspirations, dreams
influenced by a particular ecological setting, and the conjunctures that these
contribute to create.
It is possible to detect glimpses of Papuan history in their beliefs and customs,
which are based on and accounted for in their myths or oral tradition transmitted from
generation to generation. The oral tradition, still alive today among the Papuans,
represents their historical archive. The primitivist-evolutionist approach as well as the
scientific approach of social sciences in general, adopted in the study of West Papuan
culture, has contributed to deny the existence of a Papuan history.
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The perception of ‘history-less-ness’ derives from the fact that scholars have
tried to understand Papuan culture and history through western categories and
parameters according to which the presence of monumental edifices and of complex
systems of material culture indicated the presence of a highly developed ‘historical’
civilisation, neglecting the fact that often civilisations, peoples, nations disappear or
decline without leaving traces of their past grandeur. When dwelling on this thought, I
can hear the echo of the wise words of the Herodotean Muse, which any historian who
is about to write a history should remember:
I will proceed with my history telling the story as I go along of small cities
of men no less than the great. For most of those which were great once are
small today, and those which used to be small were great in my own time.
Knowing therefore, that human prosperity never abides long in the same
place, I shall pay attention to both alike.2
In this chapter it will be shown that the Papuans were part of a wide web of
commercial and political relations characterising the South-east Asian milieu since
time immemorial in which they were acknowledged as a people, the Papuans,
inhabiting a defined territory that corresponds to today’s West Papua including the
adjacent Papuan islands. This world has been recently analogically compared to
Braudel’s Mediterranean in which people of diverse cultures and heritages engaged in
a series of economic and political relations creating structures and conjunctures, the
‘webs of significances’,3 that shaped their histories, identities and destinies.4
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Furthermore, from the historical dynamics or developments reconstructed and
described in this chapter, it will emerge that the western part of the island of New
Guinea, known over time as Netherlands New Guinea, Irian Barat, Irian Jaya and now
West Papua, appears to constitute a geographical reality separated from the eastern
part of the island which represents today the independent nation-state of Papua New
Guinea. Past and current anthropological and ethnological literature dealing with the
peoples inhabiting the island of New Guinea has contributed to generate this image
and perception, so that while Papua New Guinea is considered part and parcel of a
wider Melanesian complex, West Papua comes to be envisaged as a ‘Melanesian
appendix’ of South-east Asia. The relations between these two parts or ‘halves’ will
not be examined, although I need to point out that traces of relations between the two
sectors can be found in the languages/dialects5 and stories6 of the Papuan peoples on
both sides of the ‘artificial’ colonial divide or border. The persisting porousness of the
border7 shows how the ‘drawing of a line’ is not sufficient to demarcate nation-states:
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the border disputes, which followed the official colonial partition of the island,8 are a
tangible evidence of the incongruity informing such an act. West Papua,
consequently, has been drawn into the history of the Malay world and cut off and
excluded from Melanesian history by ‘colonial’ partitions and dynamics. I believe that
from a scholarly point of view, it is important to consider the Malay dimension as a
historical development, even though some activists emphasise the Melanesian aspect
of Papuan identity.9
Edward Carr’s statement, quoted to introduce the chapter, explicitly indicates
the limits of historiography and the difficulty historians face in trying to reconstruct
the past on the information transmitted by their predecessors. Historians, in fact,
select, interpret and introduce facts according to their interests and their experiences
by engaging in a continuous dialogue with the past. However this dialogue takes place
in or against an episteme. That is, to use Foucault’s definition, “a set of relations that
unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological
figures, sciences and possibly formalised systems”.10 It is an a priori “whose
jurisdiction extends without contingencies’.11 Since a peculiar epistême becomes the
organising principle endowed with an inherent logic, the archives of the past can be
considered as a series of collected memories and documents, “systems of statements”,
historically determined and politically constructed, whose meaning shifts over time in
the light of different and new hermeneutical approaches and political interests.
It follows from this that historical memories are mere constructions of an
agency that orders and organises selected experiences in significant and persuasive
8
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structures. Factual experiences and events are transmogrified into abstract symbols to
signify and legitimise relations of political, economic and social inequality. By this
process of structuring and systemising, history comes to be identified with
historiography, that is a specific epistemology based on a particular hermeneutics. As
Croce observed, a book of history has itself a historicity.12
Croce argues that political historiography is simply the ‘propaganda’ of the
‘hegemon’, may this be a social class, a person or a regime. Consequently a
historiography operating under these conditions and constraints is far from producing
a ‘universal history’ in which a society, as a stratified whole, may be able to recognise
itself. In a certain way, the writing of history comes to share with the social sciences
the same dilemma stemming from the epistemological and hermeneutical dialectics
between rationalism and relativism,13 between what Sahlins labels as “the practical
and the meaningful”.14 Referring to the eulogistic and militant nature of official
historiography, which celebrates and heralds to posterity the positive events, and
neglects and silences the negative ones, Croce states that it tends to commemorate
merely “what man does and not what he suffers”.15 In this context history becomes a
right bestowed to the powerful agens, denied to the powerless and oppressed patiens.
The denial of history has become a means to deny the right of a people to freedom and
self-determination, in other words to exist as ‘a people’.
The myth of the ‘history-less people’ or ‘people without history’, as described
by Wolf,16 represented the keystone of colonialism, structuring a rigid system of
10
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relations between the coloniser and colonised in which power and resources were
allocated to meet the needs and wants of the rulers. This was done by promoting
acculturative processes that aimed at wiping out any vestige of the past of the
subjected populations. Thus, as the German historian Michael Stürmer once stated,
“in a land without memory anything can happen”.17
Nationalism, as pointed out in chapter I, is inherently a symbiont of history
rooted in religious beliefs. Being an amoebic, shapeless reality it owes its intrinsic
meaning to the ideology and symbols provided by a particular historiography. There is
no nationalist ideology or movement that has not resorted to history to further and
legitimise the right of a people to nationhood and self-determination or has not used
history as a means to cement, aggregate and foster a sense of unity and sodality
among its members. History, although providing a religious foundation to
nationalism, has contributed (paradoxically) to its ‘rationalisation’ and ‘secularisation’
by providing it with tangible elements on which to found the legitimacy of its
existence and claims, overshadowing messianic – mystical traces and idyllic rêveries.
In 1969 the Papuan-Indonesian Anschluss finally eventuated. Following a
stalemate, which had lasted for almost 20 years, the Dutch Government ceded the
territory of West Papua to the Republic of Indonesia in 1962. The Indonesians had
used historical arguments to support and justify their ownership rights over the
Papuan territory claiming that it had been part of Indonesia since the times of the
Kingdom of Majapahit.18 For a strange irony that sometimes seems to characterise
the destiny of individuals and things, a people that, until then had been considered a
‘people without history’, had become suddenly a part of the official history of
17
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Indonesia. While an autonomous history was still being denied, this circumstance
implicitly opened the doors to the debate of Papuan historicity and, consequently,
identity.
With the exception of the monograph by Haga, Nederlansch-Nieuw Guinea en
de Papoesche Eilenden: Historische Bijdrage 1500-1883, commissioned by the Dutch
colonial government in 1884 in order to prove that the country had been part of the
Sultanate of Tidore and consequently, under indirect Dutch influence, there is no
‘history’ regarding the Papuan people prior to the year 1945. Officially Papuan history
begins in the aftermath of World War II and coincides with the struggle to avoid
incorporation into Indonesia. Such a history matured in the mould of the intensive
program of nation-building implemented by the Dutch government. More recently the
‘historical beginnings’ of the Papuan people or ‘nation’ have been further postponed
and brought to the year in which the New York Agreement was signed, that is 1962.19
An evident charade of historical truth and reality!
The historical literature and documents available on West Papua prior to the
year 1945 are extremely scarce and inadequate to provide a continuous narrative.
Before the establishment of permanent Dutch administrative posts and mission
stations in West Papua, the references to the Papuans are rare and random. Only when
the Dutch established a permanent presence in, and direct rule over, the territory that
the mission and administrative reports, regularly sent to the headquarters in the
Netherlands or Batavia after 1855, become a rich source of information useful in
reconstructing phases of Papuan local history.
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As to earlier documents, Chinese sources make no reference to New Guinea,
although archaeological and ethnological evidences reveal the presence of the Chinese
in the area already during the Han dynasty.20 Arab sources are silent as well. Islam, in
fact, appears to have reached the island around the XV-XVI century. Its contact was
mediated by Malay traders of Ceram that were part of the commercial network of the
Gujerati traders. The only reference to the territory of New Guinea in Indonesian
sources is a possible mention in the XIV century poem by Prapanca
Negarakartagama in which the gloss Wwanin may well refer to modern ‘Onin’
peninsula.21 The Papuans begin to be randomly mentioned in the Portuguese sources
of the XV-XVI centuries and in the Dutch sources of the XVII-XVIII centuries.
To identify earlier phases of Papuan history one must also consider and explore
the mythological tradition of the Papuans themselves since it appears to contain
‘sedimented traces’ of a remote past continuously reinterpreted and reformulated to
incorporate intrusive elements and face the new challenges brought about by the
arrival of the Europeans in the area. The dynamics of cargoist hermeneutics, which
will be briefly discussed in chapter IV, will represent the medium enabling the
identification of the meaning the Papuans attributed to the events and processes taking
place in and affecting their world of relations and the mean by which to extrapolate
from the ‘European narrative’ the possible ‘Papuan chronicles’.

The Papuans in South-East Asia.
The identification and definition of the Papuan world is extremely important
since it was this world that acted as the catalysing filter of a new system of thought
20
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and action. If the arrival of Christianity, in fact, fuelled complex mechanisms of
change in indigenous discourses, it is also true that it itself was in turn affected by the
‘recipient matter’ that gradually was being cast into its mould. But can a Papuan
cultural and historical identity still be reconstructed from the debris of a
homogenising colonial system and the propaganda and diffusion of western
modernity? Is ‘Papuan-ism’ an ethnic and ontological reality in se et per se, and as
such historically identifiable? The answer to this question will provide the context in
which to determine the nature and origins of Papuan nationalism.
It is difficult to reconstruct the position of the Papuans in South-east Asia prior
to the arrival of the first European fleets because of the lack of documents. Most of
the information of earlier periods of Papuan history is derived from XVI century
European sources and this is also based, as stated in the previous chapter, on either the
personal inferences of the writer or on local tradition collected en passant and
recorded as a mere anecdotic curiosity. Very few documents regarding the Papuans
have survived the shipwrecks of time and those that have are of recent vintage. Much
of this material is based at times on mere speculation or hearsay.
The earliest sources, dating back to the XVI century A.D., belong to a literary
genre devoted to the recording of anecdotes and exotic curiosities gathered by casual
explorers, travellers, navigators, traders and missionaries. Often these accounts record
events and facts that have not been directly experienced by the writer but that
probably have been drawn from other accounts. A classic example of this literary
genre is the XIV century travelogue by Sir John Mandeville who abundantly drew
information from the accounts of Odoric of Pordenone, John of Plano Carpini and
Marco Polo. Among the curiosities Mandeville reports that, during his peregrinations,
21
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he came across a race of midgets that could be conjecturally identified with the
warrior pygmies who inhabit the highlands of New Guinea.22 Whether Sir John really
undertook these journeys or were they simply fruit of his fantasies and imagination, is
difficult to establish. It is however certain that no European at the time has been
recorded as landing on the Papuan shores, although such a possibility cannot be
excluded.
Attempts to reconstruct an earlier Papuan reality, that is prior to the XVI
century, and to establish its place within the South-east Asian region, is consequently
based more on the analysis of the geographic distribution of linguistic evidences
crystallised in surviving anomalous lexemes, onomastics and toponyms which may
provide

information

regarding

human

migrations,

contacts

among

distant

communities through trade, centres of power and influence.
Anthropological and archaeological research conducted in South-east Asia
during the XX century has contributed to uncovering some of the mysteries
surrounding the earlier history of New Guinea and its connections with South-east
Asia. These studies reveal that the Papuan populations inhabiting mainland New
Guinea and the adjacent islands off its western shores were actively involved in the
trade cycles that developed and thrived in the region since the III millennium B.C.23
Commodities, such as spices coming from the South-east Asian region, have been
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found in the archaeological sites of the Middle East in stratigraphic sections of the II
millennium B.C.24
Initially this trade was limited to the inter-island commercial networks through
which goods and artefacts were presumably bartered. Archaeological diggings
conducted in the north-western part of the island of New Guinea reveal that during the
III millennium B.C., pottery from the west was being exchanged probably for Bird of
Paradise skins and other local products.25 The pottery, elaborately decorated and
known as Lapita, also represented an innovation in the South-east Asian earthenware
production. The Lapita pottery seems, in fact, to have been introduced into the area by
migrants who colonised the eastern Pacific islands.26
The Lapita tradition is associated by both linguists and archaeologists with the
arrival of Austronesian speakers in the region that, along with a new bronze
technology, introduced new religious beliefs and political systems that triggered a
gradual change in the culture of the non-Austronesian substratum.27 De Hoog suggests
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that probably the Lesser Sunda and the Southern Moluccas were the meeting place of
the two cultural complexes.28
Between the V century B.C. and the beginning of the Christian era, a new
‘cultural revolution’ took place in South-east Asia, the effects of which also reached
the shores of New Guinea. This period coincides with the establishment of centralised
kingdoms, bringing to completion a process already initialised a couple of centuries
before, with the development of permanent agricultural patterns and the rise of
important ceremonial building complexes. The accumulation of exotic valuables
became the expression and symbol of wealth and power, while ancestral kinship
yields to divine kingship. The Dong Son warrior aristocrats of North Vietnam are the
most illustrious example of the new culture emerged in his period.
In this new political and social milieu trade became an important means by
which to obtain these valuables, the symbols of divine power and prestige. The
innovations introduced by the Dong Son civilisation gradually spread to other regions
of South-east Asia. Kettle-drums of the Heger type 1 have been found in an area
extending from Sumatra to New Guinea along the ancient trade route that, from
Sumatra reaches New Guinea through Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands.
This trade route, using the islands as stepping-stones along the way, was that
covered by the lightly equipped Kora-Koras, Prahus or other small traditional skiffs
used by the island populations. The route was, in fact, favourable to the navigation of
small vessels that, in case of adverse atmospheric conditions, could have easily found
shelter in the island bays and coves.
Archaeological findings reveal that West Papua was part of the intricate web of
commercial enterprises that developed between the V century B.C. and the III century
28
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A.D.: bronze tops of the Heger type 1 drums of North Vietnamese provenance and
dated 250 A.D. have been found in the interior of the Vogelkop peninsula near Lake
Aimura and in the Lake Sentani area. 29
Swadling suggests that the Dong Son manufactures may probably have made
their way to New Guinea in exchange for Bird of Paradise plumes. The hypothesis
seems to be confirmed by Wallace’s earlier observations indicating that both the Lake
Sentani area and the Vogelkop peninsula are home to many bird of Paradise species.30
Asian iconography, in particular from India and China, dated between the III century
B.C. and the III century A.D., indicates that Bird of Paradise’s plumes were
appreciated and avidly sought by the Asian rulers.31
Bronze kettle drums found in the outer islands of Indonesia reveal peculiar
Indian and Chinese (Han dynasty) motifs such as tigers, elephants and peacocks.
Archaeological diggings, chronologically related to the period in question conducted
in the Lake Sentani area, indicate the association of bronze artefacts and glass beads.
The latter have been found both in Biak, used as traditional valuables, and in an
archaeological site in Bali of the early Metal Age.32 The archaeological evidences
allow us to hypothesise a close interaction between eastern Indonesia and the Southeast and East Asian continent probably activated by commercial enterprises.
By the end of the III century A.D., the trade relations between New Guinea and
insular and continental Asia suddenly began to decline. The quantity of bronze
artefacts of continental provenance gradually decreases, presumably along with the
demand of Birds of Paradise. The cause of the decline is probably to be imputed to the
29
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demise of the Dong Son dynasty and the spread of Hindu-Buddhism.33 It is possible
also to hypothesise that the decline in the volume and quality of South-east Asian
trade may have resulted from the ongoing wars of the Romans in Asia, in particular
with the Parthians first, and then with the Sassanian empire of Persia. The gradual
penetration of Indian elements into the region brought about a shift in the demand for
certain goods, with the demand for spices and sandalwood replacing that for feathers.
As documented by archaeological34 and literary35 sources for the nearby
Moluccas, Indian traders or indianised Malay traders may have engaged in
commercial relations with the inhabitants of the coasts of north-west New Guinea.
Elements in the local mythology can well be relics of ancient Indian or Hindu
contacts. Horst believes, in fact, that the baptism by fire present in the Biak myth of
Manseren Manggundi is of Hindu origin.36 He also attributed a Hindu origin to the
Papuan Rum Sram, or Men’s House, maintaining that its ceremonial meaning and
function is not related to ancestor worship but rather to Lingam worship.37
Horst’s hypothesis, although contested even at the time of its publication,38
seems to be confirmed by Fabritius who visited the Biak and Geelvink Bay area a few
years before the arrival of the first Christian missionaries from Utrecht, namely before
1855. In his comment on a version of the myth of Manseren Manggundi, he states that
a Hindu missionary once visited the Numfor-Biak area. In this version it is believed
31
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that Manseren left the island of Numfor and travelled to Kalinga, which probably
must be identified with modern day Orissa on the Coromandel Coast, an important
and ancient seat of Brahmanism from which “missionaries went out to preach the
doctrine of their religion in the most distant regions”.39
At this stage there is neither archaeological nor anthropological evidence to
support the hypothesis. It must be noted that ‘Kalinga’ was a recurring name in
Indianised South-east Asia: it is known that Java was often referred to as Ka-ling. A
Chinese inscription reads:
Ka-ling is also called Djava [Java], it is situated in the Southern Ocean at
the east of Sumatra and at the west of Bali. At its south it has the sea and
towards the north lies Cambodia…In 674 the people of this country took as
their ruler a woman of the name Sima.40
The tradition associates Queen Sima with the arrival of Islam in archipelagic
South-east Asia when the so-called Ta-shih people came into contact with her
kingdom. 41 At the beginning of the VII century A.D. a number of Ta-shih settlements
were established along the coasts of West Sumatra. These settlements have been
associated with Arab tribes.42
It is possible that the demand for spices and wood increased with the arrival of
the Arab traders in the region around the VII-IX centuries A.D. Gradually the Muslim
merchants established important commercial entrepots such as those in Gujerat in
north-west India and Malacca in South-east Asia, only to name the most important
and strategically significant. Through the Arab traders, commodities from the
mysterious ‘Far East’ made their way to the European markets. At the same time local
39
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rulers were embracing Islam: the first fully-fledged Islamic states in Indonesia date
back to the XIII century A.D on Sumatra. Marco Polo, visiting Sumatra in 1292
observed that the urban people of the island who once were ‘idolators’, had converted
to the “law of Muhammad” for their continuous contact with Arab merchants.43
By the XV century the western part of the Indonesian archipelago, Java and the
Spice Islands appear to be governed by local Muslim rulers who adopted the Arab
title of Sultan.44 The old Hindu title of Raja seems to have been confined to the nonMuslim vassals as well as to the surviving Hindu enclaves. It is documented that the
Papuan leaders, vassals of the Sultan of Tidore, were granted the title of raja along
with the indigenous Malukan titles of kolano and sangaji.45 Although it appears, as
recent anthropological studies have revealed, that the raja continued to be
characterised by the qualities and functions typical of the traditional Melanesian ‘Big
Man’.46 The influence of the Muslim sovereigns over the Papuan islands was probably
established after the demise of the first kingdom of Majapahit in 1478 following
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longstanding dynastic conflicts and its incorporation first into the Islamic state of
Demak in 1527 and finally into the kingdom of Mataram in 1584.47
During the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit in the XIV century, the
south-western part of the island of New Guinea appears to have been part and parcel
of the dialectics between Jawabhumi (Java) and Nusantara (the other islands) which
characterised the Indo-Malay world at the time.48 The ancient XIV century Javanese
poem, Negarakartagama,49 already mentioned, lists the Onin peninsula among the
territories visited by the Majapahit ruler. Swadling suggests that, at that time, it is
possible that the massoi50 producing area of Onin was under one of the Moluccan
Sultans, probably the Sultan of Bacan.51 This hypothesis is based on the Myth of
Bikusagara, recorded by Antonio Galvão in 1536-1539, which suggests a direct
kinship relation between Bacan and the Papuans inhabiting the Raja Ampat Islands.52
The myth describes the discovery of four naga eggs by the elders of Bacan from
which four individuals were born who founded the royal houses of Bacan, Banggai,
Loloda and the Papuas.
The myth of the naga eggs clearly betrays its Hindu origins and must
consequently pre-date the spread of Islam in the area. Similarities, in fact, with the
Indian epic poem of Mahabharata concur to suggest an early Hindu chronology,
although some are inclined to hypothesise a later date, after the composition of the
47
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Negarakartagama.53 Historical records indicate that at the time of the Tidorese
expansion between the XV and XVI centuries A.D., Onin was under the influence of
the island of Misoöl that in turn had close relations with Bacan.54
As already pointed out in the previous pages, early Chinese and Arab sources
provide little information on the inhabitants of New Guinea. It is known that Chinese
and Arab trade routes intersected in the monsoonal region of South-east Asia.55
Archaeological findings, however, reveal that the Papuans developed direct or indirect
trade relations with Chinese merchants as early as the I century A.D.. The finding of
bronze pieces with a chemical composition similar to the Dong Son alloys of the Han
period among the Mejprat of West Papua, suggest that the Chinese developed some
form of trade connection with mainland New Guinea.56
The archaeological information seems to be corroborated by that contained in
XIII century Chinese sources revealing that among the products traded on the
Bandanese market figured a series of commodities that may have originated from
New Guinea: the “little black slaves” and the “small clove bark”, probably massoi
wood from the Onin peninsula, may be of Papuan provenance.57
It is known that Banda had developed trade connections with Ceram and,
through the Ceramese traders, with the coastal areas of New Guinea. It was through
these traders that Papuan products, such as slaves, sago and massoi wood, reached the
Bandanese market.58 The commercial transactions were based on barter: local
products were exchanged for textiles, in particular patula cotton cloth from Gujerat.
53
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Barbosa reports that patula cloth was traded in Banda already in 1512 when the first
Portuguese expedition, led by D’Abreu, reached the island. Patolas or Cambaya
cloths were traded along with “great bells of metal”, probably gongs, ivory and “fine
porcelain”.59 The gongs and the porcelain probably originated from China and were
presumably used by Chinese merchants for barter in their commercial transactions. As
Kamma reports, foreign goods, such as cloth, porcelain, beads and bronze gongs,
articles whose manufacture was shrouded with mystery for the Papuans of Biak, were
highly valued and, consequently, for their ‘extra-ordinary’ nature incorporated into
ceremonies.60
Among the items the Papuans were collecting on their raids were also slaves to
exchange on the Malukan markets for valuables sought for their ceremonial value.
They themselves had been, as the Chinese sources suggest, the object of this trade. It
is recorded, in fact, that in the year 724 A.D. a “black girl” was listed among the items
of the tribute Sumatran envoys of the trading empire of Srivijaya brought to the
Chinese court which, speculatively, could have been of Papuan origin.61 Furthermore
from the record of the foundation of a Buddhist sanctuary, it appears that Papuan
slaves had been on Java since the X century A.D.62 Van Vollenhoven reports that
Papuan traders, presumably those who inhabited coastal areas were providing Java
with Papuan slaves probably from the interior of the Papuan islands or New Guinea at
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the time.63 A form of socio-political or economic dialectics between the Papuans of
the coast and those of the interior, translated at times into a form of dependency of the
inland tribes, was to be identified by later explorers such as Forrest and Wallace, as
already mentioned. Papuan slaves were still present on Java at the end of the XVI
century.64
The XIV century poem Negarakartagama mentions the Onin peninsula and the
island of Seran, presumably modern Ceram. The fact that the two areas are mentioned
together indicates that probably the association is not ‘casual’ but ‘causal’. Tome
Pires clearly indicates that, in the XVI century, Ceramese traders were
commercialising Papuan products on the Bandanese market.65 It is possible that the
Sesolot or Sosolot of the south-western coast of New Guinea, from MacCluer’s Gulf
to Triton Bay, were established by the Ceramese traders.
The Sosolot were areas with exclusive trade rights. The etymology of the term is
obscure. It possibly derives from Malay and, as the XVII century explorer Johannes
Keyts suggests, it denotes a hill or harbour, marked by a flag, whose owner had
exclusive trading rights over the area.66
The Sosolot appear to have been communities of traders or trading agents.
Goodman hypothesises that there is probably a relation between the importation of
bronze and iron artefacts from Maluku and the establishment of the first Sosolot

63

Vollenhoven C., van, Het Adatrecht van Nederlansche-Indië, I, Leiden, 1918-1933, p. 425.
Rouffer G.P. & Ijzerman J.W., De Eerste Schipvaart de Nederlanders naar Oost-Indie onder
Cornelis de Houtman, 1595-1597: Journalen, Documenten en Ander Bescheiden, vol. I, Works of the
Linschoten Vereeniging, The Hague, 1915-1929, p. 197 & n.3.
65
Pires T., Suma Oriental, V, Fol. 156v. Translated from the Portuguese MS in the Bibliotèque de la
Chambre des Députés, Paris and edited by Armando Cortesão, vol. I. In the works issued by the
Hakluyt Society, The Suma Oriental and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues, Second Series, Kraus
Reprint Limited, Nendeln, 1967, p. 208.
66
Hille J.W. van, ‘Reizen in West-Nieuw- Guinea’, Tijdsschrift Nederlansch Aardrijskundig
Genootschap, 22, 1905, pp. 233-330.
64

133

communities in West Papua.67 This suggestion seems to be supported by Kamma and
Kooijman’s findings regarding the identification of a considerable number of ironworking sites stretching from the MacCluer Gulf to Triton Bay.68 The location of
these smith-shops does not seem to have been casual but to follow a precise pattern
suggesting the existence of some sort of ‘manufacturing network’ connected to a
‘specialised trade’.
According to Kamma and Kooijman, iron working in West Papua began around
the middle of the XVI century, a time that coincides with the apogee of the expansion
of Islam in Maluku, Banda and Ceram. This ‘circumstantial evidence’ leads them to
hypothesise that the Malukan and Ceramese69 smiths, who introduced iron working to
New Guinea, were probably Muslims. What seems to support the hypothesis is the
presence of a food taboo, the prohibition of eating pork, associated with the smith in
West Papua, a prescription that is clearly a foreign or intrusive element in Papuan
culture.70 The presence of Muslim communities on the south-western coast of New
Guinea, probably original Sosolot communities, is confirmed also by XVI century
Portuguese mission reports, as will be shown later in this chapter.
Existing documents reveal that at the beginning of the XVI century Tidore
began to extend its influence over New Guinea. In 1534, it conquered Misoöl in the
Raja Ampat archipelago and the eastern part of Ceram. It is not clear, however,
whether the Ceram Laut islands and their Sosolot network became part of the
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‘Tidorese Mandala’.71 The Adatrechtbundels inform that, on that occasion, a number
of chiefs were appointed among the Papuans of the Onin peninsula and that these
appointments followed the previous Sosolot divisions.72
It appears also that the Sosolot continued to foster and maintain their original
interdependence, although foreign traders were allowed access to the area. In these
centres a type of ‘Chinese System’ of trade seem to have been adopted. That is,
because of the seasonal nature of the trade, based on the monsoons, foreign merchants
advanced goods to the local population and consequently they had to appoint an agent
to stay on the spot when they left in order to ascertain that the return goods were
available and ready for them when they returned.73 In 1670 the island of Namatote
near Triton Bay on the south coast of West New Guinea was the centre of trade and
the headquarters of an agent who bore the title of raja. Papuan functionaries were
appointed by Ceramese traders in remote villages of the interior.74
The goods, in the form of massoi bark, slaves and nutmegs, came from the
interior. Forrest, who visited New Guinea in 1775, refers to this system of trade in his
passage regarding the Haraforas of the interior of Doreh Bay and clearly indicates
that it is a Chinese system.75 The system of advanced payments was still in use when
the Dutch traders entered the New Guinea area in the XIX century.
The presence of a Chinese system of trade in New Guinea suggests the possible
existence of an earlier Chinese commercial influence in the area. Forrest, in fact,
observes that, notwithstanding the apparently fierce and hostile nature of the Papuans
of the south-western coast, “they are said to deal honestly with the Chinese, who trade
71
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with them”,76 a fact that suggests that the Chinese were well known and integrated in
the area.
The Chinese trade, however, must have experienced alternating periods of
‘boom and bust’ over the centuries, but their presence must have been constant. At the
beginning of the XVIII century the Chinese appear, in fact, to have dominated the
trade to Numfor and other coastal areas of New Guinea. Here they bought slaves,
massoi bark and tortoiseshells in exchange for cloth, coral, knives and swords.77 The
Dutch tried several times, around the beginning of the XVIII century, to bar the
Chinese from trading on the coasts of New Guinea78 but encountered the opposition of
the Sultan of Tidore who believed that the Chinese were the only ones able to
guarantee the profitability of the trade with the Papuans.79
As Forrest observes, the Papuan people of the coast seemed to have the
monopoly of the goods produced by the Papuans inhabiting the interior:
The Papua people also did not seem willing that we should have any
intercourse with the Haraforas, who, I believe, are some how kept in
ignorance by the Papuas. When I asked any of the men of Dory, why they
had no gardens of plantains and kalavansas, which articles they were
continually bringing from the Haraforas, I learnt, after many interrogatories,
that the Haraforas supply them with these articles and that the Papua people
do not give goods for these necessaries every time they fetch them; but that
an ox or a chopping knife given once to a Harafora man, makes his lands or
his labour subject to an eternal tax, of something or other for its use. 80
This system of dependency is confirmed by later XIX century sources, the
report of the traveller Dumont d’Urville81 and the observations of the naturalist
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Russell Wallace who refers to the men of the interior as Arfaks also observing that the
Papuas and the Arfaks differed much in physical features.82
Interestingly the name Papuas, referred to in earlier sources, appears to be
reserved for indicating the coastal inhabitants of New Guinea as well as those
inhabiting the off-shore islands. From the sources it emerges also that the Papuan
world was characterised by a dialectics between the coast and the interior expressed in
economic, and, probably, political terms providing us with some insight into Papuan
modes of self-identity. This appears to be based on residential or territorial relations, a
fact that seems to be confirmed by modern anthropological research. The Dani of the
Baliem Valley, for instance, used to identify themselves on the basis of prestige and
ecology contained in the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ valley labels.83 The same antithesis
appears to occur in XVI century Maluku in the political and economic dialectics
generated by the political figures of the ‘intrusive’ Kapita Laut or Lord of the Sea and
the ‘indigenous’ Jojau or Lord of the Land.84
It appears that when the Europeans arrived in the region they found a world
characterised by an intricate web of economic and political relations. As Van Leur
points out, the first Portuguese vessels entered a region “where there was a complex
of shipping, trade, and authority as highly developed as the European”.85 The Papuans
were part of this bustling world of peddlers, agents, wholesalers and privateers. The
Europeans did not ‘discover’ South-east Asia. They simply had ‘ignored’ its existence
until the changing economic, political and religious systemic configurations of postReformation Europe prompted the necessity to find new sources of wealth and gain.
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In their journeys, regulated by the monsoons, the Europeans landed on the
shores and anchored in ports they never had before. They gradually penetrated the
areas of traditional trade disrupting with their presence the ancient practices and
relations. Their driving forces were profit and power and these acted also as criteria in
selecting partnerships and in drawing commercial routes and maps. What was
regarded as ‘unprofitable’ was neglected. Traditional trade was never completely
discarded but absorbed into the new mercantilist network as a sort of ‘sub-system of
indirect local trade’. It was as members of this sub-system that the Papuans came to
be encompassed into the structures of colonial capitalism.

The arrival of the Europeans.
The island of New Guinea received its name from the Spanish Captain Yñigo
Ortíz de Retes who, in search of a south-east route to Mexico and forced to land
because of unfavourable weather in the area of present day Sarmi, in 1545 claimed
possession of the territory for the Spanish Crown.86 This was presumably under the
Treaty of the Tordesillas since the anti-meridian crossed Maluku.87
The first account specifically referring to the territories inhabited by the
Papuans is the Relaçion que Miguel Rojo de Brito da de la Nueva Guinea, written
shortly before the year 1600 by Hernando de los Rios. Brito sojourned in the Raja
Ampat islands, the MacCluer Gulf and North Ceram between 1581 and 1582. Sailing
under the Spanish flag, it is not known whether he was on an official trip or on his
own account. In his Relaçion he often compares the features and customs of the
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Papuans to those of the inhabitants of Guinea in West Africa.88 From several
references in the account it is possible to infer that Brito was interested in gold and
probably the scope of his voyage was that, as Sollewijn Gelpke suggests in his preface
to the translation, of identifying the source of the fine quality gold circulating at the
time in the area between New Guinea and Bacan.89
Besides visiting the Papuan islands of Misoöl and Waigeo, Brito, accompanied
by the raja of Waigeo and travelling south-west, seems to have reached the shores of
mainland New Guinea landing at MacCluer Gulf on the Onin Peninsula. Brito reports
his observations of the island:
The people of this region are black, like those of Guinea, and they are
traders; they [go to] trade in a kingdom on the equator called Sekar, where
there is a village with an important market where black slaves are traded;
here the people of Onin buy [slaves], which they sell in Serdanha (Ceram).
The Serdanhos, since they are very wealthy, buy them and take them to the
island of Kidang as labour for their gardens. It is [a] certain [fact] that there
are Serdanha Yndios who own a thousand black slaves, who produce much
sago bread, which they accumulate in order to sell to the Javanese; and
[these] trade it for nutmeg and mace in Banda, because of [the Bandanese]
lack of staple food.90
Brito adds later that the gold found in the Raja Ampat islands originated from
this area, from the village of Ugar. Here traders from Ceram came to buy massoi
wood, in high demand in Java, in exchange for iron.91
From the MacCluer Gulf Brito continued his trip northwards along the coast
reaching, after a few days of navigation, the then densely populated area of Apaa, to
be probably identified with the modern town of Waba, between modern day
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Wandamen and Manokwari.92 Here he noticed that the people of Apaa did not wear
gold but were extremely fond of iron gongs that they obtained in exchange for the
prisoners captured during their raids on the island of Gebe situated half way between
Halmahera and Waigeo.93
After returning to one of the islands of the Raja Ampat group, Notan, Brito set
off from there to Ceram. At the time he reports that, on the Hoamal peninsula of West
Ceram, was stationed the base of the so-called Rubihongi or ‘smasher of fleets’, who
was the admiral instructed by the Sultan of Ternate to fight the Portuguese in
Amboina and who, at the time of Brito’s sojourn, was engaged in an attack.
From Brito’s account important information can be inferred. Setting aside what
he reports directly and the obscure reason of his journey among the Papuans, his
account presents the Papuans inhabiting the islands and coastal areas of New Guinea
as a distinct ethnic group ‘within’ the Malayan world.
Papua and the Papuans appear to be in the XVI century a well-defined reality in
ethnic terms. This means that they are distinguished by peculiar ‘markers’ such as
language, race, religion and colour. Since ethnicity is not an ontological res but a
‘relational category’ it is possible to argue, on the basis of the information provided
by Brito, that the Papuans were perceived to be ‘different’ from the Malayans with
whom they constantly interacted. Brito, in fact, referred to their colour calling them
negros as distinct from yndios, a term that he adopts to designate the straight-haired
people, the Malay stock, inhabiting the non-Papuan islands.
Linguistic differences may also have reinforced the perception of differences
between the Malayans and the Papuans: Brito informs us that he used a Malay
interpreter in his dealings with the Papuans, a circumstance suggesting that the racial
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taxonomy came to be translated into linguistic terms. That Brito did not fail to notice
the differences existing between the Malay and the Papuans appears in his reporting
of ethnographic curiosities and details related to the Papuans. The fact that he dwells
on recording them suggests that they drew his attention for being unusual and unique,
not having encountered them anywhere else in East Indies.
Another interesting fact that emerges from Brito’s account is that the Papuan
people seem to be defined in both geographical and territorial terms, their territories
being located to the east of the Spice Islands. References to the Papuan territories
prior to Brito’s Relaçion date back to the year 1513.
Tomé Pires in his Suma Oriental refers to Papua as a defined territorial entity.
While reporting on the booming of XV century Bandanese market of cloth, imported
from Gujerat and Bengal, and of ivory tusks and gold, the provenance of which is not
specified, Pires informs:
(…) people from Banda from a great many outside islands to buy cloth from
Gillolo (Bato Ymbo) to Papua, from Papua to Moluccas, and many other
islands. (…) Banda has ivory tusks and gold which are brought from other
islands to be sold.94
Probably the gold Pires mentions, the same that will draw, some year later,
Brito’s attention on Banda, came from New Guinea. Since at the beginning of the
XVI century when the first Portuguese vessels arrived in the Spice Islands, the Papuan
territory of the Onin peninsula appears under the influence of the Sultan of Bacan,95 it
is possible that it was through the latter that Papuan products were commercialised in
the Indonesian archipelago. Among the surrounding islands Pires mentions the Jlha
de Papua, the island of Papua, from which the nore parrots came.96
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Although the drawing of maps always reflect the ideology of the commissioner
and his ‘vision’ of the world, nonetheless they still represent a useful historical
document of an epoch and the way the world was structured and ‘represented’.
Besides the inevitable ‘sins of commission’, maps may also present significative ‘sins
of omission’.97 During the XVI century the mapping of territories equated to the
‘colonisation of space’. Territorial representations were politically meaningful
pointing, as Mignolo argues, to spatial differences and translating them into values.98
A rapid glance at XVI century cartography may produce interesting insights regarding
the geographical and political ‘position’ of the Papuans in XVI century Portuguese
South-east Asia.
A map drawn by the cartographer Francisco Rodrigues in 1540 indicates the
islands of Papua, as jlhas papuas, situated to the east of Gillolo (Halmahera). On the
same map the island of Gillolo, located to the north of Ceram, bears the inscription
Jlha de Papoia e a Jente dell sam Cafres.99 He probably refers to the large Papuan
enclave on the island.
In a map of 1563 drawn by Luís, the north coast of a large island to the east of
the Spice Islands is denominated Nova Guinea. The same coast is referred to as
Costas dos Papuas in Dourado’s map of 1573. The oldest Portuguese map showing
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the Ilhas dos Papuas is that dated 1537 and attributed to Gaspar Viegas which depicts
also the island of Biak.100
Pires refers to the Jlha de Papua in the context of the inter-island trade relations
developed in the Maluku area locating the island at eighty leagues from Banda but
without specifying the direction. This could be either one of the Kei islands or the
island of New Guinea. The reference to an island inhabited by Papuans is made in
relation to an exotic curiosity: he had been told by the inhabitants of Maluku that in
this island “there were men with big ears (orelhas grandãs) who cover themselves
with them”.101 To what in reality the ‘myth’ referred, it is difficult to establish.
Probably a misunderstanding due to an inappropriate translation caused the rise of
such curious story. Although the following remains a highly speculative hypothesis, it
is likely that the original informers were referring to the koteka or phalocrypt in use
among the Papuans of the interior of New Guinea or the bark-cloth, which the coastal
inhabitants used to cover themselves.102
References to the Papuans appear also in the account by Antonio Pigafetta of
Magellan’s voyage in 1519. The Papuans mentioned by Pigafetta are those heathen
populations inhabiting the island of Giailolo (Halmahera). He reports that these
Papuans, ruled by a king, Raia Papua, are rich in gold and live in the interior, while
the Moor kings live along the coast.103 Where these Papuans originated from, it is
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difficult to ascertain. It is likely that the island is one of those off the coast of New
Guinea. Wichmann reports that according to an old map, this was an island considered
part of the lands known as Terra Australis since the Latin inscription of the map
reads: Nova Guinea a nautis sic dicta, quod eius Citora, cocoriemque facies Guineae
Africanae multum sunt similia….partem autem esse continentis Australis.104
Local legends among the Papuans of the north-west coast of New Guinea report
that people from Biak and Geelvink Bay migrated to Halmahera and intermingled
with the local inhabitants as the adoption of the local Malay title suggests.105 Kamma
reports that people of Biak originally migrated from the area between Sarmi and
Jayapura to Northern Halmahera in a time prior to the arrival of the Europeans in the
area,106 a fact that has been corroborated by linguistic surveys conducted in the two
areas which tend suggest a very early date for the migration.107 Visser’s ethnological
study on the Sahu/Sawai108 of north Halmahera has confirmed the existence of the
relation between Sahu/Sawai and the Papuans inhabiting coastal and insular
territories.109
A more ancient reference to the Papuans is contained in the Treatise on the
Moluccas dated 1544. Philological analyses have revealed that the author relied on
older reports the chronology of which is not certain. The Treatise in chapter XIII
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records a myth of foundation related to the institution of the Raja-doms of Banggai,
Bacan and Papua.110 The Treatise, however, fails to geographically specify the land
referred to as ‘Papua’, although I am personally inclined to hypothesise, on the basis
of the information provided by Brito, that the Treatise refers to the island of Misoöl.
De los Rios, narrating Brito’s journey to the Papuan islands, reports that Brito
visited Misoöl in 1581 and spent some time with the king of the island. He addresses
the king as the Rey Papua,111 a title that appears he does not use when referring to the
king of Waigeo112. In the account it is also stated that the king of Misoöl had been
elected by the people, a fact that suggests that autochthonous elective forms of
leadership were still in use among the Papuans of the islands notwithstanding their
close relation with Malay populations.
In 1527 Martin Uriarte, a pilot of the remaining vessel of Garcia Jofre de
Loaysa’s fleet, explored the coast of Halmahera and recorded in his log that in the
south-east were las islas de las Papuas, numbering more that eight large and small
ones.113 Among these were probably the islands of Gebe and Waigeo. In 1528 Alvaro
de Saavedra, while sailing east towards the Americas, was forced to stop on an island
situated to the east of Halmahera “en unas de negros, que llaman Papuas”.114 In a
letter dated 1544 addressed to King João III, Jorge de Castro, Governor of Ternate,
used the expression Arçepeligo das Papuas referring to the territories east of the Spice
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Islands.115 The same expression occurs in the account of Gabriel Rebelo of the same
year.116
Following the Portuguese capture of Melaka in 1511, the original trade centre
gradually shifted further east to Makassar in the Celebes.117 The Portuguese Crown
tried to obstruct private trade in the area under its dominion but without results.118 The
trade laws prohibiting Christians from carrying out commercial transactions with
Muslim merchants and communities were not able to hinder its practice and
development.119 The increased demand by both Portuguese and Asian communities
for spices triggered an increase in the cultivation of cloves and the introduction of
clove cultivation to other islands in the region.120
The change in the trade map also affected the Papuan populations. The
proximity of rising entrepots in the Celebes and Maluku caused commercial
transactions to intensify in the area. The Sultanates of Tidore and Ternate reached the
zenith of power and state development during this period. The Portuguese, in fact,
exploited the bitter rivalry existing between the two Sultanates in the Spice Islands in
order to further their interests, with the Sultan of Ternate becoming the most
important Portuguese ally. By favouring the monopoly of the spice trade by the
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Portuguese, the Sultanate of Ternate was able to extend its influence over Maluku and
forestall the rise of Tidore’s dominance in the region.
Before the arrival of the Portuguese, the most important island in the Maluku
area was Halmahera and the neighbouring island of Giailolo. Ternate and Tidore,
helped respectively by the Portuguese and the Spanish, increased their authority on
Halmahera at the expense of the Sultan of Giailolo.121 Plausibly it was during the
power struggle between Tidore and Ternate and the demise of the political supremacy
of Giailolo, that the Papuan populations became tributaries of the Sultan of Tidore as
the ‘saga of Gurabesi’, developed in this period, symbolically and aetiologically
suggests. Slaves and products from New Guinea and the Papuan islands made their
way to Tidore as tribute.122 A VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie)
document, dated 1705, reports that since the XVI century the islands bordering the
northern coast of West Papua, inhabited by people who spoke a Papuan language,
were tributaries of the Sultan of Tidore.123
The arrival of the Dutch in South-east Asia at the beginning of the XVII century
caused a further disruption in the commercial transactions and arrangements of the
region. The increase in the production of spices, already initiated during the
Portuguese mercantile domination, caused their price to plunge on the world markets.
The East India Company tried to solve the crisis by implementing the policy of
extirpatie, that is the destruction of cultivated trees in order to reduce production, and
by introducing trade restrictions aiming at impeding private trade. Subsidies, known
as Recognitie Penningen, were paid to the rulers of those islands forced to reduce
cultivations.124
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Once again the trade centre shifted, this time to the west, from Macassar to
Batavia on Java, and to the south on the Ceram Laut islands. In the latter case the
Bandanese who fled when their island fell into the hands of the Dutch are probably to
be held responsible for the rise of a florid market in the second half of the XVII
century.125 Schouten, quoted by Galis, reports that in 1602 the trade area covered by
Ceram Laut merchants extended as far as the Raja Ampat islands, New Guinea and
Timor to the east and Bali, south-east Kalimantan and east Java to the west.126 Among
the commodities commercialised by the swift kora-koras were birds of paradise,
massoi bark and Papuan slaves from the Onin and Mimika coasts.127
It seems that when the Dutch realised that the Ceram Laut merchants were
carrying out a profitable trade along the south-west coast of New Guinea, they
became interested in the area. The Ceram Laut merchants were trading in textiles and
beads on the Onin peninsula in exchange for slaves and massoi bark. By the beginning
of the XIX century they had established a monopoly over these products continuing
with the traditional Sosolot practice and trade friend agreements.128 It was the
existence of these longstanding traditional arrangements between traders and locals
that neutralised any attempt made by the Dutch to gain the monopoly over the area
covered by the Ceram Laut commercial venture, that is, from the Onin peninsula to
Kowiai. Here Ceramese traders had established several trading stations or Sosolots, at
Triton Bay, Namatote and Lakahia in which they appointed local agents. The
Ceramese expansion on the south coast of New Guinea came to a halt when the Sultan
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of Tidore, attempting to enforce his influence over New Guinea, initiated hongi
expeditions in 1850.129
The Dutch did not exert, in the first place, direct control over New Guinea.
Since they did not see any profit and benefit deriving from directly controlling the
Papuan territories, these were allowed to remain under the sovereignty of the Sultan
of Tidore as the treaty signed in 1660 shows.130 Any attempt to find precious metals
and resources in west New Guinea had failed. In 1667 the treaty was renewed but the
boundaries of the territories placed under the jurisdiction of the Sultan of Tidore
remained vague. The treaties were subsequently renewed on the same terms in 1689
and 1700.
According to one of the clauses contained in the treaty, the Sultan of Tidore was
held responsible by the Dutch for the activities and disturbances caused by Papuan
raids and piratical practices. This probably explains why the boundaries of Tidore’s
sovereignty were never clearly defined: in this way the Dutch could have, in fact, at
any time, called up Tidore’s intervention invoking responsibilities stemming from
jurisdiction.131
Valentijn, writing at the beginning of the XVIII century, reports that in 1670 the
inhabitants of Weda and other Papuans raided Ceram and Ambon. Furthermore in
1700 groups of Papuans, migrated from Misoöl and established in North Ceram, were
causing disturbances in the area forcing the colonial Government “to attack the
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Papuans not only on our shores, but even in their own eyries on the coast of Maba,
Weda and Salatta”.132
Probably the Papuan raids reported by Valentijn were part of Papuan rak
ceremonies, headhunting expeditions, or a means to obtain slaves to sell on the
lucrative regional markets.133 These disturbances may also have been related to the
insurgency against the Dutch and Tidore led by the Sangaji of Patani that will be
discussed later. However, that the Papuans practiced piracy seems to be confirmed by
the fact that for the Timorese of Kisar the word papua meant ‘pirate’.134
From the archival documents and contemporary accounts it appears that the
Dutch and their Tidorese vassal were experiencing difficulties in asserting and
maintaining their control over the Papuan populace of New Guinea. In 1703
representatives of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie travelled to New Guinea
with representatives from Tidore in an attempt to assert Tidorese sovereignty over the
Papuans. This practice became customary and lasted until the XIX century when
Dutch direct rule came to be established. In 1706 Governor Roselaar listed the islands
of Pisang, Popa, Bolo, Misoöl, Salawanta, Batanta and Waigeo as being under
Tidorese rule. No mention is made of the Onin peninsula and Gebe, although it seems
that the Sultan claimed sovereignty over these territories as well.135
The repercussions of the Napoleonic wars and the contemporaneous industrial
revolution in Europe affected also the South-east Asian region. The Congress of
Vienna, which restored the balance of power of the Ancien Regime, prompted a new
wave of colonial enterprises in Africa, Asia and Oceania. The shift from colonial
mercantilism to capitalist imperialism brought about a change in the existing
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longstanding economic and political relations, as well as traditional allegiances. The
necessity to secure unrestricted access to resources forced the Dutch to establish direct
control over the territories until then indirectly administered.
In order to forestall the ongoing British expansion in the east and the south, in
1824 the Netherlands signed an agreement with Great Britain over the partition of
New Guinea, presumably part of the treaty of London, which had worldwide
application. A few years later in 1828 at Fort Du Bus in Triton Bay on the south-west
coast of New Guinea, the Dutch government claimed sovereignty over the territories
from the Vogelkop peninsula to 141 degrees east longitude.136 In 1897, because of the
necessity to control the raids of Tugeri or Marind-anim head-hunters of the south
coast into the British sector of the island, the Dutch government was reluctantly
forced to include in its budget for 1898 an item for the establishment of an
administrative post in Netherlands New Guinea.137 But this, more than an
administrative post, was a sort of military garrison. It was only in 1907 that an
effective administrative post was established in Merauke sanctioning the beginning of
official Dutch rule in the territory and the incorporation of West Papua into the Dutch
colony of Indonesia.
The survey of the existing archaeological and literary sources reveals that the
Papuans were a people occupying a territory geographically situated to the east of the
Spice Islands and Halmahera. The same sources, however, provide little or no
information regarding the characteristics and traits constituting Papuan identity, that
is, how this identity was structured in relation to the wider regional Malayan context
by external observers as well as Papuan self-perception.
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Regional Perceptions of Papuan Identity.
The scarcity of documents renders difficult any attempt to determine the
characteristics and constituents of Papuan identity in pre-colonial South-east Asia.
The sources surveyed portray the status quo the European powers found when they
first entered the region. They list the Papuans as part of the traditional commercial
network and they appear to constitute a ‘people’ or ethnic group in their own right
distinct from the Malay people on the basis of racial, linguistic and cultural traits. But
they say nothing regarding how Papuan identity was structured.
Identity is the outcome of a relational process continuously shifting over time.
Not having an ontic dimension, but being a relational entity generated by the
dynamics of a continuously changing dialectics, it escapes any attempt of
conceptualisation and definition. It represents, in fact, the knowledge of one’s essence
and existence in relation to another mutating entity so that perceived differences
become structural elements of identification. The relation creates a system in fieri,
continuously changing and shifting towards new dimensions, configurations and
meanings.
Ethnographical accounts show that the Papuans identified themselves with
reference to their tribe, clan, confederacy, territory or ecosystem and never to the
common intertribal elements they shared.138 They never referred to themselves as
‘Papuans’. Probably the dialectical idiosyncrasies of Papuan languages and the
totemic ancestries contributed to foster this type of ‘localised’ or ‘residential’
identification. Only in their relations with the Malays and, subsequently, with
European traders did they refer to themselves as Papuans, that is the name that had
been attributed to them by the outsiders, the perceived ‘strangers’ or ‘other’.
137
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Consequently, in order to reconstruct the identity of the Papuans in South-east
Asia, an historical analysis of the name may represent an optimum point of departure.
Names, in fact, tend to resiliently survive the test of time and can be considered
bearers or custodians of historical significances and experiences. As toponyms are
used by archaeologists as relics to reconstruct the history of a settlement, so eponyms
and ethnonyms may be indicative of historical vicissitudes and cultural peculiarities.
In support of the hypothesis that, at the dawn of the XVI century, the Papuans
were already regarded as a people ethnically distinct from the Malay populace
inhabiting Maluku is the name ‘Papua’ itself. Apart from an isolated inference that
can be drawn from a document dated 1554 by Vicente Pereira reporting that the name
derived from the Papuan language,139 evidences seem to suggest that the name derived
from a Malay word or etymon and was used by Malay speakers to denominate their
non-Austronesian neighbours.
Antonio Galvão, who had served as Governor General in the Moluccas between
1536 and 1538, stated that the “Moluccas call those people Os Papuas (Mal. Orang
Papua) because they are black, and have frizzly hair, and the Portuguese also call
them so, because they copied it from the [Moluccas]”.140 The word ‘Papua’ therefore
appears to refer to the physical characteristics of the Papuan people, that is their
negritude and frizziness. Galvão informs us that etymologically the name derives
from a Malay word, probably puah-puah, meaning ‘wollen’ or ‘frizzly haired’.
The etymology puah-puah was first listed in the 1852 English-Malay lexicon
compiled by Crawfurd who worked on previous dictionaries and word lists, in
139
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particular those compiled by missionaries. Since the term puwah-puwah does not
appear in Marsden’s dictionary of 1821, Sollewijn Gelpke hypothesises that probably
Crawfurd derived the information from other sources and in particular from the notes
of the missionaries Hutchins and Robinson who worked respectively in Penang and
Batavia at the end of the XVIII century.
Sollewijn Gelpke observes, however, that in Crawfurd’s reporting of the
etymology there are some inconsistencies. In his lexicon, Crawfurd provides three
definitions of the word ‘Papua’ determined on the basis of perceived phonetic
differences. In the first, papuwah, of Javanese and Malay derivation, is listed as
meaning ‘frizzled’, “a negrito of the Indian islands, an African Negro”. This is
followed by the entry pâpuwah, “frizzled; the island of New Guinea; an inhabitant of
that island being of negrito race”. Finally he lists the Javanese-Malay word puwahpuwah as meaning “frizzled or woolly; a Negro. It is applied to anything with a
frizzled or woolly coat”. Crawfurd, writing some year later, added that the Malayans
and the Javanese used to refer to New Guinea as tanah puwah-puwah, the land of the
Papuans, that subsequently the Europeans corrupted into ‘Papua’.141
According to Crawfurd the homonyms or homophones of papuwah and
pâpuwah would indicate the existence of two different referents. The necessity to
duplicate referents derived probably from the need to overcome the semantic
confusion of the word papua meaning both ‘black’ and ‘frizzled’. Antonio Galvão, in
fact, as mentioned above, reports that the inhabitants of the islands east of the Spice
Islands were called os papuas because they are black and have frizzly hair. Sollewijn
Gelpke suggests that Galvão intended the term as meaning primarily ‘black’. The
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same meaning, in fact, appears to occur in Wilkinson’s dictionary the compilation of
which was based on lexemes contained in old texts and manuscripts and not on preexisting dictionaries.142
A completely different etymology is that proposed by one of Galvão’s
contemporaries, Gabriel Rebelo, who argued that “Papua, em todas as linguas de
Maluco diz Cafre”, that is ‘heathen’.143

The same association between negritude,

frizzly hair, and ‘kafir’ is reported in Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola’s Conquista
de las Islas Malucas. But for Argensola ‘cafre’ or ‘kafir’ means ‘dark-skinned’ and
not ‘heathen’. Argensola’s text reads:
(…) los Papuas al Este del Maluco, islas poco frecuentadas (…); cuyos
naturales son negros como los cafres: usan el cabello revuelto en grandes y
crespas greñas; (…) Llamaronse Papuas que en su lengua significa prietos
(…).144
A completely different etymological identification is that proposed by Kamma
who hypothesises a native origin for the term based on historical considerations, that
is the historical use of the term, rather than abstract lexical and semantic speculations.
Kamma’s argument is constructed by contextualising the Papuan reality in the Maluku
world, in its economic and political configuration reconstructed on the basis of the
information provided by XVI –XVII century Spanish and Portuguese sources. These,
in fact, tend to relate the term ‘papua’ to the seafarer tribes of Biak and the Vogelkop
peninsula who were part, as shown in the previous pages, of the intricate web of
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commercial and economic relations developed in eastern Indonesia since time
immemorial.
The earliest South-east Asian maps and reports seem to confirm the assumption
that the name ‘Papua’ was used to refer to a region east to Halmahera and with which
Halmahera had a close and longstanding relationship. Several traditions seem to
support the hypothesis that groups of Biak people migrated to Patani and Sawai long
before the arrival of the Europeans. Visser points out that the Sahu of north-west
Halmahera speak a language that belongs to the West Papuan Phylum of nonAustronesian languages.145 According to the linguistic analyses conducted by Würm,
the West Papuan Phylum comprises of 24 languages located in the central and
northern parts of the Vogelkop Peninsula in West Papua and on northern
Halmahera.146 Miguel Roxo de Brito reports that the people of the Geelvink Bay area
told him that some of their kinsmen (keret) lived in a region beyond Gebe. It is likely
therefore that they were referring to East Halmahera, Patani and Weda.147
Portuguese and Spanish reports, dating back to the XV-XVI centuries, indicate
that the Papuan islands paid allegiance to the Sultan of Tidore. In the Tidorese system
of vassalage, the Biak, Numfor and Raja Ampat islands were denominated
collectively as sup i papwa or ‘the land below’. This is a designation that may be read
as either a geographical reference, as ‘land below the sunset’, which is a rather
difficult etymology to accept since Papua is east of Tidore, or as indicating a political
status alluding to the subjection to the Sultan of Tidore.148
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It is evident that the acceptance of either the geographical or political meaning
of the term will weigh on Papuan chronology, with the geographical semantics
vouching for an earlier chronology. The two meanings of the term however can well
be referred to two different moments of Papuan history, as ab origine the term may
have had a geographical connotation and subsequently it underwent a semantic ‘drift’
or ‘shift’ assuming a political meaning coinciding with the submission to Tidore
around the XV century A.D.. Presumably before any Papuans became vassals of the
Tidorese Sultanate, they were known as the people inhabiting the ‘lands below the
sunset’, more precisely the territories south to Halmahera traditionally connected to
the populace inhabiting the north-western shores of New Guinea.
The Papuan shore-dwellers of New Guinea and off-shore islands were well
known in the Maluku-Ceram Laut trade circuit. The Papuans were also known not
only as traders and suppliers of particular commodities, but also for their piratical
activity. Piracy is the concept applied by the Europeans of the XVI-XVII centuries to
define Papuan raiding activity. The term is, however, inappropriate since a great part
of presumed Papuan ‘piratical’ activity had a ceremonial or ritual meaning. These
raids were usually head-hunting expeditions or rak, that had in the Papuan worldview
a profound social meaning. Among the Marind-anim, for instance, they served the
purpose of obtaining new names for the individuals of the tribe. As Van Baal points
out, head-hunting expeditions were usually carried out in areas distant from their
home territory in order to prevent their victims from retaliating with counter-attacks
on the raiders’ village.149 For the people of the Biak-Numfor area it was a means by
which to acquire those valuables necessary for the performance of ceremonies and the
definition of social ranking.150
149
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European sources, dating back to the XVII-XVIII centuries, report that the
Papuan incursions were greatly feared by the coastal populations. Argensola writes
that the Papuans were considered “hombres rígidos, sufridores del trabajo, hábiles
para cuelquier traición”, that is men morally inflexible, hard workers and capable of
any sort of treachery.151 Valentijn, writing at the beginning of the XVIII century,
states that “al deze papoasche ingezenten zijn en zeer befaamde roovers, voor welke
de bewoners van Ceram (waar zij ook meest aankomen) uitnemend bang zijn”.152 He
also reports that, because Papuan piracy was increasing in brutality and frequency, the
Bandanese trade was experiencing severe losses in terms of profits and volume of
trade.153
The arrival of Islam in Eastern Indonesia, with its prohibition against enslaving
coreligionists, may have greatly affected the modalities and characteristics of
traditional slave trade patterns and practices. New parameters were established and
new traders emerged. Reid argues that in the XV century slave trade followed a
precise pattern:
(…) slave trade (…) tended to take people from east to west, from small
divided states (especially those prey of internal warfare) to larger wealthier
ones, and from non-Muslim to Muslim societies. A number of states rose
and flourished primarily on the traffic of slaves, many of them seized by
raiding expeditions against coastal peoples in the Central Philippines,
Eastern Indonesia, New Guinea, Arakan or the Mekong Delta. Aru
(Sumatra) and Onin (New Guinea) had the reputation in the XVI century
(…).154
The historical process that brought about the commodification of the Papuans as
slaves and the development of a master-slave relationship between the Indo-Malays
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and the Papuans, probably represented the locus originis of the persisting Indonesian
attitudes of contempt for the Papuans.155 Twentieth century Dutch reports, although
written in the milieu of an anti-Indonesian propaganda, confirm that the sense of
superiority that characterised Indonesian attitudes in their relations with the Papuans
date back to the beginning of their contacts and it was during this time that the
expression Papua Bodoh, stupid Papuan, was coined.156
Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, South-east Asian slave trade was mainly
local, motivated by religious and social factors. Once again, as has been argued in
regard to piracy, the concept of slavery is inappropriate to understand the meaning of
the institution in the South-east Asian context. This was part, in fact, of the wider web
of the traditional South-east Asian patron-client hierarchies and bondage
relationships,157 and, as the Malay Law Texts indicate, a taxonomy of dependencies
existed in the regional system of bondage and slavery.158
With the expansion of Islam in the region, non–Muslim communities became
the agents and centres of the profitable slave trade. In the XVI century, the most
important trade route was that operating between Onin and the island of Goram.
Coastal non-Muslim tribes, known and feared for their bellicosity and fierceness, were
left to monopolise the florid trade of human cargoes. The Papuans from the Onin
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peninsula sold slaves to Muslim traders from Ceram and Tidore with whom they had
Sosolot agreements.159 It is possible that the conversion to Islam of Papuan
communities was hindered by the necessity to maintain control over this trade sector.
Islam in fact appears to have been confined to a relatively exiguous number of people
living in the Sosolot areas where Muslim trade agents from Ceram or Tidore lived
whilst maintaining contacts with the local ‘heathen’ population. This situation seems
to be confirmed by the fact that when the Dutch traders entered the Papuan-Ceramese
trade network they found trade agents of mixed-blood referred to as ‘Papuans’.160
The Dutch Generale Missiven indicate that the Dutch tried to enter and take
over the slave market controlled by the ‘Ceramese-Papuan connection’ but that their
attempts failed,161 probably because of the support of the Muslim traders for a
Papuan-Ceramese monopoly. In support of this hypothesis, VOC documents indicate
that in the XVII and XVIII centuries the Papuans continued to control undisputedly
the slave trade in a wide area stretching from the so-called Gamrange region north to
the Raja Ampat.162
From the scarce information available regarding the Papuans in South-east Asia
in both the pre-colonial and colonial eras, it emerges that they were perceived by
Malayans and Europeans as a ‘people’. More than a peculiar identity it is possible to
determine certain modes of ‘identification’ based on particular activities that the
Papuans exclusively engaged in. Piracy and slave trade, justified by Papuan beliefs,
values and norms, became the structural elements in which a Papuan mode of
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identification was moulded religiously, as being non-Muslim, and racially, by
referring to their negritude and physical features.
The term ‘Papuan’ was used to designate the “frizzly haired” inhabitants of the
islands and coastal areas of what is today West Papua. The inhabitants of the interior,
in their relations with the coastal dwellers, appear to have been perceived and
represented as a different ethnic group as some European accounts seem to suggest.
The implications of the dialectics will be shown in the later parts of this thesis.

Christianity and Colonialism: Exporting the West, Importing the Rest.
Max Weber, in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, postulated
a proportional relation between religious affiliation and social stratification and that
“religious affiliation is not a cause of economic conditions, but to a certain extent it
appears to be a result of them”.163 Although Weber was elaborating a theory ‘within
the boundaries’ of Christianity characterised by denominational divisions,164 one
might argue whether there is a direct correlation between Christian ethics, values and
beliefs and the capitalist world system which emerged and took shape during the XV
– XVI centuries A.D.. In this period Europe came to represent the epicentre or focal
point of homogenising centripetal and centrifugal forces.
Christianity, inculturated by the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman mind and
systematically developed by medieval scholars,165 had become the ideological
foundation and the source of identity of the West. The merchants, adventurers,
conquistadors, missionaries and settlers set out to explore the newly discovered
territories with their family Bibles and breviaries in their satchels and trunks. Often, as
163
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the log books and diaries of many navigators of the time record, prayers were recited
and psalms were sung to foster a sense of safety and security during the hazardous and
turbulent journeys and to provide a meaning for their actions and their enterprise. It
was Christianity which, informing a particular way of life, made the Europeans
socially and culturally visible in alien settings, becoming the matrix of their identity in
an ‘unknown’ and ‘uncivilised’ world. The consequences of this process were that, in
the long run, Christianity came to represent what was ‘known’ and ‘civilised’.
The missions, the institutionalised emblem of Christianity in colonial settings,
became the outposts of Western civilisation and through their activity of
christianisation were able to ‘convert’166 some non-western populations ‘towards’ the
acceptance of western ways of life, values and norms. Christianity appeared to be able
to support the colonial system since it acted as a means for mobilising the peripheries
to meet the needs and demands of the core. To a certain extent Christianity did
provide capitalism, and its offspring colonialism, with the fundamental (and
foundational) ethics and ethos, that is a code of behaviours and beliefs, justifying and
informing the actions and practices of those living in the colonies.
The arrival of the Europeans in South-east Asia between the XV and XVI
centuries saw the establishment in the region of Christian missions and the gradual
penetration of ‘institutionalised’ Christian ideas, beliefs and values into non-Western
systems. Its appearance was not, however, ex abrupto but had been preceded by
earlier forms of Christianity. Studies carried out by Sutjipto Wirjosuparto167 and
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Bakker168 on ancient Arab sources suggest that in the second half of the VII century
A.D. a community of Nestorian Christians169 flourished near the Sumatran town of
Pancur. This location was probably the commercial entrepot of Barus to which Arab
sources, dating back to the X century, refer.170 According to the tradition of the Acts
of Thomas, Christian communities were established by the apostle Thomas in southeast India along the Coromandel coast.171 It is possible that from here Christian ideas
and customs made there way to the islands of the Indo-Malay archipelago as far as
New Guinea along traditional local trade routes, as for centuries did Hindu practices
and tenets. In his report regarding the Papuan myth of Manseren Manggundi, for
instance, the XIX century captain and explorer Fabritius tells us that in earlier times
the Biak-Numfor region of West Papua was visited by a Hindu priest whose fate and
the doctrine he preached might have influenced the Biak legend. In the Manggundi
myth the doomed hero is said to have left for Kalingga or the coast of Coromandel,
the seat of Brahmanism, whence from earliest times many Hindu missionaries set out
to preach their doctrines in the most distant regions.172 The phoenix motif and the
baptism by fire, present in the mythological accounts of the Biak populations, are
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symbolic representations probably derived from Hindu beliefs.173 The hypothesis is
tinged, however, with probabilism and appears to depend on semiotic interpretations
(the pitfall of comparative studies!) which tend to debase symbols to mere signs.174
The fact that similar symbols recur in different religions does not entail ipso facto that
they may be the outcome of influences or contacts.
As discussed previously in this chapter, the casual explorers who visited from
time to time the scattered islands dotting the Indian Ocean in search of new sources
and opportunities of wealth and gain before the opening of the sea-way by Vasco de
Gama in 1498, probably represented an optimum display of Christian civilisation to
the local populations. In the Franciscan archives it is documented that in 1291 Fr.
John de Monte Corvino was the first European cleric to undertake a sea-journey to the
East although from his letters we are not sure whether he visited any of the IndoMalay ports.175 He was followed in 1323-1324 by Blessed Odoric of Pordenone who
visited Sumatra, Java and Borneo176 and in 1347 by Bishop John de Marignolli who
on his visit to Sumatra reported that, at that time, “sunt enim ibi pauci Christiani”.177
What must be considered at this stage before undertaking the narration and
analysis of the spread of Christianity to West Papua, is that monotheistic views had
already penetrated into the religious sphere of coastal populations in pre-missionary
times because of the spread of Islam by Arab and Persian traders. Archaeological
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evidences shows that an Arab settlement existed on Sumatra from the IX century A.D.
and that Arab merchants played an important role in the affairs of the Sumatran
Buddhist trading state of Srivijaya founded in the VII century A.D..178
The preceding nominal acceptance of, or conversion to Islam, experienced by
some of these populations, cannot be ignored in any discussion concerning Christian
evangelisation in the East. Henotheism and polytheism, which characterise animistic
religions or religiousness, were not the only elements the Christian missionaries had
to contend with in their evangelical enterprises. The confrontation and competition
between the Cross and the Crescent was an element that greatly influenced missionary
activity with regards both to its organisational strategy as well as to its educational
and catechetical programs.
As Valentijn reports, Islam reached the eastern region of the Indonesian
archipelago in the last quarter of the XV century with the conversion of the Sultan of
Ternate179 and, as the author of the Treatise informs, this remained confined only to
the ruler and his immediate entourage.180 This information is confirmed by Tome
Pires who observed that Islam began to be accepted by local rulers in Maluku fifty
years before the arrival of the Europeans in the region and that “the kings of the
islands are Mohammedans, but not very deeply involved in the sect”.181 He also
pointed out that many of the natives who had converted to Islam were not
circumcised. These converts, however, represented a very small number of the
population that still paid allegiance to their traditional deities and beliefs. In fact Pires
observes that “the heathens are three parts and more out of four.”182 Haga reports that
Islam reached the Papuan islands around the middle of the XVII century when all the
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Papuan islands were subjected to Tidore, although he admits that nothing is known
about the supremacy of Tidore on the coast of New Guinea.183 It is possible to
assume, however, because of the frequency of contacts, that Islam was introduced to
New Guinea by merchants from Halmahera and Ceram during the XVII century and
would explain the similarity in the denomination of the ‘Muslim’ sects in XVI century
Portuguese and XIX century Dutch sources: the Portuguese ceita de Mafoma in
Halmahera184 and the Dutch caste Mafore in New Guinea.185 The Etna Report of 1858
also refers to Myfore as a clan or keret on the north-western coast of New Guinea.186
Andaya’s study of the Maluku region supports the hypothesis that Islam spread
to New Guinea two centuries after the introduction of Islam to north Maluku.187 Also
Andaya argues that the clash or encounter between different worldviews came to be
perceived differently by Europeans, Arabs and South-east Asian populations. For the
Europeans and the Arabs it was a continuation of earlier religious conflicts initiated in
the XI century with all their economic and political implications.188 Trade wars were
the most visible sign of these clashes and did not pass unnoticed by the local
populations for whom the acceptance of either Islam or Christianity represented the
“commitment to either Christian or Muslim socio-political institutions and economic
networks,”189 an act lacking religious resonances.
The latent battle between Muslim ulama and Christian missionaries came to be
translated on the ground as a struggle between opposing symbols. These came to be
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loaded not only with a spiritual significance and content, but also with historical and
political meanings. The locals, in the beginning, interpreted this ‘war of signifiers’
according to their hermeneutics, as a clash between forces or powers. It was a natural
process that caused the rift between signifiers and their signifieds to widen and shift
towards new meanings bringing about the rise of new or apparently hybrid ideologies.
For the Papuans the acceptance of either Christianity or Islam was conceived as
a political and economic statement of allegiance entailing the adoption of existing
political institutions and economic networks. It did not have an impact on a spiritual
level since they simply systemised the new symbols into their native epistemology.
Local Muslim or Christian converts tended to indifferently use Christian objects
as tutelary or apotropaic talismans. This attitude implicitly reveals that their
conversion was propelled by the pragmatic opportunity to get access to new sources
of spirits and power in order to ameliorate their lives.190 Consequently the appearance
of either Christian or Muslim symbols and practices in the aboriginal system does not
ipso facto mean that one is in the presence of converted populations or communities.
Notwithstanding the acceptance of Islam, it appears that the local populations of
the Maluku-Papuan region continued to maintain their traditional animistic beliefs and
rituals which supported and underpinned their atavistic system and network of social
and economic relations. Foreign elements, such as Islamic beliefs, rituals and
practices, were merely incorporated into their traditional systems.
As will be discussed in chapter IV, the Papuans tended to incorporate intrusive
elements into their native systems of beliefs by interpreting them in the light of their
native hermeneutics. Among the Papuans ‘conversion’ had a different meaning not
entailing the abjuration of the past in order to make ‘space’ for the exclusive
189
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acceptance of the ‘direction’ indicated by the new faith. Conversion was a politicoeconomic ‘act of allegiance’ not different from that by which relationships were
established within the native exchange system regulated by the Big Man. It was the
‘cargo’ transacted within the system of values and beliefs of the Papuans.
From the discussion above it appears clear that when the Portuguese first arrived
in the region in the XVI century, a mild inkling of Christianity was already present,
long before the establishment of the first missionary posts and the enactment of a
program of systemic evangelisation of the area. Christianity and related ideas had
already been directly or virtually experienced. In India, for instance, the Portuguese
found the Thomas tradition well rooted and widely established.191
In the beginning the Portuguese were not concerned with spreading the
Christian faith. Their enterprises were not crusades and the initial attitude and
mentality was more that of a conquistador than of a coloniser. Unfavourable
contemporary criticisms tend to emphasise the thirst for booty of the first Portuguese
merchants and soldiers. Hugo Grotius reports in this regard that “the Portuguese in
most places do not further the extension of the Faith or, indeed, pay any attention to it
at all, since they are interested only in the acquisition of wealth”.192 Similar
denunciations are found in Spanish sources such as that of the Dominican Friar Diego
Aduarte who in 1598 polemically argued that the Portuguese were far more interested
in holding the ports they had than gaining souls to the Christian cause.193
The tendency to create a Pax Lusitana in the south-eastern seas facilitated the
spread of missionary activity. Permanent stations were established alongside
commercial entrepots and administrative posts. This detour in attitude was in great
part determined by political considerations. In order to strengthen their position on the
191
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European chessboard against the rival Spanish Crown, it was vital to the Portuguese
to gain the support of the powerful Catholic clergy at that time struggling against
criticisms and apostasies fuelled by Lutheran reformism. Another factor which may
have contributed to the creation of permanent urban ‘Portuguese’ settlements was the
increasing power that the Black Portuguese, or Topasses,194 were gaining in the
territories under Portuguese influence. These mestizos, for instance, in Timor
controlled the sandalwood, wax and gold dust trade with Macao and Makassar in
which the Dominican missionaries of Solor also had a profitable share.195 The
involvement of the clergy in mercantile activities was not casual but was prompted by
practical needs.
According to the Padroado (Spanish Patronato) agreements,196 which regulated
the relations between the Church and the Crown in both Portuguese and Spanish
territories and can be regarded as a direct corollary of the treaty of the Tordesillas of
1494 dividing the world between the Iberian empires,197 the Portuguese and Spanish
crowns were able to impose restrictions on church activities in the region by applying
to the missionaries the same mercantile policy they had enacted for foreign ships
trading in their seaports. Missionaries had to be in possession of a regium placet, a
sort of cartaz,198 in order to carry out their work and acknowledge the jurisdiction of
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the Portuguese Crown and of the Padroado prelates.199 Since the Bulls instituting the
Padroado had granted the king of Portugal the right to collect tithes and other
ecclesiastical revenues, the overseas dioceses and missions were financially
dependent on the crown and came to represent a constant item in the Portuguese
balance of payments. However revenues were often insufficient to support the
ecclesiastical organization overseas and had to be often integrated with subsidies from
the Royal Exchequer. The fact that this was most of the times empty, forced the clergy
to look for alternative sources of income and maintenance.200 For this reason the
missionaries, religious orders and high ecclesiastical personalities were forced to
engage or become involved in mercantile activities. It is documented for instance that
the Jesuits took part actively in the Maluku spice trade. A document dated 1575
expressly refers to Jesuit commercial enterprise: the fathers of the Maluku mission in
Ambon had a licence to trade four bahars of cloves.201 Father Valignano who visited
the missions in the South-east Asian seas deplored the fact that the missions
resembled commercial entrepots rather than institutions for the advancement and
promotion of Christianity in the region.202 Furthermore, the peculiar ‘hybrid’ reality of
the South-east Asian context brought Christianity to engage in relations with the nonChristian world, in particular with the old enemy Islam. Papal bulls tried to systemise
the relationship in order to curtail negative doctrinal effects. In the Bull Aeterni Regis
Clementia of 1481, Pope Sixtus IV spelled out the ‘rules of engagement’ of
Christianity in the South-east Asian region to be observed by both Christian laics and
custom duties on the merchandise bought or sold were paid at the Portuguese ports docked by foreign
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199
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clerics: trade with non-Christians was permitted provided they did not supply
weaponry and believers continued to promote the propagation of the Christian
Faith.203
Missionary involvement in worldly mercantile affairs projected a peculiar image
of the mission to the native populations: Christian beliefs and practices, as it will be
shown, came to be envisaged as ‘means’ to enter the politico-economic network
centred around the mission. It was presumably in this way that the missions were
perceived by the Papuans who were part of a longstanding inter-island trade network
between New Guinea, Ceram and Maluku and it prompted their interest in
Christianity.

The Maluku Mission and the Papuans
The christianisation of the Papuan region appears to have been closely connected
to that of Maluku. Once the mission station was established in Maluku, missionaries
set out from there to reach the western shores of the territories of New Guinea and its
adjacent islands. This connection between Papua and Maluku constitutes a recurrent
leitmotiv in Papuan history since primeval times and continues up to its incorporation
into Indonesia and beyond. The Catholic Church itself enhanced this already existing
connection when drawing its ecclesiastical districts. In 1902 Maluku and West Papua
would become the first Apostolic Prefecture to be instituted as a separate entity from
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Java, a binomial that will last until 1949 when Jayapura will be established as an
independent Apostolic Prefecture.204
The Portuguese, stationed in the Maluku seaports, did not make any concerted
attempt to convert the native inhabitants to Christianity. When the fortress on the
island of Ternate was built in 1522, the Padroado Real provided the settlement,
limited to its Portuguese population, with a vicar and, in some cases, with one or two
beneficiaries belonging to the secular clergy. Their duty was to take care of the
spiritual needs of the Portuguese residents and their native wives and children. The
conversion of the autochthonous inhabitants did not represent their main duty
according to the contemporary sources available on the area.205 This was undertaken
only when believed to be politically necessary.
Under Captain Tristão de Ataide who governed the Maluku fortress in the years
1533-1536, conversions were made among the native inhabitants, the light brown
‘Alfuros’,206 of the so-called Moro, identified with the region to the north of
Halmahera.207 Among the converts were the village chiefs of Tolo and Mamuya on the
Morotia (Morotai) coast and more than five thousand locals. During the revolt against
Ataide in 1535-1536, known as the Molucensian Vespers,208 some ‘Moro’ villages
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apostatised and killed one of the vicars, Fr. Simão Vaz, who had been sent there to
evangelise the ‘pagan’ populations. His companion, the merchant Francisco Alvares,
had a narrow escape from his would be murderers and managed somehow to return
safe and sound to Ternate.209 It can be speculated that at this time there was a protomission field operating on the island of Halmahera, which, as previously shown, had
strong relations with the Papuans inhabiting the off-shore islands of New Guinea,
since the two heroic pioneers had been joined, in 1534, by Fernão Vinagre.210 The
contemporary Jesuit cleric Marta reports that the south of the Moro region was
inhabited by Papuans who occasionally were found in the north as slaves of the more
wealthy Alfuros.211
Between 1536-1539, under the regency of Antonio Galvão, the Maluku-Papuan
region had been pacified when Tidore, which had been occupied by the dissident
Maluku kings and their Papuan allies,212 was captured. During this period Francisco
Alvares Pinheiro, a priest, went twice to the island of Moro and baptised many
Christians but did not reside there.213 At the time of St. Francis Xavier’s arrival in the
area, however, there still were few Christians. In this regard he writes to his fellow
Jesuits in Rome:
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De la otra costa de Maluco está una tierra, la qual se llama o Moro, a sesenta
leguas de Maluco. En esta isla de o Moro avrá muchos años que se hizieron
grande número de christianos, los quales, por muerte de los clérigos que los
baptizaron, quedaron desamparados y sin doctrina (…)214
Very few of the converts remained loyal to the Christian faith. On Ambon
conversions had been made under Captain Antonio Galvão in 1538. In the same year
Galvão was informed of the arrival of ships from Java, Makassar and Banda in Ambon
sent to buy cloves in exchange for arms. Galvão held that this was against Portuguese
interests and in contravention of the papal bulls regarding the rights and duties of the
Padroado.215 Probably the words of the papal Bull Aeterni Regis Clementia were
echoing in his mind and served as a pretext to send out a fleet under the orders of
Diogo Lopes de Azavedo to expel the intruders. On this occasion the whole of Ambon
came under Portuguese-Ternatan control and three villages requested to be baptised.216
These must have increased by the time St. Francis Xavier arrived on the island in 1546
since he records “siete lugares de christianos”, seven Christian villages.217 As to
Ternate, the Portuguese town inhabited by “casados”, their native wives and slaves
214
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were Christian. No other Christian community is reported to have existed on the island
before the arrival of the Jesuits.
The arrival of the followers of the Society of Jesus represents the point of
departure for the systematic evangelisation of the native populations and the
development of Christian missions in South-east Asia. The Jesuits became politically
and economically involved in East and South-east Asian affairs: under their
sponsorship the Catholic Church appeared to be but a militant and mercantile
organization.218 They were, for this very reason, the most strenuous defenders and
prominent exponents of the claims of the Padroado for the following two centuries.219
Since the Maluku region represented until the arrival of the Jesuits the
easternmost frontier of Christianity, in West Papua, there had been no systematic
evangelisation. Christianity may have been, for the populations situated on the coasts,
mere hearsay. Nor there are any documents referring to the religious status of West
Papua prior to the Maluku mission. Only when the mission was established in Ambon
in 1547220 do we find some references to the island of New Guinea and the Papuan
inhabitants.
The earliest Jesuit information regarding the Papuan populations dates back to
the year 1553. Fr. Juan De Beira,221 writing to his fellow Jesuits in Coimbra reports:
Hay nestas partes huma terra chamada Nova Guiné e por outro nome
Papuas. É terra muy grande; tem perto de si muitas ilhas. A terra firme tem
mais de 700 legoas em comprido. Nella ai 4 reinos e todos se entendem com
huma mesma lingua. Regem-se polas estrellas e contão seus meses por ellas.
generally translated into English with ‘hamlet’. It is more likely that Bartoli has in mind the selfsufficient medieval units that emerged more for defensive purposes than economic ones.
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Huma destas hé a mão, e tem tantas estrelas como a mão de conjunturas, e
chama-ce em sua lingoa “fale”; outras são como hum arco, outras como
huma nao, e assi outras figuras que as estrelas rapresentão. Hé terra fertil e
de muitos mantimentos, que são como os das ilhas de o Moro, e mui só; e a
gente simple, nem ay entre ellos mouros; e quem se pode fazer grande
serviço a N. Sehor em ajudar a salvar estas almas.222
The information provided by Fr. Beira is extremely significant for the inferences
that can be made. First of all Fr. Beira’s missionary activity was in the so-called Moro
region (Morotai – Halmahera). It is possible that during his stay in the Maluku mission
he had a chance, not expressly reported, to visit the Papuan country or had information
of the area from the local inhabitants who had contacts with the Papuans of New
Guinea and nearby islands. It is also possible that he had a chance to meet either the
residual Papuan communities who lived in Halmahera and Morotai or the Papuan
embassies to the Sultan of Tidore. He mentions, in fact, 4 reinos, Four Kings or Raja
Ampat, a name used to designate the islands west of New Guinea and some parts of its
western coastlands, including the Geelvink bay region, all of which fell under Tidorese
sovereignty.223 Beira’s account seems to be confirmed by a contemporary source, that
of Antonio Pigafetta, who, in his account of Magellan’s voyage around the world,
refers briefly to these Papuan populations inhabiting the interior of the island of
Halmahera that he calls ‘Giailolo’:
Before this island is another very large one named Giailolo, inhabited by
Moors and heathen. And there were (as the King told us) two kings among
the Moors, one of whom had six hundred children, and the other five
hundred and twenty five. The heathen do not keep so many wives, and do
not live so superstitiously as the Moors; but in the morning, as they leave
222

Documenta Malucensia, Doc. 44, pp. 129-131. Translation of Portuguese text: “There is in this
region a land called New Guinea and by another name ‘Papuas’. It is a huge territory; it has nearby also
many islands. The mainland is more than seven hundred leagues in length. It is governed by four kings
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their house, they worship the first thing they see for the whole day. The king
of those heathens, called Raia Papua, is very rich in gold and lives in the
interior of the island. 224
Beira’s predecessor, St. Francis Xavier, had reported of the village of Alilio on
the north coast of Morotai that was inhabited presumably by Papuans who appear to
have been Christian: in 1555, in fact, there was a cross standing in the village but no
church.225
Beira describes the Papuans as “gente simple”, naive people, probably referring
to their rudimentary, “primitive” way of living. However the most important piece of
information he provides is that the Papuans had not been converted to Islam, “mem ay
entre ellos mouros”. This information may be used to infer that Arab merchants who
had arrived and established themselves in the Maluku area never landed on the Papuan
islands and mainland. It is possible, since Papuan products appear to have represented
a consistent part of the early trade cycles monopolised by the Arabs in South-east
Asia, that the relationship between the Muslim traders and the Papuan territories were
mediated either by a third party, probably the Tidorese sultan, or else the exchange
took place in an intermediate market (Maluku). In fact, Beira’s testimony seems to
corroborate this supposition, since it seems that the Papuans whom he refers to are
seafarers, living therefore in coastal areas, who use the stars for orientation and time
reckoning, naming the months of the year after stars and constellations.
The very few documents contained in the Jesuit archives referring to the Papuan
populations reveal that the missionaries of the Maluku station intended to evangelise
the Papuans too and carry out missionary work in their lands. But there was a lack of
personnel able to carry out the necessary work. It is documented that in 1545 there was
a cleric working in the territory of New Guinea, a not well-specified Fr. Jeronimo who,
224
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at the outbreak of the war between Spain and Portugal in that year was forced to leave
the island. How long he sojourned among the Papuans is not reported.226
The lack of missionaries probably was one of the main reasons why Papua was
neglected and missionary work began late. In a letter dated 1563, Fernão De Osorio,
wrote to the Jesuits in Lisbon about the need for more missionaries in the region as the
inhabitants were many and the territory to cover vast:
E tãobem causa grande dor tão grande messe e tão poucos obreiros porque
Ihes sei dizer que esta terra de Maluco hé huma das grandes empressas que a
Companhia tem, por ter muitas terras propinquas que dizem folgarião de ver
os Padres e fazerem-se christãos, como hé hum reino que se chama
Seyrão227, terra muito grande; outro que se chama o Papua, tãobem muito
grande (…)que hé imfinidade de gemte, todos com desejos de christanitade,
e por falta de obreiros se não começa quaise nenhuma.228
The same shortage of clerics is recorded by other two documents respectively
dated 1564 and 1569 both referring to Papuan populations:
Ad haec Papuarum populi impense baptizari efflagitant, quorum tamen
saluti ob nostram paucitatem hucusque consultum non fuit.229
E por aqui verão as terras que quá pedem christanidade; nomear-ihas-ei pera
que roguem a Nosso Senho que manda muitos obreiros a ella[s], pois tantas
almas se perdem à mingoa de quem as bautize, scilicet; a terra dos papues,
que hé gente como cafres, omde há muitos reis e estaraa daqui algumas 60
ou 70 legoas. Hé terra de infenita grandeza e dizem que são jaa discubertas
della 70 legoas, e hé terra incognita eindiscuberta: dizem que chega ao Cabo
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Documenta Malcensia, Doc. 128, par.4 “ Fr. Pero Mascarenhas SJ to Fr. Francisco Rodrigues SJ,
Goa”, Ternate, December 1563 to February 1564, p. 434. Translation of Latin text: “For this reason the
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178

de Boa Sperança. Algun destes reis vi eu stando em Bachão, que vierão a
visitar a el-rei por serem amigos e juntamente a pedirem
christandade,(…).230
It is not easy on the basis of these documents to geographically localise the
Papuan people to whom they refer. Probably since the former document deals with the
evangelisation of the island of Bacan it is possible that it is alluding to the Papuans of
the Kei islands who wanted to be christened, as is reported in a previous document.231
Otherwise it may be conjectured that it points more indistinctly to the inhabitants of
east Ceram, inhabited by ‘Alfuros’,232 and of some adjacent islands whose allegiance
was claimed by the king of Bacan. Among the adjacent islands, Nusa Laut appears to
be the one, which could fit the description. Situated between Ceram and Amboina
Nusa Laut was in fact a nodal commercial point, where boats usually laid over, and
was inhabited by the Alfuros whose piratical activities caused problems to the
Maluku-Ceram-New Guinea trade network.
The reason for the willingness of the Papuans to become Christians is not clear.
Probably the local populations thought that the conversion to the new faith would
materially benefit them somehow. The struggles for the commercial monopoly of
230
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certain products between the Ulilimas who had become allies of the Muslim traders
and the Ulisiwas, allies of the Portuguese, as reported by the Feitos Eroicos,233 may
offer the key to identify the causes which sparked the Papuan request. In fact, if one
reads the Feitos Eroicos with another document reported by de Souza showing local
kings ‘shopping around’ to choose the more profitable faith, the cause for the request
becomes clear and appears in tune with Papuan attitudes: De Souza reports that the
king of Banggai234 sent his son to examine both the Christian and Muslim creed and to
choose the best one. He decided in favour of Christianity following the advice of the
king of Bacan against that of the king of Ternate.235 In some other cases conversion
was used as ‘merchandise’ to barter in exchange for power or wealth. It is reported in
this regard by St. Francis Xavier that the king of Ternate promised that one of his sons
would convert to Christianity on condition that the latter was created king of Moro.236
The last document found in the Jesuit records regarding the Papuans is a survey
of Maluku commissioned to Fr. Nicolau Nunes by Fr. Martim Da Silva SJ of Goa
dated 1576. Besides the general information regarding the “terra dos Papuas” already
provided in previous accounts, for the first time there is a clear reference to the
indigenous religious practices of the Papuans that suggests that at that time there was
a general ethnological knowledge of Papuan practices and beliefs.237 They are
described as being devoted to the practice of magic, as fetishists and as displaying a
great reverence towards their idols.238 The interest that the missionaries showed
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towards the Papuans was probably due to their demographic density and to the
prominent role they played in inter-island trade. Nicolau Nunes’ report, in fact,
contains a reference to the abundance of gold and of birds of paradise,239 the latter
item one of the most traded commodities from New Guinea in East and South-east
Asia. Father De Beira repeatedly shows in his letters his keen interest in the Papuan
people240 and, at the same time, we learn that the Papuans are repeatedly calling to be
christened by the Jesuit fathers. A letter by the Scholastic Luís Froís SJ informs the
Jesuits in Portugal of the Papuan request and their favourable disposition towards
Christianity:
Hé gente viva d’ engenho, segundo os escravos que quá há nesta terra muito
ouro, e facilmente tomarião a fee se ouvesse obreiros della. Esta hé a gente
que continoamente está clamando: Senhor, não há homens que nos metão na
pesina do sancto baptismo.241
It seems that the slave that provided Fr. Luís Froís with this information was
from Papua. Supposedly, as information regarding the Papuans and their territory was
passed on to the missionaries through intermediaries and random contacts in an
intermediate location, probably in the same way information regarding Christianity
might have reached the Papuans but also through the Papuan enclaves of Maluku. In
1588 the Jesuit Marta reports that on the island of Morotai, the village of Alilio,

ainda que seja a pescar sem fazerem primeiro as sortes (…)”. The same information is reported in
Treatise, pp.152-154. (Translation of Portuguese text: “All these Papuans are fetishists and believe in
idols and behold these as their gods, that every nation of Maluku still make even if they are already
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known also as ‘Papua Maleleo’, is listed among the 29 Christian villages of the Moro
Mission.242
The interest of the Papuans for Christianity appears to have been prompted by
the peculiar physiognomy Christianity came to assume in South-east Asia.

Promoting Christianity in the Maluku-Papuan Region
Missionary ethnographic accounts are fundamentally theocentric, that is they are
based on the concept of the deity. From an epistemological point of view this means
that their description of tribal societies is connected to and influenced by their own
synchronic social position within these societies. The accounts available show that the
Jesuit Portuguese missionaries aimed at providing a moral justification for the
presence of the mission. From this attitude derive two mutually antithetical images of
the people studied. On one hand there is the latent theoretical assumption that there is
a general inclination on the part of the people towards Christianity. On the other, one
can observe that the missionaries perceive the people they intend to evangelise as a
‘primitive other’, an attitude that reinforces the disinclination of the natives to convert
to Christianity.243 Both positions are unequivocally present in the XVI century
writings of the Jesuit missionaries.
Portuguese missions in Asia between 1550 and 1750 were mainly manned by
Jesuits in Portuguese Asia, although a contemporary Spanish source documents that in
the area other religious orders were actively carrying out missionary work.244 However
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the missionaries of the Company of Jesus were those who made the struggle for souls
as intensive and extensive as was the spice trade competition in the area.
St. Francis Xavier, the founder of the Maluku mission, sojourned in the region
from 1546 to 1548. It is possible, in general terms, to trace his itinerary through the
islands even though there are some doubts regarding the exact names of places he
travelled to and consequently their location. In the letters that he addressed to the
Company he speaks of ‘Molucco’ as a single place, at the same time he refers to it as a
region or as the ‘Molucca’ islands.245 His own language leads us to suppose that he
used the name in a large sense to designate a tract of ocean sprinkled with islands, but
that he considered it one country.246 His letters are an important testimony of the time
and provide us with useful information regarding the methods of evangelisation
experimented with by the first missionaries, along with the common difficulties they
encountered. What these accounts lack, however, is information concerning the
reactions or perceptions of the native populations to the fathers’ activities, their
understanding of what was being taught and references to the social, political and
economic changes their presence and action ignited. The only facts reported, as seen,
are either willingness manifested by the natives to convert to Christianity or their
violent reaction to the fathers’ presence in a given territory: we are not provided with
the motives that triggered these attitudes, as happened in the Moro region. Missionary
accounts can be regarded exclusively as the narratives of the mission and not of the
native converts.

through the preachings of the Augustinians, Dominicans and Franciscans, and thanks to Father Francis
Xavier, Jesuit and his comrades; churches were being built …”).
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As already stated no mission was established in the Papuan territories of New
Guinea and the Raja Ampat islands for lack of missionary personnel, even though the
Papuans repeatedly asked to become Christians. That the Papuans were in the minds of
the missionaries is proven by a proposal dated 1577 from Fr. Antonio de San Gregorio
who proposed to evangelise New Guinea by establishing a permanent mission station.
Preparations were made but at the last moment his destination was changed and a
royal decree ordered him to sail for the Philippines.247
Following the systematic evangelisation carried out by the missionaries in
Maluku, presumably the Papuan enclaves on the island of Halmahera experienced
conversion to Christianity and were able to transmit Christian beliefs and practices to
the Papuans of other territories with whom they were in contact. Of course here, for
the lack of textual evidences, we are navigating in the realm of supposition and
inference.

However what the missionary accounts report on the methods of

christianisation applied in a given territory can be taken as a general practice and
extended to other areas.
It is widely accepted belief that Jesuit evangelisation was a mixture of carrot and
stick, that the conversions were made either by force or by emotionally and materially
blackmailing the local populations; in other words that the Jesuits enacted some sort of
‘food for souls program’. Boxer, quoting the Jesuit Fr. Valignano, refers to St.
Francis’s “judicious mixture of threats and blandishments”.248 Others reject this
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opinion, maintaining that the missionary respected the free will of the people.249
Valignano’s testimony may be true as to the overall picture, in particular where the
Jesuit activity came to be instrumental to Crown politics. This, in fact, transpires in the
letters of St. Francis. That the Jesuits were involved in secular politics emerges clearly
when the great missionary saint acknowledges the necessity to convert the headmen of
communities and villages. The European practice of cujus regio illius religio was
applied in the overseas missions:
Se el-rey há se fizer christão, espero em Deus Noso Sennhor, que
nestas partes de Maluquo se am-de fazer muitos christãos.250
The conversion of a king would have brought about the conversion of the whole
community. State politics and missionary policies went hand in hand. On one side the
temporal power of the Crown sought loyal and exploitable subjects. This was easily
achieved since many of the Asian princes became suspicious of those subjects who
accepted Christianity because they came to be identified with the European
intruders.251 Christianity was for the Asian kings and headmen synonymous with
Western ideas and customs. On the other hand the missionaries wanted to gain as
many souls as possible for the cause of Christianity and in particular that of
Catholicism which at that time was struggling against Protestantism. In other words
the urge to spread the Gospel was dictated more by political concerns, both in loco
and in the mother country, often expressed or formulated through the categories of
heresy and apostasy, than spiritual and moral ones. At times conversions of some
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territories were fuelled by the allegiance or vassal status that these had towards a
neighbouring sovereign.252
The Crown, as previously stated, helped the missionaries in their endeavour by
enacting and enforcing a favourable legislation in the territories. Among the laws
enacted by the Crown in order to facilitate the christianisation of the heathen
population in the Indies were the prohibition of polygamy and the partition of villages
in Christian and non-Christian sectors.253 Fines were levied for those who tried to
circumvent the obligations. In other words the decrees implicitly concentrated on a
certain exclusiveness of Christians against the heathen populations. Non-Christians
were discriminated against. Only Christian converts, for instance, were allowed and
favoured to occupy public offices and remunerative posts.254 Consequently, if the
native populations did not convert at the point of sword, it was difficult for them not
to adhere for practical reasons to the Christian faith.
Great attention was devoted by St. Francis and the other Jesuit missionaries to
the children since they were seen as the most effective means of spreading the faith to
the elders and of assuring its preservation in the community for future generations.
This is why the first missionaries insisted on administering baptism to the children
and their catechisation. In 1559 the Crown promulgated the infamous Crown Decree
on Orphanage by which children could be arbitrarily taken from their living parent or
surviving next of kin and entrusted to a Pai dos Christão, usually a prelate, who took
care of them educating them to the Christian faith. The practice was arbitrary since the
original decree defined an orphan child as one who had lost both parents and both
grandparents. The application of a wider definition was justified on the basis that in
the Portuguese Code of Law an orphan child was considered one who had lost only
252
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one of his parents.255 This paradigmatically shows how and to what extent the decrees
established by the Council were often reinforced by enacting coercive measures. In
other cases, however, they were relaxed for reasons of political opportunism that
called for a partial tolerance towards some autochthonous customs of religious
worship, as in the case of the Malabar and Chinese rites, sparking serious
controversies with the Vatican.256
According to St. Francis the first step in evangelising the heathen populations
was to establish a common means of communication. He writes in this regard that all
the islands of the Maluku area differ among themselves in language and in some of
them the inhabitants of neighbouring villages use different dialects.257 However, he
noticed that all understand the Malay language, the lingua franca in inter-island trade
relations.

For this reason, while he was residing in Malacca, he commissioned the

translation into Malay of the fundamental Catholic prayers, that is the Creed, the form
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of general confession, the Lord’s Prayer, the Hail Mary and the Ten
Commandments.258
The translation of Christian prayers marked the beginning of a long process of
translation into native languages of the books of the Old and New Testament and the
‘colonisation of language’, a fact that was to have remarkable influence on the
literature of the local populations. It was the Church that became the promoter of
literacy and of an indigenous written culture. It is, in fact, reported that one of the
Spanish Augustinian fathers, who in 1545 had unsuccessfully asked permission to
enter the Moro region for missionary purposes, had drawn up a Tidorese dictionary.259
The processes of Westernisation and modernisation began with the translation of the
local languages and the vernacularisation of the Christian message.260 Of course the
possibility of the missionary giving direct instruction to the natives in their own
language was more likely to be effective, since the missionary would have been able
to achieve what he had in mind.
Schurhammer, in his monumental work on the life and epoch of St. Francis
Xavier, provides us with a detailed account of the method the father adopted in order
to bring people to Christianity. He usually went door to door asking if there were any
sick people or children to baptise. In the case he had a positive response, he went
inside and began to recite the Creed and the Commandments in Malay. Then he read a
passage from the Gospel and baptised the children. With the interpreter’s help he
gathered the young and the elderly to teach them the prayers and the articles of the
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Christian faith in Malay.261 These methods were applied first in Ternate and then in
Moro, North Halmahera and Bacan.
However the battle of the Jesuits was not only against pagan beliefs and
practices, but also against Islam. In two distinct passages St. Francis refers to Muslim
cacizes, Muslim teachers:
Dos o tres cacizes que venieron de Meca (…), convertieron grande numero
de gentiles a la cecta”. Estos Moros lo mejor que tienen es que no saben
cosa ninguna de su secta perversa. 262
Los moros de aquellas partes no tienen doctrina de la ceita de Mafoma;
carecen de alfaquis, y los que son, saben muy poco, y quasi todos
estrangeros.263
Both documents point out the doctrinal ignorance of the Muslim teachers, but
what is interesting is the fact that these teachers are said to be ‘estrangeros’, strangers.
This induces us to suppose that beside the Christian mission there was a more or less
organised Muslim mission that drew preachers from Arabia, Turkey and Egypt.
At some point in the last quarter of the XV century, in fact, Ternate had adhered
to Islam. According to tradition a Javanese trader, a certain Hussein, introduced the
new faith to the region; he was later followed by a Javanese priest who initiated the
process of proselytising the locals.264 Portuguese sources however point out that, at the
beginning, Islam was confined to the ruler’s family and his court entourage265 while
the rest of the population was left to worship its native gods and goddesses.266 Islam
introduced into the Maluku- Papuan region new power relationships expressed in the
261
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adoption of new titles, in particular that of hukum.267 These, however, were never
structured within the autochthonous socio-political system and were regarded as
external accessories of allegiance to the ruler, a fact that will account for the pseudoreligious fluidity that seems to characterise the region during the XVI century.268 The
conversion of Ternate to Islam encouraged Maluku Muslim traders and scholars to
travel to the area, as they felt more comfortable and safe when dealing with Islamic or
Islamised rulers.269 It is recorded however that the Islamisation of the Papuan islanders
took place two centuries after that of Northern Maluku,270 presumably at the time of
the arrival of the Portuguese. It was between the end of the XV century and the
beginning of the XVI century that the ‘saga of Gurabesi’ explaining the vassalage of
the Papuans to the Sultan of Tidore was developed.271
By being vassals to the Muslim Sultan of Tidore and in order to maintain “a
beneficial relationship with an overlord, which required total commitment to his
world,”272 the Papuans also accepted the forms and contents of the faith of their ruler.
Islam, however, came to be contextualised by the Papuans into their world-view
according to which life primarily consisted of interlocking worlds of relationships.273
Conversion to a religion always took place on the basis of existing political or power
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relations generated and supported both by the original religious beliefs of mana and
taboo and spatial locations.274
It appears from the letters of the first missionaries, previously examined, that
there was a general awareness of the fact that, in order to eradicate native religious
superstitions and idolatry, it was necessary to change the way of life of these peoples.
It is obvious that the pioneer missionaries realised that there was a directly
proportional relation between a given socio-political and economic organisation and
the systems of knowledge and belief. Changing one would have brought about the
transformation of the other. For this reason the fathers sought to ‘de-link’ or disengage
the individual from the community. They taught the people to be economically selfsufficient and to possess a single family home.275 This kind of teaching in a society in
which an individual’s life is organised in the terms of the clan or tribe did not fail to
produce, in the long run, devastating consequences for the traditional cultural and
social patterns. Therefore the critique that maintains that pioneer missionaries had no
knowledge at all of the religious beliefs of the populations whom they were trying to
convert, that there was cultural myopia on their behalf,276 is unfair since it generalises
from the outcomes of very few exceptional cases. In reality many missionaries acted
as cultural catalysts between Asia and Europe. One might only think of the attempts
that Roberto de Nobili in India and Matteo Ricci in China made to ‘indigenise’
Christianity by using philosophical and ideological categories of those cultures in
which it was being implanted.277 It must also be considered that the disciplines of
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anthropology and missiology at that time were far from being systematically
developed. The missionaries were left on their own to face the challenges of an
unknown world.

Conclusions
When the Europeans appeared on the horizon of what can be regarded as the
‘Maluku-Papuan zone’,278 they found a regional system characterised by highly
permeable and fluid boundaries between different ethnic groups, whose identity was
nothing but the product of a series of structural processes and relations.279
Archaeological evidences and the scarce literary sources seem to suggest that the
people known as the ‘Papuans’ were part and parcel of this world of structuralsemantic relations.
During the first phase of christianisation of South-east Asia, missionary activity
was limited to areas surrounding Portuguese garrisons and fortresses. In exceptional
cases it was directed towards those areas of economic and strategic interest.280 In the
period between 1546, which marked the arrival of St. Francis Xavier in the region, and
the end of the century there were an estimated 16,000 Christians in the Maluku area.
These had been ministered to, over half a century, by only fifty Jesuits.281
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The lack of personnel was one of the major problems of pioneering missionary
endeavour. There might have been only five or six missionaries available to serve an
enormous region at any given time.282 The scarcity of missionaries appears to be the
main reason why West New Guinea was not included in the first missionary itineraries
and programs. Contemporary sources, in fact, show that both the missionaries and the
Papuans were well aware of the existence of each other.
In the missionary accounts, the Papuans display a great interest in becoming
Christian. This may not be regarded as mere Jesuit propaganda and the cause of the
declared willingness may be located in questions concerning allegiance and vassalage
to some of the Maluku sovereigns. The political and economic power that the
Portuguese missionaries concentrated in their hands may have also contributed to the
Papuan insistent request of christianisation. Consequently the desire to embrace
Christianity may be historically authentic since it appears to be ascribed to motivations
well in tune with the peculiar pragmatic and materialistic character of Papuan
religiousness.
It is possible to infer from the documents previously examined that a few Papuan
communities in Halmahera and Morotai adhered to the Christian faith. Ex hypothesi,
these may have communicated Christian ideas, values and beliefs to the Papuans of the
coastal areas of New Guinea and nearby islands with whom they had well established
commercial and/or ceremonial contacts.
Sixteenth century Portuguese sources reveal that Papuan interest in Christianity
was prompted and regulated by ‘autochthonous perceptions’: what they ‘saw’ was not
Christianity as a doctrine or set of beliefs, but the Christian mission, a reality or
establishment capable of harnessing and distributing resources. It is possible that for
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the Papuans the parallel with the Muslim sosolot was inevitable and consequential, and
it could account for the practice of mass conversion to the European faith. The
apparently materialistic attitude of the Papuans was, however, prompted by a peculiar
hermeneutics, referred to as cargoism, operating to systemise intrusive elements into
the native socio-cultural templates. The modes and means of this ‘processual
systemisation’ will constitute the object of the subsequent chapter.
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Chapter IV
In Search of the Papuan Clio
History is a child building a sandcastle by the sea,
and that child is the whole majesty
of man’s power in the world.1
But what happens when a tidal wave suddenly and fortuitously washes away the
sandcastle leaving behind just a fistful of sand, meaningless, amorphous? When
tangible signs or ‘vestiges of memory’ do not survive to testify existence, is it moral,
if morality is still of some concern to an historian, to deny sic et simpliciter the
existence of a past existent? Does the fact that it is empirically impossible to trace
origins and developments, in other words the ‘archaeology’, of a people that appear to
share common cultural traits, imply that they ‘really’ did never exist as a people or a
nation?
In this chapter I will continue my journey, initiated in the previous chapter, to
find traces of the existence of a Papuan Clio, as expression of pre-colonial Papuan
ethnic identity, by referring to precise ‘texts’, different in origin and nature: the
Papuan-Tidorese tradition of Sekfamneri, known also as Guru Besi or Gurabesi,
developed in the insular and littoral areas of north-west New Guinea, and the Dutch
documented or reported revolt of Nuku. The journey will continue in the subsequent
chapters in which I will detail the modes and means of penetration of Christianity and
its effects on the local populations. It will be argued that it was through the
hermeneutics, referred to as ‘cargoism’, and evident in mythopoeic processes and
developments of the narratives of Papuan oral tradition that the acceptance of the
message of Christianity and modernity was possible and prompted the emergence of
notions of nationhood and nationalism. The outcome of the journey will not be a
1
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‘history’ in the sense we commonly intend the word today, but the Derridean
acquisition of tangible, material ‘traces’ of the existence of a Civitas Papuana.
Before perusing the documents available that will represent the milestones of
this temporal journey, which is inherently based on the assumption that ab esse ad
posse valet consequentia,2 I need to consider the nature of these documents and
sources and whether it is possible to use them to reconstruct ‘one’ of the many
possible archives of the Papuan people.

Trekking the Papuan Archives
More than any other people, the Papuans are affected by what Derrida defines as
the mal d’archive, the need for archives.3 The current political debate regarding
Papuan nationalist claims cannot be disjoined from the search for the historical
genesis of Papuan nationhood and the historicity of the Papuan nation.
As Derrida has effectively pointed out, authority as well as authoritativeness
rests on the existence of memory preserved in the archive. From this it follows that
the archive can be envisaged as the custos or custodian of a people’s past, the locus
where memory is preserved and defended.4 Consequently the archive more than an
‘archaeology of knowledge’ is an ‘architecture of memory’.
It has already been stated in chapter II that the archive endows people with the
power to assert themselves as a people, a group, a nation, a ‘self’ whose existence and
identity are substantiated and acknowledged by the existence or survival of memory.
The semiotic tautology embedded in the relation archive-people explains why
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nationalist doctrines or ideologies are rooted in and sustained by myths of origins, a
mythical or mythologised account of how, from a state of original chaos or entropy, a
nation was able to establish itself as an ‘orderly’ unity ruled by a ‘monarch’ or
‘oligarchy’ chosen from the aristoi, the best and wealthiest of a community. It was
this exclusive elite that, by a quasi-religious creationist act, prompted the genesis of
the archive which became the foundation of its legitimacy to rule.
The power of the ruling class, consequently, is embedded in the normative
ordering of events in the archives, an order supported by an ad hoc epistemology and
hermeneutics of which the archive becomes the symbol, paradigm and beacon.
Foucault’s theory that the archive represents “the general system of the formation and
transformation of statements”5 corroborates the normative and ‘assertive’ function and
nature of the archive. When Renan, as mentioned in chapter II, argued that more than
memory, a nation is based on a shared amnesia, he was probably alluding to the
processes of selection and ordering operating in the construction of what I would
denote as ‘archival’ and not archetypal memories. The concept of the nation as an
‘imagined community’, formulated by Benedict Anderson,6 finds its raison d’être
only in the existence of an archive. Since these are the ‘genetic’ and ‘teleological’,
more than functional, characteristics of the archive I agree with Derrida when he
argues that the ‘eco-nomy’ of the archive consists inherently in keeping in order the
oikos (οικος)7, the house, or to use Croce’s expression, il Palazzo del Potere.8
When I first put hand to the study of Papuan nationalism and, a fortiori, Papuan
history, I found myself lost in the mists of amnesia. Here was, in front of me, a people
5
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possessing an evident ancient culture derived from the processes of external
adaptation to a peculiar environment and of internal cultural-societal integration, but
that did not possess an ‘archaeological memory’ that could have represented the
foundation stone of an archive recording their past existence. Neither did an oral
tradition of past events, elaborated in pre-literate times, exist that could have replaced
the lack of written documents. That such a tradition did not exist or was neglected
because of its mythologised character, as Kamma’s collection of religious texts of the
Papuan oral tradition reveals,9 was confirmed by the project regarding the rectification
of Papuan history, as referred to in chapter II.
According to the project, it appears that Papuan history began only in the
aftermath of World War II and is to be identified with the history of integration of
West Papua into the Republic of Indonesia “and aims at clarifying Papuan history in
order to strengthen the people’s unity in the State of the Republic of Indonesia”.10 In
other words what is being written or ‘rectified’ is not an independent history of Papua,
based on traditional accounts and memories, but one of the many Papuan
historiographies, in this case the one serving the purposes of a specific power agency
(Indonesia) implicitly denying Papuan nationhood and Papuan historicity.
This state of affairs induced me to undertake a quest for historical documents
which could have constituted the basis of a possible archive. This was deemed
necessary for the purpose of my research aiming at assessing whether and to what
extent Christianity contributed to the formation and development of West Papuan
nationalism.
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In a visit to the Vatican archives and library in Rome in February 2001, I came
across copies of XVI century Spanish and Portuguese documents, which variously
referred to the Papuans. The contents of these documents have been used in the
previous chapter. These documents reveal that the Papuans were at that time a wellidentified ethnos. It is not clear who the Papuans mentioned by the Iberian sources
were, but presumably they must be identified with those inhabiting the offshore
islands and coastal areas of West New Guinea. The Hispano-Portuguese documents,
however, as already observed in the previous chapter, provide information useless to
any reconstruction of Papuan identity and history, being only brief references, mainly
anecdotical in character.
In the Dutch colonial archives in The Hague, the information becomes less
novelistic and imaginative and more precise and factual. In contrast with the HispanoPortuguese sources which consisted in brief and marginal observations contained in
travelogues and log-books, the Dutch documents consist of government decrees,
official private and public reports, newspaper articles, mission reports and letters,
from which emerges a clear picture of the relations between the colonial government
and the local agency.
The Papuans in the Dutch archive are recorded in a series of XVIII century
VOC documents and in XIX century government and missionary reports. Their
presence however is not continuous. There are extensive time lags between one
reference and the other, the most extensive being those between 1658, the last date on
which the Papuans are recorded by the Hispano-Portuguese sources, and 1716, and
1784 and 1828.
The discontinuities of the archives cannot be regarded, as Foucault once argued,
as “something that the historian secretly supposes to be present”, as the positive
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element that determines the object of the historical reading and validates his
analysis11, but rather the presence of the authority that has determined the existence of
the discontinuity by applying criteria of selection, admission and omission which have
contributed to engender the ‘infamous’ categories of primitivism, orientalism,
occidentalism, as well as various criteria of historicity by which to support and justify
governance and dominance.
The missionary archives, by contrast, are less selective because they are already
ordered by an existing pre-formatted ‘missiological discourse’ generated by the
ecclesiastical establishment and ‘canonical’ activity. The archive here is implicitly
dominated by an Augustinian historicism that assumes Divine Providence as the
Prime Mover of events and processes and the mission as the civitas Dei (city of God)
located within the civitas diaboli (city of the devil) of the heathen populations.
Although spiritually edifying, the missionary accounts often appear to be distorted by
this vision so that the information they provide appears, at times, ‘unrealistic’ and
affected by some sort of ‘romantic idealism’.
Since the documents are divided by missions, that is geographically, the spatial
element provides that sense of continuity in the missionary narrative that is missing in
the colonial archives. The ‘discontinuity’ in this context comes to be marked by the
absence of the Papuans as the subject/agent of a narrative parallel to the missionary
one, and consequently they appear as passive objects of missionary enterprise.
Although the missionaries do refer to the reactions of the Papuans to their activity,
this is always ‘described’ and ‘interpreted’ according to missiological hermeneutical
parameters or western gnoseological categories.
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200

Missionary narratives merely ‘objectify’ the Papuans, implicitly denying them
the autonomy typical of an historical agency or subject. Since narrative, as Peel
argued, is “the most spontaneous form of historical representation”,12 I believe that
the existence of missionary narratives, not counterweighed by any parallel Papuan
narrative, tends to implicitly and systematically deny Papuan historicity.
Paradoxically, however, the missionary narrative does act as a sort of ‘apophatic
epistemology’,13 since the implicit ‘negation’, while admitting the factual existence of
the object, stresses the inadequacy of the language and concepts adopted to ‘speak’ of
the ‘other’ on their own terms. What emerges from an historical reconstruction based
merely on these narratives is a ‘missionary monologue’ that is essentially metahistorical.
One way to overcome the structural impasse, generated by a lack of
countervailing documents, is to explore whether it is possible to use the missionary
narratives to reconstruct ‘possible’ Papuan chronicles.14 As Roland Barthes stated,
“for history not to signify, discourse must be confined to a pure, unstructured series of
notations. This is the case of chronologies and annals”.15
A deconstruction of missionary discourses contained in the narratives, as will
be shown later, will not yield supposedly existing Papuan ones. The missionary
narratives are the texts of the narrator, of his culture, his space, his time, his
situational and gnoseological contexts. The spatio-temporal continuity of this
narrative is that of the mission and not that of the Papuans who are ‘outside’ or
12
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represent the ‘antithesis’ of the mission’s spatio-temporal dimension. What can be
retrieved from the missionary narrative is isolated episodes, ‘epi-eis-odos’ (επι-ειςοδος), in the sense of facts which ‘stand out’, focalised around an issue, without
interrupting the normal spatio-temporal sequence. The Papuan chronicles will be
therefore destitute of epistemic connotations. These may not be regarded as milestone
or significative events for the narrated, as the narrator’s version may induce one to
suppose. They may simply be regarded as the ‘sub-liminal’ message contained in
external or liminal narratives by which it is possible to subjectify the object being
narrated. As Hayden White pointed out:
A historical narrative is not only a ‘reproduction’ of the events reported in
it but also a complex of symbols which gives us directions for finding an
icon of the structure of those events in…tradition.16
This chronicle of the ‘subjectified object’, recovered by this process of
‘sublimation of missionary narratives’, will remain, however, destitute of the
autochthonous spatio-temporal dimensions typical of a narrative, the recovery of
which is practically impossible. Even the use of mythological material transmitted
through an oral tradition, for its fluid and flexible nature, will not help in the
reconstruction of the spatio-temporal milieu. The chronicle will lack, therefore, in
historicity and will resemble more a phenomenological paradigm, which can be used
as the seedbed of ‘possible histories and historiographies’.
In the chronicles, identified in the missionary narrative of cargo cults, it is
possible to identify a Papuan hermeneutics, the ‘processual activity’ by which the
Papuans interpreted and systemised intrusive data within autochthonous socio-cultural
templates. This hermeneutical activity performs, in fact, the function of guaranteeing
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the survival and perpetuation of Papuan cultural-social identity17 in a constantly
changing environment.18 The gradual intensification of transformational processes
fuelled by European colonialism and channelled by Papuan hermeneutics accounts for
the eschatological-teleological tension, which appears to be one of the constant
features of later Papuan narratives.
The cargo cult, as reported by the missionaries, being a phenomenon able to
coalesce myth, tradition, history and modernity, represents the ideal ‘structural
conjuncture’ from which to identify Papuan chronicles. The process consists in a
transition from mythical tradition to annalistic sequence, from facts that have been
mythologised by the collective imaginary to historical episodes recorded in written
documents. The dynamics of this transition and the different discourses they generate
appears evident when analysing two episodes, one rooted in the Papuan-Tidorese
tradition and the other recorded in the archives of the VOC. It will appear evident that
the two visions, the mythical vision of the past and the historical one, when societies
become ‘historical’, do not exclude each other but tend to coexist in what Susman
refers to as “a dialectical tension generating a variety of historical visions”.19 Of
course in this epistemological-hermeneutical milieu, the historian must still face the
dilemmas generated by a method based on the analysis of effects, to reconstruct the
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I reject the academic distinction between social and cultural; phenomena as outlined by Kroeber A.L.
& Parsons T., ‘The Concept of Culture and the Social System’, American Sociological Review, 23,
1958, pp. 582-583.
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I assume that cultural-social templates are produced by processes of external adaptation to a peculiar
ecosystem prompting parallel processes of internal vertical and horizontal integration. R. Rappaport
had already discussed in his Ecology, Meaning and Religion (1979) the relation between ecology and
religious beliefs and norms. In my model I assume that structure and meaning come to represent a
fundamental-foundational unit or component. This semantic-structural component is not a monadic
immobile given but subject to change under the effect of transformational rules or hermeneutics
generated by the system itself in order to guarantee its survival and perpetuation. I have presented this
theory, which draws on the Chomskian linguistic generative-transformational model, in a paper entitled
‘Western Cargoes, Papuan Cults: In Search of a Native Hermeneutics’ presented at the Postgraduate
ISCCI/CAPSTRANS Seminar series of the University of Wollongong on 27-28 November 2003.
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Susman W.I., ‘History and the American Intellectual: Uses of a Usable Past’, American Quarterly,
16, 1964, p. 244. Cfr. Levi-Strauss, op.cit., pp. 231-234.
203

possible causes. In other words the historian must make a ‘Great Trek’ through the
shifting ontology and logic of tenses and perceptions.

Gurabesi and Nuku: Prolegomena to a Papuan History.
In the ‘virtual archive’ of the Papuans two events appear to have been
considered as eventa digna memoria: the saga of the hero Gurabesi recorded in the
Papuan-Tidorese tradition and the revolt of Nuku documented in the Dutch archives.
These two episodes represent two important stages in the development of Papuan
ethnic and political identity although different in character and spatio-temporal
contexts: the saga/text of Gurabesi occurs in the pre-colonial period and that of Nuku
in colonial times.
These two episodes share common modal dynamics, which points to the
existence of a Papuan hermeneutics previously referred to as cargoism. The fact that it
is possible to identify ‘cargo practices’ and ‘discourses’ in pre-colonial times prompts
us to review the longstanding ‘Western’ postulates regarding cargo cults, which
considered them as messianic movements fuelled by processes of acculturation and
modernisation, and to discard the axiomatic notions of primitivism and evolutionism
embedded in them. Both the traditions of Gurabesi and Nuku reveal the presence of a
hermeneutics generating Papuan understandings and knowledge and informing
Papuan behavioural patterns.
Historians have always presented and analysed these two traditions or episodes,
in particular that regarding Nuku, in the broad context of Indonesian history. The
influence of political opportunism on official historiography may be responsible for
interpolating and drawing this particular perspective in an attempt to play down the
importance of the event for a possible ‘Papuan history’. In fact, once the events in
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question are isolated or uprooted from the development of Indonesian history, they
become relevant events for a Papuan history within and often in contrast with the
world of Maluku.
The story of Gurabesi, because of its oral tradition, appears to be shrouded by
the diaphanous veil of myth.20 The problem in dealing with mythical accounts is
whether these can be used as sources for historical reconstructions. The answer to this
question depends on the definitions assumed for myth and history.
The heroic accounts of both Gurabesi and Nuku appear to be constantly and
continuously rooted in past stories of a mythical Golden Age to which the present
comes to be anchored, understood and projected, through prophetic visions, into a
future dimension, a teleological projection which allows the community to survive
and perpetuate its own tradition. The continuous editing of the narratives by the
Papuans reveals the existence of latent processes of social and cultural adjustment to
changes affecting the environment and the system of structural-semantic relations. As
Nancy Florida has demonstrated with her study on Javanese historiography in Writing
the Past, Inscribing the Future, texts can be considered as historical events and as
potential contexts21 in that the past becomes a prefiguration of the future. An
analogous approach may be adapted to the study of the oral tradition of mythology.
The event, underlying the myth, comes in fact to represent a sort of ‘contextualised’
caesura subsuming myth and history in which paradoxically the aporia between the
two is overcome. In my opinion historiography is nothing but mythology rooted in an
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‘archaeological knowledge’ and justified by an ‘architectonic memory’ and endowed
with a teleology or eschatology: that is, meanings generated by structural changes.
The ‘contextualised’ nature and origin of myth, having the attributes of
temporality and public memory guaranteed through oral transmission, endows it with
a sort of historicity and can be used to reconstruct historical experiences in the form of
chronicles. Myths, although fluid in nature for the medium by which they are handed
down through time and spatially diffused, retain traces or fossils of their previous
arrangements. The structural and logical inconsistencies that the survival of these
relics tends to generate represent the key to the Papuan archive.

The Story of Gurabesi
The episode of Gurabesi, whose Papuan name was Sekfamneri, represents the
beginning of Papuan submission to the Sultanate of Tidore and coincides with the
arrival of the first Portuguese vessels in the eastern seas. Until the second half of the
XV century, the relations between the Papuans and Maluku had been characterised by
a series of trade transactions in the context of either kinship or ceremonial obligations
shrouded in a mystical aura of aetiological or foundation myths.
The appearance of Gurabesi on the scene represents the turning point in the
Papuan world since it can be envisaged as the attempt to ‘historicise’ or rationalise
customary relationships and spatio-temporal occurrences. Although Gurabesi later
transmogrified into a legendary culture hero and come to be related to the cycle of
narratives connected to the introduction of iron to the Papuan territories,22 there is
sufficient evidence to prove the historicity of his existence. Legends are nothing but
the product of a process that I would refer to as the ‘metamictisation of history’, what
22

The name Guru Boesi (or Guru Besi) in Malay means ‘master of iron’ pointing to the hero’s activity
as a ‘blacksmith’, an activity highly valued among the Papuans.
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Hobsbawm and Ranger call the invention of ‘tradition’.23 The construction of legends
and traditions represents a conscious attempt to structure and systemise, culturally and
socially, an ‘event’ to which symbolic meanings have been attached.24
The story narrates how the Biak hero Gurabesi, the founding father of the Raja
Ampat Kingdoms, married the daughter of the Sultan Jamaluddin of Tidore who
reigned between 1495 and 1572 A.D.25 The Dutch civil servant de Clercq placed the
event under the predecessor of Jamaluddin, Mansur.26 However historical evidence,
incorporated into the story, indicates that the story of Gurabesi has to be placed in a
period prior to the Islamisation of Tidore, that is prior to the reign of Jamaluddin, the
first Tidorese raja to convert to Islam. This circumstance suggests a date ante quem
for the episode of Gurabesi under the raja Mansur of Tidore in the second half of the
XV century. It is possible that its ‘traditionalisation’, that is its transformation from
historical episode into saga, occurred later during Jamaluddin’s reign, a fact that could
account for eventual inconsistencies. The existence of conflicting chronologies
indicates that there was at the time a process of systemisation in fieri aiming at
adjusting socio-cultural templates to a changed environment, which apparently
affected the meaning and function of previous narratives.
The episode of Gurabesi has to be analysed within the endemic structural
rivalries between the sultanates of Tidore and Ternate.27 During the second half of the
23

In this regard see: Hobsbawm E. & Ranger T. (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge
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Papoese’…cit., pp. 536-541.
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XV century, the Sultan of Tidore, on the renewal of the conflict between the two
regional potentates, summoned the Sangaji of Patani, Sahmardan, to explore whether
among the neighbouring areas there was a brave and strong man able to assist him in
his struggle against Ternate. The Sangaji set out to find such man and travelled
through the eastern islands to Waigeo. Here he met the Kapita of Waigeo, Gurabesi.
When Gurabesi learnt of the reason of the Sangaji’s journey and of the prospects of
reward granted by the Tidorese ruler, such as clothes marking his official position, he
agreed to provide the Sultan with the help required.
Before setting out to undertake what he had promised, he asked permission to
hold the clothes for a few moments. After having kissed them and raised them
ceremoniously above his head in sign of respect, he travelled with his men to the court
of Tidore. Once he reached the court, Gurabesi offered his services and was rewarded
with the suit of clothes. Having distinguished himself in the battle against Ternate, he
was given a wife in exchange for his loyal services and heroic exploits, the Sultan’s
daughter, Boki Taebah, with whom he returned to live in Waigeo.
After ten years, the ruler of Tidore decided to engage in a new expedition to
conquer new territories and enlarge his kingdom and wealth. He went to Patani, Gebe
and the Raja Ampat islands, that were at the time tied to Tidore by vassal obligations.
In Waigeo he met with his son-in-law Gurabesi and together with the Sangaji of
Patani and the newly appointed rulers of other vassal territories, they went to New
Guinea. On his return from the successful expedition, the Tidorese ruler stopped in
Waigeo again and appointed his four grandsons as rulers of Waigeo, Salawatti,
Waigama and Misoöl, better known as the Rajahs of the Four Islands.28

archive of the Department of Education and Culture, Soa Sio, in Tidore: Ringkasan Kisah perjalanan
ke Irian Barat dalam tempu 7 bulan 77 hari and Hubungan antara Tidore dengan Irian Barat.
28
Raja Ampat means ‘Four Kings’.
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Andaya reports other two variants of the tradition regarding the appointment of
the Rajahs Ampat. One version narrates that the rulers of the so-called Gamrange, that
is the south-eastern settlements on the Island of Halmahera, Buli, Maba, Bricoli and
Patani, were raised by Tidore to become the rulers of the Raja Ampat kingdoms. The
other version tells of the conflict among the four brothers, Gurabesi’s sons, which led
to the migration of the youngest brother, who originally had settled in Waigama, to
Ceram.29
It is possible to hypothesise that these later versions were formulated to justify a
series of economic and ceremonial relations between the Papuans of the New Guinea
islands and coasts with both Patani (and the Gamrange) in the north and the island of
Ceram in the south which, as shown in the previous chapter, were part of a
longstanding inter-island commercial network. The three versions appear to share a
common element or tradition focusing on the primacy of the Sangaji of Patani. It is
possible to conjecture that local legends about the migration of the Papuans inhabiting
the islands and the coastal areas in the north and south of New Guinea may have
converged, at the time when relations became more intensive, into the creation of a
common epos. Presumably this occurred with the activity of Muslim merchants in
Eastern Indonesia around the early XV century and brought about an increase in the
demand for local products on traditional markets.
The authoritative supremacy of the Gamrange and Patani settlements derived
from an acknowledged antiquity. Kinship ties were an important functional
component of both Malukan and Papuan social and cultural templates, being often
institutionalised in ceremonial rituals. It is documented that migrations between the
two areas occurred over the centuries. Enclaves of Papuan speaking communities are
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documented in Halmahera and Morotai in the XV-XVI centuries, the Sawai of
Halmahera being acknowledged among the oldest Papuan settlements. When, in fact,
the people from Biak arrived in Halmahera they found this earlier group that
consequently came to be regarded as possessing greater prestige.30 The myth of Fakok
and Pasrefi refers to the relationship between the Papuans migrated from the Schouten
islands to Halmahera and their original settings.
Fakok and Pasrefi, who are said to be originally from the neighbourhood of
Jayapura,31 introduced iron to New Guinea, the use of which they had learnt during
their raids in Halmahera. The strongholds from where they launched their marauding
expeditions were located on the island of Waigeo known also as Wardo.32
Significantly the village of Kabu Bay on Waigeo was the centre of the Kawe tribe that
claimed to have had rajas long before the Tidorese Sultans began to exert their
influence.33
The introduction of iron to New Guinea presumably took place after 1500, the
time in which the Sultan of Tidore converted to Islam. This chronology can be
inferred from the taboos, as for instance the prohibition to eat pork, associated with
the blacksmith which reveal a Muslim origin.34 The fact that the two mythical heroes
are said to be raiding the island of Halmahera, and in particular the areas inhabited by
the Sawai, suggests that this area was, at that time, widely inhabited by Austronesian
speakers interspersed by pockets of Papuan settlements.
According to Kamma, the Sawai were Biak migrants who established
themselves in Halmahera, Patani, Maba and Weda as well as north-east Ceram where
30

Kamma F. Ch., ‘Incorporation of Foreign Culture Elements and Complexes by Ritual Enclosure
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they came to be known as ‘Tidorese Papuans’. In 1653 Patani was mentioned as being
a centre of Tidorese Papuans too.35 The geographical distribution of the Sawai
settlements comes consequently to account for the trade patterns of the Papuans as
outlined in the previous chapter.
The protracted contacts with Halmahera prompted a series of technical
innovations resulting in the invention and the introduction into the Papuan world of
new elements of material culture, in particular those related to maritime navigation
and warfare, such as bellows for forging and the bulwarking of canoes and shields.36
It was because of the presence of Papuan kinsmen and for being the source of new
valuables that the area came to be regarded as the mythical centre of power located,
according to a longstanding tradition, in the west. The widening of the Papuan world
of relations however caused a spatial shift in the original cultural-social templates.
The idea of the ‘west’ as the mythical source of wealth and the centre of power
is a topos, common to many civilisations, deriving from the analogy of the life cycle
with the cursus solis and explains why it has been associated with ancestor worship.
At a certain point this topos came to be historicized, presumably following a time of
migrations directed towards the western territories. Among the Biakkers this process
presumably occurred when the migrations of Papuans from the Sentani area towards
Biak took place. The myth of the West, in fact, appears to have already been present
in Biak mythology: the myth of Fakok and Pasrefi indicates that the Biakkers were
originally from the area east of Sarmi. At that time the mythical west was located
along the Mamberamo River. Reminiscences of this location, as a centre of power,
apparently continued to persist in Biak myths as the participation of Biakkers to a
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cargo movement in the area in 1910 seems to suggest.37 The West, as the source of
power, is also recorded among the Kamoro of the Mimika region,38 and among the
Marind-anim on the south coast.39
According to the myth of Fakok and Pasrefi reported by Kamma, it appears that
the Sawai of Patani, Gebe and the Gamrange were already under the influence of
Tidore. When the Sawai defeated the marauding brothers from Biak, they became on
their return home ‘representatives of the Sultan of Tidore’, a fact that they accepted
reluctantly and against which they attempted to rebel.40 When Gurabesi, who is said to
have distinguished himself in the struggle against the Sawai,41 appears on the scene,
Tidorese rule was well established in the area, and over the Sawai-Papuans who were
used by the Sultan as intermediaries with the Papuans of New Guinea.
In the episode of Gurabesi, the Sultan of Tidore is portrayed as being a
distributor of titles and clothes to the Papuans.42 The meaning of this practice is rooted
in the ideological context of the Papuan exchange system regulated by the figure of
the ‘Big Man’, central to Papuan socio-economic and political organizations, and the
associated concept of nanek. In this ideological milieu the Sultan of Tidore is
perceived by the Papuans as the Big Man to whom they felt obliged to pay allegiance
until he was able to assert his power through ceremonial gift-giving. The payment of
the annual tribute, or Samsom, to the sup Manseren or ‘Lord of the Land’, and the
titles and valuables obtained in return, sanctioned the relationship between the
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Papuans and Tidore.43 XVIII and XIX centuries Dutch sources record episodic
refusals of the Papuans to send the Samsom to the Sultan and to which Tidore reacted
by setting up expeditions to collect the tribute and enforce vassal obligations. It is
possible that Papuan refusal to pay the tribute indicates that Tidore, by that time, had
lost in the collective imaginary of the Papuan people its original ‘religious’
significance.
Yet in the XVI century the Papuans believed that the objects coming from the
Tidorese court were imbued with the sacredness of the Sultan’s nanek. They believed
that by touching these objects they were able to absorb the particles containing the
Sultan’s power. This belief prompted the creation of a particular ritual that in many
ways resembled that performed on the return from headhunting expeditions.44
In the XIX century the missionary Geissler, in his De Reis naar Tidore,45
described in detail the tribute mission to Tidore which, at the time, was still being
ceremonially enacted, notwithstanding that the Dutch had officially abolished any
form of tribute payment to Tidore by 1861,46 as well as the complex ritual
surrounding the reception of the Sultan’s letter. Both the letter and the Tidorese
envoy, believed to be ‘carriers’ of the Sultan’s nanek, became objects of a peculiar
ritual in which the village headman solemnly touched both the envoy and the letter in
order to enhance the prosperity and welfare of the community. The same belief
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inspired the practice of the Papuans bringing tribute to Tidore who used to crawl on
the floor of the Sultan’s palace in order to absorb the spiritual traces of the ruler’s
magic powers. On their return, the village people gathered around the tribute mission
to share in the Sultan’s nanek.47 The distribution of clothing and titles by Tidore was
seen as having the same function, namely that of distributing the ruler’s divine
powers.
Although very few Papuans converted to Islam, probably because of the
prohibition of eating pork which represented the main source of animal proteins in the
Papuan diet and which was so important that pigs were part of numerous ceremonial
complexes,48 the acceptance of the Sultan’s faith was a way to express allegiance and
share in the privileges of the Sultan’s world. Papuan conversions were therefore more
a nominal, formal acceptance of material elements and behaviours peculiar to Islam
and did not impinge on or transform the structural meanings of the Papuan worldview.
The absence of spiritual conversion to Islam seems to be confirmed by that fact
that the acceptance of the new faith did not bring about any transformation of Papuan
political and social templates. The elements introduced by Islam were simply
juxtaposed to the existing structures and beliefs. The Muslim titles were mere ‘names’
endowing the recipient, usually the local headman, with material privileges and were
not indicators of a new form of political institution. On Salawati, for instance, the
raja, a title introduced at the time of the Indian expansion in South-east Asia, and the
jojau, the Muslim-Moluccan ‘Lord of the Land’, lived in the same community and
were considered equal in status.49 The Papuans seem to have persevered in
maintaining their original identity characterised by a peculiar worldview that
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consisted in, as Andaya effectively points out, “interlocking worlds of relationships,
all of which had to be carefully nurtured”.50 It is in this particular spiritual and cultural
milieu that the epopée of Gurabesi must be understood.
The information regarding Gurabesi and the submission of the Papuan islands to
Tidore seems to a western observer to be clouded by symbolism and mysticism,
whereas a Papuan interpretation reveals the inherent linkages and patterning
dynamics. The relevant historical facts and their structural progression or sequence
can be isolated and extrapolated from western narratives and reinterpreted in the light
of Papuan hermeneutics in conjuncture with archaeological, anthropological and
linguistic evidences that have survived the test of time.
The saga of Gurabesi corroborates the hypothesis, put forward in the previous
chapter, that, before the arrival of the European fleets, the Papuans appeared to have
represented an ethnie identified on the basis of racial and cultural indicators and
occupying a well defined territory represented by the coastal areas of West New
Guinea and off-shore islands. That the Papuans were aware of their peculiar ethnic
identity, defined in relation to the neighbouring Malay and, later, European
populations, appears clear from the dynamics of the revolt led by Nuku in the XVIII
century and in which the spirituality of the Papuans, their beliefs and values, played
an important role in determining their participation and in shaping symbols and
meanings as well as the semantics and structure of their relations with the Europeans.

Nuku and the Maluku-Papuan Connection.
The struggle documented by the VOC reports takes place in the Maluku-Papuan
area and can be considered a form of proto-anti-colonial or nativist struggle in which
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the colonised take arms against the colonial power and its local vassals to restore
pristine systems of relations and beliefs. Although the Papuans fought alongside the
Malukans, they still appear to have retained their ethnic and cultural identity. The
Dutch sources refer, in fact, to them as the ‘Papuans’ and constantly emphasise the
central role they played in the struggle.
The Papuans who took part in the revolt appear to have been those inhabiting
the islands, although it cannot be completely excluded that the Papuans from other
areas may have participated in the events. This can be inferred given the intricate web
of local commercial relations between the Papuans of the off-shore islands and those
of the New Guinea coasts and between the coastal dwellers and the Papuans of the
interior. Visser has identified strong similarities, for instance, between the political
model of the Sahu and that of the Asmat of New Guinea,51 a fact that corroborates the
idea of possible direct or mediated influences and contacts.

Furthermore, it is

noteworthy that those areas, which experienced the turmoils of Nuku’s attempt at
restoration, became the setting of the XX century proto-nationalist feelings and
movements and the place where nationalist aspirations received their political
articulation, as will be shown in the following two chapters. Significantly at a more
mature stage of the nationalist struggle in the aftermath of World War II, some
Papuans, as Chauvel’s study reveals, attempted to forward their cause in connection
with the nationalist claims of the southern Moluccas.52
Beliefs and customary practices shared by the Malukans and Papuans appear to
have been the prime movers in the clash between the colonisers and colonised. The
cause of the conflict can be traced in the feeling of disaffection and alienation
experienced by the people of the area under Dutch domination. The arrival of the
51
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Dutch and the implementation of their commercial policies disrupted the original
harmony of relations developed over centuries in the Malukan-Papuan area and
maintained under Portuguese domination. The unity of the area of north Maluku,
considered the centre of power or heartland of the area, was structured by referring to
the four cardinal points, or ‘four quarters’ of the world: Giailolo as the north, Bacan
the south, Ternate the west and Tidore the east. Each cardinal point indicated the
boundaries of their sphere of influence irradiating as a mandala, a legacy of the early
expansion of Hindu-Buddhism in South-east Asia.53
In 1551 Ternate had conquered Giailolo, initiating the gradual destruction of the
original balance in the region. The intrusion into the Maluku-Papuan area of the
Dutch VOC had accelerated the domino effect caused by the fall of the ‘northern
quarter’ with the submission of Ternate in 1683, reduced to a Dutch vassal state,
while Tidore continued to remain relatively autonomous for much of the XVIII
century.
The submission of Ternate to the Dutch brought about the obliteration of the
structural and ideological dualism generated by the tension between Ternate and
Tidore that, as Andaya’s study reveals, represented a sort of gravitational focus of the
Malukan world. The Ternaten and Tidorese rulers more and more came to rely on
Dutch assistance to secure their sovereignty, power and influence in the region. They
were, consequently, more concerned with pleasing the VOC in order to secure its
support than with the functioning of either their administrations or the welfare of their
52
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subjects. This situation of neglect caused the emergence of a rift between the local
rulers and the ruled.54
The economic policies introduced by the VOC, in particular the so-called
extirpatie or spice eradication, contributed to augment the negative effects of the
political change occurring in the region. South-east Halmahera and the Papuan islands
fiercely opposed the implementation of the policy. The extirpatie, in fact, went against
the fundamental tenets and practices of the traditional exchange system in the region.
It entailed not only the destruction of the traditional commercial network but the
disruption of the underlying system of rituals and beliefs as well. It meant the
systemic ‘eradication’ of a longstanding world of living and thinking. As a
consequence, disaffection of the subjects towards their rulers intensified and became
widespread.
This sense of alienation and disenchantment was further enhanced by the
simultaneous occurrence of natural disasters, such as the drought and consequential
famine that ravaged the area in 1723, and the outbreak of smallpox in the 1720s.
These events were interpreted by the natives as signs of the structural disharmony
affecting the Maluku-Papuan world as a whole and of the depletion of the spiritual
power of the sovereign of Tidore.55

It was in this period, in fact, as has been

previously pointed out, that the Papuans began to question their obligation of tribute
to Tidore. Political and social upheavals, caused by the spiritual malaise and the
material precariousness of life, were frequent. Messianic and soteriological
expectations emerged to provide people with some sort of hope in the future and a
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justification for the temporary misery of the present. Eschatological and apocalyptic
beliefs penetrated and were systemised in the religious worldview of animism.
The feelings of anxiety, alienation and moral uncertainty found their ideological
and cathartic expression in, and were catalyst for, the rise of a revivalist or nativist
movement. Historia docet that, when people are afraid of the future and dissatisfied
with the present, there is a natural tendency to turn back and look at the past in search
of certainties, in search of a secure and safe spiritual harbour. In the second half of the
XVIII century, there was a widespread and well-rooted belief that the cause of the
troubles ravaging the people of Maluku and Papua lay in the disruption of the former
unity following the fall of Giailolo.56 This event came to be mythologised or mystified
in the collective imaginary as the apocalyptic ‘beginning of the end’. Consequently
the restoration of the ‘four quarters’ was deemed as a logical necessity, a categorical
imperative that could no longer be procrastinated. The myth of the ‘Golden Era’,
elaborated by apocalyptic-eschatological exegeses into systemic ideologies centred on
the restoration of Giailolo, incited the Malukans and the Papuans to action.
The Dutch colonial archives contain several reports regarding the disturbances
that occurred in the region. Andaya has used these documents to reconstruct the
structuralism, rooted in religious and mythical beliefs, characterising the Malukan
world. During my visit to the archives in The Hague I was able to view and study the
same documents in order to verify whether they contained information useful to the
reconstruction of the role the Papuans played in the struggle.
In two VOC documents dated 1765 and 1766 respectively, it is reported that a
group from the Tidorese settlement in Tomelau, led by an imam and two scribes,
arrived in Giailolo with the intent to crown a believed direct descendant of the
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legitimate royal family of Giailolo, Abu Laif, and restore the kingdom. The attempt
failed since the local pagan headman did not want to swear allegiance to the supposed
heir. When fighting broke out between the two parties, the Dutch were forced to
intervene and, by 1766, peace was restored.57 Turmoil and disturbances, however,
persisted throughout the Malukan-Papuan region.
The areas in which the movement for restoration grew strongest appear to have
been those inhabited by the Papuans, namely Halmahera and the Papuan islands.
From 1716 to 1728, the Sangaji of Patani led a rebellion of Papuans against the Sultan
of Tidore. Once again the Sangaji of Patani, as in the saga of Gurabesi, appears to act
as the leader of the Papuans of the islands with the difference that, at the time of
Gurabesi in the XV century, the Sangaji of Patani was a loyal vassal of Tidore.
The factors that caused the Papuans to move away from and against Tidore at
the beginning of the XVIII century can only be conjectured and inferred from the
VOC documents regarding the evolution of the relations and situation in the region in
the two centuries between the XV and XVIII. It is possible that the intensification and
expansion of trade relations that took place in this stretch of time might have caused a
spatial or geographical shift of the original centres of power and wealth in the region.
This shift also acted in and affected the metaphysical sphere of religion so that Tidore
was no longer envisaged as the sole and exclusive source of nanek and valuables by
the Papuans. The submission to Tidore lost its pragmatic and symbolic significance.
The revolt led by Patani, however, was quelled by the Dutch and a precarious state of
peace ensued.
In 1761 the conflict was renewed. The raja of Salawati led a contingent of
fifteen hundred Papuans against the kingdoms of Sula Besi and Buru. Among these
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VOC 3186, Geheim Verbaal, 7 June 1766, fol. 218; VOC 3181, Besluit Nederlands Raad op Ternate,
23 October 1765, fol 5.
220

were many people from Patani.58 Tidore was once again unable to suppress the
rebellion since various bobatos, the traditional leaders of the soas or village-wards,
opposed the use of force against the Papuans, adducing existing ancestral kinship ties
between some Tidorese and the Papuans. The sultan was, therefore, compelled by the
adverse circumstances to turn for help to the Sangajis of Weda and Patani.59 Archival
documents report that the Dutch ascribed responsibility for the opposition to the
Tidorese sultan to a politically influential family in Java whose members held, in
Tidore, the important offices of jojau, kapita laut, jurutulis respectively ‘lord of the
land’, ‘lord of the sea’ and scribe, and collector of the tribute from the Papuan
territories.60 This reveals how traditional trade networks and allegiances persisted in
the region notwithstanding European penetration and policies.
Political instability characterised the Maluku-Papuan area for almost the entire
XVIII century. The situation worsened when the Dutch engaged in a series of actions
aimed at forestalling British expansion in the area. Treaties were renewed with the
Malukan vassals in order to prevent them from lending support to English vessels
cruising the region. Political instability became an important issue on the Dutch
agenda. Turmoil, insurrections, dynastic disputes, power vacuums would have, in fact,
provided the English with an opportunity to intervene and eventually establish a
foothold in the region. The situation forced the Dutch to assume a different approach
to the 1761 Papuan rebellion.
Besides introducing constitutional reforms, such as the institution of the raja
muda or heir apparent,61 in order to prevent succession disputes from arising, the
VOC decided to resort to the use of force in order to restore peace and security in the
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region. Any insurrection aiming at subverting the status quo was considered an attack
against Dutch interests. The rebellion was quelled, however, not by the military
superiority of the Tidorese-Dutch coalition but because of the outbreak of an
epidemic, which killed eight hundred Papuan rebels.62
The suppression of the revolt did not inaugurate the establishment of that Pax
Nederlandica greatly pursued by the Dutch. Iranun fleets from Magindanao in the
Philippines were raiding the archipelago, disseminating panic and terror among the
Malukans and Papuans inhabiting coastal and littoral areas.63 It was in this area that
British ships were first intercepted, inducing the Dutch to suppose a Tidorese
involvement. Because of this conviction, probably supported by information gathered
by his intelligence network, in 1779 the Dutch Governor of Ternate ordered the arrest
of the Sultan Jamaluddin of Tidore and his raja muda, who were both exiled to
Batavia.64 A new government of five regents was appointed and new treaties were
signed between the VOC and Tidore, and the VOC and Ternate.65
The aristocratic families of Tidore opposed the constitutional change. Among
the dissidents was Kaicili Nuku who left Tidore in 1780 and went to Patani. Having
established a base between Weda and Patani he tried to build a coalition of Malukans,
Papuans and Ceramese to fight the VOC and its puppet government in order to
reconquer Tidore. He also tried to exploit the presence of the Spanish and British
fleets cruising the local waters at the time, as well as the piratical incursions of the
Iranun of the Philippines.66 Nuku, acclaimed ‘King of the Islands’ by the Papuans,67
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initialised a restoration movement aiming at both overthrowing the current Tidorese
government and expelling the Dutch from the region.
The Papuans identified Nuku with the mythical culture hero Manseren
Manggundi, the ‘Powerful Lord’, who had promised to return and inaugurate the
Koreri, the promised and longed for era of peace, prosperity and wealth.68 This
identification was probably prompted by the translation into the Papuan language of
one of the Malay epithets by which Nuku was addressed, Jou Barakti or ‘Lord of
Fortune’.69
Messianic expectations were widely spread at the time in South-east Asia and
represented a recurrent motif in many of the local mythologies. The presence of
Messianic beliefs and ideas in South-east Asia are documented in the VIII- IX
centuries A.D. and their presence coincides with the penetration of elements of Hindu
spirituality in the region. The ideal or motif of the Ratu Adil, the Righteous Ruler, was
developed in this period and although betraying a strong Hindu influence, I believe its
genesis and emergence was prompted by the intensification of change in the region
affecting traditional social-cultural templates through a process of adjustment, earlier
referred to, which generated a teleological tension. The messianic investiture of Nuku
is justified and assumes significance when considered in this particular spiritual and
historical context.
Nuku’s piratical activities in the area were severely damaging Dutch
commercial interests. In 1780- 1781, the Dutch launched two attacks against Patani in
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order to wipe out the movement. Nuku and his followers had, however, moved their
headquarters to the Papuan islands further east.
Following the Dutch capture of Patani in 1781, the headmen of the islands of
Patani, Maba and Weda were forced to sign a treaty of submission to the Dutch.
Article 7 of the 1781 treaty is extremely important because of its reference to the
Papuan people as a ‘nation’. Yet it is obvious that this statement must be considered
with due caution since the Dutch were applying their own categories to define the
perception they had of the Papuans. The definition may not be significative for
Papuan self- perception.
The article in question stated that the headman of Patani, Maba and Weda must
accept not to “exploit the support and friendship of the Papuans in order to perform
evil deeds, but to use all possible means to motivate this nation towards peaceful
thoughts and submission to the company and to their lawful ruler”.70 The Dutch in
order to prevent the Papuans of Halmahera from joining or providing assistance to
Nuku, forced them to transmigrate to the south-west coast of the island.71
Hunted in the area by the Dutch, Nuku moved his headquarters further south to
Ceram. Here he was able to gather a number of exiled Tidorese and move against the
Dutch, inflicting a series of losses. In his move to Ceram, Nuku was able to rally the
support of the Papuans of the south-west coast of New Guinea. The Papuans of Onin
figure prominently among the petitioners, urging him to expel the Dutch, in a letter
dated 28 September 1783, addressed to the Dutch-appointed Sultan Badaruddin of
Tidore, and sent by 12 Sangajis, Gimalahs and heads of Ceram.72
In the letter the resentment of the rebels towards the VOC appears evident. The
struggle was not a dynastic one to overthrow an illegitimate sovereign. In fact the
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rebels were petitioning the ‘illegitimate’ Sultan Badaruddin to expel the Dutch and
not to abdicate so as to restore the legitimate ruler to the throne. What was being
fought was an anti-colonial war aiming at expelling a ruler that had undermined the
interests and privileges of the traditional ruling classes as well as subverting the
ideological and religious systems that sustained their privileges. The anti-colonial
character of the struggle explains why Nuku was able to attract a number of different
followers cutting across political ambitions and dynastic preferences. Aware of
Nuku’s extensive support among the Malukans and the Papuans, the Sultan
Badaruddin was forced to implement the requests of the Sangajis and declare war on
the Dutch.
Flying the Tidorese flag upside down, in a symbolic gesture marking the
subversion and end of the existing world, a gesture that will be reiterated by the
Papuans, as will be seen, almost two hundred years later during the Manseren revolt,
Nuku went to Tidore to assume the command of the war. In the meantime a joint
Ternaten and Dutch expedition was established against the Tidorese and Papuan
rebels. Within a month the coalition was able to defeat some of Nuku’s followers,
compelling others to surrender.
The treaty that followed, signed in December 1783, confirmed Tidore as a
vassal of the VOC. Following a series of explorative talks with the bobatos of Tidore,
in 1784 the regency was given to Kamaluddin, who had been living in exile in Ceylon
and was considered the legitimate heir.73 A Dutch report reveals that the Papuans did
not attend the ceremony of enthronement and this caused them to be excluded from
the amnesty granted by the colonial authorities.74
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Notwithstanding the defeat, Nuku’s charismatic appeal did not wane. Confined
to his base in Ceram, he still enjoyed considerable and widespread support among the
Malukans and Papuans. The threat posed by Nuku to the Dutch, however, was not
represented by his ability to foment and lead mass insurrections, but by the fact that
he could have provided the English with an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Spice
Islands.
English shipping in the area had increased during the second half of the XVIII
century. The lucrative Chinese market had forced the English to search for an ‘Eastern
Passage’ that could be used all year round, in particular during the countervailing
winds of the north-east monsoon. This favourable route was identified as that passing
between the islands of Obi and Ceram leading into the Pacific through Pitt’s Strait
between the Papuan islands of Batanta and Salawati.75 The area was, at the time,
under the influence of Nuku.
Police interviews and intelligence operations and reports confirming that Nuku
was in the Raja Ampat islands, also revealed the intensity of the support that Nuku
still had among the Tidorese aristocracy. The Dutch attacked and occupied Salawati
forcing the local raja to swear allegiance to the VOC.76 Nuku, however, was moving
constantly through the islands, and was able to avoid capture.
A series of deliberations of the Oost-Indische Comite, which come to replace
the VOC in 1795, reveals that the fears of the Dutch materialised when the English
finally decided to join Nuku, taking advantage of the Iranun raids in the archipelago
that were depleting the Dutch military and economic resources and capabilities.77 The
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English, in fact, had been able to establish a trading post in Doreh Bay on New
Guinea in 1793. The English traders who had discovered the profitability of this local
entrepot, probably because it could have been used to enhance and strengthen their
position in the Chinese market, lobbied the English colonial government in Bengal to
intervene in Nuku’s favour against the Dutch.78 Bengal, however, declined the
suggestion, deciding to persist in a policy of non-interference in Dutch-Malukan
affairs.
The outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe brought about a change in the
attitude of the English government. The Stadhouder of the Netherlands, William V, in
exile in London after Napoleon’s invasion of Holland, issued in 1795 the so-called
‘Circular Note of Kew’ by which he authorised the English allies to occupy all Dutch
overseas territories in order to prevent them from falling into French hands. The
English, therefore, occupied Banda and Ambon in 1796.79
Nuku seized the opportunity and joined the English fleet with his contingent of
kora-koras. In the same year he took control of Giailolo where the Tidorese jojau was
installed as Sultan. Although he was not the legitimate heir to the throne, the
restoration of the Sultanate of Giailolo had a profound symbolic significance
indicating the restoration of the Malukan-Papuan world and the beginning of a new
era.
The English, however, did not want to strengthen Nuku’s position further, since
they feared it would have inevitably clashed with their own interests in the long run.
They also feared that, if they moved against him, he might play the French card using
the same tactics already tested with the Dutch. The English government, therefore,
decided to return to a policy of non-interference. By contrast, the English traders
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continued to support and supply Nuku with weapons for the planned capture of
Tidore. This was preceded by a siege of Ternate, where the Sultan Kamaluddin had
fled, which aimed at taking the island by famine.
The English, deeming that Ternate was important to their commercial interests
in the area, decided to cooperate with Nuku.80 In the light of the English resolve
toward establishing a permanent presence in Maluku, the alliance with Nuku was
considered crucial since it provided a degree of legitimacy to the establishment of an
English influence that the Dutch never had.
The capitulation of Ternate in 1801, accelerated by the demise of the VOC in
1799, decreed the success of both English ambitions and Nuku’s aspirations. Nuku
was proclaimed officially the Sultan of Tidore by the English. The proclamation was
followed by a treaty between the Dutch and Nuku inspired by the important principle,
identified by Andaya, of ‘mutuality of relationship’, a principle reflecting the nature
of the relationships between the Malukans and Papuans.81 It appears that following
Nuku’s revolt and his installation as the Sultan of Tidore,82 the original world of
relationships and values in the Malukan-Papuan region came to be somewhat restored
with the policies regarding the monopoly of the spice trade imposed by the Dutch
VOC abandoned in favour of more flexible policies which enabled the renaissance or
restoration of local trade.83
The return of the Dutch to the region, following the Peace of Amiens of 1802,
did not wipe out Nuku’s moral and material conquests: the Dutch were, in fact,
obliged to accept the status quo.84 Although agreements were signed between the
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parties in order to facilitate relations and safeguard mutual political and economic
interests, a nebulous aura of defiance against the Dutch persisted in the region even
after Nuku’s death in 1805.85 The quiescent seeds of anti-colonial revolt were ready to
dehisce at the first blasts of the winds of freedom.

Conclusions
The analysis conducted in this chapter has revealed that the two episodes of
Gurabesi and Nuku can be considered as chronicles of Papuan history, identifiable by
the peculiar ‘modal dynamics’ producing the narratives. The Papuan interpretation of
these episodes, in fact, appears to be rooted in the cultural-religious tradition
developed in insular and littoral areas inhabited by Papuans who had developed
longstanding relations with the neighbouring Indo-Malay populations and which
represented the basis of their ethnic identity. The narratives presented in this chapter
reveal that the category ‘Papua’ is ‘glimpsed’ in its intersection with that of ‘Maluku’
so that both narratives come to belong to and reflect a ‘Maluku-Papuan World’. This
can be geographically located in the triangle, Papuan littoral and insular territoriesMaluku-Ceram, the structural-semantic boundaries of which continuously shifted over
time to incorporate intrusive elements. How these narratives related to the West
Papuan reality, assumed as a category, and the existence of which appears to find
confirmation in the local relations between interior and coast, discussed in the
previous chapter, remains problematic. Because of the paucity of documents and of
material evidences, the relations between the Papuans of the interior and those
inhabiting coastal and insular areas will remain one of the many mysteries of history
awaiting to be unravelled.
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The analysis seems to suggest, however, that at the dawn of the Dutch
colonisation of West New Guinea a Papuan historical hermeneutics, embedded in
peculiar social-cultural templates, which were produced and determined by processes
of adaptation to a peculiar eco-system, appear to have existed and through which it is
possible that particular dynamics of ethnic self-perception and representation took
place. That Halmahera/Giailolo was an important structural-semantic feature for the
Papuans, inhabiting insular and littoral areas of northern New Guinea, is testified by
its re-appearance in a prophetic movement, which took place in 1876-1877.86
Consequently it is possible to infer that the Papuans would perceive and systematise
the colonial experience in the light of this peculiar cultural-historical hermeneutics.
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Chapter V
Colonisation, Conversion and the Construction of Ethnic Identity

I descended again and drew a ship in the sand,
I designed it and it became a boat
A loaded boat, its cargo-mark nearly submerged
(…)
These are the treasures and the wealth
Which the gentlemen (the stranger) have.
These are the treasures which I own.
These are the treasures
Which the gentlemen (the whites) see and possess
And bring along with them (always) when they are coming.
(tercets, 35; 41-42.)1
The words of the Beyuser of Manarmakdi probably echoed in the minds of the
Papuans when they saw the first European ship docking in the tranquil and safe
harbours of their coast in the Year of the Lord 1829 and then departing leaving on the
shore a small contingent of European men with their strange cargo. Before then the
Papuans, inhabiting insular and littoral areas had engaged in permanent relations with
the outside world that had brought them to encounter the white people either on the
high seas or in the ports and markets where they went to trade their goods. Tercet 41
of the Beyuser seems to suggest that this was the case.
The white man was therefore neither a ‘mystery’ nor a ‘novelty’ to the Papuans.
What constituted a ‘mysterious novelty’ was the fact that never before the year 1829,
the date of the establishment of the Dutch post of Merkus-oord, did any white man set
foot on their native soil with the intention of settling there ‘permanently’. The last line
of the Beyuser seems to refer to these events and appears to create a sort of ‘temporal
1
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anacoluthon’ or ‘parataxis’ when read in conjunction with the preceding lines and
visibly points to two different, juxtaposed temporal and spatial experiences.
Although parataxis is usually seen as the correct way to read such traditions, the
inferences derived from philological analyses are questionable since they often work
on an oral, fluid tradition that has been continuously manipulated and interpolated
over time before being fixed in a written, ‘standardised’ text. Textual analyses of this
type end up being merely the ‘philology of a philological process’ still in fieri.
Kamma himself, in reporting the text, states that the Beyuser of Manarmakdi is the
product or collage of different texts.2
The Beyuser, however, has become and is regarded as an ‘historical text’, a
Papuan narrative that the historian or philologist analyses to retrieve information and
reconstruct past events reproducing that epistemological conundrum that Hayden
White refers to as the ‘nature of histories’. As White argues these are not only about
events but in particular about “possible sets of relationships that those events can be
demonstrated to figure”, sets of relationship that are not immanent in the events
themselves but that exist only in the mind of the historian reflecting on them.3
At the outset of undertaking the reconstruction of the modes and processes of
the christianisation of West Papua, and the exploration of its relation to and influence
on the processes that brought to the construction of Papuan ethnic identity between
1854 and 1938, one is confronted with the lack of sources sufficient to identify the
dynamics, dialectics and dialogue between Papuans and missionaries. While the
missionaries have provided ‘texts’ reflected in reports, letters, diary entries and books,
regarding their understandings, perceptions and activities among the Papuans, the
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latter have only their material culture and oral tradition reiterated in the cargo cults
and reported by the observers, not the participants. Consequently, while for the
missionaries we possess narratives, for the Papuans we possess chronicles reconstructed and derived from those very narratives. More than a dialogue, the
historian is left to examine a monologue and the reactions or choreography of an ideal
but mute audience, a ‘drama of voiceless protagonists’.
In this chapter, I will first examine the international processes that prompted the
colonisation of West Papua and the modes and means by which the missionaries
established relationships with the local people. This will be done with reference to the
first mission established in Mansinam. This represented the first ‘historical’ contact of
the Papuans with Christianity. Here the terms of the dialogue with the native
inhabitants were first articulated through the politics of space, the battle engaged by
the missionaries to appropriate and control material and symbolic domains of Papuan
life and the contest over language and representation. Since the activity of the
missionaries was instrumental to the interests of the colonial government, I will also
briefly outline the rules and regulations set up to control their establishment in
colonial territories.
Furthermore I will explore how Christianity was presented to the Papuans.
Christianity, in its ‘translation’ to West Papua, brought along those theological,
exegetic and denominational differences that characterised its existence in Europe. In
colonial settings these denominational differences manifested themselves in a variety
of missiologies, which came to inform missionary activity. Christianity was not
homogeneous in its outward manifestations but was simultaneously a uniting and
divisive force and could have been used either to foster unity or division according to
the interests it served.
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Finally, it must be pointed out that, since this thesis aims at providing a
comprehensive study of the genesis and development of West Papuan nationalism in a
historical perspective, tribal distinctions as well as mission divisions will be set aside.
I will not focus specifically on one mission or tribe at a time, as anthropological
studies usually tend to do, but I will try to reconstruct a general picture of the
processes and effects of christianisation in West Papua and how they affected the
emergence and dynamics of nationalist ideologies, movements and discourses in the
post-war period. In order to overcome the ‘localism’ affecting missionary accounts I
will collate them with the documents of the Colonial Archives regarding policies and
interventions in order to cast them into a wider ‘national’ perspective.

The World System and the Dutch ‘Discovery’ of West Papua.
During their ‘Golden Age’, the Dutch paid little or no attention to the territories
of New Guinea. The mercantilist system, on which the Dutch seaborne empire rested,
was sufficient to guarantee the political and economic control over territories, peoples
and resources. The capitalist system, prompted by the industrial revolution, came to
dominate the world in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars and, along with the new
system of international relations established by the Congress of Vienna (1815),
introduced new paradigms of social, economic and political organisation and the
demise of mercantilism. At the beginning of the XIX century, the attitude of the
Dutch towards the Papuan territories, in fact, underwent a radical change. The
archives, that had been scanty in yielding information on the territory of West Papua
following the years of the ‘proto-anti-colonial’ struggle led by Nuku, suddenly invert
their trend providing an increasing number of reports and accounts on the Papuan
territories.
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Portuguese and Spanish sources, dating back to the XVI century and referred to
in the preceding chapters, clearly reveal that the Papuans had encountered the white
man prior to this date, when the first galleons coasted and charted the coastlines of
New Guinea. For two centuries the Europeans considered West Papua as a ‘useless’
territory, inhabited by ‘savage’ and ‘primitive’ people not worth colonising and
consequently entrusted the territory to the Sultan of Tidore believing that the ‘few’
resources that the territory had to offer could have been easily accessed, without
excessive costs and labour, on the regional markets of Banda, Ambon, Ceram and
Tidore.
It is possible that the growing financial difficulties experienced by the VOC at
the end of the XVIII century may also be held responsible for the little attention paid
to the Papuans. This supposition seems to be corroborated by the fact that after the
dissolution of the VOC in 1795 and the concomitant takeover of all its assets by the
Dutch Government, documents regarding West Papua reappear in the State Archives
confirming the ‘paradigm shift’ in Dutch politics and attitudes.
The collapse of the VOC was, however, a structural outcome of the changes
taking place in the system of international relations. What contributed to or prompted
the change in the patterns of relations between the Papuans and the Europeans was the
changing economic and political relations in Europe. The intensification of the
processes of industrialisation and urbanisation as well as the accumulation of financial
capital forced the European countries to consolidate their control over their offshore
possessions. Mercantilist policies proved to be insufficient to sustain the growing
European economies for its ‘political vulnerability’. The ‘World System’, to use
Wallerstein’s designation,4 imposed the creation of ‘permanent peripheries’ able to
4
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guarantee both a stable and continuous flow of resources and profitable markets
capable of absorbing the industrial and financial surpluses of the metropolises.
Colonialism appeared to be the socio-economic and political response to the new
European demands and challenges.
An attentive analysis reveals that industrialisation and urbanisation were not the
only cause of the emergence of colonialism. As Philip Curtin argues, colonial
discourses and processes did not have their Sitz im Leben only in the metropolis but
also in the distant peripheries as the effect of that phenomenon identified as “man-onthe-spotism”.5 Traders, missionaries, administrators living in the overseas territories
interpreted their task as one of maximising their own power and advantage at the local
level. When the local budget was unable to bear the costs of particular projects, they
turned for help to the metropolis justifying the request as furthering the common
good.6 By doing this they were able to draw the economic and political core ‘to’ and
‘within’ the periphery shifting the original relations of structural dependency of the
periphery towards one of inter-dependency between core and periphery.
These considerations cause us to re-consider the modes and means by which
colonial enterprises and processes were prompted, planned and realised. Colonialism
was not an ‘external’ importation and imposition but a phenomenon that took place in
the colonial settings where cultural values, customs, norms and beliefs as well as
political, economic and social interests had already undergone processes of change
and differentiation under the influence of the new ecological and cultural milieu to
which it was forced to adapt. The West transplanted in the colonial establishments, in
other words, was ‘different’ from its original source. It was a ‘creolised’ version of
the European world. New economic and political interests had matured at the local
5
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level among the colonisers, new values had emerged and the western socio-economic
and political ideas had been able to follow different trajectories of development free
of the stereotypes and prejudices imposed by a sclerotic, authoritative tradition.
At the dawn of the XIX century British power and influence were expanding in
the east and south-east Asian regions and it appeared necessary to the Dutch to
forestall any penetration in those areas, which had been until then an exclusively
Dutch trade reserve. In 1824 the Treaty of London, defining the boundaries of the
Moluccan archipelago, was signed excluding ipso facto any foreign power from trade
in the area.7

This act was followed in 1828 by the so-called ‘Van Delden

Proclamation’ by which the Dutch claimed colonial possession of the coast of New
Guinea “van den 141sten graad oostelijke lengte van Greenwich op de zuidkust, en
van daar west-en noord-waards op tot de kaap de Goede Hoop, op de noordkust
gelegen”.8
Viewed in this perspective the fate of West Papua appears to be intrinsically
connected to the historical developments taking place in the European world and the
‘colonial entity’ of West Papua is nothing but the product of systemic forces fuelling
and regulating the trends, processes, needs and wants of the people of the time.
West Papua found itself in that particular ‘situational context’ or ‘structure of
the conjuncture’. Strategically important for its geographic position as the easternmost
Dutch outpost on the borders with the British colonial possessions and presumably
rich in those resources that the natives were trading on the regional markets, West

6

ibid., p. 48.
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northward up to the Cape of Good Hope, situated on the north coast”. Müller S., Reizen en
Onderzoekingen in de Indischen Archipel, gedaan op last der Nederlansche Indische Regering
tusschen de Jaren 1828 en 1826, vol. I, Amsterdam, 1857, p. 109.
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Papua gradually ceased to be regarded in the political and collective imaginary as the
mythical Ultima Thule.
In 1824 the Dutch Government signed a series of treaties with the sultanates of
Ternate and Tidore confirming the trading rights and relations that had been
previously established with the VOC. In the Openbaar Verbaalarchief No. 84, dated 6
December 1824, the Dutch Crown confirmed the sovereignty of Tidore over the
territories inhabited by the Papuans. However rumours regarding the establishment of
a British post on the coast of New Guinea east of the Aru Islands,9 that later proved to
be unfounded, prompted the Dutch to consider the establishment of an administrative
post on the south coast of West Papua.10 The Dutch trading post of Merkus-oord was
thus established at Triton Bay in 1828 to mark the official annexation of West New
Guinea to the Netherlands.11 Local rulers were appointed in order to establish and
maintain friendly relations with the natives living in and around the post.12
Life in the first colonial outpost must not have been devoid of difficulties and
hardships. Tensions with the local inhabitants represented a constant threat and the
appointment of local rulers according to the well-established practice already adopted
by Ceramese traders as seen in chapter three, did not bring about the desired effect of
exorcising the latent risks of upheavals. In 1830 Du Bus Fort, the military presidium
guarding Merkus-oord, was attacked by the Papuans forcing the intervention of the
Governor-General stationed in the Moluccas. A warship was sent in to protect the

9
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Openbaar Verbaalarchief No. 77, 16 November 1826; No. 78, 20 November 1826; No. 45, 24
November 1826.
11
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Dutch personnel and a commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the causes of
the attack.13
From the archival sources reporting the episode, it appears that the cause of the
attack was that Merkus-oord was interfering or competing with the previously
established sosolot trading arrangements in the area. Presumably the attack by the
Papuans was instigated by their manibob or ‘trade friends’ from Ceram in an attempt
to expel the Dutch from the area. After a few years, in 1835, the Dutch decided to
dismantle the trading post of Merkus-oord.14 The situation must have been
exacerbated by a strong resentment spreading among the Papuans from the nearby
Raja Ampat Islands because of a hongitochten fitted out by the Sultan of Tidore in
1830. Since the Dutch had kept a tight control over the practice in the aftermath of the
uprisings led by Nuku, the Governor of the Moluccas sent out a warship to investigate
the veridicality of the accusations and the eventual reasons behind the Tidorese
initiative.15
The archival documents reporting the situation of the time record only the
motivations, decisions and actions of the Dutch in response to Papuan activity or acts
of aggression. The motives behind Papuan actions remain obscure and can only be
inferred from the Dutch reports. Consequently what is referred to in the documents as
a ‘reaction’ to Papuan actions may be in reality a corollary to a Papuan reaction to
Dutch activity or presence. This once again shows how approximate and aleatory any
reconstruction of historical processes and events is when using unilateral sources of
information.
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The Dilemma of Colonising West Papua
The failure of the first attempt to colonise West Papua forced the colonial
government in Batavia to consider other means and methods to attain control over the
territory. The indirect control through Tidore was considered a non-viable and
ineffective solution. The Papuans, in particular those inhabiting the villages that had
participated to the uprisings led by Nuku and had probably ‘traditionalised’ some sort
of anti-colonial resentment, had manifested, on several occasions, their reluctance to
‘serve’ Tidore since this had lost its original mythical meaning of being a ‘power
centre’ or mandala centre. The refusal to pay tribute to Tidore and accept the practice
of the Hongitochten indicates the change in the Papuan collective imaginary of the
symbolic meaning of Tidorese supremacy.
Furthermore the Dutch considered that ‘indirect control’ inherently meant
putting oneself in a position of strategic weakness. The presence of military posts
would have, by contrast, guaranteed the allegiance of the local populations and
deterred the expansionist ambitions of other European powers. Consequently in 1840
the Dutch government decreed the necessity to carry out ‘small acts of sovereignty’ in
their New Guinea territories following reports of an increasing activity of British
vessels in territorial waters. On this occasion some of the representatives argued in
favour of the necessity to find a suitable and healthy location for the establishment of
a colonial settlement,16 a trend that had already begun in 1829 when a group of
members of the Dutch Parliament suggested to organise an expedition to New Guinea
to assess whether there was a suitable location for the establishment of a colony of
European convicts.17

16
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Geheim Verbaalarchief, 1 February 1840, doc. No. 37; 14 February, doc. No. 59.
Openbaar Verbaalarchief, 12 November 1829, doc. No. 72.
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Although it was believed that English traders, established in Port Essington
(Australia), did not represent a direct and imminent threat to Dutch interests in
mainland New Guinea, there was nevertheless, as a political report on the situation in
the East Indies reveals, a strong feeling among some of the Dutch stationed in Batavia
and the Moluccas that these would have been able to succeed in penetrating the
islands of Aru, Goram and Ceram.18
In the meantime a commission, chaired by A.L. Weddick, to investigate and list
the Tidorese possessions was set up in 1846. Two years later commissioner Weddick
produced the results of his investigations including an ethnographical and
geographical account of West New Guinea. Among the Papuan territories considered
as being under Tidorese sovereignty were the Raja Ampat islands, the Geelvink Bay
area and the Onin peninsula.19
Between 1849 and 1851 commissioner van den Dungen Gronovius undertook
an expedition to New Guinea to mark the Dutch colonial boundaries and provide
ethnographic information regarding the inhabitants of the area.20 In his account he
mentions the ‘caste Mafore’ that inhabited an area on the north coast of New Guinea
It is possible that this was a longstanding Muslim trading community or Sosolot that
recalls the ceita de Mafoma mentioned by XVI century Portuguese sources and that
St. Francis Xavier found on his arrival in the Moro-Halmahera area.21
In the middle of the XIX century the Dutch government in Batavia was
experiencing a political impasse, as the archival documents of the time reveal. While
acknowledging the strategic importance of colonising West Papua, it was well aware
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that a repeat of the Merkus-oord failure would have represented a setback for the
Dutch in the international balance of power politics and colonial expansion. It was
also evident from the ethnographic accounts regarding the local inhabitants that there
were longstanding Muslim Malay-Papuan trading communities that represented the
real obstacle to Dutch establishment in the area. It was necessary, following the
lessons learnt from Merkus-oord, for the Dutch to devise new means and strategies to
penetrate ‘peacefully’ into New Guinea and take control over the area. The Christian
missionaries represented a solution to the issue at hand. An article published in the
newspaper Indiër of 13 December 1852 reveals that missionaries of the Utrecht
Mission Society (UZV) had requested permission to establish a station in New
Guinea.22
To facilitate and encourage the establishment of mission posts in New Guinea,
in 1857 the Governor-General authorised the payment of grants to missionaries who
carried out work in those areas where there was no administrative post. These
missionaries were also granted free passage on government ships.23 It is evident that
the Christianisation of West Papua meant its transformation into a Dutch colony. The
Cross, aided by the Crown, paved the way for the Colonial Flag in accordance with a
customary European practice. The relationship between altar and throne will
characterise and influence the modes, processes and trajectories of Papuan
Christianisation and socio-cultural change.

Mission and State: the Dialectics of a Connubium in Colonial Settings.
As discussed in chapter III, the Catholic missionaries, who ventured to travel to
the East Indies, were first sent there with the task of providing education and
22
23
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satisfying the spiritual needs of the European settlers in the towns. Only during the
second half of the century did they endeavour to spread the Christian faith among the
autochthonous populations, although the lack of personnel represented a constant
impediment. This trend continued during the XVI-XVIII centuries when the Dutch
took control of the Portuguese settlements in the region. It was, however, only in the
XIX century and in particular after 1850 that the Dutch Government favoured the
systematic christianisation of colonial populations.
The direct intervention of the government in regulating mission work, and the
legislation it enacted to control its performance, influenced the work of the
missionaries by constructing invisible barriers and demarcations, and channelling the
processes of change along pre-determined trajectories and in established directions.
The overt or latent conflicts among the various Christian denominations that
characterised the religious status quo of the time in the mother country, were
transferred to the overseas territories and brought about the partitioning of territories
and populations in the colonial setting of West New Guinea. The effects of this
territorial division did not fail to emerge when the first nationalist movements
emerged.
The Dutch government adopted in its colonies the practice of non-interference
in local customs and traditions and, in particular, in matters of native religiousness, a
practice that became a principle and codified in the Government Regulation of 1836.
The policy was reiterated in subsequent acts and constitutions and summarised in art.
124 of the 1854 Government Regulation and art. 178 of the 1925 Dutch East Indies
Constitution stating as follows:
1. As far as the religion professed by each of them is concerned, the priests
of the indigenous population who do not profess the Christian religion are
put under the general superintendence of the princes, regents and heads.
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2. The latter take care that the priests do not undertake anything
incompatible with this act (this Constitution) and with the ordinances issued
by or in the name of the Governor General.24
The mission stations established in West Papua, from the beginning, fell directly
under government control. Mission activity was stimulated and favoured in order to
open up and explore new territories with their rich deposits of resources and
inhabitants whose ‘modernisation’ would have contributed to increase the capabilities
of the metropolis. The flag of the national interest came consequently to encompass
the religious discourse of the mission in a nationalist perspective.
Since Protestantism was the official religion of the Dutch nation-state and the
Roman Catholics represented a politically irrelevant minority, the Dutch government
continued to favour, as it had already done in the era of its Golden Age as part of its
attempts to forestall Iberian expansion,25 the extension of Protestant evangelisation and
the establishment of Protestant mission posts in its colonial territories. Furthermore,
Protestantism was a religion that, disengaged as it was from external influences and
allegiances, better embodied the nationalist character of the mother country and
consequently better served Dutch national interests. In order to protect and favour the
expansion of Protestant missions, the Dutch government set up an appropriate
legislation by applying to the colonial territories the tenets of that Zuilen or
‘Pillarisation’ policy already enacted at home. By providing institutional autonomy to
the two main religious groups, Protestants and Roman Catholics, in the colonial
possessions, the Dutch were able to exert a more effective control over mission
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activity26 and avoid the rise of socio-economic conflicts derived from a polarisation of
society in religious terms.
The enactment of this legislation was occasioned by the diatribe, regarding
ecclesiastical jurisdictional competencies, which had first manifested itself in 1845 in
Jakarta and saw protagonists the newly appointed Catholic Bishop in Batavia, Mgr.
Jac Grooff and the Dutch Governor-General, J.J. Rochussen.27 The latter, in fact, did
not tolerate any other authority over the priests than the government. The difficulties
between the Governor-General of the East Indies and the Roman Catholic Bishop led
to a series of negotiations between the Dutch Government and the Vatican.
The respective competencies of the two parties were laid down in what is known
as the Nota der Punten, or ‘Note of Items’, of 1847 establishing the number of priests
to be sent out to the Netherlands Indies as assessed by ecclesiastical authorities. The
Note also established that no priest was allowed to travel to the Indies without a
certificate of admittance or Radikaal issued by the Dutch Government irrespective of
whether the prelate was appointed and paid by the Dutch Government or not.28
Jurisdiction and control over mission work and church activity by the Dutch
government was further enforced by art. 123 of the 1854 Regeringsreglement, or
Netherlands Indies Government Regulation. This stated that, besides the Radikaal, a
26
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bijzondere toelating, or special permission, had to be granted by the government in
order to carry out mission work in a selected territory in the Netherlands Indies. The
article stated as follows:
De Christen-Leraars, priesters en zendelingen moeten voorzien zijn van een
door of namens de Gouverneur-Generaal te verlenen bijzondere toelating
om hun dienstwerk in enig bepaald gedeelte van Nederlands-Indië te mogen
verrichten. Wanneer die toelating schedelijk wordt beronden, of de
voorwaarden daarvan niet worden nageleeffd, kan zij door de GouverneurGeneraal worden ingetrokken.29
By establishing a series of obligations and requirements the Government was
able to prevent non-Dutch and non-Protestant missionaries from travelling to certain
territories and avoided the possibility that different denominations would carry out
mission work at the same time in the same place.
The background of this policy, that is commonly referred to as Rust en Orde,
peace and order, is to be traced in the liberal conception of the state, centred on the
principle of non-intervention, embraced by Dutch policy makers.30 The provisions
contained in art. 123 were reiterated later in art. 177 of the 1925 Indische
Staatsregeling or Netherlands Indies Government Regulation. The manipulation of
these provisions by the Dutch colonial government in Batavia resulted in heated
discussions in the Dutch Parliament that often prevented missionaries from either
contacting populations or renewing mission activity in particular regions.31
In the case of West Papua, art. 123 brought about the partition of the territory,
fifty years after the arrival of the first missionaries, on the basis of ‘Biblical Exegesis’.
28
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The north, which encompassed the coastal area stretching from the Vogelkop
Peninsula to Humboldt Bay and Lake Sentani, became the field of Protestant mission
work, while the southern coast was assigned to the Roman Catholics.32 The central
highlands were in a first moment excluded from any partition and attribution until they
became open to exploration and penetration in the early 1930s.
Interestingly the partition did not cut across but followed the isotropic
boundaries of the three ecological-cultural areas which can be identified in West
Papua: that is, the salubrious north-west coast and off-shore islands; the swampy south
coast from the Onin Peninsula to the Papua New Guinea border and the inaccessible
central highlands. The criteria adopted to draw these boundaries, however, at the time
remain obscure. It is improbable that the Dutch used ethnographic considerations since
very little was known about the territory and the customs of its inhabitants at the time,
except for anecdotal curiosities reported by either casual explorers or scientific
expeditions, the latter more concerned with the flora and fauna or the identifications of
possible resources to exploit than with the customs and beliefs of the inhabitants.33 It is
more probable that the Dutch considered the commercial arrangements they had with
the areas favouring the north-western shores because of their proximity to the Dutch
Maluku settlements. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the ‘denominational
allotment’ of the New Guinea territory in which the Protestants were allocated the
more important north-western territories.
Political and economic considerations and conveniences may have conjured to
determine the territorial partition, although practical evaluations cannot be excluded.
31
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The coastal areas of the north appeared to have been more receptive to engage into
contacts with the non-Papuan world given the longstanding history of relations with
Maluku. Since the influence of Tidore had consistently waned in the last century, the
Dutch believed that the people, not paying allegiance to any foreign sovereign, would
have been unable to oppose a stable European presence. Furthermore, the environment
and climate was more salubrious and suitable for Europeans than the swampy and
malaria-ridden areas along the south coast, as the high mortality rate of the Merkusoord venture had demonstrated.34
The bellicosity of the native populations of the south may have also acted as a
deterrent to the establishment of Protestant missions. The Dutch authorities wanted to
succeed in colonising West Papua and turning it into a ‘Dutch colony’, that is
subordinated to Dutch national interests, and Protestant Christianity best served the
purpose of embodying Dutch nationalist ideology that supported those interests. At the
same time colonisation needed to be carried out with minimum effort and costs, in
particular by reducing and containing the cost of military expenditure that an eventual
resistance by the locals would have caused to increase.
As shown in chapter III, the Papuans inhabiting the south coast had established
commercial relations with Muslim Ceramese traders since the XV century. The
Sosolot were a well-established presence in the area and represented the setting in
which Papuan and Ceramese interests coalesced and thrived. As the Merkus-oord
experienced had shown, this was a difficult area to penetrate ‘peacefully’. There was
the risk that the polarisation of economic interests may have assumed religious

Government commissioners Van Delden and Macklot. Openbaar Verbaal, doc. No. 52 of 1 March
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connotations. The territory was therefore assigned to the Catholic Missionaries of the
Sacred Heart and the Jesuits. Using the Kei Islands, and in particular the mission
stations in Langgur, as their launching pad, the Catholic missionaries35 began to
penetrate the area between the end of the XIX and beginning of the XX century with
the establishment of the mission station of Merauke in 190536 following the
establishment of the Apostolic Prefecture of Irian Jaya-Maluku in 1902.37
The different missiological approach adopted by the different denominations
inevitably influenced the processes of cultural and social change bringing to the fore
the latent cultural idiosyncrasies that characterised Papuan civilisation and there
inevitable politicisation. The race between the missions to gain control over Papuan
souls, coupled with an excessive missionary zeal, as will be shown, often caused
frictions and clashes.

Christianity and Missiological Heterogeneity in the Papuan Mission-Field
The existence of a geographical partition on the basis of Christian denominations
assumes importance when considered in the context of historical epistemology. The
different missionary denominations prompted different timing and modes of material
organisation and modernisation stemming from a peculiar Biblical exegesis, giving
rise to different missiological discourses.38
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To understand the heterogeneous effects that Christianisation had on the native
populations of West Papua, one must consider the differences existing between
Protestant and Catholic missiologies. These differences never developed into any sort
of structural antithesis or polarisation in Papuan Christianity, as it occurred in
Polynesia and East Melanesia,39 although episodes of friction between Catholics and
Protestants were recorded. Emblematic in this regard is the episode of the Catholic
missionary Cappers in Merauke.40
The different methods adopted by the missionaries of Christian denominations
ignited different reactions at the local level in regard to issues of conversion and
modernisation. These differences later contributed to mark the character of some of the
people’s movements, which endemically emerged, as well as the degree of
involvement of the missionaries themselves in the anti-colonial or nationalist
movements.
The differences between Protestant and Catholic mission work revolve around
four basic points: ecclesiology; the attitudes towards non-Christian cultures and
religions; the nationalities of the missionaries involved and the measure of their
ethnocentrism and nationalism; and finally the organisational structure of the
mission.41
From an ecclesiological point of view, according to Protestantism the primary
aim of mission work was the achievement of individual conversion while for the
Catholics it was represented by the foundation of an ecclesiastical hierarchy. This
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difference came to be reflected in the direction and organisation of the mission station
and influenced the relationships with the colonial government.
Protestant missions were managed by laymen who were preachers of the Word
often accompanied by their families setting a living example of the ‘Christian way of
life’ in antithesis to the indigenous and heathen. They depended financially, apart from
their mission headquarters in the metropolis, on the colonial government, although
they were instructed to live of their own means in the mission station. This, of course,
forced them to engage often in commercial relations with the local inhabitants as will
be shown in the following pages.
The Catholic mission stations, by contrast, were managed by clerics who were
priests as well as educators. They depended on the Vatican through their regional
Apostolic Vicariates. They were financially and logistically supported by the strong
network that the Holy See had been able to create superseding national boundaries to
embrace ecumenical universalism. Consequently Protestant ecclesiology was inclined
to or aimed at creating national churches where the Catholics tended to found new
Christian communities as part of a universal ecumenical church. Protestant mission
activity was regulated by the so-called three autonomies, namely self-sustainment,
self-government and self-diffusion bringing about its indigenisation, while their
Catholic counterparts tended to foster the creation of an indigenous clergy analogous
to the missionary one.
The aim of indigenising Christian mission communities accounts for the
different modes of conversion promoted and pursued by Protestant missionaries. The
Protestant emphasis on the necessity of individual conversion explains the resistance
of native populations to Christianity in the early stages of Protestant missionary
enterprise. Individualism was a category unknown to pre-literate populations who
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thought themselves as an integral part of a wider political, socio-economic and cultural
unity represented by the tribe.42 The phenomenon of ‘detribalisation’, often imputed
to mission work, has been one of the major traumas suffered by pre-literate
populations when processes of rapid modernisation took place. This phenomenon has
been regarded as the primary cause in prompting the rise of resistance movements.
The lack of individualism in some pre-literate cultures accounts for the frequent
and deplored phenomenon of ‘mass conversion’ of entire tribal groups and
consequently the presence of a nominal form of Christianity in colonial settings.
Stepping beyond the missionary interpretations of the phenomenon, this clearly
indicates the different meaning attributed to conversion by the local populations.
Among the West Papuans, as will be shown, it will come to be intrinsically linked to
the system of prestige and power of the Big Man.
Notwithstanding the exegetic, ecclesiological and missiological differences,
Catholics and Protestants shared a common attitude towards processes of
modernisation or, as the missionary texts refer to it, civilisation. This was primarily
intended as technological and socio-economic amelioration or change. The sole
difference consisted in the timing and modes by which modernisation, according to the
missionaries,

should

have

been

attained.

The

Catholics

maintained

that

Christianisation and modernisation had to be conducted simultaneously: the
acceptance of Christian values, beliefs and norms should be accompanied by an
overall re-structuring of native material and social life. Protestants, by contrast, did not
have a unitary way of dealing with these two aspects, some of them believing that
modernisation was a pre-condition to evangelisation, others the opposite.
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Both Protestant and Catholic missionaries, however, intended modernisation in
ethnocentric terms. Modernisation was conceived tout court as a synonym of
‘Westernisation’. With mission work the semantic equation ‘Christianisation =
Westernisation = modernisation’ becomes a definite morphological entity and identity.
A perusal of the reports and letters sent by Dutch missionaries to their
headquarters reveals how this equation represented an underlying assumption
permeating their activities and their daily relationships with the locals. Their attitudes
towards, and perceptions of, the native inhabitants in colonial settings were influenced
by the general spiritual and cognitive atmosphere of Positivist European society of the
second half of the XIX century in which contemporary notions of primitivism and
evolutionism were contributing to construct an ‘axiomatic justification’ of colonial
enterprise. In this context the missionaries were believed to be the “bringers of
Civilisation”.
An article published in the colonial newspaper Javabode, dated 10 November
1860 reporting the activity of the first missionaries, Ottow and Geissler, in New
Guinea. It bore the title De Toekomst van Nieuw Guinea en Zijn Eerst Beschavers, ‘the
future of New Guinea and its first bringers of civilisation’, and clearly reflected the
spirit and attitudes of the time towards the function of missionary enterprise and its
intrinsic relation to colonisation:
(…) maar hoeveel dat ook beloofde, hoezeer dat ook getuigde voor den
ernst der Hooge Regering, om zich het lot en de toekomst van Nieuw
Guinea aan treken, dat lot en die toekomst bleven tot heden onveranderd
(…) dat eiland zullen geven geen hollandsche vlag en vorstelijk wapen
alleen, maar een gezag en invloed tevens, die de booze geesten van
slavenroof, kannibalendom en volslagen regeringloosheid daar bezweren, tevens een nieuwe orde van zaken, een schoone toekmost zullen doen
geboren worden voor dat eiland, - meer dan twee eeuwen lang door
Nederland vergeten, zoo geheel aan zijn barbaarschheid en ellende
overgelaten.43
43
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A note in the Colonial Archives in The Hague, dated 7 August 1862, refers to
the missionaries as living among “eener gansch woeste en onbeschaafde bevolking”,
‘a savage and uncivilised people’.44 Earlier in 1854, the French Verguet, while taking
a position in the debate between creationists and evolutionists, had already put the
question in the same terms. When referring to the necessity to evangelise the peoples
of Melanesia he asked:
Les Mélanésiens sont-ils nos frères? Avons-nous une même origine avec ses
hommes dont la peau est si different de la notre? (…) Vous devinez déjà ma
response, je la tire de la Genèse.45
The terms ‘savage’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘barbarian’ along with the concepts of
cannibalism and slavery appear in the parallel discourses of Christianisation and
colonisation and contributed to create that intricate conceptual framework in which the
Other represented the ‘negation of the West’.
In 1884 Haga, commenting on the positive effects of Christian missionary
activity in West Papua, wrote that although the Papuans did not understand anything
about Christian worship, when the sound of the gong rang through the village to signal
the beginning of church services, men, women and children in their best dresses
gathered in the missionaries’ house. He observes that “through all their gradual work,

April 1861, No. 17. Translation: “(…) but how many have interrogated themselves in front of the
gravity of the Supreme Ruler, in regard to the fate and future of New Guinea, that fate and future
experienced until today invariable (…) that island will be given not only the Dutch flag and the coat of
arms, but at the same time prestige and influence which will exorcise the evil spirits of slave trade,
cannibalism and false authority – at the same time a new order of things, a beautiful future will begin
for that island that for more than two centuries the Netherlands forgot, and which still lives in total
barbarity and misery”.
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the missionaries have found themselves in a position to win the Papuans’ trust, for the
latter are now more properly clothed and have even begun to attend to their gardens”.46
It appears evident that the colonial archives represent the memory of the West
and the memorial of its achievements and presumed superiority. They contain the
narratives of the relations of the West with the colonial peoples that, not possessing an
analogous ‘mnemonic architecture’, are dubbed as ‘history-less’ people. In power
relations, analogy functions as an important criterion of establishing similarities and
differences in colonial discourses. The lack of analogical terms generates the negative
notion of ‘anomaly’. Non-western societies are consequently perceived as anomalous
formations that need to be ‘normalised’. This process of normalisation can only be
achieved by transferring the norms, along with the underlying values and beliefs, of
Western society to the non-Western ones. These norms, beliefs and values were those
of Christianity, which represented the ideology of the West.
The separation of the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal in the early
modern era of European history was a natural evolution of the rationalism implicit in
this type of epistemology. The secularisation of thought thus represented the main
characteristic or connotative attribute of Western civilisation in clear contrast with
either the mysticism or legalism, obsessed with purity and orthopraxy, of the Eastern
societies. Modernity, that is the questioning of the validity of the axioms of tradition in
the solution of issues stemming from historical and structural conjunctures, was the
product of Western rationalism that called for a pragmatic and empirical attitude in
understanding the world and reality.
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From Merkus-oord to Mansinam: Christianity lands in Papua.
In the collective imaginary of the Dutch, New Guinea appears to have been
envisaged as a sort of inhospitable, savage and wild land, a world of secrets to disclose
as well as of people to civilise. That this was the vision and perception of the
easternmost land of the growing Dutch colonial empire appears evident from the
description provided by the naturalist Alfred Russell Wallace who in 1858, while
standing on the deck of the schooner Hester Helena bound to New Guinea,
contemplated the “rugged mountains retreating ridge behind ridge into the interior,
where the foot of civilised man had never trod”.47 When he finally landed on the shore
of the small island of Mansinam in Doreh Bay he met the two German missionaries,
Ottow and Geissler, who had established a mission post in 1855 in the area. As
Wallace reports “these missionaries were working men, and had been sent out as being
more useful among savages than persons of a high class”.
The two missionaries sent to New Guinea were, in fact, artisans, members of the
Comité van de Christen – Werkman (Christian Workmen Committee), a sort of guild
that counted among its activities mission work and evangelisation. Before being sent
to their final destination, Karl Ottow and Johan Geissler underwent a period of
missiological training in Batavia and then were sent to Ternate to wait for permission
from the Sultan of Tidore to travel to New Guinea. During their sojourn in Ternate,
Otto Heldring, the founder of the Committee of which Geissler and Ottow were
members, established the Utrecht Zendingsvereeniging (UZV)48 inspired by Pietism.49
47
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The UZV aimed at sending two kinds of missionary personnel, those who
underwent theological training and were ordained, and laymen with more practical
knowledge and technical skills. The conversion of people to Christianity had to be
accompanied by the simultaneous transformation of their material and socio-economic
life.
Once Ottow and Geisler obtained the letter of the Sultan of Tidore granting
them permission to travel to the territory under his sovereignty, they set out to
establish a mission station in the Doreh Bay area frequented by Moluccan vessels
since time immemorial. The small island of Mansinam in the Bay appeared to be a
suitable location. The reception by the local people was, however, far from the one
they expected. Relying on the information on the inhabitants gathered during their
residence in Ternate, they expected that the presentation of the letter of the Sultan of
Tidore would have prompted the traditional reception-ceremony that the Papuans used
to reserve to the Samsom party returning from Tidore.
Notwithstanding the almost complete indifference that the locals displayed for
their arrival, the missionaries managed to set up their small settlement and after a few
days began tilling the soil and planting the seeds they had brought with them. The
missionary association had, in fact, imposed that its personnel had to be able to
support itself without external assistance and without relying on help from the local
inhabitants. The necessity of the economic and financial autonomy and selfsustainability of the mission was probably dictated by practical considerations, that of
generating among the native population a particular perception of both the role and
the meaning of the mission and the missionaries.

strict moral Puritanism, that often resembled bigotry, represented one of the limitations to its spread.
See in this regard: Stoeffler F.E., The Rise of Evangelical Pietism, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1971, pp. 180-246.
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The first period of Ottow and Geissler’s residence appears to have been marked
by a particular purpose, that of ‘rooting’ themselves in the chosen cultural and
environmental setting and not simply ‘adapting’, as well as to testify their Christian
identity ‘against’ the local one. The letters and the entries of their diaries report how
they tried to assert and establish a Christian presence in the territory. This was
constructed by carrying out normal daily Christian duties, such as praying, holding
Sunday services and catechetical sessions and attending to work in the gardens
surrounding the mission.50 By 1856 the mission had its house and worship centre
completed51 and by the time Wallace reached the island, Ottow had already learnt to
speak the local language and had begun to translate portions of the Bible, probably
made by using the 1691 Malay translation by Melchior Leidekker. As Wallace
reports, probably on the basis of an observation made by Ottow himself, since the
local language, that of Numfor, was poor from a lexical point of view, a considerable
number of Malay words were used to convey the Christian message.52 At the time
here were few nominal converts mainly children and women.
From the accounts of the missionaries it appears that the encounter between the
UZV mission and the Papuans of Doreh Bay did not produce the desired results of
individual conversion. The Sunday sermons were far from being listened to by the
local population, let alone understood for what they really meant. The Papuans saw
the white man preaching from the pulpit as either a trader bartering new exotic
50
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products for local ones or as a spirit of the dead that had returned from the West
bringing them the promised cargo.
It appears that Ottow and Geissler’s arrival did not cause surprise among the
inhabitants, who almost ignored their presence. It was the commercial activities that
brought the locals to the mission, and the missionaries used trade as a means to attract
them. The church, the school and the hospital, with their functions of converting,
teaching and healing, were considered by the Papuans as places or markets where
‘transactions’ were carried out. It was only when the first Papuan converts, as Petrus
Kafiar,53 and the Sangirese and Ambonese teachers54 were introduced into the mission
that the Papuans began to change their original perception: the missionaries were not
white and this meant that, apart from not being the dead ancestors, non-white men
could become Pandita, missionaries.
The missionaries had established a school soon after their arrival, which was
attended by children. Education was imparted at first in Malay, but later was replaced
by the local language. The adoption of the local language in the education system
seems to have been prompted by the elders who feared that the children proficient in
Malay would have been employed to deliver letters to the incoming schooners and
there captured by the slave traders.55
On Sundays the missionaries held services in the house of worship situated in
the mission compound. In order to encourage attendance the missionaries had refused
to trade on Sundays. Consequently the locals, in order to be able to purchase tobacco
and medicines, attended Sunday services. It was in this milieu of ‘tacit blackmailing’
Taalkunde in De Indonesische Talen, vol. II, 1900-1970, Martinus Nijhoff, ‘S-Gravenhage, 1978,
pp.116-130.
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or ‘trade’ that the first conversions, or the acceptance of Christianity, in the area took
place. The missionaries were to blame for this type of development and
understanding. In order to approach the native people they exploited the structures of
their material life by intruding into them, producing what Rutherford refer to as
“docile bodies”.56 Wallace himself pointed out the ‘mercantilist’ mentality of the
Papuans of the islands on his journey towards New Guinea:
They were very extravagant in their demands, being accustomed to sell their
trifles to whalers and Chinese ships whose crews will purchase anything at
ten times its value.57
Supposedly the same mentality existed among the Papuans inhabiting the
littoral areas of New Guinea that had engaged in local trade relations with the nearby
territories of Maluku since time immemorial.
At the beginning the missionaries, therefore, adopted trade as a means to
‘engage’ the Papuans. Over time, however, the missionaries themselves began to
benefit from the commercial transactions as a source of sustainment and profit for the
mission’s survival and expansion. This was a phenomenon that had already
characterised the Maluku Mission at the time of the Portuguese expansion in Southeast Asia and that has been referred to in chapter III. The mission station became a
sort of trading post or market. Wallace again did not fail to notice the dangers implicit
in this type of relationship.58
In their sermons and teachings Ottow and Geissler preached against the local
agama based on ancestor worship and fetishism, but to little effect.59 In their weekly
sermons the missionaries thundered against the pagan practices of idolatry and orgy
55
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threatening the people with the apocalyptic visions of the Second Coming, the
beginning of the end, when the dead would have been resurrected and Mankind would
have been subjected to the Final Judgment. The visions of punishment and call for
repentance recall the sermons that St. Francis Xavier delivered three centuries earlier
during his visit in the Maluku mission.
The missionaries tried to eliminate customary practices in order to erase any
vestige of Papuan culture believed to be an obstacle to the propagation of Christianity
and of Western civilisation, a belief that came to be one of the features of Dutch
missionary and government attitudes toward the Papuans.60
The fact that the missionaries were from the West and that their medicines were
able to heal and reduce mortality rates among the villagers, as experienced during the
outbreak of measles in 1861,61 induced the people to believe that the Western pandita
were not human. This perception was reinforced by the belief that they were an
inexhaustible source of foreign goods for which it seemed they did not work.
With the death of Ottow and the arrival of three new missionaries, Klaasen,
Ottespoor and van Hasselt,62 in 1863 the methods of evangelisation changed. More
attention came to be paid to understanding Papuan culture and worldview, although
acculturative methods were not yet replaced by inculturative ones.63 This will take
place only later in the XX century mission field and will favour, as will be discussed
in chapter VI, to the indigenisation of Christianity.
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Conversion, Convergence, Sub-Mission
The arrival of the new missionaries, and in particular of van Hasselt, represented
a turning point in the history of the Mansinam mission. The mission in Mansinam
became the headquarters for the opening of new mission posts along the north coast of
West New Guinea: the station of Meoswar by Kampo, Woulders and Mosche; the
station of Moon by Meuwig and those of Roon, Andai and Windessi were all
established after 1863. The opening of new stations coincided with an increase in
financial support by the Dutch government that allowed for the missionaries to devote
more time to the evangelisation of the native populations. The concession of grants to
the missionaries had the effect of endowing the mission and mission work with more
autonomy not having to rely on local trade with the native population for their
sustainment.64
Van Hasselt’s mission activity, covering a long period of time from 1863 to
1907, continued the process of convergence of the Papuans towards the mission that
characterised the early period of Ottow and Geissler’s mission work. But gradually
this spatial orientation assumed, through conversion, ideological connotations. The
acculturative methods enacted by van Hasselt were coupled with a greater degree of
sensitivity towards Papuan culture, although this approach did not entail the use of
Papuan culture to explain or transmit Christian doctrines, values and beliefs. Van
Hasselt’s catechesis was still strongly conservative and anti-syncretistic. Change was
imposed by the mission and this meant the abandonment of traditional, native ways of
life and practices and the total, intimate acceptance of Christianity.65
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A cultural sensitivity towards the Papuans was manifested in the way the
Christian message was delivered. The moralising and threatening sermons of Geissler
and Ottow were replaced by a continuous attempt to engage the listeners in a
dialogue.66 The centrepiece of van Hasselt’s approach was represented, in fact, by
education in the form of schooling for which he was, at a later stage of his mission
work, able to obtain government subsidies.67 Children and adolescents were his
primary concern since he believed that they represented the foundation of a future
Papuan Christian society. The adults attended evening catechetic sessions. He also set
up programs aiming at introducing people to new methods of agriculture and to the
cultivation of new crops in order to improve their quality of life.68 It is possible,
although not explicitly stated in his mission reports,69 that the introduction of new
technologies, techniques and crops aimed also at moving the people away from those
pagan ceremonies connected to traditional methods of gardening. The aim of van
Hasselt was the eradication of Papuan culture.
While this shift and developments in mission policies were taking place during
the 1860s, the Dutch government began the exploitation of the coal deposits in
Geelvinks bay.70 In 1864 a coal depot was established in Doreh Bay in a location not
far from the mission of Mansinam, a coincidence that clearly shows how the political
and economic interests of the colonial government tended to prompt and direct both
the establishment of mission stations and missionary activity and contributed to the
‘politicisation’ of Christianity in colonial settings.
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Documents reveal that Christian missions and colonial government were at
times at odds over policy issues. Some residents, such as the Resident of Ternate de
Clercq, overtly obstructed mission activity.71
The Oost-Indisch Besluit of 7 January 1864 No. 15 decreeing the establishment
of the depot, refers to the great danger in which the missionaries were living because
of the tensions between the coastal and hill tribes. In the same year the Resident of
Ternate was forced to intervene to restore peace and order among the native
inhabitants and protect the missionaries.72
The archives are silent on the cause of these tensions. Presumably the animosity
between the coastal and hill tribes could have been sparked by the exploitative
attitudes of the coastal populations over those of the hinterland. As already pointed
out in chapter III, Wallace observed that the coastal people of Doreh were often
attacked by the ‘Arfaks’ of the interior,73 and Forrest added that there was a sort of
dominance exerted by the people of the coast on those of the interior probably
because of the existence of the Chinese system of trade.74 The mission may have
represented an element that disrupted the traditional balance in the relationships
between the coast and the interior by introducing new and larger quantities of
commodities in the traditional trade cycle. Since the political system among the
Papuans was based on a ‘quantitative system of prestige’ determined by the ability of
the individual to monopolise and harness wealth in the form of material resources and
valuables, the easy access to foreign commodities through the mission station and the
71

Openbaar Verbaal, 12 June 1889, No. 16. De Clercq, in fact, rejected the request of the missionaries
regarding the stationing of civil servants in New Guinea in order to support the mission
administratively and increase European-Christian presence and ways of life in the territory. Cfr.
‘Memorie van Overgave van het Bestuur Der Residentie Ternate van den Afgetreden Resident D.J. Van
Braam Morris aan den Opgetreden Resident F.S A. De Clercq’, in Overweel J.A., Irian Jaya Source
Materials, No. 13, DSALCUL/IRIS, Leiden/Jakarta, 1995, pp. 78-79.
72
Javaasche Courant, 23 January 1864, No. 7, in Register op de Indische Couranten.
73
Wallace, op.cit., p. 379.
74
Forrest, op.cit., p. 109.
264

quantity of these brought about increasing inequalities in the allocation and
distribution of power among Papuan communities based on their geographical
proximity to the mission station.
It appears clear that those villages situated closer to the mission and,
consequently, to the source of foreign goods, wielded more power and prestige than
those inhabiting distant areas. It is possible therefore that the original antithesis
interior-coast, that both Wallace and Forrest identified, came to be replaced by that of
a mandala, the centre of which was represented by the mission.
Tensions with the local inhabitants became a constant during the 1880s. The
archives contain numerous requests by the missionaries for government intervention
and the establishment of administrative posts to guarantee law and order in the
region.75 In an article published in the Haagsch Dagblad of 26 October 1887, Van
Hasselt pointed out the troubles the missionaries were experiencing because of the ill
disposition of some of the Papuan tribes towards their presence in the area. He argues
that these attitudes were probably instigated by local traders who considered the
mission’s activity and presence as either competing against or endangering their
economic interests and privileges. Because of the constant danger in which they were
living, the missionaries of the UZV requested their societies to suspend mission work
in West New Guinea and recall all personnel.76 The situation was further aggravated
by the war that broke out in 1889 between the Papuans from Doreh Bay and those
from Wandammen Bay that, as a Surabayan newspaper informs, was triggered by
local trade issues.77 In the same year Papuan tribes of Geelvinks Bay declared war on
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the Dutch government.78 The Surabayan newspaper imputes the unrest to the
weakness of the colonial government unable to assert control over the area and calls
for the establishment of European settlements and administrative posts.
The Catholic missions, established on the south coast of West New Guinea,
encountered less hostility. Documents contained in the archives of the Missionaries of
the Sacred Heart (MSC), the first Catholic missionaries to penetrate the area, report
very few incidents between local populations and the mission. The obstacles to the
establishment of Catholic mission work came from the Protestants.79 The MSC
established their mission in Merauke in 1905. The Catholics, however, had been
seeking permission to carry out mission work in south-west New Guinea since 1892.80
It is possible that several factors contributed for the relative acceptance of the
Catholic missions by the Papuans of the south. First, the Catholic mission reproduced
the monastic order. The autonomy and self-sufficiency that characterised the
organisation prevented it from being perceived as a competitor that could intrude into
the local socio-economic relations. The Catholic mission, in fact, maintained a
relative independence from the colonial government not depending on subsidies or
funding. The missionaries of the MSC posed the refusal of government funding as a
condition to guarantee their autonomy.81 Furthermore, the missionaries, some of
whom were indigeneous, came from the Kei Islands, an area that had no relation with
Tidore.
The Catholic missionaries selected strategic villages to establish their missions
and from where they could have contacted a wider region. From Merauke, in fact,
during the 1920s, the Catholic mission gradually extended into the Upper Digul area
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around Tanah Merah and along the Mimika coast.82 By 1931 there were seventeen
schools with 634 students in the region.83 Traditional enmities between the Papuans of
the coast and those of the interior, however, prevented the missionaries from either
maintaining or establishing contacts with the populations inhabiting the inland areas.
Boelaars reports that often the Papuans of the coast were reluctant or refused to
accompany the missionaries in their inland journeys.84
Apart from the particular organisational structure of the Catholic mission, what
also favoured their penetration into the Papuan world and territory were the external
features of their ceremonies. Mass services, rituals, processions and the colourful
iconography and dresses were elements that appealed to the senses and aesthetics of
the locals in contrast with the austerity and parsimony of the Protestant missions. The
Catholics, also, attempted to change the customs of the local populations but they did
this by using the local beliefs and practices: syncretism was not abhorred but used as a
medium to facilitate the transmission of Christian beliefs and doctrines. In contrast
with the Protestants who requested individual conversion, the Catholic missionaries
allowed for mass conversion believing that this represented a form of abjuration and
the first step towards a Christian way of life. Because of their apparent degree of
tolerance, the Catholics were able to intervene directly in the social life of the local
populations acting as mediators in tribal wars, as did the Mission in Okaba in 1910,85
and founded several ‘model’ villages by gathering a number of hamlets presided over
by a priest or teacher.
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The new system of villages brought about a dismantlement of the social and
economic structures of Papuan societies and with them the loss of a system of
reference and meaning on which Papuan identity was founded. As Marilyn Strathern
has pointed out, in Melanesian societies personhood is represented by a composite of
relationships, a microcosm homologous to society at large. The person is not
conceived or thought of as an ‘in-dividual’ but as a ‘di-vidual’, his/her identity being
shaped by the template of relationships he/she is part of.86 The abolition by the
missionaries of the celebration of particular cults, such as the Sosom-Bombari among
the Marind-anim, the practices of ritual gift-giving and of bride-wealth arrangements,
along with the introduction of concepts, such as that of ‘sin’ and individual
responsability, alien to Papuan religiousness,87 contributed to generate a sense of
latent disorientation among the Papuans that in the long run became frustration.
Van Baal reports that, when he was controleur of South New Guinea in 1937,
he had to intervene to lift the ban imposed by the Mission of Merauke on the
celebration of the Sosom in order to alleviate the sense of oppression among the
natives who were still secretly performing the rituals, whilst avoiding a feud between
administration and mission.88

The missionaries and previous administrators had

justified the ban of native celebrations on the grounds that the homosexual practices
that they entailed were causing the spread of venereal diseases.89
The villages, established by the Catholic missions, had the benefit of preventing
the spread of endemic diseases as well as those diseases derived from the sexual
habits and customs of the native people. During the first two decades of the XX
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century venereal diseases, in fact, probably introduced by labourers indentured from
Thursday Island to assist in the construction of the new settlement in Merauke in
1902, caused the birth rates among the Marind-anim tribes to dramatically drop.90
Disease was the main factor characterising mission activity in south-west New
Guinea. Malaria was endemic and at times hindered the expansion of the mission
field. In 1937-1938 an epidemic of influenza and grip forced people to flee the region
into nearby Papua New Guinea.91 Because of the frequency of endemic diseases, a
great part of the Catholic missionary work in the south was centred on the
safeguarding and improvement of health conditions of the local people. Consequently
the medical activities and health programs drove the social changes they
implemented, as can be inferred from the account by the missionary Vertenten who
worked in the region in the years between 1913 and 1927.
The fear of death among the local populations, a fear they tried to exorcise by a
complex ritual system covering all aspects of their life, provided the missionaries with
that support and receptiveness necessary to implement health care programs and
socio-economic changes. The particular character of the Catholic mission was
probably the reason why, in the period preceding the Second World War, the
missionaries did not record episodes of cargo cultism or cargoism among the southern
tribes.92 Conflicts arose between tribal groups triggered by accusations of sorcery, but
never between the Papuans and the missionaries.93
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It was from the southern missions that expeditions moved to penetrate and
explore the highland territories of the interior following the Archbold expedition.94
The Catholic Father Tillemans reached the interior of Mimika in 1937. By the
outbreak of World War II, which caused a temporary suspension of mission activity,
nine Catholic mission stations were operating around Lake Paniai,95 while the CAMA
(Christian and Missionary Alliance) missionaries were setting up missions around
Enarotali.96 In both mission fields, the north and the south, the presence of the
Catholic and Protestant missions prompted processes that brought about the
redefinition of spatial relations shaping what can be defined as the ‘politics of space’.

The Politics of Space
In their monumental work regarding the Tswana of South Africa, the Comaroffs
defined the politics of space, prompted by the presence of the mission, as a sort of
“taking place”.97 The aim of the mission was that of establishing itself at the heart of
the indigenous social order, beside the ruler from where it would have engaged in
spreading the “kernel of knowledge and truth, and work profound civilising
transformations”.98 The mission was therefore located within the confines of the
chiefdom’s capital. As the Comaroffs point out, what the mission in South Africa
engaged in was a battle not for sacred sites, since religion saturated everyday activity
but “for mastery of the mundane map of lived space”.99
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The spatial dialectics of the missions in West Papua were different. Here the
mission, as seen, did not locate itself ‘inside’ the village community, but outside or on
its borders from were it acted as a pole of attraction or magnet. This particular
location determined the modes of evangelisation and socio-cultural change of the
local populations. It aimed inherently to shift the people away from the traditional
spaces, and the symbolic meanings they entailed, to Christian and Western spatial
categories. The people, as the accounts of the missionaries Ottow and Geissler reveal
along with Wallace’s observations, were attracted to the mission by trade, by the
‘cargo’ that it could deliver. The Papuans tried to systemise the mission in the
traditional space in accordance with the traditional symbolic meanings, those same
meanings that the missionaries were there to challenge and change.
The struggle between the Papuans and the missionaries was substantially a
struggle over space and meaning. The war over meanings and symbols was fought in
the spatial dimension. The mission was geographically situated in an area not far from
the village, in a peripheral but visible location that was to become over time a
gravitational centre by operating a shift in the values, beliefs and material life of the
locals. The mission came to ‘position’ itself as the antithesis of the native village and
traditional way of life.
The shift of the spatial dimension caused a natural shift in the temporal one:
time gradually lost its unitary character regulated by the seasonal cycle. The Sunday
service and the establishment of working and market days brought about a
fragmentation of time and its cyclic reduction, natural time giving way to normative
time. This temporal reckoning was determined by the spatial existence of the mission,
the centre of which was represented by the sacred edifice of the church. Consequently
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the meaning of labour changed, its daily continuity elapsed with the construction of a
spatio-temporal and semiotic caesura represented by the Sunday service.
The church replaced the traditional ceremonial centre of the Rum Sram and the
school, especially when the missionary van Hasselt began to target the younger
generation, interrupted the normal processes of enculturation creating a vertical
generation gap in the community. The social space of the village was thus fragmented
by disposing traditional age groups into a vertical stratigraphy that replaced the
original template of horizontal complementarity, disrupting the modes of
interpersonal relationships.
Literacy and Christian education became the discriminating factor between
generations, the space of traditional enculturation replaced by modern socialisation.
The church and the school represented two spaces where change was realised and the
belief in their validity and effectiveness was reinforced by the function of the hospital
or clinic in which medicine replaced the belief in evil spirits. The missionaries
consequently came to compete, as Geissler narrates, with the local mon or witchdoctor,100 a pattern common also in many African missions. In the south, the
missionaries report that because of the strong belief in sorcery, to which diseases and
catastrophes were attributed, the mon was able to exert his influence over the
community.101
As it has already been pointed out in the previous pages, the Papuans accepted
this spatio-temporal caesura as part of a bargain. It was, however, in this spatiotemporal cluster that socio-economic change was initialised, where processes and
discourses of modernisation were gradually being translated and enacted. As Andrew
Lattas has argued in his study regarding the Bush Kaliai of West New Britain, in order
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for people to contemplate and enact change it is necessary that they identify a space
outside their daily lives from which they can view their lives critically and creatively.
For the Bush Kaliai, he argues, the stimulus to change was represented by the colonial
order.102 Since the colonial order did not allow for a total participation in the
distribution of power and wealth, the Kaliai were forced to identify a creative space or
‘alterity’ in which change could be actualised. This creative space according to Lattas
was represented by the Cargo Cults.
The same dynamics took place among the Papuans. The narratives of the
missionaries are interspersed with accounts and reports of cargo cults observed among
the Papuans, interpreted either as a reaction to their presence or as a sign of their low
level of development or primitivism. The phenomenon of cargoism in reality
represented the epistemological and spatio-temporal locus in which the Papuans came
to accept and systemise socio-cultural change while preserving their identity.

Cargoism: the Political Space of the Papuans
The polarisation of space between mission and village, between modern space
and traditional space prompted the necessity to create a third space in which the
colonised could reconstruct their identities in transition. As Goeffrey White wrote in
his study of the Melanesians of Santa Isabel in the Solomon Islands:
for an historical event or epoch to become an emblem of community
definition it must be incorporated in local modes of understanding and
communication that recreate it as a subject of collective significance.103
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The milieu of cargo cults fulfilled this function of providing a meta-spatiotemporal dimension in which to systemise intrusive elements and redesign spatiotemporal and structural relationships, and a ‘political space’ in which to address the
problematic of ethnic boundaries and meaning. Since ethnicity is determined by the
categories of identity and culture, the change affecting one of the terms of the
equation implies a change of the other. Missionary activity targeted in primis Papuan
culture, that is their system of meanings and symbols, and the material structures by
which it expressed itself. The presence of the mission itself affected the modes of selfdefinition of the Papuans and the perception of their identity. Processes of cultural
change brought about a transformation of ethnic identity through the creation of new
collective meanings and the reconstruction of a sense of community through
mythology and history that were, in the long run, to become the bases for ethnic
mobilisation.
As already argued in chapter IV, cargoism is nothing but an hermeneutical
process by which knowledge comes to be structured into intelligible forms. Cargo
cults are neither a psychotic nor neurotic phenomenon104 nor the manifestation of a
primitive mode of thinking. In reality cargo cults do not exist, but are simply the
product of a colonial discourse in which indigenous epistemological processes have
been reified. Consequently more than a category of the colonised they are a category
of the coloniser. Nancy Mc Dowell well described this process of reification when she
stated that
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cargo cults do not exist or at least their symptoms vanish when we start to
doubt that we can arbitrarily abstract a few features from context and label
them an institution…as totemism did not exist, being merely an example of
how people classify the world around them, cargo cults too do not exist
being merely an example of how people conceptualise and experience
change in the world.105
Cargo cults are consequently a ‘native discourse’, a visible manifestation of an
“underlying constant routine”.106
The prophetic and millenarian movements recorded by the missionaries in West
Papua support this hypothesis. Far from being a manifestation of primitivism,
cargoism represents an epistemological process. During the revolt led by Nuku, as
seen in chapter IV, the Papuans joined the struggle to restore the mythical centre
represented by Giailolo. The widespread participation of the Papuans inhabiting
littoral and insular areas points to the existence of common beliefs and values
underpinning their political, social and economic institutions. The situation of latent
instability and uncertainty that characterised the XVIII century fuelled a millenarian
movement in which the restoration of Giailolo and the Golden Age it represented
figured as its ideological centre-piece and Nuku the prophet or Messiah.
In the years preceding the arrival of the missionaries in West Papua, the archives
report a series of uprisings in the Papuan islands fuelled by the presence of a selfproclaimed prophet. The first incident was recorded in 1852 when a prophet is
captured on the north coast of New Guinea and transported to Ternate.107 The news
was reported by the colonial newspaper Javaasche Courant because of the problems

105

McDowell N., ‘A Note on Cargo Cults and Cultural Constructions of Change’, Pacific Studies, 11,
1988, pp. 121-122.
106
Lindstrom L., Cargo Cult. Strange Stories of Desire from Melanesia and Beyond, University of
Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1993, p. 63.
107
Javaasche Courant 1 September 1852, No. 70; 2 October 1852, No. 79; 8 December 1852, No. 98,
in Register op de Indische Couranten.
275

these prophetic movements were causing to commercial navigation in the waters of
New Guinea. Trading vessels were often attacked.108
It is possible that the movements may have been a direct consequence of the
increasing naval traffic and traders in the area that were disrupting the local trade
networks in terms of quality and quantity of the commodities circulating as well as
subverting the modes and meanings of traditional relationships.
In 1854 a new prophetic movement is reported in New Guinea. It was probably
this movement that Captain Fabritius of the schooner Fear Not witnessed in Numfor
and whose account has been reported by Goudswaard.109 According to the report a
prophet claimed that Konori (the prophet/Messiah)110 had come to fulfil the
soteriological expectations of the people. In order to accelerate the coming of Koreri,
the age of happiness and prosperity, the people had to cease to pay the tribute to the
Sultan of Tidore and make offerings to Konori. The cessation of the payment of the
Samsom prompted the intervention of the Sultan of Tidore who sent out a hongitochten
to collect the annual tribute and restore Tidorese supremacy. Later it was proved that
the prophet was merely an impostor, a former slave that had taken advantage of the
people’s credulity.
Whatever were the reasons of the deception, the episode shows how at the time
the people were receptive to promises of salvation, liberation and change. In 1856 the
archival documents report the activities of another Papuan prophet known by the name
of Koepang. The sixty pages of the Openbaar Verbaalarchief dated 17 September
1858, No. 40 detailing the event reports that Koepang was a slaven handel en roof, a
slave trader and robber, operating in the area between Waigeo and Misöol. The rajas
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of Misöol and Waigeo complained of the disruption caused by Koepang’s raids to their
interests with the colonial government who sent the warship H.M. Phoenix, along with
auxiliary forces from Tidore, to quell the revolt and restore peace and order in the
region.
Although the lengthy report does not present Koepang as a prophet, nevertheless
he might have been seen by some of the Papuans as a sort of Nuku Redivivus, with the
characteristics or attributes of a prophet or Konor, a Big Man able to provide the
people with valuables and commodities, whereas the Dutch considered him only a
slave trader and a robber. What the episode reveals is that the increasing presence of
the Dutch traders in the area was perceived as a disruptive element in the Papuan
world prompting a reaction to protect their own spaces in which their traditional
activities and relations took place.

Cargoes and Missionaries
The presence of the missionaries in the territory contributed to enhance the
situation of strife determined by the dislocation of traditional spaces. In his Die Biene
auf dem Missionfeld of 1860, the missionary Ottow reported that a movement
emerged in Doreh Bay prompted by the arrival of two self-proclaimed konors
(heralds) from the island of Numfor. These heralds announced that they had
experienced the revelation of the secret of Koreri after having sojourned for five days
in the Papuan heaven. Their predication caused the celebration of the so-called
‘Advent Nights’ during which the Papuans sang and danced until dawn waiting for the
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arrival of Manseren Manggundi.111 The missionary describes how in his attempt to
convince the villagers of the falsity of the message, he challenged the konors to take
him with them the next time they visited the Papuan heaven.112 The missionaries
strongly opposed such movements since they were hampering mission activity
because of the influence the self-appointed prophet was able to exert over the people,
as Van Hasselt clearly stated during a movement he witnessed in the mission of Doreh
in 1871.113
The cargo movements among the Papuans recorded during the first fifty years of
mission work on the north coast of New Guinea present similar features and all appear
to be caused by the situation of uncertainty and instability that characterised the
Papuan world at the time. The movements share a common pattern and their ideology
is centred on in the Papuan myth of Manseren Manggundi. The appearance of a konor
or herald announcing the imminent advent of a new era of prosperity, the Koreri sets
in motion a series of responses by the locals ranging from the destruction of gardens
and the suspension of normal daily activities to the construction of Rum Sram or
‘Men’s Houses’, to the suspension of ancient obligations as the payment of the tribute
to Tidore.
Although these seem, prima facie, to be the effects of the Konor’s message, at
least this is the impression that the narratives of the missionaries convey, it is possible
that they could have been in reality the causes triggering the movement. The
widespread and latent dissatisfaction with the existing socio-economic conditions may
have brought about the rise of a leadership able to catalyse popular resentments, the
desires of change and aggrandisement and emancipation. This hypothesis seems to be
111
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confirmed by the fact that the movements, as the missionaries’ reports reveal, came
into existence concomitant with situations of crises.
During the epidemic of smallpox in 1861, Mansinam was the stage of a
movement led by a Konor who claimed that he had the power to expel the disease,
which was thought to have been caused by evil spirits. The Konor incited the people
to rebuild the Rum Sram that had collapsed some year earlier in which to display the
korwars of the ancestors. The collapse of the Rum Sram, but above all the failure to
rebuild it was interpreted as an omen of future disasters for the community.114
The failed reconstruction of the Rum Sram following its collapse may be
imputed to the phenomenon of ‘shifting spaces’ prompted by the presence of the
mission. The climate of anxiety and precariousness generated by the smallpox
epidemic among the local population may have triggered a reactive nativistic
movement aiming at restoring atavistic beliefs and ceremonies as well as traditional
power relationships within the community by local power agencies. The veridicality
of the conjecture cannot be proved since the missionary sources do not offer sufficient
information. By inference however it is possible to assume that the movement can be
interpreted indirectly as a reaction to the presence of the mission.
The occurrence of epidemics and natural disasters appear to have represented
the ideal milieu for the rise of cargo movements. This is because the coming of Koreri
was thought to be preceded or accompanied by apocalyptic phenomena. The
movement recorded in Amberbaken, on the north coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula in
1864, and reported by the missionary van Klassen, was caused by the occurrence of a
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tidal wave that brought havoc and misery to the affected villages.115 Geissler reports
that on this occasion, for the first time, hostility was manifested towards the
missionaries believed to be the cause of the catastrophe.116
It is possible that the resentment against the missionaries was triggered by the
failed actualisation of the koreri that prompted that social phenomenon known as
scape-goating.117 The frustration generated by the failed fulfilment of their
expectations probably raised their level of latent aggressiveness. This came to be
directed against the most accessible target that could be blamed for their discontent.
The missionaries representing an alien minority in a Papuan setting fulfilled this
function.
Apart from sociological explanations, other factors may have contributed to
generate attitudes and feelings of hostility towards the missionaries. One factor could
have been directly derived from their teachings and attempts to change the Papuan
way of life by abolishing religious practices, such as the initiation rituals performed in
the Rum Sram, or forcing changes in the traditional social customs and rules such as
marriage and bride-wealth arrangements. These changes also affected the distribution
and allocation of power in Papuan society generating foci of resentment. Significantly,
some movements were triggered by the village mon. 118
Another factor was represented by the growing awareness among the Papuans
of the relationship that the missionaries had with Tidore. In this regard Goudswaard
reports that, during the prophetic movement in Wandamen of 1861, Geissler had
publicly threatened the participants that he would inform the Sultan of Tidore of the
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Konor’s activities.119 To confirm this assumption some movements, such as those
that took place in Dusner and Wandamen in 1867, targeted foreigners, usually
missionaries, traders and government officials irrespective of their functions, but
whose presence somehow was contributing to change the Papuan way of life. As
Geissler reports, at the time the Papuans had begun to hand in to the missionaries their
Korwars or sacred objects because they were willing to become Christians.120 It is
possible that the prophets, emerged among the mon or headmen, were trying to
reverse the trend that was undermining their socio-economic privileges, by appealing
to the traditional promises of Koreri.
The feeling of uncertainty and anxiety that the social and economic changes
implemented by the mission were contributing to spread among the Papuans caused
the emergence of prophetic movements that called for a restoration of the ‘old world’
as the basis of a future palingenesis. The missionary Bink reports that in 1875 a native
informant explained him why the reconstruction of the Rum Sram that had collapsed
in 1864 was necessary. The Papuan informant declared:
The Rum Sram collapsed in the earthquake of 1864, but since then we have
suffered from the ill effects. The Dutch were the cause of all these
calamities that have visited the population, for all these things [the smallpox
epidemic and earthquakes] were unknown before they came. Manseren
Nanggi was angry with the people because they did not follow the adat
faithfully as before.121
The statement is extremely important because it manifests the attempt of the
Papuans to rationalise the events they were experiencing. As Festinger suggests, once
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a prophecy has failed to actualise there is a tendency to rationalise the failure in order
to reduce the dissonance caused by dis-confirmation.122 This process is also
accompanied by an attempt to reformulate the individual and group identity and cast it
into a new perspective by which to control the future developments of the situation. In
a later movement, witnessed by the missionary Jens in 1884, the same attempt to
rationalise the diffused feelings of alienation, frustration and relative deprivation
appear to be present. When Jens tried to convince the people of the falsity of the
prophet’s promises, the Papuans gave him an answer similar to that of Bink’s
informant:
The Lord of Heaven made the Papuans first when he did not quite know
how, therefore they are stupid [bodoh] and black and do not wear clothes.
After that he made the Malays of Ternate, they are lighter-skinned and wear
clothes. And it was only after that that he made the Dutch; they are white,
wear good clothes, know a great deal and eat bread and good food every
day.123
Jens’ information reveals that, at the time, the identity of the Papuans was
formulated initially by referring to the Malay and then to the Dutch. Categories of
stupidity, blackness and the lack of clothes became the markers of a Papuan mode of
identification.
In the second half of the XIX century it appears that Papuan identity was in
transition. The tribe no longer figured as the system of reference, at least this is what
can be inferred from the missionary accounts, but a wider unity of self-identification
was being constructed, that of ‘Papuans’ and with it the category of ‘Papuanity’. The
socio-economic changes that the mission’s presence contributed to enact prompted
processes of detribalisation and the creation of new networks of communication.
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During the movement in Dusner of 1868, already referred to, the missionary
Geissler observed that in all the villages, the Konor had appointed delegates that
appeared to cut across tribal and clan divisions.124 Since the movement spread to the
villages that were affected by the mission’s activity, it is possible to speculate that the
system of communication of the mission became the channel through which the
ideology of the movement spread.125 Old networks of communication, however, were
still operative, as the prophetic movement, which emerged in 1877 in the Papuan
villages of Halmahera and that spread to north-west New Guinea, seems to suggest.126
More than being torn between the old and new, it appears that the Papuans were
struggling to bridge and synthesise tradition and modernity. The years between 1886,
when the cargo motif first appeared in the movements’ ideology127 and 1895 appear to
have been characterised by a widespread unrest and rebellions among the Papuans.
The archives confirm the reports of the missionaries in recording the occurrence
of local anti-colonial uprisings and episodes of civil disobedience. In 1886 punitive
expeditions were sent to Biak following the killing of part of the crew of the Ternaten
ship Coredo in Geelvinks Bay.128 A letter of the missionary van Hasselt regarding the
situation in New Guinea and published in the Haagsch Dagblad of 26 October 1887
well illustrates the conditions of the time. The missionary calls for the sending of civil
servants to the region in order to appoint and control local rulers. He believed, in fact,
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that the establishment of administrative posts would have contributed to pacify the
area and restore law and order.129
The unrest among the Papuans seems to have been fuelled by a growing sense
of relative deprivation. The attacks appear to have targeted traders and hunters
entering the New Guinea area to buy or gather local products. The Javaasche Courant
of 1 February 1887 No. 9 reports the killing of a Tidorese trader and two of his
employees in Humboldt Bay. A punitive expedition was set up by a group of Ternaten
traders to avenge the deaths of their colleagues and ended up with the burning of a
Papuan village. The retaliatory act forced the colonial government to intervene in
order to prevent an escalation of events.130
The continuous hostilities in the region manifested against traders were
damaging Dutch interests and hindering the expansion of mission activity in particular
in the Wandamen and Doreh Bay areas.131 Presumably the increasing demand for
specific commodities was causing a series of ecological changes that directly
impinged on the life of the people. It was probably for this reason that the colonial
government in 1897 established a series of measures to limit cassowary hunting in
New Guinea.132
In the south, in the years 1890-1891, raids of the Tugeri tribes, also known as
the Marind-anim, in nearby British New Guinea, were causing problems.133 It was
probably the necessity to establish a presence in the area, that might have prevented
the recurrence of raids and border crossings, that the requests for the establishment of
a Catholic Mission by the Mission of the Sacred Heart (MSC) was finally considered.
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Piracy and slave trade was, also burgeoning along the south coast creating a
continuous state of social instability.134
It appears that, in concomitance with the systemisation of Christian elements in
the cargo ideology, socio-economic resentments came to assume political
connotations. Tax payments, corvee obligations and the continuous exploitation of
natural resources were considered an unbearable burden by the Papuans since these
directly encroached on their traditional customs such as bride-price and inter-village
ceremonial exchange. The uprisings staged in Manokwari in 1920135 and in the Raja
Ampat Islands between 1931 and 1934136 were triggered by social and economic
unrest and directed against the exploitative policies of the Dutch administration.
Analogous motivations seem to be at the basis of other movements in the north.
The intensification of European presence in the Humboldt Bay137 and Lake
Sentani areas, following the rescheduling of the shipping services of the Royal Packet
Navigation company (KPM) in the 1920s from an eight-week to a service every four
weeks, and the imposition of corvee obligations and taxes appear to be accompanied
by the emergence of cargo movements. In these the motifs of the imminent return of
the dead and the distribution of wealth appear to have played a major role in
mobilising the population. In the Lake Sentani movement, in fact, recorded by the
Protestant missionary Bijkerk stationed in the area, the leader Pamai convinced the
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local inhabitants of the villages of Ormu and Gresi to refrain from performing the
labour services imposed by the Dutch.138
Concomitant with the widespread unrest caused by socio-economic factors in
the last decade of the XIX century, Christian symbols and beliefs gradually began to
be systemised in the cargo ideologies. The first case of identification of Jesus Christ
with Manseren Manggundi, recorded by the missionary Bink, appears in a movement
that took place on the island of Roon in 1894.139 A few years later, on the same island,
the missionary Metz reports that the Bible’s message was placed within the
framework of local myths.140 The demands for western commodities as well as
schools141 and factories142 became prominent during the first three decades of the XX
century, bringing about the particular connection between Christianity and modernity
that will characterise mission work in the aftermath of World War II.
Contrary to the Marxist belief that modernisation will prompt processes of
secularisation,143 it appears that the Papuans merely ‘cargoised’, that is ‘indigenised’
the message of both modernity and Christianity. Religious practices and institutions
did not lose their social significance but were simply re-systemised following the
transition to Christianity. Emblematic in this regard is the episode that took place in
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the Ayau Islands in 1933 where the local inhabitants farewelled their ancestors by
performing rituals to justify their acceptance of Christianity.144

Conclusions
The arrival of the missionaries and the implementation of Dutch policies in
West New Guinea prompted a series of cultural and socio-economic changes among
the native populations. The gradual dismantlement of tribal structures, caused by the
mission at the local level, prompted a parallel shift in the modes and means of
identification of the Papuans.
The fact that the Dutch and the missionaries did not ‘deal’ with the Papuans by
referring to their tribal divisions and structures, but as a single unit, along with a
redistribution of wealth and functions that disregarded or overlapped the existing
traditional ones, forced the Papuans to consider their identity in the terms of the new
‘alter-ity’. Ethnicity, rather than tribalism, emerged as the element that acted as the
basis for the reconstruction of Papuan identity. This shift is evident in the ideologies
of the cargo movements witnessed and reported by the missionaries. Christianity as an
overall ideology, cutting across atavistic tribal divisions, was able to foster the
creation of networks and systems of communication and of a common system of
beliefs and symbolic meanings on a larger scale.

Traditional cargoist practices

represented the epistemological process and mould in which Christianity came to be
indigenised creating the basis and structures for the creation of a new Papuan ethnic
identity. However, in order for ethnic identity to become the basis of an ideology for
ethnic mobilisation, the occurrence of a precise event was necessary around which the
Papuan people could coalesce and invent themselves as a nation and a political entity.
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Chapter VI
The Tension between the ‘Ethnic’ and the ‘National’ in Papuan
Nation Building
Ethnicity and nationality are two distinct categories although both are concerned
with the construction of a form of collective identity. Ethnic identity is a selfconscious perception of one’s own collective existence “substantialising and
vocalising” attributes such as race, language, religion, territorial occupation and
attaching them to collectivities as an innate possession and mythical-historical
legacy.1 Central ideas of ethnicity are therefore those concerned with the existence of
a collective name, myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, specific
cultural traits, association with an original homeland and a sense of solidarity shared
by ‘significant’ sectors of the population.2
Ethnicity is the logic category functioning in the perception of an ‘objectified
Self’. The perception of the ‘Self’ can be achieved only in relation to a ‘Other’ that
has been defined according to analogous criteria or parameters. It is the dialectics with
and the existence of the ‘Other’ that represents the hub or seedbed of any form of
principium individuationis or ‘Id-entity’, the third entity between the ‘Self’ and the
‘Other’, between the Freudian Ego and the Es. It appears evident that it is the ‘Identity’ that comes to act as the metaphysical locus where differences are reified.
Geoffrey White3 and Patricia Spyer4 in their analyses of Melanesia and Indonesian
societies respectively acknowledged the importance of past encounters with different
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peoples in the creation of criteria of inclusion and exclusion or, as they define them,
oppositions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.
Among the ‘ethnic ideas’, however, figure elements that concur to define
national identity, such as the existence of an historical homeland, shared myths and
historical memories and a common mass public culture.5
Although some scholars have argued that the distinction between ethnic identity
and national identity is contentious if not spurious,6 I tend to agree with Anthony
Smith in the substantial difference between the two since I believe that the nature of
the processes generating the two categories are different.7 I assume culture is the
outcome of processes of adaptation to a particular ecosystem, which prompts parallel
processes of internal, societal integration. Consequently it appears clear that Papuan
ethnic identity can be defined only with reference to the peculiar traits and features
these processes contributed to generate vis à vis the neighbouring Malayan people and
which acted as the basis or the structure for the occurrence of particular historical
developments or conjunctures.
The elaboration of common myths of origin as, for instance, that of either Fakok
and Pasrefi or Gurabesi, presented in Chapter IV, aimed at providing an aetiology of
the structures and infrastructures of Papuan culture as well as integrating the Papuan
world within the regional cultural reality. These ‘ethnic myths’ acted as ideologies
justifying and sustaining the system of relations in the wider Maluku-Papuan region
5
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of which the West Papuans were an integral part. Economic and political processes
contributed in the selection, development and transmission of particular myths that
have endured the test of time revealing that they were somehow, as Weber once
argued, the product of “political action”.8
Papuan ethnic identity, prior to European colonisation, was rooted in and
supported by those myths presented in chapter IV. In these myths the Papuans found
the existential and essential meaning of their identity. In the previous chapter I have
shown how the establishment of Christian missions, which prompted processes of
christianisation and modernisation, along with the intensification of Dutch colonial
policies and interventions in the territory brought about a re-definition of Papuan
ethnic identity. In the epistemological milieu of cargoism the Papuans systemised the
intrusive elements of Christianity and modernity by restructuring the system of
reference and meaning on which their ethnic identity was based. This process of reformulation or re-definition of ethnic identity, prompted by the necessity to adjust to
the new behavioural norms and institutions being introduced into the physical
environment, did not, however, bring about the creation of a national identity. For
ethnic identity to evolve into national identity, the occurrence of a milestone event
was necessary, which could have acted as the catalyst of national consciousness, by
which a “political community” could be “imagined”,9 and the locus in which the
reification of ethnic identity could take place. This temporal context would represent
the ‘political space’ in which a nationalist ideology could be articulated.
In this chapter, I will examine how Papuan ethnic identity, reformulated by the
processes of Christianisation, modernisation and colonisation, acted as the foundation
of this dubious nature: so, too, might any city which had the dimensions of a people [ethnos] rather
than those of a city [polis]”.
8
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290

for the development of Papuan national identity and nationalism between 1938 and
1962. In these twenty-four years, the constitutive elements of Papuan nationhood were
clearly defined through the reification of their ethnic identity and a Papuan nation was
built. It will be argued that the so-called ‘cargo movements’ that took place between
1938-1943 in the Geelvink Bay area represented the crucial turning point of the
Papuan transition from ethnicity to nationality in which Christianity and
modernisation played a major role in shaping the emerging nationalist ideology.
Although during the Second World War mission activity was interrupted, the mission
network continued to function and became the means of a nascent political
consciousness.
The process of nation-building undertaken by the Dutch ran parallel and, often,
in contrast with the ‘natural’ or autochthonous development of Papuan national
identity. The cargo cults of the 1950s in the highlands and the protests fuelled by
socio-economic discontent in the urban centres are nothing but movements of
resistance to neo-colonial policies prompted by that process of ‘national
identification’ already initialised during the war period. Ethnic traits of identification,
as Comaroff pointed out, “may take a powerful salience in the experience of those
who bear them often to the extent of appearing to be natural, essential, primordial”.10
After detailing the processes and events of the intermezzo bellico, I will
consider the role of mission activity and Dutch administrative policies in the
processes of nation-building and in the politicisation of national identity, through the
formation of political parties, until 1962 when finally West Papua was transferred to
the Republic of Indonesia and how these were inspired by neo-colonialism rather than
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decolonisation. Christian institutions and ideology played a major role in this process
by creating ‘spiritual colonies’ of the West and inevitably drawing West Papua into
the contentions of the West.

From Koreri to the Second Coming
In the first two decades of the XX century mission activity intensified in the
areas along the coast and in particular in the area surrounding the Mansinam mission
that had become the centre of Protestant missionary expansion. In these years
Christianity in West Papua was expanding at a rate never recorded before following
the occurrence of a significative event that prompted and marked the transition from
animism to Christianity and that took place in the years 1906-1907. It was this event
that allowed for the religious element to become a structural component of the
construction of Papuan national identity.
In 1906 on the instigation of the Sultan of Tidore, the local people were
pressured by the local rulers to abandon their old religion and convert to Islam.11 The
Sultan of Tidore had realised that his influence and sovereignty over the Papuan
territories was waning because of the increasing presence of the Dutch in the area, a
presence that was undermining his economic interests as well. The missionary Van
Balen reports that the people did not want to accept Islam, viewing the alternative
represented by Christianity as more advantageous. The Islamic prohibition regarding
the consumption of pork, that represented the main source of proteins in their diet,
was probably the major cause of their refusal to convert.12
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In 1906 the people from Roon and the villages of Geelvink Bay began flocking
to Mansinam asking for Christian teachers. In this atmosphere of spiritual unrest, the
episode of Yan Ayamiseba took place: an episode that, in the spiritual history of the
people of the area, represented a caesura between past and future, tradition and
modernity, heathenism and Christianity.
Yan Ayamiseba was an emancipated slave who, before dying from injuries
suffered in an accident, told the people of his village that he had had a vision in which
he was urged to accept the new religion of Christianity. Three days after the vision he
died. This episode would have passed unnoticed if the wife of the teacher of Roon did
not have a dream in which she saw Ayamiseba ascend to heaven.13 The dream was
interpreted by the locals as a confirmation of the veridicality and importance of
Ayamiseba’s hierophanic experience. Van den End claims that the episode assumed a
foundational importance in the acceptance of Christianity, equated to a sort of
Revelation, because, for the first time, the Christian message was being presented
within the framework of Roon’s mythology and in the modes and by the means of
Papuan religiousness.14 Metz, who was a missionary in Roon at the time the events
took place, reports that the episode of Ayamiseba was part of a wider movement that
began in 1900 and whose leader was Marisi, a foster son of the former missionary
Bink.
Marisi had grown up in the mission compound and had been educated in the
mission’s school. Presenting himself as an envoy of Jesus Christ and boasting
thaumaturgic powers he was able to draw a great number of people from the nearby
areas to the island of Roon to listen to his teachings in which Christian elements were
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fused with the local myth of Manseren Manggundi. Challenged by the missionary to
present himself in Church to account for his deeds, Marisi preferred staying at home
where he sat on the ridge of the roof waiting for the advent of Manseren Manggundi.
For the occasion he had also erected a flagpole.15 The flagpole was probably an
imitation of the flagpoles erected by the Dutch in their compound and came to achieve
a symbolic meaning and function in the collective imaginary of the Papuans. It
represented the first association of Christianity with political power and domination,
an association that will reach its apex of development twenty years later.16
The episode of Yan Ayamiseba caused an increase in the number of people
converting to Christianity as the mission reports contained in the archives reveal. The
act of conversion was marked by the symbolic gesture of handing over to the
missionaries the sacred objects to be ‘ritually’ burnt.17 The increasing number of
converts compelled the mission headquarters to establish more mission posts in the
area. Mission stations, comprising schools, churches and, in some cases, permanently
staffed hospitals, were established in the Schouten Islands and in the Waropen region,
the most important post being that in the village of Supiori on Biak established in
1910.18 It was, however, the nearby mission of Numfor, as the missionary van Hasselt
reports, that in 1913 recorded the greatest number of converts and school
enrolments.19 The growing presence of indigenous evangelists and teachers, who
began to assist the missionaries in those years and whose number rose sharply after
1917, may have also contributed to the increasing number of conversions.20
15
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The indigenous evangelists and teachers, who came mainly from Maluku and
Sangir, were less prepared than the Dutch missionaries from a theological and
catechetical point of view, but their willingness to live in isolated villages coupled
with the ability to endure harsh living conditions and endemic diseases were sufficient
reasons to overcome the conservative attitudes of many of the Protestant missionaries
regarding native catechists. In time, some of the indigenous evangelists were able to
reach high positions in the mission hierarchy.21
The influence of Maluku Christianity in West Papua was strengthened by the
establishment of the missions of the Moluccan Protestant Church in Merauke, Fak Fak
and Sorong, an area that rated high in the percentage of Papuan and Malay Muslims.
This circumstance probably forced the mission headquarters to increase a
countervailing Christian Moluccan presence in a region that had been assigned to the
Catholic missions inevitably causing frictions with the latter.22 It was, however, the
presence and activities of the indigenous teachers from Maluku that contributed to
establish Malay as the language of worship23 and to continue a West Papuan
relationship or connection with Maluku.

Winds of Change
The period between the two World Wars was a time of deep and radical change
in West Papua. Mission and administrative activity gradually intensified as interest in
West Papuan resources and the awareness of its geo-political and strategic capabilities
grew in the Netherlands. The winds of change grew stronger by the day affecting the
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eco-system and consequently, Papuan material life and worldview. Societal relations
mutated, disrupting cultural templates, while the Papuans adapted to or resisted the
changing environment.
The expansion and intensification of Dutch administrative control in the region
prompted a gradual, but radical change in the ethnic composition of the Papuan
coastal populations. Indonesian and Chinese immigrants began to settle in West Papua
attracted by new employment opportunities. Mining activities had, in fact, begun in
Sorong and Bintuni Bay before 1920.24 By the 1930s one thousand Papuans are
recorded to be employed in the Sorong-based Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea Petroleum
Maatschappij25 and more than one thousand Papuans and Indonesian immigrants were
employed by Japanese companies in copal production.26
The immigrants, once established in West Papua, tended to gather into small
ethnic communities and, where there was a teacher from their own ethnic background,
they founded local associations that were formally recognised by the local mission.27
The presence of these local ethnic associations inevitably forced the Papuans on the
other side, if not to coalesce willingly, at least to consider themselves as a separated,
distinct entity in relation to the newcomers.
The number of non-Papuans in the region was also boosted by the exiled
political activists deported to the region in the years following the rebellion of Java in
1926-1927 when the Dutch chose West Papua as a gaol. Eight hundred prisoners were
deported to Tanah Merah, 500 km up the Digul River. The influx of political prisoners
lasted until 1937 and in the collective imaginary of the Indonesian nationalists, West
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Papua became a symbol of their resistance, resolve and suffering against colonial rule.
Some of these prisoners were allowed to relocate to West Papua with their families
and in the 1930s a small Javanese, predominantly Muslim, community of rice farmers
and traders flourished near Merauke.28
During the 1920s Western education and Christianity began to have an impact
on the local people increasing the request and need for more schools and mission
posts. The acceptance of Christianity by some villages was also prompted at times by
the need to protect themselves from traditionally hostile villages, a trend that had
already been recorded in 1868 by the missionary Mosche,29 but that appeared to have
endemically persisted.30 It is possible that the inter-village hostilities were instigated
or renewed by outsiders who had some vested interest in a particular area. Traditional
Muslim traders from Maluku and Ceram perceived the advance of Christianity as a
threat to their longstanding economic interests and privileges in West Papua. In some
cases, in coastal and insular villages the influence of Islam was strong and deeply
embedded because of persistent local Sosolot arrangements, already referred to in
Chapter III. Some missionaries were forced to use the establishment of schools or
health centres as means to enter a Sosolot village that was barred to evangelising
activities.31
In some cases, as van Oosterhout’s recent study of the local narratives of the
Inanwatan inhabiting the south coast of the Vogelkop peninsula reveals, conversion to
Christianity was prompted by the need, and used as a means, to counteract the
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‘dangers of Islam’ which was identified as political and economic influence from the
regional and, later, also national centre of power, namely Java.32
Following the episode of Ayamiseba, Papuan Christianity came to assume
peculiar connotative features initiating that important process of vernacularisation that
prompted the rise of either independent churches or proto-political associations.
Cargoist hermeneutics favoured a reinterpretation of Christianity in the light of the
autochthonous Papuan myth of Manseren Manggundi by which the Papuans were able
to ‘take possession’ of the Christian ideology or, as Rutherford’s Derridean reading of
the myth suggests, to defer “the emergence of a modern Christian subject – at least
until the ancestor returns”.33 While I am reluctant to accept the implicit ‘displacement
or procrastination of aims’, which the deferral of meaning entails,34 I believe that, if
the study of socio-cultural templates is considered in the mould of a semanticstructural or generative-transformational approach, such an understanding or
interpretation could account for the Papuan ‘acceptance’ of failed insurgencies and
‘national persistence’. As shown by Otto in his study regarding religious change in the
Pacific, local populations play a central role in directing processes of cultural change
without losing their identity and local traditions, such as religion, which contribute
significantly in determining that direction.35
This process was accelerated during the 1920s probably favoured by the new
missiological approach implemented first by the Catholic missionaries and then by the
Protestants. This new approach called for the adoption of ‘inculturative’ methods,
32

Oosterhout, op. cit., p. 68.
Rutherford, Raiding the Land of the Foreigners…cit., p. 145.
34
According to Derrida’s concept of Difference, the deferral of meaning or the concept imagined
replaces the signifier, which becomes therefore inaccessible. Transposed to the domain of historical
inquiry, this approach would deny the possibility of action and human agency.
35
Otto T., ‘Empty Tins for Lost Traditions? The West’s Material and Intellectual Involvement in the
Pacific’, in Otto T. (ed.), Pacific Islands Trajectories: Five Personal Views, Australian National
University Press, Canberra, 1993, pp. 1-29. cfr. Otto T. & Borsboom A. (eds.), Cultural Dynamics of
Religious Change, KITLV, Leiden, 1997, pp. 103-112.
33

298

implying the respect of local traditions and customs and the ‘empowerment of the
native’, instead of the traditional acculturative ones.36 Indigenous culture was not to
be completely erased and replaced by Western Christianity but allowed to become the
‘vehicle’ or the ‘mould’ through which Christianity could be transmitted, understood
and accepted. The signifiers of traditional cultural templates were emptied of their
symbolic-semantic value and turned into signs or icons of new meanings. In this way
the epistemological structures of indigenous cultures were maintained and turned into
the receptacles of new meanings, whilst averting the risk of syncretism.37 Father
Coenen, who was in charge of the Catholic mission in East Timika in 1956, reports
that the church used the local culture and narratives as vehicles to explain Christianity
to the local populations.38 The new missiological approach was also favoured by the
government, which viewed the previous missionary keenness to stamp out Papuan
customs as counterproductive. The Resident Beets in 1938 established, in fact, that if
native feasts and dances do not pose a threat to public peace and order, they should
not be prohibited.39
Since Christianity was being introduced along with the modernisation of Papuan
economic, political and social systems and the introduction of new technology and
scientific knowledge, the Papuans tended to associate modernity with Christianity.
Flag poles, schools and factories became emblems of power and domination but also
of Christianity. This explains why the Papuans associated the requests for Christianity
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with that of schools and factories and why the flag and the flag-pole became an
important symbol during the nationalist struggle.40
Conversion to Christianity, that meant also a conversion to modernity, caused a
complete semantic restructuring of Papuan culture. The Papuans had to adjust to
Christianity by creating new cultural and cognitive templates of external adaptation to
structures of modernity and, consequently, of internal, societal integration. Kinship
ties lost their social function and significance and were replaced by the
communitarian ideal of Christianity stating that everybody, irrespective of existing
blood ties, are brothers and sisters. The communitarian ideal was promoted and
actualised by removing clans from their original habitats and resettling them into
larger villages. In the years between 1910 and 1925, for instance, the tribes living near
Sorong were resettled in a single village.41
By 1937 mission records show that, of an estimated population of 312,000
inhabitants, there were in north-west Papua 7,500 Protestant Christians organised into
400 congregations led by local elders and served by seventeen UZV missionaries and
300 native teachers with 157 schools and 8,650 students. On the south coast there
were 42,687 Catholic and 584 Protestants.42
The boost to Christianity in the region during the 1930s may have also been
fuelled by the influx of Indo-Europeans and Eurasians to the northern coast of West
Papua, in particular in the urban centres of Hollandia (modern Jayapura) and
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Manokwari.43 The ‘Indo-European Trek’, as Danilyn Rutherford refers to the
immigration of Indo-Europeans to West Papua, while contributing to the
establishment of a creolised form of Western culture and to Curtin’s phenomenon of
“man-on-the-spotism”, also prompted the expansion of Christian institutions, beliefs,
values and way of life. Many Papuans became servants in the houses of these new
immigrants and their increasing presence in the urban centres may have contributed to
strengthen the association of Christianity and modernity on one side and Christianity
and colonial rule on the other, a development that, in my opinion, is the cause of the
rise among the Papuans of the belief or myth that the Europeans were withholding the
secret of the Bible from them.
By the late 1930s, Christianity seems to have finally established itself in the
coastal areas but did not yet constitute an element or feature of their identity. For this
to eventuate, it was necessary that their ethnic identity underwent a process of
‘politicisation’ in which Papuan Christianity could have functioned as a foundational
ideology by creating autochthonous representations, visible through social relations
and practices, able to countervail colonial ones.44

The Politicisation of Koreri and the Birth of Papuan Nationalist Ideology, 19381945.
In the Archieven van de Raad voor de Zending van de Nederlandse Hervormde
Kerk, located in the small town of Oegstgeest near Leiden, I came across a 230 pages
unpublished manuscript by Kamma’s informant K. Mandof, entitled Tentang
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Pergerakan Koreri, narrating the events of the Koreri movement that took place in the
Schouten Islands between 1938 and 1943.45
The importance of this particular movement lies in the fact that for the first time
political and nationalist claims appear articulated according to the categories of native
cargoist hermeneutics and cast into the mould of the indigenous Koreri ideology. A
number of Christian elements, usually in the form of symbols, images and ritual acts,
appear in the movement and that were used to convey a vernacular or Papuan form of
Christianity. It was the use of these symbols of ‘colonial’ faith and power that led to
the ‘politicisation’ of the Koreri myth and of Papuan ethnic identity. Rutherford refers
to this process as the product of that allure of “foreignness” patterning Papuan culture,
arguing that the 1938-1943 Koreri movement in Biak is “an episode of renewal in a
pattern of dealing with outsiders with deep roots in the regions past”.46 The process
of politicisation prompted the definition of a nationalist ideology that reached its
maturation in the aftermath of World War II.
As Mandof’s manuscript informs, the movement began in the village of Supiori
on Biak in the Schouten Islands. A woman, whose name was Angganita Menufur and
who had lived for years in isolation as an outcast on the small island of Aiburanbandi
because affected by a supposed incurable skin disease, became the leader of a
movement that was to spread over a vast area along the north coast of West Papua and
last for almost five years. Following her miraculous recovery, on her return to the
native island of Insumbabi she narrated that she had been visited by a man. Kamma
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reports the words by which the mysterious visitor addressed Angganita as they were
referred to him by one of his informants, Kuri of Numfor:
I have seen the misery and all thou hast had to bear, the sorrow and the
persecution, and all the foreign oppression. I shall give thee a reign of
permanent peace and therefore thy name will be Bin Damai or Nona Mas ro
Judaea (Woman of Peace or The Golden Lady of Judea). Today I send thee
forth to lead the people to Koreri. In order that this may come about thou
shalt never shed blood, for blood bars the way to Koreri, since I know thy
people is one that likes to wage war. And this shall be the token to thee all,
the flag that shall fly out over all New Guinea in blue, white and red – faith,
peace and courage – or from above comes peace and war. I am Kayan Sanau
who comes from the West and who wages all the wars of the world. If, O
Irian, thy right and thy flag are not recognised, if again thou art oppressed,
then a third world war shall destroy the whole world. But I, Kayan Sanau,
shall lead the world war, do not fear.47
It appears evident from the text that the words attributed to the man, identified
with Manseren Manggundi-Jesus, and who visited Angganita, are not these. Several
elements point to later interpolations, in particular the reference to a third world war
that presupposes the occurrence of the Second World War. The second world conflict
becomes therefore the terminus post quem for the chronology of the version reported
by Kamma. It is however possible to identify an original nucleus represented by the
reference to the Koreri myth fused with Christian elements.
Two years after its appearance, the movement grew stronger. Many Papuans
went to the island of Insumbabi to either listen to or be cured by Angganita, believed
endowed with thaumaturgic powers. The protracted absence of people from their
villages and daily activities attracted the attention of the district officer of Sowek and
of the missionary of Korido who ordered the people to stop the movement and bring
Angganita to Sowek. Since the people disregarded the order, the district officer
dispatched a police patrol to the island with the order to burn all the houses that had
been built after Angganita’s return by pilgrims and migrants. The police action had
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however the opposite effect prompting a second intervention and the arrest of the
woman. Towards the end of 1941 she was released and her return to the island of
Insumbabi was saluted as a victory since it was custom that the prophets, known also
as konors, once arrested, were sent to serve their time in the prisons on Ternate.
Angganita resumed her activity as prophetess and thaumaturge. Her message this time
was imbued with political overtones and directed against the colonial administration
and the mission.
The war with Japan and Japanese occupation of the island allowed the
movement to grow and expand since many missionaries and administrators were
forced to leave their posts. It was during the war period, that represented an
intermezzo in the colonisation and christianisation of West Papua, that the national
and political identity of the Papuans was forged. The Christian Papuans were isolated
since their foreign leaders, the missionaries, the administrators and teachers, were
forced to leave causing the temporary closure of mission and administrative stations.48
To exacerbate their conditions, was also the fact that they were looked upon with
suspicion by the Japanese occupiers.49 In the south of West Papua, Japanese
occupation had a smaller impact on the missions since these were mainly situated in
the areas that never fell under Japanese occupation because of their insalubrious
environment and presumed low economic potential. Here Christianisation continued
in particular among the Muyu in the Upper Fly region.50
The situation of isolation, brought about by the war, caused the Christian
Papuans to continue in the way of life adopted when they converted to Christianity, or
in which they were born, without external guidance, a fact that induced them to
ponder and define their place in the society generated by colonial processes. Once
48
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again it appears that the processes of world history intersected and interacted with
local history drawing and determining new trajectories.
Japanese rule proved to be a time of hardship for the Christian Papuans.
Japanese policies, in fact, discriminated against the Papuans, because they were
considered pro-Western and anti-Japanese, in favour of the Muslim Papuans or
migrants. Since the Japanese considered Christianity as Agama Belanda, Dutch
religion, they encouraged the formation of pro-Japanese Muslim organisations, as the
Djimayah Islamyah Ceram, as well as sponsoring programs of Islamisation in
particular in the industrial area of Sorong.51
The religious polarisation of Papuan society prompted by Japanese policies
created a fertile ground in which Papuan Christianity could define itself in political
terms moving away from ethnic modes of definition. Discrimination came to be
structured, articulated and voiced in political terms in the form of an anti-Japanese
ideology. It was the division between Muslims and Christians in Papuan society,
bringing about the stratification in the Papuan ethnos, that made possible the
‘politicisation’ of Christianity that had, since the occurrence of the Ayamiseba
episode, become a feature of Papuan ethnic identity, and the emergence of a national
identity and nationalist ideology.
A strong anti-Japanese sentiment brought the Papuans to join the war effort.
Paradigmatic in this regard is the episode of the Dutch controleur Vic de Bruijn who,
with a group of Papuans, engaged in acts of intelligence-gathering missions for the
allied troops in the interior of West New Guinea. Here in the mission of Enarotali he
formed a group, the Oak Party, comprising Indonesians and Papuans.52 Analogous
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operations were conducted by the commissioner of police in Manokwari, J. van
Eechoud with a small group of Ambonese and Papuans that later were to represent the
first members of the Papuan Battalion established at the end of the war.53
The wartime activities of de Bruijn and van Eechoud deeply affected the
development of political consciousness among the Papuans involved. For the first
time they were fighting, united as Papuans against a foreign enemy, the Japanese. As
van Eechoud stated at the time “de eerste symtomen van het zelfbewustzijn onder de
Papoea’s zin direct na de verdrijvin de Japaners duidelijk aan het licht gekomen”.54 In
my opinion it appears evident that Japanese policies regarding religion and the system
of corvee they imposed allowed for and prompted the incorporation of Christianity
into the emerging Papuan nationalist identity and political and nationalist ideology.
The Christian Papuans, however, did not constitute a compact, unitary group. In
the north, Papuan Christianity was divided between the ‘Gospel Christians’ and the
‘Koreri Christians’, the former believing that the Gospel was incompatible with the
Koreri ideology while the latter maintained that the apparent incompatibility stemmed
from the fact that the missionaries had torn out a page from the Bible where the
identification of Manseren Manggundi with Jesus was clearly stated.55 In the
nationalist struggle that was to follow the Koreri Christians were able to prevail. This
because through the creation of interpretations or myths, as that of the page of the
Bible withheld by the missionaries, they were able to provide their own
representations of the colonial order. This was obtained through the cargo
epistemology, the locus where native paradigms and models were able to exert their
53
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hegemony and that guided the assimilation of Christian practices with local interests
and meanings. The ‘stories’ or ‘narratives’ of Christianity become part of Papuan
cultural heritage and history constituting the basis of a new identity and ideology.
Christianity became a means of self-definition.
During the war period the movement of Angganita became the harbour of
persecuted Christians. The movement grew and developed into a fully structured and
functional organisation. It was in the years 1941-1942 that the Papuan flag, with the
Sampari star and the cross as icons, made its appearance for the first time. Meetings
were held on a regular basis to accelerate the coming of Koreri. To force people to
join the movement, in 1942 a group was appointed to propagandise the message of the
movement. This proselytising activity often caused clashes with the local police and
Japanese authorities due to the anti-Japanese elements contained in their message.
This prompted Japanese intervention to suppress the movement and caused the arrest
and imprisonment of Angganita.56
The movement, deprived of Angganita’s leadership, did not wane. A new
leader, Stephanus Simopyaref, released from the Japanese prison in Manokwari, took
the helm. It was under his leadership that the Koreri movement became political and
nationalist. The core of Stephanus message and political propaganda was the
attainment of the political independence and national unity of West New Guinea. In
an address to his followers, the characteristics or distinctive traits of Papuan identity
and nationalist ideology clearly emerge, with Christianity, ethnicity and territorial
independence prominently figuring:
We are Christians, but now we see it all in a new and true light. The
missionaries have deceived the Papuans on purpose. They have torn out the
first pages of the Bible, where it is clearly stated that Jesus was one of our
55
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own race, a Papuan, and not a white foreigner as the missionaries wanted us
to believe. From the moment the foreigners arrived we had to obey orders
and were no longer free people in our own land. But our time is coming, the
masters will be slaves and the slaves masters.57
Influenced by the events taking place at the time, with Stephanus the movement
becames political engaging in military actions against the Japanese. A Council of War
or Fandurna Mamun, was established and an army was set up. Biblical passages, in
particular the Book of Joshua because of the warrior and nationalist ideology
characterising it, as well as Biblical expressions, were used in the speeches of the
leader rallying his troops and calling them to take arms against ‘the invader’.
Nationalist claims were articulated in a symbolic language and structural template
provided by Christianity. Captured by the Japanese Stephanus was sentenced to death
and the leadership of the movement passed on to Stephanus Wanda.
In those same years an analogous movement was taking place in the Tanah
Merah district, south of Hollandia, led by Simson Sommilena. The movement started
off as protest against Dutch taxation and forced labour. Strongly animated by the
traditional beliefs regarding ancestor worship and cargo expectations, the movement
aimed at expelling colonial rule by resorting to the use of force and transferring power
and wealth to the members of the movement. Notwithstanding the persecutions of the
Japanese, the movement was able to survive until the arrival of the Americans.58
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Dazzling Images of Freedom and Equality
The landing of 140,000 American and Australian troops in the bay of Hollandia in
194459 represented a further step towards the elaboration of a Papuan national identity.
The city of Hollandia became the operational centre of the American Command in the
area. Tonnes of equipment and supplies were brought in and the Papuans were
employed in odd jobs and in the construction of roads and bridges.60 During the
American occupation the Papuans had a taste of socio-economic equality and
modernisation, as emerges from the words of Nicolaas Jouwe who later became a
leader of the nationalist guerrilla movement Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)61:
My father was a tribal leader in a Kampung near Hollandia. He, with the
men of the village went to find out what was happening. They saw how
Negroes, who were as black as we, were building roads, driving large army
trucks, and were able to do all sort of things just as well as the Whites. They
saw black pilots, black sailors, blacks in beautiful uniforms with bottles of
coca-cola. Of course they had no idea about racial discrimination in the
USA. But what they saw opened their eyes. They had always been despised
and treated as savages. Not so much by the Dutch but by the lower ranking
officials. They had always been at the lowest point of the ladder: firstly
there were the Dutch, then the Chinese, followed by the hated South
Moluccans (‘the Black Hollanders’), then the Javanese, and finally the
Papuans. So this contact of the coastal population with the American forces
in 1944 contained the germs of the later growth of political consciousness.62
The same perceptions and feelings echoed in the words of another Papuan
leader, Markus Kaisiepo, some years later:
It wasn’t just the goods of the Americans which seemed important to us. We
also noticed something else. The army had men with dark skin who lived in
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the same way as the Whites. We even saw black officers. Then we were sure
that our people too could live differently than they had been living.63
On the basis of these post-eventum statements it appears that the display of
‘racial equality’ in the American military camps was an important factor in the growth
of political consciousness among the Papuans. It also reveals that the Papuans had,
until then, accepted their social and racial inferiority in the colonial order. The epithets
of Papua Bodoh or Bintung Bodoh, by which they were often addressed by the
Indonesian migrants employed by the Dutch colonial authorities, began to be
questioned.
The ‘rapid deployment’ of Western technology and power brought in by the
American troops, comprising both Whites and Blacks, made a huge impression on the
Papuans. As the Dutch missionary Teutscher, who was stationed in the Lake Sentani
area in those years, wrote, “this technical and comfortable civilisation of the West had
suddenly broken in upon the Papuan area with a tremendous force and unsurpassed
perfection. And it found the Papuan rather dazed and upset”.64
The Papuan people had experienced a rapid change, the landing of the
Americans literally turning up side down the world they lived in. Their arrival created
a caesura in their temporal dimension. It was a significative event that marked a new
beginning and created the consciousness of the past order of things. Being already
affected by the changes introduced by colonisation and christianisation as well as by
the terrible experience of suffering and persecution under Japanese rule, the Papuans
were on that crucial threshold between two worlds. This experience was characterised
by a strong feeling of soteriological expectation and anxiety that brought them to
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consider the American landing as eventful, as an important signifier. Some Papuans
were, to use Daniel Lerner’s expression, in that crucial “point of engagement”, the
painful threshold where the intimate psychological restlessness and the historical
events are on the point of being linked to each other. Lerner justly argues:
The meaning of events is best clarified by those whom we perceive at the
moment of ‘engagement’ – a moment which occurs when an expansive Self,
newly equipped with a functioning empathy, perceives connections between
private dilemmas and public issues. This is political consciousness, in the
larger sense, and its acquisition distinguishes those who have been pierced
by the present and in responding shape the future.65
The conjuncture between the cultural and psychological structure and the
external event acted as a formidable catalyst and ground for future developments.
It was in this period that the connection between Christianity and modernity was
finally actualised. Teutscher reports that the Americans used to visit Papuan churches,
participating to the religious services, praying with their “black brothers” and putting
their offerings into the common collection box.66 The Papuans were overwhelmed by
the abundance and prosperity brought in by the Americans and to which they were
allowed to participate. They also realised that their culture was useful and not inferior
as they had been forced to believe since then, as Teutscher writes, “they were called to
become head-hunters again and to pursue fleeing Japanese who had hidden in the deep
forests. Now they were no longer despised and abused, but seemed to be of use and
highly appreciated even by those clever Americans”.67
The war period proved to be a time of awakening, a turning point experience in
the development of Papuan political consciousness and that contributed to the
development of a Papuan national identity. The experience of suffering at the hands of
the Japanese who cruelly repressed the Koreri movements and devastated Papuan
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villages and lives, forced the Papuans to coalesce into a new unity far wider than that
of the village or tribe and become aware of their own strengths and potentialities. The
seeds of Papuan nationalism were ready to dehisce at the first favourable winds.
In assessing the war experience it appears evident that it had brought to
completion the detribalisation process already initiated by the missionaries in the preconflict years. As seen in the previous pages, Christian missions had created a
communication network that cut across tribal divisions. The Koreri movement had
used the Christian network and ideology to spread in a way unthinkable a century
earlier. This appears evident when comparing the spatial diffusion of the first
movement reported by Captain Fabritius in 1854 with the great Koreri movement of
the war period.
The withdrawal of missionary personnel from the region or their confinement in
camps by the Japanese at the outbreak of the war, forced the Christian Papuans to rely
on their own strength and resources. Assisted by few indigenous teachers, they
continued to run the mission stations holding church services and spreading the
Christian message. It was in this period that they became aware of their potentialities.
Communication among distant Christian groups continued to be nurtured and
maintained. They understood that it was important to maintain the network if they
wanted to survive Japanese rule and its policy of Islamisation. Paradigmatic (and
emblematic) in this regard was the Simson movement, already referred to, in which the
‘telegraphists’ played a central role. The telegraphist was said, in fact, to be able to
communicate with the ancestors who were believed to live in Bandung, through a wire
at the end of which a used milk can had been attached. Through the wire the
telegraphist was believed to receive orders issued by the ancestors.68 According to
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Penders, the city of Bandung was chosen as the home of the ancestors because the
leaders of the movement were aware of the fact that this was the main
telecommunication centre in the Netherlands Indies.69
Communication was a means of survival, the conduit in which and by which
Papuan political consciousness came into being and a social and political public
emerged. In the light of Deutsch’s theory of nationalism70 we can state that it was this
group that allowed for ‘a common history’ to be experienced as ‘common’ by
balancing the current war experience with recalled Koreri traditions, by linking
‘private dilemmas’ with ‘public issues’. Communication networks, established by
mission activity to spread Christianity, fulfilled the same function in building national
consciousness in a similar process to Anderson’s print capitalism. As the development
of ‘print-as-commodity’ represented the key to the generation of new ideas of
simultaneity,71 the mission network, in spreading the contents of Christianity,
prompted a change in the perception of temporal and spatial dimensions.
That some of the Papuans directly involved in or affected by the conflict
became aware of their ‘political potentialities’ appears in the words of van Eechoud on
the day he inaugurated the Bestuursschool in 1945:
We came here in 1828 and we told you what to do. Today you are called to
take the government of this country in your own hands, today the new
Papuan is being ‘born’.72
Political consciousness among many of the Papuans, who had been educated in
mission schools or were born Christians prior to the outbreak of World War II and
those who had converted to Christianity at some stage of their life, was a fact. A 1948
report by the district officer Courtois clearly states that the Papuans were “politically
69
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active” in the years following the conflict.73 A diffuse and embryonic sense of
community had been forged in the struggle against the Japanese invader. From the
ashes of devastation, the idea of a Papuan nation began to loom on the horizon.

The Return of the Missionaries.
And suddenly the war was over. (…) Ship after ship left the harbour. Camp
after camp was evacuated. Papua became silent and empty again. (…) And
in silence and emptiness a great bitterness and disappointment prevailed.
This time the new age had come so near. But just as they tried to catch it, it
had disappeared again (…) the missions came back.74
The missionary Teutscher well describes the state of post-war West Papua. The
Papuans had experienced a time of prosperity, a time of empowerment and suddenly
everything had disappeared. Dutch administrators and missionaries returned to the
territory, but something had changed both in Papua and the world.
The process of decolonisation had begun bringing about the creation of new state
entities and a restructuring of international relations shaped by a new ideological
dialectics, that generated by liberal democracy and communism, a process that brought
to complete maturation also that process of the “Death of God” initialised at the
beginning of the XX century. While the Papuans were experiencing the effects of
change at the local level triggered by the internalising of acculturation processes, the
colonial powers were also affected by a series of changes at the macro-level. These
two concentric circles suddenly collapsed on their centre.
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The creation of the independent Republic of Indonesia in 1945 determined the
future developments of West Papua’s history. At the Linggadjati75 and Renville76
agreements as well as at the Round Table Conference of 194977 the question regarding
the fate of West Papua was postponed. The Dutch retained temporary administrative
control over the territory pending a final settlement of the issue with the Republic of
Indonesia.78
On their return to their colonial possessions the Dutch were faced with a political
task, that of preventing West Papua from being incorporated into Indonesia. This was
a battle that was fought at an international level in the United Nations General
Assembly, and at the local level by engaging in a program of nation-building, which
would have justified a request for the constitution of an independent West Papua.
While the Dutch politicians in The Hague were occupied in lobbying the international
agencies, the missionaries were working on the internal front in implementing the
program of nation-building. The process of creating a Papuan nation was cast into the
mould of Western-Christian institutions and ideologies. Christianity came,
consequently, to be assumed as a distinctive, ‘nationalist’ marker of ‘Papuan-ness’
against an Islamic Indonesia.
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Because of the presence of a conspicuous number of Indo-Europeans and
Indonesians in West Papua, Papuan society was gradually undergoing a process of
polarisation that had already began to manifest itself during Japanese occupation. The
negative effects of this influx of Indonesian and Dutch settlers was expressed by van
Eechoud in a letter to de Bruyn in 1947. The letter emphasised how the Papuans had
changed since the war and how ‘sensitive’ they had become to socio-economic
issues.79 It is possible to speculate that the religious dichotomy between Christians and
Muslims, which will appear in more recent stages of West Papuan nationalism and
which appears to have been prompted by Indonesian repression of the nationalist
movement and by the ongoing transmigration policies, although there is an attempt to
stress the ‘ethnic dimension’ of Papuan nationalism by drawing into the movement
Papuan Muslims, has its seedbed in the dichotomy between the pro-Indonesian Kaum
Kiri and the pro-Dutch Kaum Konan, as described by van der Veur.80
The pro-Dutch group in 1950 founded the Gerakan Persuatuan Nieuw Guinea,
or New Guinea Unity Movement in opposition to the pro-Indonesia party Partai
Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or Indonesian Freedom Party for Irian, founded in 1946. The
party’s program was the creation of an independent Papua with the help of the
Dutch.81 It appears clear that Papuan political consciousness came to be clearly
articulated in the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia.
Dutch policies towards West Papua also changed. The embryonic national identity and
nationalist ideology that emerged during the war effort was not considered as a
convenient foundation stone for future political developments in the area. Van der
Veur well illustrates this change in Dutch attitudes by dividing Dutch colonial policy
of the post-war period 1950-1962 into two distinct phases: the first phase, between
79
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1950 and 1960, is represented by what he defines as ‘neo-colonialism’ and a second
shorter phase from 1959 to 1962 of “terminal colonial democracy”.82
Van der Veur’s interpretation of Dutch colonial policy in West Papua indicates
that the processes of nation-building were guided by Dutch neo-colonial interests and
that the Papuan nation that emerged was a mere artificial construction of neo-colonial
policies. Colonial administration and mission activity tended to complement each
other in the enterprise of nation building re-creating that indissoluble ‘connubial bliss’
between the flag and the cross that has always accompanied the construction of
colonial societies.
The Dutch missionaries returned to West Papua with the task of preparing the
Papuan Church for independence. The key word was not restauratie but reconstructie,
not ‘restoration’ but ‘reconstruction’.83 In this program the neo-colonial intent appears
evident. In order to reconstruct it was necessary to destruct or de-construct what
existed, that is what had been built until then during the colonial period. The post-war
paradigm shift of Dutch policy towards West Papua entailed the destruction of the
colonial society of the pre-war years in order to create a new society in tune with the
demands and needs of neo-colonialism. This stance called for the ‘erasure’ of Papuan
ethnic identity forged during the colonial era and the formation of a new ‘national’
identity in which the constitutive trait of ‘ethnicity’ could have functioned as an antiIndonesian value. This process of reconstruction could only be attained through the
implementation of an ad hoc education system.
As Bourdieu argues, the function of legitimating the established order is not only
carried out by the mechanisms traditionally regarded as belonging to the order of

81

Lagerberg, Jaren …cit., p. 85.
Veur, op.cit., p. 60.
83
Hoekendijk J.C., Zending in Indonesië: Verslag Rapporten van de Zendingsconferentie te Batavia
Gehouden van 10 tot 20 Augustus, 1946, Boekcentrum, The Hague, 1946, p. 7.
82

317

ideology but it is also articulated through the system of symbolic goods of production
and the educational system that may, because of the logic of their normal and
normative functioning, fulfil “ideological functions”. Their effectiveness lies in the
fact that “the mechanisms through which they contribute to the reproduction of the
established order and the perpetuation of domination remain hidden”.84 Consequently
ideologies, considered by Bourdieu as “legitimising discourses”, are able to assert
themselves through specific ‘institutional’ mechanisms or means. The educational
system, established by the Dutch in West Papua following the Second World War, was
meant to support the dominant ideology, that of Papuan nationalism, and the neocolonialist interests and needs of the coloniser. Papuan national identity, realised
through those structures of neo-colonial domination, acted also as mechanisms of
defence and control of Dutch interests.
Education was the main focus of mission activity in post-war Papua since it was
believed that through education it was possible to create an elite capable of governing
the country. Van Baal, who was governor in West Papua from 1953 to 1958, argued,
that “education is the most important tool for the advancement of acculturation”,85 a
statement that clearly indicates the trajectory and intention of Dutch post-war policies.
Education was considered, in fact, as an effective means of disseminating neo-colonial
pro-Dutch propaganda and a tool by which it was possible to shape the form and
contents of the Papuan nation.
The education system was managed by Christian missions, so that, as the
Australian missionary Roscoe, who was touring West Papua in the late 1950s, reports:
“every school in Netherlands New Guinea is a Mission school”.86 The Report on
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Netherlands New Guinea of 1961 indicates that there were 496 unsubsidised mission
schools with 20,000 pupils where the content of teaching was almost exclusively
religious. The missions also ran the 776 subsidised primary schools with 45,000 pupils
in which religious contents did not figure prominently.87 Many students were also
attending secondary schools in which technical and vocational subjects were taught.
Literacy programs were centred mainly on the reading of the Bible, the textbook
par excellence, and the schools often shared the same Church building. This caused a
blurring on the division between the religious and secular realms of modernity and
concurs to explain, in my opinion, the ‘mystic’ character of nationalist ideologies and
movements in decolonising realities.
Administratively the school system depended on the government. Each of the
major mission denominations appointed a General School Manager whose salary was
paid by the Dutch government. Roscoe observed that the Dutch recognised the
different educational needs of the children living in urban areas and those who lived in
rural settings. Since the ethnic make-up of urban areas was rather composite the
primary schools were divided into two distinct categories, a Primary A for children
who spoke Dutch at home and a Primary B for those who spoke either Malay or
Chinese.88 Following the completion of primary schooling, the students attended the
Intermediate School or MULO in which denominational divisions tended to disappear.
Secondary education was reserved to a very small group of Papuans selected and
instructed to be the future political elite of an independent West Papua. In 1961, 22
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Papuans were attending the single secondary school in the territory and 95 Papuans
were studying abroad.89
The village schools, by contrast, fell under the tutelage of a specific mission. In
the areas of the interior opened to full scale foreign penetration only in the aftermath
of World War II, the children, before undertaking normal schooling programs attended
to the so-called beschaving school, ‘school of civilisation’, in which they became
accustomed to order and routine.90
In inaccessible and remote areas of the interior, that had not yet been fully
explored and brought under either missionary or administrative control in the 1950s,
schooling and christianisation activities were carried out by the so-called ‘witness
men’. These were Papuan representatives from different areas, chosen by the villages
themselves and not by the missionary, who came to the mission station to be educated
into evangelical teaching. As the missionary Myron Bromley informs in an article
published in The Alliance Witness, the lesson consisted of a series of ten teachings so
that they could be easily memorised and remembered. The contents of these groups
were the creation story, the ten commandments, the story of Jesus’ birth, His death and
Resurrection, the foundation of the early Church, the Apostles’ profession of faith and
a paraphrased version of the first chapter of the Gospel of Mark.91 Classes were
conducted for three days from Tuesday to Thursday. On Friday the ‘witness men’
returned to their villages where they taught their village fellows what they had learnt.
The Witness School system, while proving to be a useful means to contact a
wider number of people in distant hamlets and villages, allowed for the emergence of a
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new Christian leadership, although errors and misunderstandings often occurred,
ending up with some witness school men propagating the wrong message.92
In almost all the schools, but in particular in rural or village settings, teaching
was initially in Malay since it was carried out by a native guru, who was either Papuan
or Indonesian. It appears evident that the spread of western and Christian values was
the fundamental aim of Dutch educational system. But while Christian religion
appeared to be the dominant feature of education, the issue regarding the ‘creation’ or
‘choice’ of a national language was poorly addressed in the nation-building process.
During the van Eechoud period and the governorship of Waardenburg that
witnessed the opening up of vast unexplored areas of the interior, the Dutch language
replaced Malay in the new schools established in the highlands following the reopening and the establishment of mission stations. The adoption of Dutch was
explicitly stated in a memorandum by the Catholic Bishop of Hollandia A. Cremers to
Dutch Bishops and politicians, which pointed out the nexus between Dutch language
and the promotion of a western-Christian civilisation in West Papua.93 The
replacement of Malay with Dutch had already been proposed by van Eechoud in
1949,94 probably conscious also of the risk in favouring the adoption of one Papuan
dialect over others that could have caused fragmentation and the resurgence of
tribalism.
There were, however, problems regarding the implementation of educational
institutions and programs. The international climate, once again, affected this specific
sector of Papuan development.
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Maju against Reconstructie: Conflicting Goals in Post-Colonial West Papua.
As van der Veur points out, the poor socio-economic conditions of the country,
the unequal distribution of wealth among Eurasians, Indonesians and Papuans could
have favoured the rise of an ‘intellectual proletariat’.95 The same fears appear to have
been cautioning van Eechoud96 and reflected a widespread belief in the capitalist
world at the dawn of the Cold War prompted not only by the reminiscences of the
1917 Bolshevic revolution but also by the more recent and traumatic experiences and
dynamics which brought to the rise of nazi-socialism in Germany.97

Van Baal

effectively summarises the risks entailed in implementing an educational program
unmatched by socio-economic development:
When education is far ahead of economic development, young people
leaving school will not succeed in finding work where they can apply the
knowledge they have gathered. They have to be content with poorly paid
jobs. Socially the disappointment experienced by these young people is a
serious drawback, eventually big enough to create a class of unemployed or
underemployed semi-intellectuals.98
In the years immediately preceding and following the Second World War a
series of socio-economic changes had begun to take place. In the highlands, for
instance, the devaluation of the cowrie shell that had traditionally functioned as
currency and the measure of wealth, coupled with the penetration of Christian
missions had triggered a series of institutional changes. Dubbledan reports that the
increase of shells circulating in those areas allowed ordinary people to become less
dependent on their traditional headmen. The interest in commodities from western
trading stores grew and guilders, necessary to buy those commodities, were attainable
by selling their garden produce and by working for the government. The availability of
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money and commodities for the payment of the traditional bride-price, along with the
practice of monogamy introduced by the missionaries, prompted changes in social and
political relations.99 Many traditional practices continued however to be upheld, and
were not always a symptom or sign of resistance but stemmed from practical necessity
revealing the unequal distribution of socio-economic benefits.
Besides the missionaries, Dutch administrators or Binnenlands Besturen played
an important role in prompting and directing change. Pim Schoorl, in fact, refers to
them as “een agent van ontwikkeling op Nieuw Guinea,” an agent of development in
New Guinea.100 Rudy de Iongh, who was controleur (Onderafdelingshoofd) in the
Mappi, Muju and Asmat regions of West Papua between 1958 and 1962, reports that
head hunting raids were often recorded among the locals, notwithstanding their
conversion to Roman Catholicism. In 1959, for instance, the Jacquai of the Mappi area
set up a headhunting expedition against the people from the Tjitak area travelling to
the town of Kepi to trade crocodile skins for tobacco, batteries, machetes and textiles.
On their way home, passing through the territory of the Jacquai, they were ambushed
and sixty of them killed. The only survivor was a boy who was able to escape and
inform the administration in Kepi. The fathers of the mission in Kepi who were
responsible for the conversion of the Jacquai were greatly disappointed by the crime of
their converts and blamed the controleur, who acted also as judge, for the lack of
severe punishments meted out for crimes. Relations between the administration
(Binnenlands Bestuur) and the mission, in fact, were often marred by conflicts
regarding jurisdiction and specific interests. What the Roman Catholic missionaries,
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however, referred to as crimes were usually Papuan customary practices, the return to
which was caused by the need to procure skulls as bride price still regarded at that
time as a conditio sine qua non for marrying. Consequently, as de Iongh reports, once
the perpetrators of the crime were captured they were judged by considering both the
adat component, which prompted the action, and the fact that contact with the West
and conversion to Christianity were very recent. The Wetboek of Strafrecht voor
Nederlansch Indie, which merged adat law and Dutch criminal and civil law, provided
the guidelines to deal with the matter.101
The changes implemented by the Dutch also caused traditional leaders to lose
their influence over local people and, notwithstanding the acceptance of Christianity,
often opposed government presence in the area.102 The persistence of traditional
practices, as that previously reported, can be also attributed to the action of local
headmen who were using adat to maintain their power. As will be argued later in this
chapter, the uprisings, such as that which took place in Obano in 1956, are a symptom
of the diffuse anti-colonial feelings among some of the Papuans.
Literacy programs were integrated with programs aiming at socio-economic
development and at the improvement in the quality of life of Papuan communities as
the ‘mobile’ health system and hygiene programs the Dutch set up to fight endemic
diseases. As de Iongh informed me, in every onderafdelingshoofdtplaats
(administrative centre) there was a doctor, several nurses and a hospital the size of
which depended on that of the onderafdeling (administrative unit). Doctors and nurses
travelled every two to three weeks to visit remote villages, although in some villages
there were local nurses who had received basic training, as did also the district officers
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(controleurs), agricultural extension officers (landbouw ambtenaren) and police
commanders.103 The administration believed, in fact, that the improvement of socioeconomic conditions and literacy programs should have been simultaneously
implemented in order to warn off the risk of a spread of communist ideologies which
were incubating in the pro-Indonesian movements and the emerging political
parties.104
The motivation behind the formation of political parties in the aftermath of
World War II had a social motivation more than being dictated by genuine nationalist
aspirations. The social and racial discrimination experienced by the Papuans vis à vis
the Indo-Europeans colonists in Manokwari and the land settlement disputes in
Merauke, forced the Papuans to address socio-economic issues. The key word, as
Lagerberg observed, was at the time maju, ‘progress’ and not merdeka,
‘independence’. With the return of the Dutch and the implementation of antiIndonesian policies, the Papuans saw that the jobs that had been previously held by the
Indonesians, in particular, the Moluccans, were becoming available to them. Social
tensions seem to have characterised the post-war situation in West Papua.105
Party ideologies in Papua had different origins and aims: some focused on local
issues and concerns; others reflected missionary influences by endorsing, for instance,
ideas regarding ‘God’s sovereignty’ or ‘peace against violence’; a few presented
themselves as anti-communist who believed that independence could have been
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achieved through an alliance with the Dutch even going as far as adopting the Dutch
language as their ‘national’ idiom.106 As van der Kroef notes:
despite such seemingly divergent emphasis, a Papuan self-perception in
terms of what perhaps may simply be called ‘development mindedness’
clearly emerges as a common undertone in these party programs, along with
a search for a Papuan national identity, not just anti-Indonesian, but also
reaching out beyond the cocoon of Dutch colonialism.107
While anti-Indonesian sentiments, instilled by colonial propaganda, were
growing and spreading, social consciousness and dissatisfaction, generated by that
social phenomenon known as relative deprivation,108 was increasing proportionally. In
1950 a strike of waterfront workers in Hollandia brought to a standstill the Dutch oil
company operating in the area. Ten years later, in 1960, the dismissal of mainly
Indonesian labourers in Sorong and low wages in Hollandia caused the outbreak of
violent street manifestations and strikes.109 The episodes reported by Lagerberg show
not only that the situation of socio-economic tension persisted during all the 1950s but
also that this was aggravated by the anti-Indonesian policies implemented and that
inevitably affected the process of Papuan nation-building. The failure of some
development projects such as the ‘Nimboran Community Development Plan’, in the
lake Sentani area, also contributed to nurture social unrest.110 Here the unrest took the
form of cargo movements known as Kasiep characterised by strong political
overtones.111 Van Baal tried to address the widespread socio-economic dissatisfaction
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generated by the failure of the project by establishing the Blitung-farms, a system
based on the cultivation of cash-crops in which the Papuans were able to make a
personal profit.112
The Christian church actively participated to the socio-economic contentions by
supporting the claims of workers and the dispossessed. It was the Protestant church
that inspired the constitution of a Protestant labour union, the Christian Workers of
New Guinea in 1960.113 It is possible that the Dutch-educated Papuan elite found a
fertile ground in this milieu of social and economic dissatisfaction which brought to
the foundation of the anti-Dutch and pro-Christian Partai Nasional or PARNA in the
‘model village’ of Hamadi near Hollandia.114
The formation of political parties spurred by socio-economic issues and backed
by union associations, allowed for the incorporation of these issues into the nationalist
claim promoted by the Dutch. Nationalism became a response of the anomic and
dispossessed working classes to both the neo-colonialist policies of the Dutch and
Indonesia’s colonialist program that came to be connected, in the collective perception
of the Papuans, with the influx of non- Papuan migrants. It was at this point that social
tensions came to be connected with the request for national independence.
The Dutch designed a national economic system by cutting off all previously
established commercial ties with the territories that had become part of Indonesia and
reoriented Papuan trade towards other areas, such as The Netherlands and Singapore.
The ties with Maluku were also severed. Van Eechoud, from the very beginning, had
declared the necessity to abandon the treatment of West Papua as an extension of
Maluku. The detailed plan that he presented in 1947 to the Batavian Government was
112

Lagerberg, Jaren…cit., pp. 124-128. The Nimboran Community Development Project had, in fact,
failed because not much attention had been given to the promotion of private enterprise in order to
encourage cooperation.
113
ibid., pp.151-155.
327

formulated on this important premise.115 This, of course, caused resentment among the
southern Moluccans who had always considered west Papua as their ‘backyard’ or
private reserve. In their own program of national independence West Papua was to be
part of either a Moluccan Commonwealth, comprising North and South Moluccas and
New Guinea, or of the Republik Maluku Selatan or Republic of South Moluccas. The
Muslim raja Sialana of Morella (Ambon) is said to have declared in 1947:
Concerning the economic problem, I feel it is very necessary that New
Guinea becomes part of our area here, because previously it was included in
our Residency. With New Guinea I am convinced that we here need not in
the future be scared of rich European countries or Indonesia, even though
we withdraw from East Indonesia and become a nation ourselves, because in
New Guinea there is a great deal of gold, silver, oil, coal and also fertile
land for an expanding economy.116
It was probably the Dutch insistence on severing persisting historical ties with
the Moluccans or disengaging the territory and the Papuans from any Indo-Malay
connection in general, in name of a newly founded national identity, that prompted
Frans Kaisiepo’s proposal to change the territory’s name from ‘Papua’ to ‘Irian’
during the Malino Conference in 1946.117 Kaisiepo, in fact, who is known to have fully
adhered to the policies formulated by van Eechoud, is reported to have stated on the
occasion:
De band van het landschap Tidore met Nieuw-Guinea dient te worden
vebroken. De naam Papoea moet worden afgeschaft, omdat dit woord in het
Tidoreesch ‘slaaf’ beteekent. Het volk wenscht het land ‘Nieuw-Guinea’ te
noemen en het volk ‘Irian’.118
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The Dutch poured millions of guilders into the economic development of West
Papua and in the establishment of Western institutions as schools, hospitals,
administrative offices Dutch expenditure affected, in particular, the urban and
industrial centres of Hollandia, Manokwari, Merauke, Biak and Sorong.119 Lagerberg
reports that in 1962 the government budget amounted to 142 million guilders and the
Dutch grant in aid 101 million. The European Economic Community (EEC) granted
133 million guilders for the development program over the whole period of Dutch
rule, while West Papua’s own share of the budget was, in 1961, 37 million guilders.120
Provisions derived from shipping and commercial activities benefited in
particular the ethnically heterogeneous coastal populations and centres with an
increase in cash incomes. Education was in great demand among the Papuans since
they realised that it was a means to become tuan tanah, owner of the land.
At the same time the government was trying to regulate the influx of migrants to
the region. In 1959 it was estimated that 21,965 Papuans were living in the major
urban centres of Hollandia, Manokwari, Biak, Sorong and Fak-Fak along with 15,190
Europeans and 9, 806 Asians. Foreign presence appears to have increased eight fold if
one compares these same estimates with those of 1930 in the same areas.121
Xenophobic attitudes among the Papuans had begun to emerge, as the newcomers
were perceived to be ‘economic competitors’. As previously pointed out, Van Eechoud
had clearly expressed his reservations and concerns regarding the immigration of
Dutch settlers to West Papua in a letter to de Bruyn:
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I must admit that I am not very enthusiastic about colonisation in New
Guinea of Europeans from Holland. In the first place I doubt it will be
successful. Furthermore it seems to me that the import of Europeans will
sow the seed of future conflict.122
Among the Muyu of the Merauke region, for instance, Christianity and western
capitalism came to be integrated into the traditional expectations of wealth and
prosperity.123 The Kuram movement that took place in the 1950s displayed
xenophobic and proto-nationalist sentiments.
Xenophobic attitudes were directed in particular against the Indonesians and
Chinese who were resented because they were believed to be destroying and
obstructing Muyu’s social mobility and economic growth with their presence.124
According to Rudy de Iongh, in the Muju area where he worked as controleur,
xenophobic attitudes towards the Indonesians had their origins in the attitudes of the
Indonesian teachers sent there from the Roman Catholic missions stationed in the Kei
and Aru islands since the 1930s. Most of these teachers began, in fact, to act as
autocratic rulers demanding produce and free labour from the villages and when their
requests were met by Papuan refusal, they resorted to the use of force. This
consequently resulted in the rise among the Muju of an anti-Indonesian feeling which
reached its peak in the aftermath of World War II when the United States increased the
pressure on the Dutch to hand over the territory to Indonesia. De Iongh noticed that the
Muju’s attitude towards the Indonesians was in stark contrast to that of the nearby
Asmat where he was stationed in 1962: the Muju were, in fact, more educated and had
greater access to means of information, such as transistor radios, than the Asmat who
appeared to be more indifferent to the takeover.125
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It appears clear that the Dutch policy of Papuan nation building aimed at
antagonising Indonesia’s claims over the territory. There was a widespread conviction
among Dutch policy makers that this goal could be achieved only by stressing Papuan
distinctiveness. The Bot plan set up at the end of the 1950s aimed, consequently, at the
‘Papuanisation’ of the public administration and at the political development for the
attainment of self-determination and independence of West Papua as part of a wider
Melanesian entity.126
‘Papuanisation’, however, did not mean or entail a ‘re-evaluation’ of Papuan
culture, but merely the ‘replacement’ of European civil servants with Papuan ones.
The way the educational system was set up, in the mould of Christianity and managed
by Christian missions, also indicates that modernisation, in tune with western
categories, could have been achieved only by adopting an ideology that would have
created a ‘sense’ of ‘spiritual affinity’ with, if not dependency from, the Western
World.
By the 1950s Christianity, filtered through the native cargoist hermeneutics, had
become an integral part of Papuan life. Dutch neo-colonial policies brought to
completion the connection between Christianity and the Dutch government perceived
during colonial times. In some cases this connection was mythologised and
‘historicised’. Pouwer reports, for instance, that the Mimika had invented the story of
two sisters who had once arrived in Kaimana or Fak-Fak, built an aeroplane, and left
for the land of the white man. There the eldest called herself Maria and the youngest
Wilhelmina. Maria went to heaven where she gave birth to Jesus, and this is how
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Christianity came about, and Wilhelmina founded the Kompanie and the Dutch
Colonial Government. 127
The nation building project tended to introduce cultural elements and values
antithetical to the Indonesian ones. ‘Papua-ness’ and Papuanisation, which figured
prominently in van Eechoud’s program of nation-building, in reality meant
christianisation and westernisation, a trend that was clearly marked during Van Baal’s
governorship and expressed in his statement that “education must bring them at least
something of the elementary fundamentals of Western secular success”.128 If the
nation-building program served the narrow neo-colonial interests of the Dutch, it also
served wider, international ones. By implementing the creation of a nation through the
use of Christianity and Christian institutions, it was possible to ward off the
ideological risks of communism. Ironically it would be the fear of communism that
would decide the fate of West Papua in 1962.129
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The religious institutions and the institutions managed by religious authorities
represented the ‘means’ by which the Papuan nation was being constructed. Religion
shaped Papuan ideology, social structure and national identity. A Papuan was first and
above all a Christian.

Papuan Response to Dutch Neo-Colonialism
As pointed out in chapter IV, we do not possess a Papuan narrative of the events
that took place in the period under examination. What we possess is only the narrative
of the colonisers, the missionaries and administrators, but in which one can possibly
identify ‘Papuan chronicles’. In order to assess the reaction of the Papuans to the
program of nation building implemented by the Dutch in the post war decolonisation
era, one needs to resort to these narratives and these possible chronicles.
Resistance to Dutch neo-colonial policies as well as to Indonesian colonialist
ambitions, was rife during the years of ‘reconstruction’. This resistance manifested
itself in the religious milieu in which Papuan ethnic identity had been forged during
the pre-war years. Papuan autochthonous national identity began to emerge
‘distinctively’ during Japanese occupation and the ensuing American liberation, in
which the traits of ethnicity and Christianity figured prominently.
Christianity had played a major role in shaping Papuan ethnic identity that
culminated with the creation of the myth of the ‘torn page of the Bible’ and the
Papuans representing themselves as the ‘elected people’ to whom the message was
originally directed. In coastal and urban centres, however, this message, under the
influence or pressure of socio-economic factors and contingencies, had undergone a
process of ‘politicisation’ represented by the formation of political parties. In the
highlands, by contrast, which had only experienced an intensive program of
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christianisation and modernisation in the post-war era, the merdeka spirit manifested
itself in the form of movements and uprisings that still preserved some typical cargoist
traits. Presumably the Wege movements that took place in the Wissel lakes area in the
1950s were initially an expression of the resistance of the Papuans to the Dutch neocolonial policies of nation-building. For the first time the region of the central
highlands became the stage of nationalist movements.
In contrast to either Lagerberg’s belief that the movements were a sign of
economic and social backwardness and primitivism,130 or to Van Baal’s theory that it
was an example of “erring acculturation”,131 I believe that these movements were an
evident, rational expression of resistance to external interference and precisely to the
neo-colonial policies of the Dutch government. This trend had already appeared in the
resistance to Japanese policies of Islamisation.
To express their dissent and socio-economic distress, the Papuans resorted to
traditional cargoist practices. The movements took their ideological inspiration from
the autochthonous myth of Situgumina, widespread among the people of the Wissel
Lakes region, who is said to have fled to the West with a cowrie shell. Here she
performed miracles and went to Surabaya where she made the people rich. From the
Wissel lakes, the movement spread to the nearby areas of Paniai and East Tigi where it
was recorded to be still active in 1960.132
Benny Giay, a Papuan CAMA Minister, in his doctoral thesis on the Wege Bage
movement133 of the 1950s, informs us that the core belief of the ideology of the
movement was that the Christian doctrines preached by the missionaries were already
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known to them long before the arrival of the Europeans.134 This view is supported by
Hitt’s observations regarding the Dani people who reports that “when the missionaries
came and talked about Christ, the Son of God as the Creator and Redeemer who was
able to restore true life to man, the Danis linked the message to their myth [NabelanKapelan/Hai] and the messengers to Bok, the God-man ancestor”.135
Social and economic changes had affected the local people during the previous
two decades. The presence of police patrols guarding the Pax Nederlandica, the Dutch
administrative policies and the educational activity of the missionaries had contributed
to create a climate of latent tension and unrest. Resistance to the immigration of new
settlers and government policies, in particular in the area of the administrative and
mission post of Enarotali, had already sparked revolts as early as 1938. In that year, in
the village of Kebo, the people had tried to drive out the foreigners during a census
registration by van Eechoud, the Bestuurassistant in Enarotali. A year later, in 1939,
the Netherlands Geographical Society members and an assistant of de Bruijn, who was
at the time head of the government post in Enarotali, were subjected to hostile
treatment by the locals and forced to leave the area. Pig feasts and ceremonial
gatherings were used by the leaders as means to rally the people of other villages to
join the uprising and expel the foreigners from the region.136 The instability that the
uprisings were causing in the region, and that was hampering Dutch penetration in the
area, forced the government to intervene to restore law and order.137
Similar revolts were also staged during Japanese occupation. The xenophobia
manifested during the war years swayed between hatred and fear. Hatred because of
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the harsh conditions of servitude and exploitation in which they were forced to live,
and fear because of the punishment they were threatened with in case of resistance or
disobedience. The missionary Mickelson, in fact, on his return to the Paniai region
after the war, found that xenophobic attitudes were still strong among the locals. Still
fearing an imminent return of the Japanese, they believed that if they allowed the
missionary to stay they would incur in some form of severe punishment. Thanks,
however, to the mediation of a local headman, Weakebo, who had become a friend of
the missionaries operating in the region, Mickelson was able to establish a mission
post in the region.138
Weakebo’s friendly attitude, towards the foreigners entering the region in the
years following the Second World War, was prompted by his ambition to further his
personal social and economic interests,139 and contrasted with that of other Papuan Big
Men. Van der Hoeven, in fact, reports a series of anti-colonial revolts in 1953-1954 in
the Aga Valley led by a local headman.140
The involvement of local headmen as leaders of the uprisings staged during this
period indicates that political and socio-economic factors were playing an important
role in fuelling discontent and unrest. As already stated in the previous pages, many
local leaders had seen their influence wane with the introduction of modern values,
norms and means of production that brought about a restructuring of the native social
and economic organisations. Between 1950 and 1955 in the area of Obano, a decline
in sweet potato yields along with the outbreak of an epidemic that reduced the pig
population were attributed to the activity of the foreigners and the innovative methods
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of cultivation they introduced. The foreigners were also thought to have caused the
epidemic of measles that ravaged the area causing the death of many children.141 The
revolt, which ensued, consequently targeted the missionary and government personnel
in Obano. Schools and other ‘foreign’ buildings were burnt and some teachers were
killed. It took two months before the Dutch were able to quell the uprising and restore
law and order.142 A period of famine characterised the aftermath of the revolt,
nurturing latent tensions. This climate of socio-political unrest and psychological
distress provided the ideal setting in which the activity of Zakheus Pakage could
assume a particular meaning.
Zakheus Pakage was a Papuan Christian who had been a member of de Bruijn’s
Oak Party and, after the war, had been educated as a catechist.143 On his return to the
Wissel Lakes, he began to implement a program of Church building that, in his
opinion, would have brought about the transformation of society and the beginning of
a new era of peace and prosperity.144
The highland districts were, in those years, witnessing the rapid expansion of
Christianity. Among the Dani of the Baliem and Ilaga valleys, fetish burnings,
symbolically marking the conversion to the new religion and way of life of the
foreigners, were gaining momentum.145 The conversion to Christianity had been
prompted by the similarities that the native populations identified between Christian
eschatological beliefs and their autochthonous belief of Hai, the promised era of
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wealth, peace and happiness.146 This is, grosso modo, a concept similar to that of
Koreri of the Papuans inhabiting the northern coastal areas. Both notions are rooted in
the myth narrating the race between the snake and the bird in primeval times that,
although with local variants, appears to be common to many Papuan people.147 Hai
movements were not new to the region. Ellenberger has, in fact, been able to
chronicle, on the basis of oral and written accounts, a history of at least ten movements
that took place between 1870 and 1977.148 The Hai movements, however, that took
place in the 1950s are those better documented.
In the context of the preaching activity of Zakheus, the Christian message was
understood as forecasting the imminent actualisation of the soteriological expectations
of the Papuans that had been activated by the diffuse and latent dissatisfaction and
discontent with their socio-economic conditions. As Giay argues, Zakheus “helped in
expressing the people’s political-theological aspirations”.149 In these sociopsychological conditions of 1951, mass conversions to Christianity accompanied by
fetish burnings took place among the people of the Ilaga valley.150
Not all the Papuans, however, joined Zakheus’ movement. Opposition came
from those who had converted to Catholicism and from the local headmen, such as
Waekebo, who felt that their positions and privileges, obtained by supporting the
mission and the government, were threatened.151
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The centrepiece of Zakheus program was the founding of a school believed to be
the sole effective means through which propagate his message and teachings. As Giay
reports:
what he taught was related to his own view of God he invented out of his
father’s teaching and that of Christianity, some things on community
development such as: how to keep the village clean, and the importance of
working hard in cultivating the land.152
It appears that Zakheus’ educational program included not only Christian
religious teachings formulated in the terms of the Papuan tradition but also projects
aiming at the socio-economic development of the region.
Grootenhuis, who travelled to the region in 1951, reports that the students of
Zakheus’ school became preachers of the Wege Mana, ‘the disturbers of peace and
order’, and the founding fathers of various villages known as ‘Wege villages’.153 This
foundational activity was in tune with Zakheus’ program of ‘relocation’ consisting of
physically removing the people from their original native villages to newly founded
ones. The migration had a symbolic meaning that indicated the total abandonment of
the ‘old way’ of life and the beginning of a ‘new way’. The ‘Exodus’, as Benny Giay
calls it, appears to have been strongly influenced by the Biblical story of Moses
leading the Hebrew tribes out of Egypt to the ‘promised land’.154
To confirm the assumption that the Wege movement was inspired by Christian
beliefs and Biblical stories concurs a piece of information provided by the missionary
Troutman stationed in the area in 1959. Having asked one of the Zakheus followers
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why he adhered to the Wege, notwithstanding his conversion to Christianity, he was
told that “Wege and the Gospel went together”.155
By 1961 the movement became decisively political influenced by the rumours
circulating regarding the imminent settlement of the dispute over West Papua between
the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, but also by Dutch initiatives in the
region and the establishment of the New Guinea Council.156 The missionary Catto
wrote at the time:
…the cult that was up there and seemed to die out has taken its stand again
and possibly at this time is not only a religious movement but is swinging
into a political movement. This I think is an outcome of the preparations
being made at the present time for this New Guinea Council which will be
inaugurated on April 5. The spirit of nationalism at the moment is real
strong although they still want the Dutch to remain and prepare for their
independence.157
And again, some months later, observing the expansion of the movement he
reported:
The Wege movement in the Kapauku country continues to advance. This
movement is first nationalistic, communistic and religious and continues to
be a threat to the Christian community of the tribe.158
On the basis of the information provided by the missionary Catto it appears that
what caused the politicisation of the movement was the establishment of the New
Guinea Council by the Dutch government that had the function of preparing the local
Papuans for political independence. Between 1959-1962 the Dutch had begun to
accelerate the program of nation-building in the region stimulating what may be
regarded as the ‘institutionalisation’ of Papuan political consciousness, that is by
establishing institutions representing politically the Papuans vis à vis the Indonesians.
Zakheus and his followers did not oppose resistance to the Dutch initiative since the
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program contained the implicit clause that, once political and national independence
was attained, the foreigners would leave the country.
Analogous movements took place in the other areas of the Papuan highlands in
the same period. It appears from the missionary accounts that these were
interconnected. It is believed that traders and travellers acted as carriers or propagators
of the message. The fetish burnings, that took place among the Damal of the Ilaga
Valley in the early 1950s, already referred to in the previous pages, appear to have
spread to the nearby Western Dani by 1958. In that year the Dani, who had begun to
negotiate with the local mission in Pyramid, began to convert. As Hayward points out
while “the Damal had listened to the promises of the Christian Gospel from the
perspective of their aspirations for Hai…the Dani were hearing it from their
aspirations for Nabelan Kapelan”,159 the Dani belief in a time of happiness at the dawn
of creation lost due to the foolishness of man.160
When the missionaries arrived and began preaching the Gospel of eternal life
and the forgiveness of sins, the Dani understood it in the sense that they were being
offered a second chance at immortality.161 Fetish burnings, instigated by a selfproclaimed prophet, Jabonep, were the most visible and momentous aspect of the
movement indicating not only their acceptance of Christianity but, as O’Brien and
Ploeg observed, also their willingness or desire to accept the European way of life.162
The Dani proved to be receptive to the message and many of them emerged as
political leaders. It is possible that the receptiveness that appeared to characterise their
initiation to Christianity was determined by the way Christianity was being presented
159
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at the time. Although scholars, such as O’Brien and Ploeg, argued that the rapid
conversion to Christianity by the Western Dani was influenced by the phenomenon of
cultural stress, as they were already dissatisfied with their original culture,163 I am
inclined to attribute it to the fact that this dissatisfaction was prompted by the
acceleration of nation-building processes mediated by Christianity. This appears
evident in the way that ecclesiastical organisation was implanted among the Western
Dani. In fact ecclesiastical organisation appears to have been juxtaposed to the native
political one, with parishes overlapping the traditional division of sub-confederacies
and dioceses overlapping that of the confederacies. This was not a conscious decision
made by the missionaries but, as Hayward reports, seems to have been a Dani
initiative.164 That the receptiveness was prompted by the way Christianity and
Christian institutions came to be implanted among the Western Dani, that is without
producing social and political disruptions, seems to be confirmed by the resistance that
the Dani inhabiting the Baliem valley demonstrated in opposing Christian
penetration.165 While the Western Dani lived in scattered and distant villages and
hamlets, the Dani of the Baliem Valley presented a complex inter-village organisation.
Christian ecclesiastical organisation could not be established without disrupting this
system.
It appears evident from the movements that took place during the period of
intensive Dutch colonial rule in the region that, notwithstanding the conversion to
Christianity, native Papuan culture and worldview persisted and continued to assert
itself. Irrespective of the nation-building process that was being implemented in the
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mould of Christian institutions and ideology, the Papuans were able to exert control
over the process itself through their native epistemology and gnoseological categories
and forestall Dutch neo-colonial tendencies.

Persisting Trends and the Eternal Return
The Papuans were able to assert their own ethnic identity shaped before and
during the Second World War, following the acceptance of Christianity, against the
Dutch nation-building program that was attempting to construct and impose a national
identity that favoured the interests of the colonial power once national independence
was attained. While Christianity and anti-communism provided the content of the
nationalist ideology propagandised through the institutions the Dutch established and
the policies they implemented, since these ideas played against Indonesia’s colonial
ambitions, Papuan autochthonous culture, that had ‘inculturated’ Christianity, was
characterised by an anti-colonial ideology.
It has been shown in this chapter that the majority of the Papuans accepted
Christianity following its re-interpretation and reformulation in the light of their
traditional epistemology that allowed it to become meaningful and value-charged. The
myth of the Biblical secret withheld by the missionaries acted as the catalyst
prompting conversion.
Conversion to Christianity brought about a redefinition of Papuan ethnic identity
in religious terms. Koreri-Christianity, derived from such redefinition, along with the
communication network established by the missionaries, played a major role in
fuelling the emergence of Papuan national, ‘super-tribal’ consciousness and identity in
the anti-colonial struggles of the late 1930s and early 1940s. In the aftermath of the
war it was Koreri-Christianity, in fact, that hindered the neo-colonial tendencies in the
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Dutch nation-building program, which implicitly aimed at imposing a constructed,
artificial national identity that suited their (neo-colonial) interests. It was in the milieu
of intensive Dutch colonial rule and nation-building that the Koreri Christians forged
their own national and political identity as the cargo movements and urban uprisings,
which characterised Papuan society during the 1950s, reveal and in which Papuan
claims and discontent appear to have been voiced through the native cultural heritage
against the acculturative attempts of Dutch Christianity.
The attempts to quell the revolts and protests of the time, which were dictated by
a diffuse socio-economic malaise and political dissatisfaction, forced the religious
ideas fostering the movements to undergo a radical modification and to become, to use
Bryan Wilson’s expression, “the ideological justification for revolutionary activity”.166
When the Dutch finally relinquished their sovereignty over the territory to the
Republic of Indonesia in 1962, the revolutionary activity became the organised, armed
struggle of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka.167
Papuan culture and Christianity are still today fundamental features of Papuan
national identity and nationalist ideology. As the anthropologist Eben Kirksey has
recently observed:
The word merdeka (freedom) – an important political concept – is also key
to understanding contemporary Papuan culture. This powerful concept
unites West Papua’s diverse cultural groups. Merdeka is broadly defined by
Papuans: it is variously a desire for divine salvation, equitable development,
environmental sustainability and political independence. Christianity has
been practiced in West Papua for nearly 150 years and a distinctively local
form of this religion flavours Papuan aspiration for freedom.168
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It is possible to state, at this stage, that an ‘inculturated’ form of Christianity
represents the core or ‘kernel’ of West Papuan nationalism. This Christian core is
continuously nurtured by the function that the Christian church has played and still
plays in the territory and its role in implicitly structuring nationalist claims for
independence.169 As advocates against human rights abuses, the Papuan churches
continue their function of structuring the myths of Papuan nationalism.
The myth of the Memoria Passionis, ‘Memory of Suffering’, has replaced the
early myth of the ‘secret withheld by the missionaries’, but it still has an analogous
function: that of coalescing and catalysing Papuan nationalist claims. According to Fr.
Theo van der Broek, the Memoria Passionis has its source in three major experiences:
the development policy pursued by the Indonesian government during the last thirty
eight years; the occurrence of human right violations in Papuan territory following its
integration into Indonesia; and the behaviour of the Indonesian armed forces
characterised by an arrogant display of brutality and power. 170
The attempts made by the Indonesian government to wipe out any vestige of
Papuan culture through the endemic implementation of policies of modernisation, such
as the infamous Operasi Koteka of the 1970s,171 or to either encourage or plan the
migration of people of different ethnic and religious affiliations to West Papua,172 has
only had the effect of strengthening the terms and modes of Papuan identification. In
fact, since the annexation of the territory to Indonesia, the Papuans believe that the
169
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Indonesian officials come to West Papua only “for business and not to build the
territory”.173 This is a belief that has contributed to enhance their sense of alienation
towards Jakarta and Indonesia as a whole. In this regard in 1970 an Australian
journalist noted:
Some Indonesian government officials talked of 100, 000 non-Irianese
eventually arriving in the province, using the paternalistic argument that the
local people were unwilling to work or unable to learn how. But glaringly
whenever I inquired I could find no evidence that efforts were being made
to educate local people in the basics of business practice, thus enabling them
to share in the economic development of the province…So far Irianese
anger has manifested itself only in market place disturbances, it is hard to
believe that Djakarta government should be pursuing such an obviously
incendiary policy.174
However where the policies of the Indonesian government have failed, the
tourist industry, managed by the Indonesians, might succeed. By selecting fragments
of Papuan cultural heritage, the tourist industry empties them of their semantic and
symbolic value neutralising their ‘political potentialities’. Ironically, the cultural
heritage that survives will be that fused with the Christian message, so that Papuan
Christianity and the Papuan Churches will strengthen their political and nationalist role
and function in a world that has recently rediscovered the force of religious beliefs and
fervour. Is this the ‘Dawn of the Gods’?175
Indonesian transmigration programs, promoting the relocation of hundreds of,
mainly Muslim, Indonesians from densely populated Java to West Papua, has further
enhanced the importance of the religious factor in West Papuan nationalism.176 The
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native Papuans voice their concerns in regards to fears that the migrations of Javanese
will dilute their culture,177 and deprive them of their identity, not only by
outnumbering their already dwindling population but also by altering the environment,
which has shaped their identity.
Papuan culture, in fact, still functions as a means to antagonise acculturative
policies of ‘Indonesiasation’ that aim at stamping out secessionist movements and
aspirations. The so-called ‘renaissance of spiritual beings’, a phenomenon observed in
the Papuan highlands during the 1980s, more than being a sign of the inadequacy and
unequal distribution of development programs, as Benny Giay argues, is an evident
expression of the West Papuan willingness to assert their ethnic distinctiveness.178
This interpretation seems to be corroborated by Eben Kirksey who argues that
West Papuan indigenous peoples are fusing modern environmentalism with
mysticism to produce a revolutionary ideology that is being used to resist,
and strike fear into, the Indonesian Army - and to drive logging companies
out of the rainforest.179
This phenomenon, observes Kirksey, stems from the Papuan belief that, when
the boulders and trees fall on the logging roads, when soldiers and logging workers
become ill or die because of diseases or by spider or snake bites, it is a sign of the
intervention by the Spirit of Nature, or Alam, that is assisting the native people in their
struggle against the oppressor and the invader. Furthermore, Rutherford notes that the
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traditional Biak wor (song/feast) functions as the means by which nationalist
aspirations come to be articulated into meaningful narratives.180
Along with the persistence of autochthonous beliefs and ‘inculturated’
Christianity the establishment of Christian institutions, in particular the Churches,
have prompted and fostered processes of cultural integration and unification in West
Papua. Their action still aims at cementing and nurturing the Papuans’ feeling of unity
and belonging by acting as the beacons that safeguard and uphold the people’s human
dignity and rights. The institution of the Sekretariat Keadilan & Perdamaian (Office
for Justice & Peace) as a functional unit of the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura reporting
on human rights abuses in West Papua in June 1998 is a tangible sign of ecclesiastical
involvement in the struggle.181
This role is acknowledged by the Papuan people because of the longstanding
presence of the Christian churches in the territory. In a recent survey carried out by
USAID in West Papua, it has emerged that 50% of the local population respect and
trust only religious institutions.182 This central role, played by the Christian churches
and missions in Papuan society and politics, manifested itself clearly during the 1996
hostage taking. On this occasion the hostage-takers, in settling for a strategy of
negotiation with the Indonesian authorities, insisted on dealing only with Christian
mission contacts.183
Attempts by the Indonesian government to forestall the expanding political
influence of the Christian missions and churches have been made. In 1993, responding
to the pressure by Muslim groups who were concerned that Christian missionaries
were luring Muslims away from the Islamic fold, and in line with their program of
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‘Indonesianising’ church activities, the government implemented a series of
restrictions. These restrictions included the issuing of visas to foreigners engaged in
social development work and missionaries, consequently, came to fall in this
category.184
Religious institutions, although not a dominant force,185 were directly involved
in the negotiations with the Indonesian government in regard to the issue of granting
Special Autonomy to the region, and opposed any attempt of the Indonesian
government to undermine Papuan national unity. The Sekretariat Keadilan dan
Perdamaian (the Office for Justice and Peace) of the Catholic Diocese in Jayapura
currently plays a leading role in the negotiations.186
Recently the division of the province into three regional districts enacted by the
Presidential Decree, INPRES No. 1/2003, inherently undermines Law No. 21/2001
concerning Special Autonomy for Papua.187 This prior unity is already affected by the
unequal spatio-temporal modes of colonisation, reflected in the factionalism
characterising the OPM.188 It is an unquestionable attempt to undertake a policy of
dividi et impera, to ‘tribalise’ the national movement by reversing historical
trajectories in order to wipe out the secessionist and nationalist movement.
The international climate further provides Jakarta with opportunities to forestall
Papuan claims to independence. Outsiders supporting the activities of the Islamic
fundamentalist group Laskar Jihad to spread from the Moluccas to West Papua incite
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religious conflict in a predominantly Christian province. In April 2002, it was reported
that Laskar Jihad was operating in the Papuan territory recruiting and training people
in combat skills as well as distributing homemade weapons. According to the Laskar
Jihad spokesman Ayip Syafraddin there were two hundred members in West Papua
and branches had been established and were operative in the territory.189
The activities of Laskar Jihad provide Jakarta with a justification for military
intervention in the area, a military presence and repression that could find also its
justification if the Indonesian government is able to have the OPM listed as a terrorist
organisation.190 The killing of two American miners in Timika in September 2002,
was attributed by Indonesia to the OPM, but more likely was carried out by the
members of the Indonesian military. This appears to have been an attempt to attain this
end.191 Furthermore the epithet ‘terrorist’, used to qualify or denote the Papuan
resistance movement,192 has been part of the Indonesian discourses of Papuan
separatism since the early 1970s.193
In the post-Cold War era the fear of terrorism has replaced that of communism in
the world’s collective imaginary. After a decade of ideological inertia, at the dawn of
the XXI century, a new dialectics has emerged based on the old antithesis of the East
and the West, with religious doctrines replacing ‘secular ideology’.

The new
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antithesis Christianity-Islam appears to have been a structural-semantic component of
Papuan identity through its involvement with Maluku.
Gianbattista Vico, in his The New Science, theorised the cyclical pattern of
history, a reality that constantly re-proposed itself with small variations.194 The
veridicality of the theory seems to be verified by the Papuan quest for independence.
In 1962, in fact, West Papua was ceded to Indonesia because of the fear of
communism rampaging in the region at the time. The war on terror, inherently a war
on Islamic fundamentalism, will impede and postpone, once again, the realisation of
the Papuan dream of Merdeka and its secession from the country with the world’s
largest Muslim population.

I am waiting our ancestors
But no-one is coming, no-one came.
Go watch for tracks in the dust.195
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Conclusions
In a recent article Octavianus Mote and Danilyn Rutherford argued that “Papuan
nationalism cannot be reduced to the inevitable outcome of the population’s exposure
to ‘modernity’ (…) rather the current movement must be placed in the context of a
particular colonial history and a particular global environment”.1 Although
contesting the latent primitivism lurking in the reference to ‘colonial history’, I agree
that a ‘particularist’ approach to the study of West Papuan nationalism is necessary.
Based on the premise that religious-cultural consciousness is the fons et origo of
historical consciousness, a domain in which feelings and discourses of identity come
to be forged and shaped, this dissertation has shown that the West Papuans had
developed in pre-colonial times a peculiar ‘historical’ perception and narratives as
well as a particular ethnic identity shaped by their relations with the neighbouring
Malay populations of Maluku and Ceram. While it appears that these narratives
belong to Papuans inhabiting coastal and insular areas, documents reveal the presence
of common beliefs, such as Koreri and Hai, as well as myths and values showing that
the Papuans inhabiting the interior of West Papua were also part and parcel of this
world of relations, long before they were ‘discovered’ by Western explorers and
missionaries in the 1920s and 1930s. It follows that the Western myth of the historyless-ness of the Papuan people is a colonial fallacy generated by a colonial
historiography and perpetuated by post-colonial readings, which claim that Papuan
history only began in 1945.
Furthermore, it has been shown that Papuan narratives, besides testifying to the
historicity of the Papuan people, reveal the existence of a peculiar hermeneutics
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underlying both Papuan worldview and epistemology. This has been referred to as
cargoism or cargo cultism and it informs Papuan narratives and epistemology. It has
been shown that it was through the categories of this hermeneutics that Christian and
Western ideas, beliefs and norms came to be inculturated and systemised in the
Papuan cultural-religious template, becoming a trait of Papuan ethnic and national
identity. Consequently Western Christianity did not create West Papuan nationalism
but merely prompted its ‘institutionalisation’: as such, Papuan nationalism happened
in and was linked to a World System in and with which West Papua came to interact.
At the same time the World System provided a ‘communication network’, which
allowed the Papuans to ‘imagine a community’.
In this new and wider system of relations, West Papuan ethnic perceptions and
identity, which had been until then formulated and defined during longstanding
relations with the neighbouring Malay world of Maluku and Ceram, underwent a
process of re-definition. These perceptions adapted to the changing ‘terms of relation
and reference’. The Christian mission, which since 1854 had become a permanent and
visible feature of West Papua’s landscape as well as the ‘semiotic’ embodiment of
Western civilisation, provided those institutions and networks which facilitated the
adaptation and re-definition of Papuan national identity.
The identification of Papuan heroes and narratives with Christian ones reveals
that the Papuans actively inculturated Christianity rather than being passively
acculturated. The great cargo cult of the Angannita, which took place in the BiakNumfor area between 1938-1942, represents the final stage of Papuan inculturation of
Christian and Western ideas and beliefs and the beginning of the politicisation of
Papuan ethno-national identity. It was during the struggle against Japanese rule and
Islamisation policies that Papuan national consciousness and nationalist ideology
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came to be clearly articulated, bringing together the Papuans of the coast and those of
the interior as the de Bruijn’s episode reveals.
The return of the Dutch missionaries and administrators, however, forestalled
such development in order to promote a form of nationalist ideology, which would
have suited their neo-colonial ambitions. The educational system established by the
Dutch did not include elements of Papuan culture in the construction of Papuan
national identity: the policies of Papuanisation consisted in merely ‘replacing’ a Dutch
with a Papuan. Papuan culture was not considered at all. Selecting and targeting
specific segments of Papuan society with the intention of creating ex novo a Papuan
elite, Western values of modernity and Christianity were used as structuring forces of
identity by the colonial agency.
The exclusion of Papuan culture from the process of identity formation can be
attributed to the political motivations that informed Dutch ‘development’ policies and
programs. These policies aimed at retaining a virtual (neo-colonial) control over the
territory, something possible only by prompting and structuring an ad hoc national
ideal of independence able to forestall Indonesian annexation. It follows that
Christianity is increasingly becoming one of the ‘markers’ of Papuan identity to
contrast and in contrast with Islamic Indonesia, although attempts have been recently
made by the moderate strand of the Papuan movement to avoid this tendency in order
to include also the few Papuan Muslims into the movement.
The inclusion of Christianity in Papuan nationalitarian identity had already
been further strengthened during Japanese occupation as a direct consequence or
reaction to the policies of Islamisation enacted by Tokyo during the war. Education
proved to be an effective demiurgic force in shaping and creating the (Dutchinculcated) Papuan nation. This process, however, did not always run smoothly.
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Resistance or nationalitarian movements emerged to challenge Western acculturative
practices and programs. It has been shown that the movements did not reject
modernisation and Christian-Western education tout court, only the suppression of
Papuan culture and epistemology. The Wege Bage movement, which visibly
incorporated Christian elements into autochthonous Papuan narratives revealing a
cultural-religious origin, stands as an example of such a form of resistance. This was
not revivalism or nativism, since these are specific categories of Western
epistemology, but the outcome of a peculiar Papuan hermeneutics. It was an attempt
to restore Papuan autochthonous ethno-national identity after it had been challenged
by Dutch neo-colonial policies and programs.
This thesis has shown that Papuan national history is characterised by the
presence of two forms of nationalism, the imported nationalism of the Westerneducated Papuan elite selected and targeted by Dutch policies and the
‘nationalitarianism’ of the common Papuan people, germinated in the pre-war Koreri
movements and well-rooted in the cultural and historical experiences of the Papuans,
which forged or prompted the perception and definition of their ethnic identity. The
Papuan government in exile, who seeks support for its cause mainly from the former
colonial power and the West and who believes that Papuan history begins in 1945, can
be contrasted with the Papuans who live their daily lives in an occupied land and
believe in the forest spirits, the dead ancestors and Manseren-Jesus. The altercations
within the Papuan Presidium, the factionalism of the OPM, and the existence of a
politically fragmented Papuan Diaspora confirm the existence of differing views in
regard to the means, modes and aims in the pursuit of national independence among
the Papuans. The causes of this politico-nationalist heterogeneity rest in the dynamics
of Papuan history and the aborted intentionalities presented here. Thus this thesis
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could pave the way to or inaugurate a new approach to the study, not only of West
Papuan nationalism, but of the nationalisms in Melanesia in general.
The split in the nationalist movement in West Papua between the western
nationalism of the few and the nationalitarianism of the many, produced by Dutch
nation-building programs, weakened Papuan chances of self-determination and
independence and facilitated the incorporation of the territory into Indonesia.
Sacrificial victims on the altars of Real Politik, the Papuan people continue their
quest for an elusive Merdeka while they fall like sue warek, “dead birds”2 in the
shadows of the Cross and the Morning Star.
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Appendix
The following song or beyuser is that recorded by Kamma F. Ch., Koreri. Messianic
Movements in the Biak-Numfor Culture Area, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1972, pp. 5963. The version of the text was passed on to Kamma by his late friend Robert Rumkabu.
Some of the explanatory footnotes have also been taken from Kamma.
The Beyuser of Manarmakdi
Fuar
(a. Introduction)

1. Oh, you brethren of the ancestor,
Who left Yamina mountain,
From the landward side of Sopen.
2. It was the mockery, yes, the mockery,
Which caused the famous chiefs
To disperse, yes, to scatter.
(b. The song: monologue of the Old Man1)

3. This was the reason, Oh Maidens:
You mentioned me in dismay, both of you saying:
Someone whose anger arose about nothing, really.
4. Someone whose anger arose because of small bones:
The tailbones of a pig.
Someone whose anger arose because of leaves:
The leaves of the bakdi-fruit.2
5. A widower I was, so I went away,
Descending the mountain, embarking in a canoe,
1
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Others instead suggest the following etymology: mansar: ‘old man’ and mak: ‘star’, so the meaning would
be ‘old man of the star’ connecting the old man with Sampari, the morning star stealing the palm wine
tapped by the old man. For the above etymologies see: Kamma, Koreri…cit., pp. 17-18.
2
The Bakdi-fruit is a creeper, the leaves of which are used in the steaming-pit.
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The small kabasa-canoe.3
6. I was a widower and had scabies all over my skin,
So I left and went along the coast,
I went until I saw the Uri4 rock.
7. I floated on the spot, took shells from the rock,
Which once the hero Uri had perforated adulterously
In the pursuit of women.
8. I went along the coast,
Arrived at the shore of Bariasba,
Meeting there my nephew, Padawankan,
And my nephew showed me pity.
9. He gave me a spear and I spreared a Manenef fish.
He took the head, I took the tail.
I took the tail to Sokani5
To the shore of the bay of Sokani.
10. He gave me a coconut,
Which I did not eat as I wanted,
But brought with me, brought to Sokani.
(c. Intermezzo)
11. The women of Anyoba6, Anyoba far away,
She gave it, yes, she gave me the coconut,
Which I brought with me and planted.
12. This was the one I planted,
And it grew and grew, and blossomed –
The one which I tapped and tapped.
13. Maids, it is because of your mockery,
Because of your despising me,
That the island of Auki lies in the way,
Hampering the view (to Meokwundi Island).
3
4
5
6

The Kabasa is a small canoe with an outrigger on one side only.
Uri is a mythical hero, protagonist of the Papuan saga of Uri and Pasai.
Sokani is a village of the Paidado islands.
The possible etymology of the word Anyoba is ‘land of the dead’.
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14. And this was what you said of me:
From his very youth, yes, when still a child,
He walked with a cane and a twig,
A twig to drive off the flies (from his ugly sores).
15. I was a widower, so I descended
I descended seeking a woman,
The lady of Anyoba, far, far away.
(d. Continuing the narrative)
16. And the star, the Morning Star7 descended.
It was the star who drank, he did the drinking,
I however, accused and accused.
17. I accused the woman, for whom I lay in wait,
I accused the men passing by in their canoes.
I accused the women of the place.
18. How ashamed the Morning Star must have been,
How utterly ashamed,
When I took hold of him.
19. He promised me the spell for wealth,
But I refused.
20. He promised me the spell for fishing,
But I refused.
21. He promised me the Koreri,
To be realised at one on the spot,
But I refused.
22. Then he offered me the Mares fruit8,
And being a widower,
I accepted and took hold of the fruit.
23. I threw the Mares fruit at the chosen maid,
(I threw it and it hit her),
7
8

The Morning Star is Sampari who was caught by Manarmakdi stealing the palm wine.
The Papuan myths show that the mares fruit is believed to produce pregnancy.
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And her breasts itched, they itched.9
24. And that day did not become night
Before she had given birth –
She gave birth to a child.
25. And the dance(rs) started and they sang,
They danced at Yuberi-beach,
The child watched and watched, alas, my mother,
Alas, my mother, father was not among them.
26. And the answering-dance started in the shadows,
The shadows of the oil-tree; the boy watched, but alas,
Alas, my mother, father was not among them.
27. And the dance started at Sokani-beach.
The child watched, and watched, but alas, my mother,
Alas my mother, father was not among them.
28. And then they started, the dancers and the singers,
Under the Aibesobin (Mares) tree.
Behold, my mother, behold, my father is there,
Leaning on a cane, and holding a switch.
29. They tore the places to pieces,
They demolished our village and left it,
Yes, they scattered and left it.10
30. When a canoe went you took a bat,
You took a bat to strike my grasping fingers,
Grasping the side of your canoes.
31. Everyone left, left us alone,
And I, I addressed my brother-in-law, saying:
Stay behind, join me, let the two of us use the tap-knife.
9

The Papuans believe that the itching of a woman’s breast was a sign of pregnancy. Manarmakdi threw the
Mares fruit to the daughter of the village headman. The woman did not know who was the father of the
child. Since the child, whose name was Manarbew, cried without pause, the villagers decided to organise a
dancing party to find out whether the child was able to identify his father. See Kamma, Koreri…cit., pp. 3132.
10
Once the villagers learnt that the old scabious man was the father of the headman’s grandson, outraged
by what was believed to be an offence, they left the island. Manarmakdi was left on the island with the
child and his young wife and without any means of subsistence since everything had been destroyed.
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32. It’s because of the oil-tree (coconut palm)
That the Indwar fish crowd under our sleeping-place,
Feeding on debris and sea-weed.
33. And he (my brother-in-law) ate, and he ate
Until satisfied, satisfied.
But I went to the beach and speared,
Speared the fish so that they floated.
34. Before that day turned into night,
Yes, before nightfall, I descended,
Descended and roasted my body in flaming wood.11
35. I descended again and drew a ship in the sand,
I designed it and it became a boat,
A loaded boat, its cargo-mark nearly submerged.
36. And we floated in the direction of Krawi,12
Krawi the bay of abundance,
But they rejected me, yes, they rejected.13
37. What shall I do now, what must I do?
Reincarnate myself in a dolphin,
(Between) Runi and Ayawi?14
38. The stream I followed, upriver I went,
The Manberamon,15 the current in turmoil,
Directing myself under the setting sun.
39. I am waiting our ancestors,
But no-one is coming, no-one came.
Go and watch for their tracks in the dust.
11

This has been interpreted by some scholars, such as Horst, as the ‘baptism by fire’ derived from
Hinduism. Following this ritual, Manamakdi was re-juvinated.
12
A village on the island of Japen in the Geelvink Bay.
13
This is the rejection of the koreri, following which Manarmakdi left the islands and went to the west,
believed to be the land of the dead and the source of valuables, from where one day he will return.
14
Ayawi is located to the west of the Schouten Islands and also in the Radja Ampat Islands.
15
The etymology of Manberamon is ‘man who went to become a mon’, that is the ‘soul of the dead’. Here
it refers to the Mamberamo River on mainland New Guinea believed to be the gate to the underworld. From
a philological point of view this section represents an earlier stratum of the myth when the Biakkers still
lived in the Sarmi-Sentani area before moving to their later island settlement since the Mamberamo is
situated to the west of that earlier location.
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40. Go to the town of the dead, the great town,
Where the roofs are touching, touching each other.
There you will find the treasures which I possess.
41. These are the treasures and the wealth,
Which the gentlemen (the strangers) have.
These are the treasures which I own.
42. These are the treasures
Which the gentlemen (the whites) see and possess,
And bring along with them (always) when they are coming.
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